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ABSTRACT 
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June 2014 
 
This dissertation analyzes the center-right in Turkey regarding its domestic politics and 
discourse through three main parameters which are democracy, state and secularism.   A 
set of theoretical explanations helps to delve into the issue more deeply.  In that regard, 
the three main connotations of the left and the right which arose  out of the French 
Revolution, the socioeconomic reading and post-materialist vs. materialist divide would 
shed light onto the dynamic and instable nature of these concepts.  Then, underlining the 
contextual differences influencing the interpretation of the left and the right as well as 
the significance of the concept of the center, the center-right in Turkey is analyzed 
through three parameters. 
 iv 
Regarding the center-right’s position on democracy, this dissertation argues that the 
Turkish center-right is eager to employ democracy as a procedural tenet rather than a 
substantial one.  Thus, the Turkish center-right parties are eager to concentrate on 
winning the elections, catching the people, representing the majority’s expectations and 
struggling for the will of nation rather than putting emphasis on the ends of a democratic 
system, equality related issues and so on.  The center-right parties have an affinity to 
take democracy as the rules of the game.   
Center-right parties’ relationship with the state in Turkey is analyzed within two 
subtopics.  First of all, in terms of power, center-right parties, represent the periphery, 
located in opposition to ‘center’ which brought about a reciprocal suspicion between 
these parties and the center.  Changing the character of the system also toyed with the 
very concept of the center which was occasionally dominated by the CHP, bureaucracy, 
military and so on.  Secondly, the allocation of state resources and the state’s position on 
the economics set another characteristic of the center-right parties.  These parties 
intensively stress liberal economic options in their programs and discourses.  
Nevertheless, until ANAP tenure, the reflection of that discoursive position to the 
policies was quite limited.  On the other hand, as service-oriented parties, center-right in 
Turkey to a large extent deals with development and technical progress which differs 
from the cultural and symbolic developmentalist insistence of the left.  On the other 
hand, center-right parties engage in cliental or patronage relationships through the 
utilization of service for political gains.  All in all, regarding both power and economics 
axes, the center-right’s position vis-à-vis the state brings us the conclusion that it was 
actually a love and hate relationship. 
 v 
Given the militant character of the very Republican ideology in Turkey, center-right 
digresses from that compulsive secularism and tries to lift the bans on religious 
oppression by trying to liberalize the visibility of religion in the public sphere, adopt 
new schooling, banking and other such measures  to support  religious followers , and to 
perceive religion as a cultural instrument through which it may  communicate with the 
people.  Nevertheless, the center-right in Turkey is very aware of the fragility of the 
secularism issue and does not promote a state system based on religion.  On that subject, 
the center-right parties in Turkey tend to introduce a passive version of secularism and 
stay within the boundaries of the regime without challenging the state structure at all.  
In conclusion, the procedural employment of democracy, a love and hate relationship 
with the state and passive secularism are three main defining notions of the center-right 
in Turkey.  If these parties move toward from these main three principles, they lose their 
ground and begin to collapse.  In other words, if any of the following options occurs, it 
will stand as a proof of having moved beyond these three principles, and the center-right 
parties will be weakened:  The drastic increase of authoritarianism without concerning 
democracy (even its procedural or majoritarian means), paying much more emphasis on 
the love side of the coin regarding its relations with the state and positioning next to the 
militant secularism.   
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Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de merkez sağın iç politika ve söylemini, demokrasi, devlet ve 
laiklikten oluşan üç ana parametre üzerinden analiz etmektedir.  Birtakım teorik 
açıklamalar da, konuyu daha derinden incelemeye yardımcı olmaktadır.  Bu bağlamda, 
sağ ve sol kavramlarının Fransız İhtilali’nden doğan, sosyo-ekonomik okumaya dayanan 
ve mataryalist - post-mataryalist ayrışmasını baz alan üç temel çağrışımı, sağ ve sol 
kavramlarının dinamik ve değişken doğasına ışık tutmaktadır.  Akabinde, sağ ve solu 
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yorumlamada bağlamsal farklılıkların etkisinin ve ‘merkez’ kavramının öneminin altı 
çizildikten sonra, Türkiye’de merkez sağ, bu üç parametre (demokrasi, devlet, laiklik) 
üzerinden analiz edilmiştir. 
Merkez sağın demokrasi hususundaki pozisyonu göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, bu 
tez, Türkiye’de merkez sağın demokrasiyi zengin (substantial) demokrasi anlayışından 
çok, prosedürel bir akide olarak ele aldığını iddia etmektedir.  Böylelikle, Türkiye’de 
merkez sağ partiler, demokratik sistemin sonuçları, eşitlikle ilgili meseleler ve buna 
benzer konulardan ziyade, seçim kazanmaya, kitleleri yakalamaya, çoğunluğun 
beklentilerini temsil etmeye ve milli irade için mücadele etmeye konsantre 
olmaktadırlar.  Merkez sağ partiler, demokrasiyi ‘oyunun kuralları’ şeklinde yorumlama 
eğilimindedirler. 
Türkiye’de merkez sağ partilerin devletle olan ilişkisi iki alt başlıkta incelenmiştir.  
Öncelikle, güç ekseni ele alındığında, merkez sağ partiler, ‘merkez’e karşı ‘perifer’i 
temsil ederler ve bu da, merkez sağ partiler ile ‘merkez’ arasında karşılıklı bir 
güvensizliği beraberinde getirir.  Sistemin sürekli karakter değişimine uğraması, 
bahsedilen bu ‘merkez’in kimi zaman CHP, kimi zaman bürokrasi ve kimi zaman da 
asker vb. tarafından domine edilmesine neden olmaktadır.  Diğer yandan, devlet 
kaynaklarının dağıtılması ve devletin ekonomideki rolü, merkez sağ partilerin bir başka 
yönünü ortaya koyar.  Bu partiler, program ve söylemlerinde liberal ekonomik tercihleri 
yoğun biçimde vurgulamaktadırlar.  Ne var ki, ANAP dönemine kadar bu söylemsel 
pozisyonun hayata geçirilmesi oldukça sınırlı kalmıştır.  Ayrıca, hizmet odaklı partiler 
olarak, Türkiye’de merkez sağ, solun kültürel ve sembolik gelişme konusundaki 
ısrarından farklı olarak, büyük ölçüde kalkınma ve teknik gelişme ile ilgilenmiştir.  Öte 
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yandan, merkez sağ partiler, hizmetlerini siyasi kazanca dönüştürmek adına, patronaj 
ilişkileri kurmuşlardır.  Sonuç olarak, hem güç hem de ekonomi eksenlerinde merkez 
sağın devletle olan ilişkisi bize bu ilişkinin aslında bir aşk-nefret ilişkisi olduğu 
çıkarımına götürmektedir. 
Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet ideolojisinin laiklik konusundaki militan karakteri 
hatırlandığında, merkez sağın bu şekilde zorlayıcı bir laiklik anlayışından uzaklaştığı, 
din üzerindeki baskıları bir nebze olsun azaltmaya çalıştığı, dinin kamusal alanda 
görünürlüğünü özgürleştirdiği, dindarlar için alternatif okul, banka ve bunun gibi farklı 
seçeneklerin yaygınlaştılmasını benimsediği ve dini, kitlelerle iletişim kurmaya yarayan 
kültürel bir aygıt olarak algıladığı görülmektedir. Diğer yandan, Türkiye’de merkez sağ,  
laiklik meselesinin kırılganlığının farkındadır ve dine dayalı bir devlet modelini 
desteklememektedir. Bu veçheden bakıldığında, Türkiye’de merkez sağ partilerin 
genellikle pasif bir laiklik anlayışını benimsediklerini, devletin laik yapısına meydan 
okumadıklarını ve rejimin sınırları içinde kalmaya özen gösterdiklerini söylemek 
mümkündür. 
Sonuç olarak, demokrasinin prosedürel biçimde ele alınması, devletle geliştirilen aşk-
nefret ilişkisi ve pasif laiklik, Türkiye’de merkez sağın tanımlayıcı üç ana nosyonudur.  
Şayet bu partiler bu üç prensipten ayrılırlarsa, temellerini kaybederek çökme tehlikesi ile 
karşı karşıya kalırlar.  Diğer bir deyişle, merkez sağ partilerin bu üç nosyondan 
uzaklaşmalarını işaret edecek aşağıdaki seçeneklerden herhangi birinin gerçekleşmesi 
durumunda, bu partiler zayıflarlar: Otoriterleşmenin ciddi biçimde artarak, (presedürel 
ya da zengin (substantive) olduğuna bakılmaksızın) demokrasiyi göz ardı etmeleri, 
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devletle olan ilişkilerinde aşk tarafının ağır basması ya da militan bir laiklik 
anlayışınının yanında yer almaları. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1.  Purpose of the Study 
 
This dissertation has the goal of exploring the nature and motives of center-right 
politics
1
 in Turkey from the beginning of the Republic.  Special emphasis is placed on 
the political activities—not only policies and people, but also discourses, ways of 
framing the world—of three majorcenter-right parties: the Democrat Party (Demokrat 
Parti – the DP), the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi – the AP) and the Motherland Party 
(Anavatan Partisi – the ANAP) until the emergence of the Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – the AKP/ the AK Party2) as the candidate for the 
new representative of center-right politics in the early twenty-first century. Analyzing 
the complex nature of center-right mentalities in Turkey, the focus of the thesis will be 
on the positions of party politics regarding (1) democracy, (2) the state and (3) 
secularism. In order to define center-right understandings in Turkey, it is also necessary 
                                                             
1
 Throughout the dissertation, I refrain from referring to a “center-right ideology” since the center-right in 
Turkey was not an ideologically coherent and bounded concept .  Instead of ideology, I prefer to use 
mentality, policy, perception or understanding to emphasize the softer nature of center-right mentality 
rather than a rigid manifest. 
2
 Use of either AKP or AK Party as abbreviations for the Justice and Development Party corresponds to 
the positive or negative attitude of my sources.  That is, in the public domain in Turkey, critics of the 
Justice and Development Party tend to use AKP, whereas party supporters advocate for the use of AK 
Party.  The reason behind my own use of AK Party throughout this dissertation has to do with the 
officially accepted nature of that abbreviation. 
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to draw the lines between the center-left and center-right and then indicate the 
divergences between the center-right and the radical right.  To that end, these three 
categories help to delimit center-right politics and discourse. Analyzing the 
characteristics of Turkish center-right mentalities, these three categories also help to 
answer the question of why the classical center-right parties could not survive in the 
political arena.   
After having identified the characteristics of the Turkish center-right shaped around the 
center-right parties’ stance towards democracy, the state and secularism, I will pursue a 
broader understanding of the nature of center-right mentalities in Turkey by questioning 
the reasons behind the diminished prominence of the classical center-right parties in 
Turkey after the 1990s.  Therefore, the purpose of this study is to fill a gap in an 
abandoned area of interest, the Turkish center-right, by  evaluating the issue in a 
historical, procedural  context of transformation. This dissertation sheds light on the 
basic tenets and discourses of center-right politics and how these tenets transformed 
when the various center-right parties took power.  
 
1.2.  Why Study the Turkish Center-Right? 
The Turkish political spectrum demonstrates particular structural characteristics, 
especially regarding the perception of center-right and center-left terminologies that do 
not map easily onto international norms and identifications
3
.  Not aloof from the 
                                                             
3
 Even some scholars also interpret this sui-generis positioning of the left and the right in Turkey as a 
complete absurdity.  According to İdris Küçükömer, for instance, in terms of international 
perceptions, the Turkish right corresponds to the left and the Turkish left corresponds to the 
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Ottoman heritage considering the state and society structure, Turkey experienced a top-
down modernization with the incentive of a political elite which was also greatly 
supported by the bureaucracy and state apparatus, did not share a similar history neither 
akin to the French Revolution –in which  the left and the right conceptualization began 
to emerge nor to a socioeconomic reading of the left and the right that has to do with the 
maximization of certain social classes’ interests.  The political struggle, which was just 
started in the second half of the 1940’s after a certain degree of consolidation of the 
Kemalist regime, was based on a competition between two parties (namely the CHP and 
the DP) dominated by the elites who had more common points than divisions.  One of 
the main themes of that struggle was the DP’s opposition to the CHP’s insistence on  
utilizing   privileges of being the real owner of the state that sometimes led to an 
eagerness to disregard very naïve democratic means.  In that regard, the center-right 
mentality, which was represented by the DP (despite they did not use “the right” 
terminology in those years), arises from a demand for further democratization of the 
country, which meant the institutionalization of free and fair elections as well as the 
elected government’s domination in the political realm.  Apart from the criticism caused 
by  the unification of the CHP and the state, the DP also tried to represent different 
interests in the society on  both economic and social grounds in contrast with  the CHP’s 
blind eye to  the variety of interests in the society with a non-realistic populist appeal.  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
right, derogatively (1994). To him, the real progressive parties in Turkey are generally those 
from so-called “rightist” versus Islamist parties that are positioned as “left” in terms of a more 
global classification. From the very beginning of the Entente Liberal Party (Hürriyet ve İtilaf 
Fırkası-1911), the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası-1924) and 
the Free Party (Serbest Parti-1931), followed by the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti - the DP-
1946) and the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi - the AP-1961), these parties, Küçükömer notes, 
initially belonged to a leftist movement, whereas the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat 
ve Terakki Cemiyeti- the İTC) and the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - the 
CHP-1923) correspond to Jacobean, elitist and rightist movements. 
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Another significant division point between the DP and the CHP was their position 
towards the Republican Revolution’s cultural aspect of which the formeroccasionally 
criticized some reforms, especially the ones related to the suppression of religion, which 
were not enthusiastically embraced by the people.  Nevertheless, this difference should 
not be understood as a pro-Republican and anti-Republican cleavage since both of these 
parties are the sons of the Republican regime and they hold quite a bit of respect for the 
regime.  Thus, from the very beginning the CHP and the DP cleavage portrayed a 
center-left and center-right division that is to an important degree sui generis for the 
Turkish case.   
The 1960 military intervention changed the composition of the ones who held the state 
power and strengthened the position of some partners such as military, civilian 
bureaucracy and universities while the CHP’s earlier dominance to some extent 
decreased.  The AP, as the successor of the DP tried to survive in the first half of the 
1960’s without loudly representing its very main political position.  It is possible to 
argue that the priority of the center-right in those years was concentrated on lifting the 
ban and punishment of the former DP members.  In the second half of the 1960’s, the 
AP gained the chance to govern the country as a single party government and defended 
the concept of ‘the will of the nation’ with a majoritarian tone rather than a pluralist one.  
In doing so, while accusing the CHP of serving Communism, the AP criticized the 
supreme power of the unelected power holders, which to the AP, impeded theoperation 
of a democratic system.  On the other hand, while introducing the left-of-center 
terminology in the wake of the 1965 elections, the CHP began to advocate promotion of 
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lower class interests under  the leadership of Bülent Ecevit and to be distinguished 
slightly from the bureaucratic center.  
 The 12 March 1971 Memorandum, with its poor grounds for attempting to make such 
an intervention, again changed the political atmosphere, and this time, the AP preferred 
to take a stance almost in-line with  the military in order to share the power with a 
considerable decrease in its will of nation rhetoric.  This so-called pragmatic preference 
decreased the popular support of the AP
4
, and the AP could not get a majority to form a 
single-party government on its own
5
.  Throughout the 1970’s, the AP engaged in 
Nationalist Front governments with the nationalist and Islamic far-right that  resulted in 
an increase of the AP’s nationalist and statist stance with an overused anti-communism 
discourse.  The CHP on the other hand began to express a more socialist rhetoric that 
attracted the votes of the working class and peripheral masses in the big cities.  In a 
move that digressed a great deal from the militant secularist mission of the previous 
CHP, Ecevit’s CHP did not project the consolidation of the secularization mission as 
thepremier priority. In that respect, the CHP also formed a coalition government with 
the National Salvation Party (as the representative of the Islamic far-right in those 
years), but even this collaboration lasted less than a year.  So, in the 1970’s, the left and 
the right cleavage to a certain degree moved into a socioeconomic reading of these 
concepts.  However, the polarization and political turmoil in the country caused the 
marginalization of both the center-left and the center-right parties that constituted a 
pretext for a new military intervention in the year 1980. 
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 In 1965, 1969, 1973 and 1977 elections, the AP won 52,8; 46,5; 29,8; 36,8 per cent of votes respectively. 
5
 In 1979, the AP formed a single-party government with the support of the far-right parties but it was a 
minority government. 
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ANAP as the new bright representative of the center-right mentality throughout the 
1980’s promised to cool down the polarization in the country with the help of an 
available arena in which all rightist and leftist elements were purged from the political 
realm.  Despite claiming to merge and represent all divergent leanings ranging from 
liberalism to conservatism, from nationalism to leftism, in fact the representation of left-
wing ideologies under the ANAP umbrella was quite limited.  As the strong center-right 
actor, ANAP focused on economic development and technical modernization issues 
similar to its predecessors, but with a great motivation.  The unity of the nation was 
stressed with a tolerant tone, but these notes of tolerance were limited when it came to 
its rivals.  Some crucial steps towards the liberalization of economics inspired from 
those times’ new-right manifest were  taken throughout the ANAP governments. 
Furthermore, the visibility of alternative living styles in the society, especially the 
conservative ones, were increased with ANAP’s religion-friendly politics throughout the 
1980’s, which still managed to  never challenge the secularist system.   
Although both the center-left and center-right experienced some particular splits 
previously, the dominant center-left and center-right parties were without any doubt 
highly visible  up until the late 1980’s.  However, this time, the split in the center-left 
and center-right was deeper and considerably divided the political support of those 
parties.  In that regard, after the relief of the political bans of the former politicians of 
the 1970’s, the DYP (True Path Party – Doğru Yol Partisi) became a major center-right 
rival against ANAP.  On the other hand, the center-left was represented by different 
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parties such as the SHP
6
 (Social Democratic Populist Party – Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı 
Parti) and the DSP (Democratic Left Party – Demokratik Sol Parti) whose stances were 
far more leftist in comparison to the Kemalist CHP on the topic of accepting the ethnic 
and sectarian pluralities in the society as well as in the area of  emphasizing 
socioeconomic equality for the benefit of the lower stratum.  Nevertheless, the SHP 
joined to the CHP in 1995 as a response to a call for unity in the center-left from their 
supporters, which led to a loss of representation of social-democratic tenets under the 
CHP roof.  On the other hand, established in 1985, the DSP could not get electoral 
success in its early times and eventually, after the failure of the center-right alternatives, 
the DSP was eventually capable of forming  a coalition government with a center-right 
(ANAP) and a nationalist far-right (the MHP) partners in the late 1990’s.   
As suggested above, throughout the 1990’s, Turkish politics suggest a complicated 
positioning.  In the center-right, Mesut Yılmaz from ANAP adopted the former DYP 
leader Süleyman Demirel’s approach while Tansu Çiller from the DYP tried to take 
former ANAP leader Turgut Özal as role model.  However, these parties could not 
adequately represent the classical center-right stance especially on the grounds of 
economics.  Furthermore, communicating with the people was a center-right strategy to 
get the majority’s support, which in 1990’s was actively utilized and even developed by 
the Islamic far-right parties.  These parties also adopted the center-right’s service-
oriented strategy as well.  Nevertheless, the rise of the Islamic far-right was tried to be 
hindered with party closures as well as the February 28 process.   
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 The SHP was founded with the juxtaposition of two leftist parties (The Public Party and Social 
Democracy Party) in 1985. 
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In a nutshell, the  split and failure of the center-right and center-left parties under an 
economic crisis and the AK Party coming from the Islamic far-right genesis emerged as 
the new representative of the center-right mentality in the early 2000’s and gained 
considerable electorate support.   Thus, the Turkish case offers an important degree of 
particularistic and complex left-right placement of political parties, which does not 
easily fit with certain left-right connotations. 
As for the functional explanation (socioeconomic reading of the issue), the left is eager 
to flirt with socialism and revolution while the right tends to perceive these ideologies as 
a threat.  Recent reports and research reveal that, in general, the electoral base of the left 
is comprised of relatively wealthier people, whereas the social base of the assumed 
“center-right” draws on poorer people for its support (Çarkoğlu and Avcı, 2002; 
Rienner, Esmer and Sayarı, 2002; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; Çaha, 2009; Hale 
and Özbudun, 2010), which may support the different positioning of these concepts in 
the Turkish-context thesis on the basis of a socioeconomic reading of the left-right 
cleavage.  In Turkey, the country’s founding party, the CHP, is to a large extent 
perceived as the representative of the center-left, commonly supported by the urban, 
bureaucratic upper middle classes, whereas, ironically, the center-right parties to a large 
extent receive their public support from the periphery (Esmer, 2002:100-102; Tosun, 
1999; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; Özbudun, 2013). Supporting this uncommon 
positioning of left and right in Turkey, a great proportion of the radical leftist parties are 
often reluctant to perceive the CHP as a leftist party due to its restrictive position toward 
the expansion of freedoms, the protection of the lower classes, and its promotion of 
militarism and nationalism. In that vein, it is hard to categorize the Turkish center-left, 
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as represented by the CHP except from the late 1960’s and 1970’s as a semi-socialist 
party sensitive to the lower classes. On the contrary, the perception of the Turkish 
center-left is rather that it is generally eager to serve the class interests of its urban, 
educated, and bureaucratic base to protect the existing state ideals, especially militant 
secularism, and to continue with its poorly formulated social programs.   
On the other hand, the center-right perception seems to embrace the masses, especially 
the lower classes, with a robust populist voice (Esmer, 2002; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu  
2007; Hale and Özbudun, 2010; Heper, 2003; TÜSES, 2002; Dağı, 2006; Yavuz 2006).  
However, lower class support for the center-right has rarely come from the poorest and 
most marginalized elements.  Instead, the center-right appears to attract those who 
passionately want to improve their living standards, are open to economic and personal 
betterment and eager to interact with other classes so as to expand their social milieu
7
. 
As Kirsheimer’s (1966) conception of a catchall party envisages, Turkish center-right 
parties generally aim to maximize their votes and, for this reason, try to capture the heart 
of the majority. Rather than feeling wedded to the protection of the state’s principles and 
mission, center-right parties to a large extent rely on pragmatic projects and viable 
economic development programs.  They also tend to deploy an understanding of ‘the 
national will’ that contrasts with a status quo variously linked to the CHP, the center, or 
the civil or military bureaucracy.  Furthermore, without advocating a theocratic system, 
                                                             
7
 For example, the studies conducted by Özbudun and Kudat separately indicate that in the late 1960’s and 
early 1970’s, villages with telephone lines, at least one market and a road usually supported the center-
right parties vis-a-vis more isolated villages, which preferred to vote for the center-left.  See Ergun 
Özbudun. 1975. “Political Participation in Rural Turkey,” in Engin Akarlı and  Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds). 
Political Participation in Turkey. Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 44-4; Ayşe Kudat. 1975. “Patron-Client 
Relations: The State of the Art and Research in Eastern Turkey,” in Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor 
(eds). Political Participation in Turkey. Istanbul:Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 61-87. 
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center-right parties typically advocate for freedom of conscience by lifting historic bans 
on religious practices in the public domain.  
Yet the functional explanation of the left-right cleavage explains only one dimension of 
it, and is far from comprehensive.  In other words, as implied above the secular vs. 
religious and the post-materialist vs. materialist connotations of the left-right cleavage 
should be evaluated through a particular case.  Therefore, it is hard to endorse the idea 
that all right-left positionings in Turkey are conflictual and inimical because, in some 
ways, right and left echo the general global understanding. For instance, a global 
understanding of the new right as characterized by liberalism in economic policies and 
conservatism in cultural policies to a large extent resembles the political agenda 
implemented by the Turkish center-right (Sezal and Dağı, 2001; Acar in Heper and 
Sayarı, 2002; Öniş, 2004; Cizre and Yeldan, 2005; Mert 2007:10).  The secular vs. 
religious divide, meanwhile, has typically served to distinguish left and right tendencies.  
Considering the left-right constellations, the Turkish context, which experienced a top-
down modernization in the 1920’s and 1930’s, later became an arena of the competition 
between the ones who enacted modernization and the ones who sided with the people 
while in some ways criticizing the strategy of that modernization.  Thus, the nature of 
the left and right cleavage in Turkey is rooted in more cultural means than economic 
means. 
Thus, the concept of the center-right in Turkey is marked by a significant degree of 
complexity, discrepancy, and ambiguity. The fundamental complexity of the Turkish 
case of positioning the center-right merits further investigation.  Thus the central aim of 
my dissertation, which is to explore the characteristics of center-right politics in Turkey 
 11 
through a particular, empirically grounded study of how different parties have 
understood democracy, the state, and secularism, as well as how they have acted 
politically on these understandings across the past seven decades. 
The center right, in other words, is a determining and significant semantic category in 
the Turkish context, and has received far less academic interest than it deserves. The 
sum of the right wing parties has usually been more than the sum of the left wing 
parties, with the exception of one election (21 June 1946).  In only two other general 
elections did the main leftist party win the election, but the cumulative vote share of the 
left was never more than 50 per cent, with the exception of the rather dubious 1946 
elections.  According to research results, many Turkish people still prefer to define 
themselves as “rightist” (Esmer 2002; Coşar and Özman 2004; Çarkoğlu 2007).  
Statistical data from the 2007 elections also reveals that the base of the Turkish right is 
broader than that of the left.  Especially after the 1990’s, this tendency increased; 
according to the World Values Survey, 2011 was the peak year in terms of the 
percentage of Turkish people defining themselves as being on the right wing of the 
political spectrum (Esmer, 2011).  Another important characteristic of Turkish politics is 
volatility (Özbudun, 1981:237-245), yet severe changes are not observed across the left-
right spectrum in general, which may be a result of the significant degree to which left-
right identity maps onto a secular vs. religious cleavage. Volatility thus largely occurs 
not across the left-right divide, but within the left and right camps respectively 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2005:138).  The Turkish voter who positions himself on the right also 
tends to consistently vote for rightist parties.  That said, some thinkers refrain from 
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utilizing these categories because of their imperfect alignment to the Turkish case
8
.  
Despite lingering doubts about the utility of a left-right categorization, many scholars, 
policy makers, media, civil society organizations and casual people nevertheless 
commonly deploy such a categorization in contemporary Turkey. 
Regarding the Turkish context, although there exists an abundant literature analyzing the 
left, the far Islamic right and the far nationalist right, for various reasons the “center-
right” mentality has not yet been studied adequately—and this is despite its having ruled 
the country more than any other ideology.  Thus this study of the Turkish center-right 
will contribute to a much-needed space in the literature on Turkish Politics through the 
analysis of a relatively untouched realm and through a nuanced historical exploration of 
the changing nature of the center-right across many decades of its critical influence on 
Turkish politics. 
 
1.3.  Research Questions 
 
Given the vague characteristics of the left and the right in the Turkish context, having 
identified the electoral superiority of the center-right parties as well as the center-right 
as a relatively understudied area, “What does center-right correspond to in Turkey?” is a 
starting point for my dissertation.  In order to answer this question, I asked further 
questions.  In order to understand what the center right mentality corresponds to, I 
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 In order to indicate the absurdity of the left-right constellations in the Turkish context, Cemil Meriç 
stated that “when I exclaimed in the court that I was Marxist, I had not shaken even one workers’ hand” 
Cemil Meriç. 2005. Bu Ülke. 26th ed. İstanbul: İletişim, 96. Meriç asserts that without experiencing the 
Western historical process that gave rise to the left-right constellation, Turkey does not need to use these 
terms.   
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believe that it is necessary to look both at the politics and discourse of the center-right 
parties.  Thus, what are the basic characteristics of the center-right politics and discourse 
in Turkey?  Under what parameters/notions can we formulate the center-right 
understanding in Turkey?  
One of the most recurrent questions for political scientists studying Turkey is the debate 
over continuity or rupture in the analysis of Turkey’s modernization—particularly, the 
transition from the late Ottoman Empire to the early Turkish Republic (Ford, 1939; 
Lerner, 1958; Berkes, 1998; Lewis, 1968; Yalman, 1973; Hale, 1980).  I shall apply the 
same framework in analyzing center-right politics in Turkey.  Throughout this 
dissertation, by exploring different parties’ approaches to democracy, the state, and 
secularism, I ask, what are the continuities (similarities in policy and discourse) and 
ruptures (radical breaks or changes, transformations) across the different instantiations 
of center-right politics in Turkey?  As the first representative of the center-right 
mentality, the Democratic Party constitutes a ground for this analysis, and the 
subsequent parties’ positions (continuity or rupture) on the same ground provide some 
particular implications on the basis of identification of the center-right mentality.  This 
investigation enables us to elucidate the Turkish center-right mentality up until the 
2000s. After that period, though, marked by the filling of the center-right vacuum by the 
AK Party, another set of questions are needed, namely: why did the classical center-
right parties leave the center-right arena to the AK Party?  Through the three main 
categories guiding my analysis (democracy, the state, secularism), I argue that when the 
center-right parties began to abandon these principles of center-right politics in Turkey 
through increasing authoritarianism and/or seizing state power and/or forsaking the 
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passive secularist understanding, they encountered trouble both from the state elite and 
from the public.  Consequently, one of the problematiques of this dissertation has to do 
with why these parties did not endure in the long run.   
Although there are various possible answers to these questions, asking and trying to 
answer them will contribute to our understanding and consciousness of one of Turkish 
politics’ dominant actors, namely, the Turkish center-right. 
 
1.4.  Methodology 
 
My dissertation relies on empirical case studies to analyze the center-right concept. 
Regarding conceptual analysis, Tilly and Goodin draw attention to the fact that an 
analysis depends on the context of its place, time, explanation mechanisms, existing 
culture, history, psychology, population, technology and the philosophy of the 
researcher (2006). Unit of analysis, method and other contextual factors also 
significantly influence the definition of the left and right distinction, making it essential 
to pursue this research accordingly.   In that regard, before analyzing the nature of 
center-right politics in Turkey, it is necessary to examine the ideological connotations of 
the left and right, considering such particular variables as time and context. Since the 
focus of the work will be Turkey and the unit of analysis its center-right political parties, 
it is necessary to compare the divergent parties of the center-right with each other as 
well as to compare their distinguishing policies and ideologies to those of their center-
left and far-right contenders.  
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I chose to analyze political parties as the agents of center-right ideology because, in a 
country like Turkey that still could not adequately consolidate its democracy in liberal 
pluralist terms, political parties enjoy a significant degree of dominance in the political 
terrain. As Linz states, “there is also considerable agreement, in both established and 
unconsolidated or unstable democracies, that political parties are essential to the 
working of democracy” (2002:291). Linz also notes, “In parliamentary systems, political 
parties relatively play a more efficient and active role than the presidential systems” 
(2002:292).  Political parties are thus one of the best instruments for analyzing political 
traditions in the Turkish case due to its parliamentary system as well as the incomplete 
implementation of democracy.  Neumann states that a political party is “the articulate 
organization of society’s active political agents…the great intermediary which links 
social forces and ideologies to official governmental institutions” (Neumann 1963:352).  
Building on an understanding of parties “as a vehicle with which to understand the 
polity” (Reiter 2006:614) this study takes parties as the main unit of analysis.  
In studying party politics, locating parties on the left-right spectrum has been identified 
as the most important dimension by many scholars (Laponce, 1981; Fuchs and 
Klingemann, 1990; Knutsen 1998; Volkens and Klingemann 2003; Klingemann in 
Thomassen, 2005; Freire, 2006). Fuchts and Klingemann state that, “At the individual 
level, the division between left and right functions as an instrument to reduce the 
complexity of the political universe; on the systemic level, it functions as a code of 
communication” (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990:205).  Klingemann, who studies voter 
alignments, argues that utilizing a left-right scale is quite advantageous, especially for 
studies of Western Europe, since almost every election study considers this scale and 
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almost all respondents are able to define themselves on this spectrum (Klingemann 
1995:183-206).  Verifying Klingemann’s argument, many other studies of political 
parties and electoral behavior suggest that individuals' left-right self-placement is one of 
the major indicators of their voting choices—hence the continuing importance of this 
cleavage in the study of many countries in recent decades (Freire 2004, 2006:360; 
Gunther and Montero, 2001, Franklin et al., 1992; Eijk et al., 2005, Niemi and Norris 
2010). 
Methodologically, the study first tries to understand the origin and the transformation of 
the concept of the center-right in Turkey. The search for the genesis of the concept of a 
left-right cleavage helps to underline the various connotations of these concepts.  
Evaluating the Turkish case within such a conceptual framework, I selected three major 
notions/parameters—democracy, the state, and secularism—because of their unique 
significance in political debates and thus their ability to help us understand the main 
dynamics of and divergences within the center-right in Turkey.  In doing so, by 
scrutinizing the sometimes blurred, sometimes clear lines between the center-right and 
center-left, as well as between the center-right and far-right, we will have a better grasp 
on what uniquely defines the center-right in Turkey and how the concept of the center-
right has been deployed, with its all complexity, across different conjunctures and 
contexts.  
Primary sources of analysis include official party programs and documents, government 
programs, Parliamentary records, leaders’ speeches, media records and statistical data. 
That said, the self-proclamations of a party are far from sufficient data sources on their 
own, as there may be—indeed, most likely are—considerable gaps between the portrait 
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they drew and the policies they pursued, between explanation and action.  Secondary 
sources—existing studies, newspaper columns, biographies and autobiographies—will 
be utilized to balance the possible biases of official party pronouncements. While 
drawing on such a wide range of materials, this dissertation not only focuses on concrete 
instruments such as implemented laws and policies.  It also aims to integrate speeches 
and policies, perceptions and concepts—consonant with my interest in understanding 
different political mentalities, and different instances of how “language is action” 
(Brown and Yule 2000:5)—to contribute to the definition of the nature of center-right 
ideology in Turkey.  The priority of the viewpoint throughout this dissertation is 
domestic politics and discourse of the center-right rather than anything else. 
In any effort to interpret policies and speeches for the purpose of conceptualizing the 
Turkish center-right context matters considerably.  In that regard, it is possible to 
observe some certain non-linear trends in center-right politics during conjunctural 
transformations. For instance, as was seen in 1960 and 1980 military breakdowns, even 
institutional frameworks were by and large altered. However, as Isard observes, 
discourses “do not merely depend on the context for…interpretation, they change that 
context” (1975:377). Thus, the theoretical approach followed in this dissertation sees a 
mutually constitutive relationship between conjunctural conditions or context and the 
discursive or interpretive acts of specific center-right parties.  In other words, different 
parties, in their historical context, are both the result of and the reason for their 
contextual conditions.  For this reason, policies of the Democratic Party -as the founder 
of the origins of the center-right mentality- and the subsequent parties who all acted in 
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divergent atmospheres, naturally influenced the conjunctures as well as were influenced 
by the conjunctures. 
Integrating historical analysis and discourse analysis, the main aim of this dissertation is 
to formulate an empirically grounded understanding of the center-right by analyzing the 
politics and discourses of three major center-right parties, through an approach that 
emphasizes the heterogeneity and complexity inherent in the very concept of center-
right.   
 
1.5.  Roadmap of the Study 
 
The first section of this dissertation involves delineating the ways in which the meanings 
of left and right are understood at a more global level.  To that end, three main versions 
of the left-right cleavage will be evaluated.  The first concerns the significance of left 
and right in the context of the French Revolution, based on secularism vs. religion and 
emancipation from tradition vs. protection of the existing order.  The second version 
draws on comparative analyses of the state’s role in the economy concerning issues of 
equality.  The third version deals with recent debates within politics that revolve around 
the distinction between post-materialism and materialism; these debates bear traces of 
older debates while also adopting new issues on the left-right spectrum.  Then, while 
underscoring the importance of context in studying the left and the right, I shall provide 
a short history of the left-right cleavage in Turkey, followed by a review of existing 
studies on center-right ideology in Turkey.  
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In the third, fourth and fifth chapters, after clarifying the three categories central to my 
analysis—namely, democracy, the state, and secularism—I will analyze the policies and 
discourses of three major parties with regards to these three categories.  In doing so, it 
seems that the Democratic Party gained the most extended space due to constituting the 
very initial typology of center-right politics and discourse in Turkey, whose  was then 
followed by subsequent parties.  
As for democracy, having identified the procedural and subsequent conceptualizations 
of the term, I point to a general affinity of Turkish center-right parties towards the 
endorsement of the procedural merits of democracy as a means for resisting certain 
institutions framed as tending to ignore the national will.  In general, an emphasis on 
heeding the national will and winning elections while building warm relations with the 
public was observed in the Turkish center-right tradition.  Center-right parties also show 
certain limitations in their understanding of democracy, for example, in relations with 
the opposition and with the press.  Overall, a picture of the Turkish center-right emerges 
that suggests that the longer these parties stay in power, the greater their authoritarian 
inclinations tend to be. 
The next chapter builds on the concept of center-periphery differences as an explanatory 
framework and evaluates the Turkish center-right’s love-hate relationship with the state.  
It diagnoses an overall predilection: the Turkish center-right, though nurtured from 
within a dichotomy pitting the state against the public, in time developed  a demand for 
controlling, possessing or at least sharing state power instead of a policy to minimize the 
state systematically.  The chapter further considers both the relationships between the 
center-right and bureaucracy, and the ways in which various center-right parties have 
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employed economics in opposition to the statist principle of Kemalism.  Despite 
drawing heavily on a liberal rhetoric of economic issues, until the ANAP years, center-
right parties were unable to successfully implement a considerable liberalization project.  
Nevertheless, the center-right tradition maintained a pragmatic focus on economic 
development as a main priority vis-à-vis the cultural modernization priorities of 
Kemalism. 
I then turn to the issue of “passive secularism” in opposition to “the assertive Kemalist 
laicite” in the eyes of the center-right by focusing on the pro-religious and pro-secularist 
aspects of these parties, which attempted to lift the ban on religious practices as well as 
to protect the secular Republican regime without favoring a religiously oriented system.  
This chapter also draws a distinction between the center-right and the Islamic far right 
on the basis of the former’s sincerity in endorsing secularism. 
In the final step of the dissertation, following a series of concluding remarks, I point to 
the various ways in which this historical study of center-right politics has ramifications 
for our understanding of contemporary Turkish politics.  Specifically, three dynamics—
namely the favoring of procedural democracy, a love-hate relationship with the state, 
and passive secularism—help to explain the characteristics of the Turkish center-right.  
As long as these parties stay in power, increased authoritarianism at the cost of 
democracy, trying to seize and use state authority instead of diminishing it, and adopting 
an assertive secularist position in certain cases, especially after the late 1990’s, might 
lead to the collapse of the classical Turkish center-right parties.  In the very beginning of 
the 2000’s, the AK Party, distinct from far-right actors, was able to attract the support of 
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the center-right parties by pursuing a policy and mobilizing a discourse reminiscent, to 
an important degree, of its center-right predecessors.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE LEFT-RIGHT CLEAVAGE AND THE TURKISH CASE 
 
 
2.1. Left and Right: Far From Frozen  
Political positioning is no straightforward matter.  In order to simplify its inherent 
complexity, scholars, journalists, and ordinary people often employ such schematized 
divisions as left-right, liberal-conservative, conservative-progressive and so on.  Among 
these categories, left-right is one of the most widespread and historically grounded 
ideologies, known almost everywhere in the world.  Downs, one of the premier scholars 
of left-right theory, maintains that political parties in every society can be ordered on the 
left-right scale (1957:142).  To him, it is the universal dimension of the left-right 
distinction that makes these categories important.   Others have similarly argued that the 
social factors of left–right categorization in politics are perhaps the most important such 
division within the hierarchy of cleavages (Sani and Sartori 1983; Noel and Therein 
2008: 12). 
However, the precise referents of the right-left division—their connotations and 
repercussions—are not the same in every context.  The nature and connotations of the 
left-right conceptualization is not frozen, monolithic and universally agreed upon.  
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Instead, “Left and right do not represent two sets of fixed ideas, but rather an axis which 
shifts considerably from one generation to the next” (Cameron 1996:ix).  This axis 
“functions as a memory tool because it is open” and “creates continuity in histories that 
are discontinuous” (Noel and Therein 2008:12). Underlining the changing nature of the 
left-right distinction, Bobbio states “Some conflicts become less important, or even 
disappear, while others emerge” (1996:35).  In other words, as the conjuncture changes, 
new issues also become a source of dispute, and through acts of political and social 
debate, get worked into existing categories and vocabularies of left and right. 
As proof of the dynamic nature of left and right, Steven Lukes suggests three varieties of 
left and five varieties of right that have evolved over time.  The first left aimed to 
expand the achievements of the French Revolution without rejecting the bourgeoisie-
liberal order.  The second left came in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century and emerged 
from the working class struggle.  The third left, which emerged after the 1960’s, has 
emphasized matters of identity, gender and ecology over economic concerns.  The first 
two categories of the right were shaped in opposition to the first two lefts: the first one 
defended the ancient regime against the French Revolution and the second one 
supported limited government intervention in economics and a generally pragmatist 
approach to politics.  The third type of right arose in the context of nationalist 
movements while the fourth emerged afterWorld War II and favors a populist, anti-
immigrant discourse.  The fifth right emerged in the 1980’s, and is synonymous with 
neoliberalism’s economy-focused agenda (Lukes 2003).   
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Lukes is not the only scholar to have commented on the historical transformation of 
what people understand of the concepts of left and right
9
.  Synthesizing this scholarship, 
we can categorize the various connotations of left and right under three headings: the 
left-right cleavage in the context of the French Revolution, left-right cleavages resulting 
from socioeconomic differences, and left-right debates that mirror materialist vs. post-
materialist debates.  These three main categories, it should be said, are not necessarily 
exclusive and overlap in some respects. 
 
2.1.1. Left and Right in The Context of the French Revolution 
Any study of the genealogy of left and right must begin with the French Revolution.  As 
is well known, the very terms left and right emerged during the French Revolution, and 
began, according to Bobbio, as a “banal spatial metaphor” when two different 
revolutionary blocks took seats on different sides of the French National Assembly 
(1996:33).  In the rightist reading of the Revolution, the deputies, defined as Girondins, 
tried to establish a regime similar to the English version without utterly destroying the 
ancient regime.  In other words, the right wing advocated maintaining the existing order 
and social institutions with respect to religion and tradition.  They accused the leftist 
Jacobins of violence and cruelty (Doyle, 2001:17).  The story begins at this juncture 
                                                             
9
 Among the most important contributions are Jean A. Laponce. 1981. Left and Right: The Topology of 
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 International Political Science Review 27: 359–78. 
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according to the right wing position.  Yet from the point view of the left, all the 
revolutionary strategies, including the use of violence, were necessary to achieve liberty, 
to end arbitrary rule, and to improve human rights by means of accusing the Right of 
violating basic individual rights.  This left-right distinction continued in the 1791 
Legislative Assembly as well.  In the aftermath of the coup d’état of 1793, some of the 
Girondins were arrested; the rest moved to the center.  After the Thermidorian Reaction 
of 1794, the far left was trimmed in the Parliament setting in motion an era of relative 
moderation (Gauchet 1997:241-18). Nevertheless, this moderation process did not last 
long; immediately after the Restoration in 1814-1815, the left-right camps reemerged.  
The royalist deputies again preferred to sit on the right side of the Assembly whilst the 
socialist deputies preferred the left.  This seating tradition after the 1850s came to be 
understood as a representation of political ideology and in the Third Republic Era after 
1871, the metaphors of left and right began to be commonly used to identify parties 
(Laponce 1981 56-8; Gauchet 1997:242-7).   
Thus, the struggle between the defenders of the Ancient Regime and reformers 
generated the initial vocabulary of left and right.  Given the significant place of 
religion—the clergy, religious nobles, religious institutions and hierarchies—in the 
Ancient Regime, much of what defined the right was their defense of those institutions.  
On the other hand, challenging discipline, authority, inequality and the superior position 
of the Church, the left demanded liberty, individualism, and the principle of equal vote 
within a secular state structure.  Whilst the left was eager to win emancipation from 
tradition and religious hegemony, the right advocated the perpetuation of religious 
domination.  Their very different attitudes toward religion also informed the stance that 
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religious figures took on each side.  Studying the semantics of left and right in eleven 
languages, Laponce claims that the right is usually associated with moral virtue and is 
portrayed as “signifying strength and dominance while religious beliefs [add] to the term 
the connotations of superiority and legitimacy” (1981:100).  In the Christian religious 
realm, the right has usually been more welcome, a point that Bobbio also ties to 
religious spatial metaphors “where the good sit on the right of the Father and the evil on 
the left” (1996:41).  Similarly, in the Islamic tradition, the right symbolizes the “correct” 
side; “good” things such as eating, writing, and holding the holy book should be done 
with the right hand.  Thus, the righteousness of the right, so to speak, was underscored 
by deeply naturalizing metaphors in the religious realm, resulting in the smooth 
mapping of the secular vs. religious duality onto that of political left and right.  This 
pattern persists in some cases; research conducted by Laponce suggests that secularists 
still to a large extent lean left while more traditional and religious people continue to 
advocate for the right (1981). 
In addition to secularism, demands for democratization and libertarian ideals were also 
central to the left until the emergence of Socialism as the dominant leftist ideology.  
According to Noel and Therein, “the parliamentary left was defined primarily by its 
support for the republic, for democracy, and for laicism, against a right still attached to 
the monarchy, to limited enfranchisement, and to state support for religious institutions” 
(2008:15).  If the right stood for the protection of the extant order and praised hierarchy 
and discipline, the left arose in favor of equality and emancipation from tradition.  Some 
scholars also postulate that the struggle against injustice is seen as a left wing tenet 
while the right embraces roots, loyalty to a nation, common destiny and history (Bobbio 
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1996:47; Confrancesco, 1993).  In the left-right continuum, secularism and one’s 
approach to religion continue to play the role of an identification marker on the basis of 
this distinction.  Nevertheless, the individualistic and libertarian stance of the left to an 
important degree shifted after socioeconomics began to be perceived as the main 
cleavage in society.  Contemporary debates pitting post-materialism against materialism 
or libertarian against authoritarian views shift the nature of the left considerably from its 
original sense in the context of the left-right cleavage emerging from the French 
Revolution. 
 
2.1.2. The Socioeconomic Reading of the Left-Right Cleavage  
 
Another group of scholars point to socioeconomic stratification as the main stake in left-
right divisions, especially after the rise of Socialism.  To Marx and Engels, any social 
analysis should focus on socioeconomic conditions since material conditions 
disproportionately create and shape ideologies, religion and philosophy; socioeconomic 
classes—a main unit of analysis for Marx—are also determined by the mode of 
production (1970).  Although he does not employ a vocabulary of left and right in his 
work, Marx’s starting point was the moral critique of Capitalism, which profoundly 
inspired virtually all subsequent leftist literature.  The general tendency among Marxist 
philosophers of equating left-right ideologies with a conflict between the bourgeois and 
the proletariat gained ascendency particularly after the rise of Socialism and the 
consolidation of industrial society.  This tendency has in turn thrown into question the 
nature of power, the proper extent of state control over the economy, and the role of 
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government with regards to the distribution of economic resources, private property, 
collective action, individualism and social equality.    In this new context, generally the 
right has been equated with the advocacy of free market economies, unrestricted private 
property rights, and defense of the status quo. The left, meanwhile, is typically 
associated with state investment, the protection of workers’ rights and robust public 
social policies.  By the 20
th
 century, the composition of the left-right cleavage changed 
considerably, as the metaphors of left and right traveled beyond the borders of France 
and spread across Europe.  The revolutionary vision, secularism and focus on equality 
that characterized the left in the French Revolution are still associated with the left, but 
the main emphasis has shifted to economic matters
10
.  
Until the 1970’s, the socioeconomic reading of the left-right cleavage remained the 
predominant perspective in the discipline of Political Science.  For example, Anthony 
Downs, who wrote on the concepts of left and right in 1957, represented this cleavage in 
terms of the role of government in the economy and the scope of the private sector’s 
room for maneuver.  For Downs, degree of state intervention is a key factor in 
identifying left and right positioning.  Bartolini’s historical analysis of the distinguishing 
features between left and right, meanwhile, linked three dynamics to class cleavage: 
social constituency, ideological orientation and organizational structures (2000).  
According to Bobbio, the left prefers a more equal and egalitarian society while the right 
perceives hierarchy as necessary and favors inequalities (1996:46).  Will Kymlicka, in 
an analysis of political philosophers, classifies them according to their position on a left-
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social class (2008: 15).   
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right spectrum that corresponds to equality and socialism versus freedom and capitalism 
(1990:1–5).  Similarly, Peter Mair, focusing on the genesis of parties, argues that parties 
are left or right oriented according to the specific histories of their emergence: 
In short, left-right divisions, which predated but at the same time were 
cemented by the political mobilization of the working class in early 
twentieth-century Europe, and which came to focus principally on the 
question of the degree of government intervention, have proved sufficiently 
flexible to endure as well as to absorb, and have thus acted as a fundamental 
force for continuity. For all the changes experienced in recent years, it is 
clear that left and right not only remain the major organizing principles in 
modern west European politics, but also help to create a uniform foundation 
for contemporary patterns of policy competition (1997:27). 
 
Hence, despite further changes in historical circumstances, the functional explanation of 
the left right still presents one of the most powerful explanatory mechanisms in Political 
Science, but it is not the only one.  Studying such European countries as the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Austria, Fuchts and Klingemann amalgamate the first and the 
second senses described above of the left-right distinction and settle on the idea of class 
and religious cleavages as constitutive of the differences between left and right (1990).  
By the same token, analyzing European party systems, Lipset and Rokkan reveal that 
political cleavages were crystallized in the established parties along social lines of 
Protestant vs. Catholic, rural vs. urban, and center vs. periphery where the functional 
cleavage also perpetuates its importance as well (1967; 1990).  Many subsequent 
researchers have made use of the dichotomies of socioeconomic stratification and state 
vs. market to help distinguish left and right.
11
  In sum, the early social vocabularies of 
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revolution vs. order and secular vs. religious characteristic of the left-right division in 
the context of the French Revolution gradually gave way to a functional explanation of 
the left-right cleavage.  And though the socioeconomic reading of the differences 
between left and right is still utilized and tailored to specific conjunctures, such an 
explanation began to lose its importance after the 1970s. 
 
2.1.3. The Post-Materialist Conjuncture  
After the 1970’s, skepticism grew as to whether the left-right distinction is as important 
as was previously thought.  Today, when post-political politics
12
 is a matter of public 
discussion, to some scholars, the left-right distinction has lost its distinguishing 
function.  One of the main themes of scholars critical of the analytical utility of the left-
right distinction points to its limits in accounting for the political world today.  
According to this point of view, the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War era, the 
fall of the Berlin War, the domination of market economy and similar political events 
amounted to a paradigm shift that chipped away at the relevance of the left-right 
dichotomy.  According to this view, recent political and social transformations have 
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rendered the left-right distinction obsoleteand ill-equipped to make sense of new global 
problems. 
Bell’s theory suggests that the emergence of welfare states and the widespread 
development of the service sector (which acted to diminish socioeconomic class 
conflicts) alongside the growth of secularism (which decreased emotional attachments to 
religion as an issue of political conflict) amounted to the end of ideology, including the 
collapse of the left-right cleavage (Bell 1960). To him, consonant with the collapse of 
socialism as the main alternative theory of economic administration, which brought 
consensus to debates over the role of the welfare state and political pluralism, the most 
important cleavage between left and right has to a large extent evaporated.     
The Green movement is among those tricky ideologies offered as an example of the out-
datedness of the left-right cleavage
13
.  To some scholars, the Green movement presents a 
challenge of categorization if the distinction between left and right is perceived in a 
dichotomous way, since “in calling for an ecological, nonviolent, non-exploitative 
society, the Greens transcend the linear span of left-to-right” (Spretnak and Capra, 
1985:3).  In line with this view, the green movement is beyond left and right insofar as it 
claims that both left and right are a part of industrialism, the super ideology of both 
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political positions (Porritt and Winner, 1988:256; Dobson 2000:180). Giddens thus 
argues that globalization, environmental issues, and transformations in personal life 
paved the way for the search for a third alternative in the political realm rather than 
taking positions in the classical left-right spectrum (1994, 1998).  To Giddens, 
especially after the demise of Socialism as an alternative system to capitalism for 
managing the economy, capitalism has come to be seen as the unrivaled ideology—part 
of the demise of the grounds of the left-right distinction (Giddens 1998:138).  
Nevertheless, one of the common points among scholars who think that the left-right 
distinction should be ousted is their tendency to that distinction as a functional cleavage.   
Yet other scholars have resisted the tendency to link a shift in high-agenda issues to the 
collapse of the left-right distinction.
14
  Clark, Lipset and Rempel argue, for instance, that 
the importance of social classes decreased with the rise of the welfare state but reject the 
claim that this automatically signals the irrelevance of left and right in contemporary 
politics (1993).  Ronald Inglehart argues that the left-right distinction did not disappear 
after the 1970s; it rather transformed into a division in the political realm between 
materialists and post-materialists.  By such a distinction, Inglehart means to point to the 
changing priorities of people, especially in advanced industrial societies.  For him, 
materialist values give priority to matters of personal and economic security, economic 
growth, and law and order over social and democratic participation, freedoms, 
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individual improvement, environmental sustainability, health, and so on (Inglehart 1971, 
1977, 1997; Inglehart and Abramson, 1999).   As long as the economic security and 
stability endure, he describes the shift as follows:  
But despite the fact that middle-class status has generally tended to be 
associated with a preference for relatively conservative political parties, the 
newly emerging type of value priorities seems likely to be linked with 
support for radical social change. Under given conditions, we believe, this 
can lead to massive shifts to the political parties of the Left on the part of 
younger middle-class groups. Conversely, working-class respondents would 
be relatively likely to have underlying value preferences which make them 
potential recruits for conservative parties despite their traditional association 
with parties of the Left. These individuals have attained a certain level of 
prosperity relatively recently, and apparently continue to place a 
comparatively high value on defending and extending their recent gains 
(1971:992). 
 
In relation to this point of view, individuals’ self-placement on the left-right axis has 
three significant variables tied to social status, values and partisan loyalties, which cover 
all the issues above (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976:244-2).  To Inglehart, value 
orientations—particularly questions of lifestyle—are dominant on the left-right 
identification in contexts marked by long-term economic stability.  By contrast, Freire 
suggests that partisan loyalties are the main determinant of left-right identification 
today. He also underscores the importance of the relative weight of social factors in 
explaining individual left-right alignments by suggesting a new specification based on 
socio-structural divisions and their organizational and identity expressions (Freire 
2006:361).  In other words, Freire attempts to connect the socioeconomic reading of the 
left-right cleavage to the left-right arisen from the new issues.  On the other hand, Van 
der Eijik and Kees Niemöller also suggest that the cleavage between the left and right 
continues, and has been transferred to newly emerging issues in accordance with voters’ 
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substantive political worldviews considering the domination of the impact of culture 
(Eijk and Niemöller 1994; 2008).     
For Lukes, the left-right cleavage is the greatest fundamental dichotomy of the 20
th
 
century, determining one’s position on both how to see the world and one’s place in that 
world (2003).  In opposition to the idea that the left-right distinction is incapable of 
explaining contemporary issues, he asserts that almost every issue (abortion, same-sex 
marriage, nuclear weapons) can unambiguously be categorized along a left-right 
spectrum (Lukes 2003).  Along similar lines, rejecting the argument that changing issues 
in politics have emptied the analytical value of left and right, Mair claims that while not 
as radical as they were in the past, it is still unusual for a Catholic party to advocate a 
pro-abortion policy due to its historical orientation (Mair 1997:21).     
In recognition of the dynamic character of the left-right cleavage, another wave of 
scholarship emerged that attempted to assess and measure left and right. Leonard W. 
Ferguson suggested a method of questioning subjects about such issues as censorship, 
birth control, evolution, law and order, communism, theism, war, punishment and 
patriotism as a means to measure left-right tendencies (Ferguson 1942).   Ferguson’s 
study was transformational for Political Science, leading to the development of a 1-10 
scale to assess leftism or rightism, a method pursued by Castels and Mair (1984).  
Following this tradition, Huber and Inglehart studied political language, political 
conflict and other substantive political issues in order to evaluate the political orientation 
of parties and experts (1995).  Interestingly, the schema of Huber and Inglehart’s study 
suggest that almost 65 per cent of the left-right constellation was still based on 
economics or class conflict (Knutsen, 1998; Klingemann, 1995; 2005).  Expanding the 
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use of the 1-10 scale and Huber and Inglehart's techniques, Budge et al. utilize another 
detailed scale consisting of 56 categories that essentially measure party election 
programs.   They interpret the results of such a scale as “right-wing” if a party supports 
traditional morals, existing laws and order, a market economy, a limited welfare state 
and strong military power.  On the other hand, if a party favors democracy, a planned or 
mixed economy, larger state welfare provisions, peace, respect for other cultures, gender 
issues and so on, they locate that party on the left.  As these divergent studies indicate, 
the functional cleavage constitutes one of the main indicators of the left-right division.  
However, as Giddens observes, today, the conservative stance is nearly synonymous 
with neoliberal attitudes towards economics though it rejects a liberal stance on 
particular issues like abortion, drugs and family (1998:21).  Stances towards new issues 
also underscore the validity of the secular/religious divide, since one’s position on many 
issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage is, to an important degree, related to 
one’s position towards religion.  These three versions of the left-right divide thus 
intersect and overlap on many points. 
 
2.2. On The Necessity of the Center 
The ambiguity of party systems in diverse contexts complicates any facile application of 
the left-right division as a set of dichotomous, mutually exclusive categories.  To 
explain the institutional reality of many parties requires that we acknowledge spaces 
apart from these two camps, underlining the necessity of the concept of the “center” as 
an explanatory tool.   In this perspective, the left-right distinction is important but is 
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insufficient to explain the contemporary world; insofar as it represents a “stark choice 
between revolution and reaction,” it is a simple and overly generalized illustration of 
values (Heywood 2003:27).  Diverging from Orthodox left-right thinkers who perceive 
the world in a dyadic fashion, many other scholars, especially those conducting 
statistical research, suggest that the concept of a political “center” is indispensable for an 
adequate understanding of social reality.   
The existence of the center can be explained in two ways.  The first corresponds to an 
ideological position that favors consensus and refrains from radicalism.  Along these 
lines, Bobbio notes the inclusive character of the center as distinct from the strict, 
mutually exclusive character of the left-right division (Bobbio 1996:5).  With such an 
understanding of center, we can interpret the terms center-left and center-right as 
moderate versions of left and right. Giddens similarly distinguishes radicalism from 
moderation and argues that the center may pursue so-called radical policies such as 
ecological problems and emancipatory politics but they are able to command consensus 
(1998:142).  For Giddens, then, the moderation attached to the center does not 
necessarily rest on the content of the issues advocated, but on the methods or political 
strategies of the center, which tend to avoid radicalism and strictness. 
At the same time, other scholars reveal that the quantity composed of the eclectic 
majority or the “cafeteria of center” corresponds to the center without dealing with 
ideological propositions (Almond 1990:24; Noel and Therein, 2008:66).  In studying the 
Israeli center, Hazan asserts that the majority’s placement around the center indicates 
stability (Hazan, 2007; Coşar and Özman 2004).  Nevertheless, it is hard to portray the 
center as a universal term since contextual differences change its scope, repercussions, 
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and content.  For instance, the French center does not necessarily correspond to the 
United States center in its ideology and policies.  The extent of clustering around the 
left, center or right differs from one country to another.   
As Noel and Therein suggest, according to the data of a 1-10 scale of left-right self-
placement gathered from the 2001 World Values Survey, while the Israeli center (the 
sum of 5 and 6 points in the 1-10 scale) includes only 27.8 per cent of respondents, these 
rates are 58.3 and 41.2 per cent in the UK and the Netherlands respectively.  In a later 
survey (2005-2008), the rates for center were 56 per cent in Great Britain, 37,9 per cent 
in the Netherlands, 45,2 per cent in France, 19,9 per cent in Italy, 55,5 per cent in the 
United States and 21,7 per cent in Turkey.
15
  In comparison to many Western 
democracies, Turkey appears to have gradually become a more polarized country, as 
suggested in the figures below: 
 
Figure 1: Self-positioning in Turkey in 1990 Source: WVS 
                                                             
15
 No data for Israel is found for the 2005-2008 period. 
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Figure 2: Self-positioning in Turkey in 1996 Source: WVS 
 
 
Figure 3: Self-positioning in Turkey in 2001, Source: WVS 
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Figure 4: Self-Positioning in Turkey in 2007, Source: WVS 
In a polarized country like Turkey, the nature of the center can be defined both by its 
ideological moderation and its capacity to attract voters.  The ideological position of the 
center-left and center-right usually does not directly challenge the preserved notions of 
the state such as secularism, nationalism and populism.  In the beginning of the two 
party system, a conversation between İsmet İnönü and Celal Bayar reveals that any 
serious discrepancies between the DP and the CHP amounted to matters of foreign 
policy and achievements of the Republican Revolution (Özbudun, 2011(2):34; Toker, 
1991a:81).  In the following years, however polarized, it is hard to claim that neither the 
center-left nor the center-right raised a radical agenda intended to change the existing 
system.  Yet it is also hard to claim that the Turkish center-left and center-right were 
eager to seek consensus; indeed, so little so that their disagreements sometimes resulted 
in military interventions.  Furthermore, considering voter alignments, a swing from 
center right to center left is less common than a swing from center right to far right or 
vice versa.   
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The Turkish center-left and center-right generally obtained the majority of votes in 
elections, though this trend to some extent diminished in the 1990s.  Today, the AK 
Party is seen as the representative of center-right politics based on its election victories 
more than its ideology.  Compared to the general concept of the political center, it is 
possible to argue that the Turkish center-right is both ideologically moderate and is able 
to gather the majority’s votes.  That said, considering its political strategies, it is hard to 
assert that the Turkish center-right works for consensus with the opposition. 
 
2.3. The Relevance of Context  
These three categories for defining left and right definition help to simplify our 
understanding of these terms, though in reality, the issue is far from clear, coherent, and 
monolithic.  Context is an important factor for how we conceptualize, give meaning to 
and use the terms left and right. 
As the history of the left-right division is closely linked to French political history, even 
today, this historical and political legacy continues to shape contemporary French 
politics.  On the centrality of secularism in French politics, Doyle observes, 
“traumatized by the experience of the 1790s, which included the first attempt in history 
in 1793 to stamp out religious practice entirely, and The French Revolution, then the 
renunciation by the Convention the next year of all religious affiliation”, this tumultuous 
history influenced the emergence of the sui generis connotation of left and right in the 
French context that continues to this day (Doyle 92-93).  The French right thus emerged 
as relatively more secular, less religiously affiliated, and less resistant to strong state 
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control of religion in comparison to the universal alignment of the right.  For instance, in 
2011 both the French left and the French right agreed upon a law banning women from 
wearing veils that cover their faces (The Guardian, 19.09.2011).  The right may be 
expected to lift such a ban on religious practices, and the left may be expected to 
advocate freedoms.  However, the assertive interpretation of secularism dominant in 
France (McClay, 2002; Kuru, 2009) led both the right and the left to take a restrictive 
position on this issue.  This event may also be interpreted as evidence of a xenophobic 
attitude towards immigrants and minorities unexpectedly shared by the new Left.   
Influenced by militant secularism, neither the left nor the right took a liberal stance on 
this issue. 
The left-right distinction in Italy is also closely linked to historical stratification where 
political dispute between agricultural and industrial groups was a source of elitism 
(Barnes 1971:162-2).  Barnes notes three aspects in Italian politics that have shaped the 
left-right cleavages and provided their ideological content and continuity—namely, 
socioeconomics, religious policy, and foreign policy (Barnes 1971; 1997).  Allan 
Cameron alludes to the marginal character of Italian politics, which during its Marxist 
uprising, for instance, experienced the left and right cleavage more acutely.  Moreover, 
in the 1980s when the left began to weaken, Italy quickly came together in opposition to 
the left (Cameron 1996:vii-viii).  It is worthwhile to note that in contrast to the French 
case, the far-right vs. far-left legacy of Italy paved the way for further fragmentation of 
its political parties, as seen in the 2013 Italian elections.   
Throughout the Cold War era, the United States maintained its position as the center of 
right politics, democracy and capitalism in opposition to the Soviet Socialist Republic 
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and, to a large extent, adopted a right-wing policy without being strictly located on 
either the left or the right.  In the US, while the left and the right are associated with 
liberal and conservative standpoints, they do not map easily onto the first two left-right 
categories.  In contrast to France, the American left is closer to the global understanding 
of centrist politics, whereas the American center resembles the global perception of the 
right.  
Freire’s study, relying on data from the 1990 World Values Survey and the 1999 
European Values Survey shows that the extent of the determinacy of social factors, 
partisan loyalties and value orientations changes across contexts.  The data showed, for 
instance, that in Spain and France the weight of social factors was stronger than in other 
cases, whereas in Italy and Germany, partisan loyalties were quite strong.  Value 
orientations composed of left-right materialism, religion and issues of new politics were 
very high in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, whereas in Portugal the weight of 
value orientations decreased from 3 per cent to 1.9 per cent from 1990 to 1999 (Freire 
2006:368).  Freire also underscores the differential impact of the structural, 
organizational, and identity components of social factors in different countries.  In that 
sense, the identity component was strong in Spain, France and the Netherlands while 
very low in Austria. Germany displayed the highest results in the organizational 
component in 1999, while the determinacy of its identity component was 1.9 per cent in 
the same year (Freire 2006:364).  Assessing respondents’ left-right orientation through 
questions on equality, competition and the role of government, Noel and Therein found 
a strong correlation in Turkey, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, 
Sweden and many other countries.  In other cases such as Iran, Israel, Mexico, Brazil, 
 43 
Hungary, Portugal and Ireland, no correlation was observed (Noel and Therein 2008:47-
51).  The same study showed that most of the countries sharing similar historical 
experiences (such as the former-Soviet states) have to a large extent developed similar 
attitudes with regards to the meaning of left and right (Noel and Therin 2008:47-51).  
Despite appearing to be a universal norm, in other words, the specific characteristics of 
the left-right distinction may differ across contexts. 
In sum, almost every context has developed different understandings of the left-right 
concept in response to a unique combination of socio-historical and political 
circumstances.  In the context of Turkey, the first Muslim secular democratic country, 
although it did not experience the industrial revolution as the West did, nor have a 
similar socioeconomic class system, nor encounter until relatively late the influences of 
the French Revolution, Turkey did nevertheless witness the emergence of its own 
specific left-right cleavage—one that occasionally varies significantly from the widely 
accepted versions of left and right.  Before we turn to the analytical heart of this 
dissertation, which is on the domestic politics and discourse of the Turkish center right 
in light of its approach to democracy, the state, and secularism, it is first necessary to 
briefly situate the concepts of left and right within Turkish political history. 
 
2.3.1. What Does the Left-Right Cleavage Refer to in Turkey?  
 
Turkey not only began to use the concepts of left and right in ways that diverged from 
their main global connotations; is also began to utilize these concepts relatively late.  
Despite today’s perception of the Democratic Party of the 1950s as the pioneer of right-
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wing politics in Turkey, in the final analysis, these terms began to be used commonly 
only after the 1960s (Çarkoğlu, 2010:255; Çınar, 2009:498; Demirel, 2009:213, 450).  
Still, even before the terms gained widespread currency, the formative political forces 
behind their content began decades before with the founding ideology of Turkey.  
Specifically, another set of cleavages—between center and periphery, secularism and 
religion, and authoritarian and majoritarian democracy—played a significant role in the 
formation of the center-left and the center-right camps in Turkey. 
In a manner quite different from functional explanations, it was the disjuncture in values 
separating those who conducted the reforms from those subjected to these reforms 
(Mardin 1991) that created the main cleavage in Turkey.  Considering the nature of the 
Turkish Revolution, Özbudun states that the “Turkish Revolution was not a social 
revolution and (…) did not produce clearly identifiable coalitions of class interest” 
(1997:83).  This fact has led the Turkish left and right to seek alternative approaches in 
identifying their ideology, basing it on social factors other than class.  Pursuing a 
topdown modernizing mission in the absence of civil and industrial society, the 
telescopic nature of the CHP and the state in the very beginning led to the continuation 
of the center and periphery cleavage
16
 which in turn became the main determinant of the 
center-left and the center-right in Turkey.  Furthermore, revolutionary strategies of the 
                                                             
16
 This issue shall be evaluated in more detail in later chapters on democracy and the state.  Also see 
Edward Shils. 1961.  “Centre and Periphery,” In D. R. Gadgil (ed). Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays 
in Honor of Michael Polanyi. New York: Glencoe. Shils’ concept of center and periphery has been 
adapted to the Turkish case by Şerif Mardin.  See Mardin. 1973. “Center–Periphery Relations: A Key to 
Turkish Politics?” Daedalus 102(1):169–90, where the author aims to explain the discrepancy of the 
modernizing state elites vis-à-vis civil society or the masses as the object of this modernization.  For 
further details, see Ergun Özbudun. 2013. Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner. Chapter 1; Metin Heper. 1980. "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special 
Reference to the Nineteenth Century," International Political Science Review, 1:81-105; Ali Rıza Güngen 
and Şafak Erten. 2005. “Approaches of Şerif Mardin and Metin Heper on State and Civil Society in 
Turkey,”  Journal of Historical Studies 3:1-14. 
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Kemalist regime along with the denial and elimination of the Ancient Regime with an 
assertive secularist mission bears slight resemblances to the left under the impact of the 
French Revolution
17
.   
The far left and communism were perceived as threats by the existing major parties in 
the 1940s and 1950s, and none of the parties (neither the CHP nor the DP), explicitly 
defined itself as right-wing or left-wing.  At a certain level, the distinction between the 
Republican People’s Party and the Democratic Party resembled the opposition between 
the Democratic Party and Republican Party of the American system, which would have 
theoretically made the DP a center-left party; however, in Turkey the DP has typically 
been perceived as a right_wing party (Ağtaş, 2007:194).   The founding cadre of the DP 
was composed of previous CHP members that worked in CHP circles for years but who 
successfully gained the support, during the DP’s establishment, of peripheral opposition 
groups such as disgruntled conservatives, liberals, and leftist intellectuals.  For instance, 
the DP cadre early on developed strong relations with two Socialist intellectuals, Sabiha 
Sertel and Zekeriya Sertel, as a means of opposing the CHP.  Similarly, the predecessors 
of the DP, Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar and Fuat Köprülü promised to write for 
Görüşler magazine, published by Sertel couple (Sertel 1987).  Interestingly, the 
Democratic Party of the late 1940s was accused of being the instrument of Communists 
as well as of receiving aid from Socialist Russia throughout its establishment (Demirel, 
2009:416). The DP in turn accused the CHP of engaging with communists without 
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 Here, the scope of similarity should not be overestimated.  In a manner quite different from the French 
understanding of the left as eager to change the existing system through mobilizing viable public support 
for the purpose of breaking the status quo, the CHP, operating in the name of the center-left in Turkey, 
emerged as the heir of the Young Ottomans (Jön Turkler) and the Committee of Union and Progress, and 
framed its activities as “saving the state” in an elitist and intellectual structure (Gültekingil, 2009:13-14 
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openly demarcating the CHP as a leftist party (Demirel, 2009:418). During the founding 
years of the Democrat Party, Celal Bayar defined his party as somewhat to the left of the 
CHP in certain aspects and somewhat to the right of the CHP in others (Bayar, 1968:48; 
Toker, 1991a:80).  All of these details point to the indeterminate nature of right and left 
in Turkey in the late 1940s and 1950s.  
The center-left, represented by the CHP, the founding party of the Republic, maintained 
an elitist, authoritarian, centralist, secular and statist image up until the 1970s.  The six 
basic principles of the CHP were nationalism, populism, republicanism, revolution, 
secularism and statism; yet three in particular, secularism, statism and nationalism, were 
the main dynamics of the CHP.  Its high degree of nationalism and eye towards 
developmentalism mixed with populism
18
, which envisaged a classless society rid of 
certain conflicts, hindered the CHP from articulating a sincere claim to social 
democracy (Parla 1991; Uçan Çubukçu 2009:520-532).  Emphasizing the undemocratic, 
solidarity and corporatist character of the populist tendency of the CHP, Özbudun also 
points to an interventionist state mentality behind the vision of accomplishing these 
tasks without being situated within the Capitalist or Socialist block (2011(1):103-2).       
Given the highly central place of Turkish nationalism, secularism and statism in the 
Republican project—which until quite recently was beyond criticism and open 
discussion—it is almost impossible for a party to frankly define itself as “anti-
nationalist”, “anti-secular” or “anti-statist” in Turkey.  It is thus unrealistic to expect 
either the DP or its center-right successors to introduce a radically controversial program 
                                                             
18
 This populist approach remains a part of the Turkish center-left.  Comparing the ideologies of the DSP 
in the 1990s and the SHP, Hasan Bülent Kahraman pointed to populism as the main impediment of the 
DSP from being a leftist party in a global sense (Kahraman, 1993:199). 
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regarding these principles embedded not only in a single party (the CHP) but in the very 
structure of the state.  The center-right mentality, in other words, represents not a 
profound shift from the dominant state mentality but rather a variation on the principles 
instituted by the CHP.  Indeed, very limited differences were observed in the early party 
manifestos of the CHP and the DP (Ahmad 1977:30,40; Özbudun, 2011(1):120).   
Although these two parties did not clearly define themselves as “right” or “left” in those 
days, the 1960 turnover and the political processes in the aftermath of the coup 
profoundly transformed Turkish politics.  Consonant with the rise of the left worldwide 
after the mid-1960s, the CHP began to define itself as a center-left party, particularly 
emphasizing this identity after Bülent Ecevit’s leadership.  The former DP and its 
predecessor the AP, as the main rival of the CHP, in turn came to identify as center-right 
parties, with the DP inventing a tradition
19
, so to speak, to ground its center-right 
leanings in an ostensibly deeper history. Nevertheless, the AP (Adalet Partisi - the 
Justice Party), with only four of its eleven founding members coming from the DP (Levi 
in Heper Landau, 1991), tried to create an amalgamation of conservatism, liberalism, 
Islamism, and nationalism.  In light of these political transformations, the 1965 elections 
were thus described as a conflict of party value systems and as a struggle between left 
and right politics (Abadan, 1966).  In the run up to the 1965 elections, İsmet İnönü 
described the CHP as “structurally a statist party and with this specification, it also has a 
left-of-center perception” (Abadan, 1966:156).  Particularly after the 12 March coup, 
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 Hobsbawm takes “'invented tradition' to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly 
accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of 
behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they 
normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past” (1983:1). Hobsbawm’s thesis on the 
“invention of tradition”—which we can detect in the ways in which center-right parties after the DP 
attempted to link themselves to its history—echoes the rightization of the DP in the Turkish context. 
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Demirel began to portray his party as right of center, as opposed to İnönü’s left of center 
description of the CHP (Çakır and Göktaş, 1991:17).  In the 1970’s, the CHP also 
adopted a more social democratic rhetoric focused on social policies, the interests of 
disadvantaged groups; it also considerably abandoned the populism of the former CHP 
and its ambitions of cultural transformation.  The center-right, meanwhile, began to 
collaborate with nationalists.  And the AP developed, in opposition to the CHP, a more 
market-oriented political agenda and made frequent mention of the ‘national will’ as 
informing their politics.  Here we should note that, in the post-1971 memorandum 
process, right of center aligned with nationalist elements and an embracing of the status 
quo and the state to a degree unlike the relatively liberal and democratic center-right of 
the 1960s.  By the late 1970s both center-left and center-right were far from centrist or 
moderate, as their uncompromising polarization suggests. 
The trend towards polarization was interrupted by a new coup in 1980.  At that time, the 
Motherland Party emerged as the main representative of the center-right, and claimed to 
amalgamate four tendencies: liberalism, conservatism, nationalism and leftism.  It goes 
without saying that the leftism was by far the most under-represented of these four 
predilections.  The ANAP, in an attempt to join a number of divergent interests under 
one political umbrella, defined the new direction of center-right politics. The True Path 
Party also emerged in the 1980s, and arose as another option in the center right, but 
unlike the DP, the AP, or ANAP, the party was not able to win a majority in elections to 
form a single-party government.  While the True Path Party claimed to be the heir of 
both the Democratic Party and the Justice Party, the Motherland Party identified itself as 
the continuation of the DP while rejecting the AP heritage entirely (Acar in Heper and 
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Landau, 1991; Ergüder in Heper and Landau, 1991). In the beginning of the 2000s, the 
AK Party has also constructed its conservative democratic identity based on the 
traditions of the DP and ANAP. 
Across the 1990s, at the same time that center-right parties gradually lost their power, an 
Islamist trend began to influence politics in Turkey. There are various hypotheses such 
as the “economics and service” explanation, the protest-vote hypothesis and the thesis of 
ideological polarization in the country’s history of Islamism and secularism. According 
to some scholars, the failure of the old center-right parties paved the way for far-Islamist 
and far-nationalist right parties to act as coalition partners in the 1990s. Thus Sayarı and 
Esmer note that “since the center-right parties that had traditionally defended the 
religious sensitivities of the periphery became less interested in representing their 
claims, the void created by the populist politics was filled mainly by the RP/FP and the 
MHP” (2002:154). 
Despite the changing nature of the center-right’s perception of secularism and its 
religious understandings, one may argue that its stance toward democracy and the state 
also accelerated the collapse of the center-right during the 1990s though this claim 
requires further unpacking. Tanju Tosun suggests that corruption and abuse of power led 
to the center-right’s decline during the 1990s (1999).  Others have pointed to the rise of 
service-oriented and dialogue-based forms of political mobilization as having enabled 
the rise of far-right Islamic parties by distinguishing them from the idleness of the extant 
center-right parties (White 2002; Navaro-Yashin 2002). In analyzing the Turkish center-
right, then, one must account for the fuse of Islamist and nationalist tendencies as crucial 
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strategies by which later representatives of the center-right attracted the votes of 
previous parties. 
In studying the radical right, Goodwin notes that it is necessary to also include 
mainstream political parties—not just fringe elements—in such analyses in order to 
grasp the issue adequately (Goodwin, 2009:325). The same is true for studying center-
right politics in Turkey; it is necessary to consider radical-right parties in order to 
understand the divergences across parties. Lipset defines the radical right as “anti-
pluralist and politically moralistic and conspiratorial as well as ideologically anti-elitist 
and anti-statist, sociologically marginalized and dispossessed” (1971) which 
occasionally fits with the Turkish case.  In the Turkish context, the radical right typically 
has two allies.  The first is Islamist political parties that fit with Lipset’s categorization 
to a certain degree. The Turkish Islamic far right has pursued a moralistic and anti-elitist 
project with a nationalist tone. The second partner of the radical right is ultranationalist 
and statist. Flirting at times with both extremes, the center-right parties in Turkey insist 
on staying within the borders of the system and sharing authority if possible (Cizre 
1993; Mert, 2007; Tosun, 1999).  In other words, despite deploying Islamist and 
ultranationalist discourses to woo sympathetic voters, the center-right has almost never 
expressed an intention to destroy the secular structure of the state or to pursue a politics 
based heavily on Islam or Turkishness—with the possible exception of the AP’s 
Nationalist Front governments in 1970s.  Hence, the Turkish center-right differs from 
the Islamist and nationalist far right ideologies on the basis of violence and on the 
center-right’s system-oriented structure targeting almost all ethnic groups and religious 
affiliations (Taşkın, 2003).  As Cizre postulates, one of the most appropriate terms to 
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describe the Turkish center-right is pragmatism—calculating one’s acts towards specific 
aims tailored to a specific conjuncture (1997).  
Intra-party issues such as leader domination and undemocratic organization are present 
in almost every party in Turkey and do not correspond to party dividing lines. 
In a basic sense, the borders of the Turkish center-right are drawn by the relative soft 
position of its various representative parties on the three categories that guide this 
dissertation’s analysis. Populist in leaning, the Turkish center-right generally supports 
democracy and the people’s voice in a majoritarian tone.  References to a national will 
play an important role in center-right discourse, which prioritizes the preferences of the 
ostensible majority over a pluralist embracement of the different motives in society.  
Despite being undoubtedly more democratic in comparison to the CHP ideology and 
displaying strong links with the procedural tenets of democracy, the center-right has 
been unable to adequately defend and expand substantive democratic ideals.   
The strict statist and secularist policies and discourse of the center-left ideology have 
also provided center-right parties with much political fodder in constructing an 
oppositional platform.  The center-right saw the links between the CHP and the civil and 
military bureaucracy as a major threat and an obstacle in realizing the national will.  
Thus, minimizing and making more efficient the state apparatus are usually high on the 
list of priorities in the programs of the center-righ though this was rarely actualized.  In 
line with their pragmatic approaches to politics, the AP, after the 1971 coup, sought 
collaboration with the military, and ANAP, in the beginning of the 1980s, avoided 
challenging the dominance of the military regime in the interests of preserving its own 
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power.  Furthermore, the longer center-right parties stay in power, the more they tend to 
not only shape the state but also to be shaped by—internalize the interests of—the state.  
Another characteristic of center-right parties in their relation to the state is their 
tendency to foster technocrats in an effort to oppose the power of bureaucratic elites.  
The center-right also favors minimizing state investments and promoting private 
enterprise in their programs and discourses.  Their ability to realize such aims was quite 
limited until Özal’s tenure in the 1980s.  However, economic development and the 
improvement of living standards has been one of the strongest platforms of the Turkish 
center-right, pitting material development against the cultural engineering projects of the 
Kemalist Revolution. 
Advocating the free and open practice of religion as a means to oppose the militant 
secularism of the CHP was another pinpoint of center-right politics, distinguishing it 
from the Islamic right, as the center-right did so while still endorsing secularism—thus 
the increased use of religious terms, rituals and symbols in the political realm by agents 
of the center-right. In conclusion, the Turkish case offers an alternative reading of the 
left-right constellation with its particular conjuncture and political history.  The 
disproportionate importance given to the center-periphery cleavage and the specific 
approach of the center-right to matters of democracy, state and secularism, which make 
up the focus of this study, altogether make the Turkish center-right a curious case in the 
global comparative literature. 
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2.3.1. Approaches to the Left-Right Cleavage in Turkey 
 
Scholarly approaches to defining left and right in Turkey tend to be influenced by the 
explanatory frameworks favored by the researcher in question. In more general political 
analyses of different party systems, four main cleavages have been identified as helping 
to distinguish different political approaches—namely, matters of center and periphery, 
state and church, functional and materialism vs. post-materialism (Lipset and Rokkan, 
1967:47; Klingemann et al. 1994:6).  In the study of Turkey, the first three have been 
seen as especially significantin the formation of the center-left and center-right. 
Regarding the functional cleavage, İlkay Sunar sees the emergence of a left-right 
separation as a result of the disruption of a coalition between the bourgeoisie and the 
bureaucracy (Sunar, 1974). As Özbudun notes, in those years, it is difficult to point to 
the existence of an influential bourgeoisie, given their high degree of dependency on the 
state (2011(2):30). To Keyder, because the Ottoman social structure lacked extensive 
landownership and a settled aristocracy, in many ways it cannot be defined as feudal, 
making it hard to categorize the Ottoman Empire and the early Republic within a post-
feudal class framework.  Bureaucracy was a different class juxtaposed with the 
bourgeoisie in the Republican Era during which political power developed  a capitalist 
investment tenet, and in Keyder’s view, the Turkish proletariat remained a passive actor, 
largely forced to observe rather than influence the changes occurring around it (Keyder, 
1987).  Even so, especially in the late 1960s and across the 1970s, the left and right 
began to represent the socioeconomic stratification in the society (Özbudun, 1976; 
Ayata and Ayata, 2012; Cizre, 1992).  In the 1980s, ANAP’s neo-liberal policies also 
echoed a broader world trend in terms of a socioeconomic reading of the left-right 
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cleavage (Öniş, 2004; Cizre and Yeldan, 2005; Aydın, 2005).  Analyzing the 
contemporary context, Ali Çarkoğlu asserts that: “The left and the right as reflected in 
the determinants of self-placements along the L-R scale have no tangible socioeconomic 
basis such as economic deprivation but have instead bases in ethnic and sectarian 
differences” (Çarkoğlu, 2007:267).  It is essential to note here that, in studying Turkey, 
party allocations might differ from the self-placements of individuals.   
Thus, in terms of a functional understanding of left and right, according to many 
scholars, Turkish politics is an exceptional case, meaning that it is difficult to classify 
left-right connotations in Turkey so as to perfectly line up with economics.  In that vein, 
the center-periphery cleavage is more helpful in elucidating the definitions of center-
right and center-left parties.  Şerif Mardin proposed the center-periphery cleavage to 
explain the Turkish case, a definition that favors the distinction of those who hold power 
and those subjected to that power without giving priority to economic patterns.  In 
relation to the 1960s, especially for the DP (in its opposition to the CHP) and the AP (in 
its opposition to the state), Mardin’s thesis helps to explain the center-right 
understanding in Turkey and its rhetoric of the nation’s will.  The leftist intellectual 
Mehmet Ali Aybar also formulated a similar duality, that of the bureaucracy vs. the 
masses, as a source of left-right cleavage (1998).  Yet the center-periphery cleavage has 
its critics (e.g. Wuthrich, 2013).  Avner Levi (1991) questions its explanatory power for 
the Turkish case, pointing to the structural presumption of the cleavage and to the fact 
that neither the center nor the periphery is composed of static bodies.  On the contrary, 
they are dynamic and multifaceted since they are subject to internal conflicts (Levi in 
Heper and Landau, 1991; Heper, 1980; Özbudun, 2013).  Nevertheless, many scholars 
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continue to defend the explanatory power of such a distinction between a center that 
holds power and is largely unconcerned with the interests of the periphery.  In a 
statistical study, Çarkoğlu and Avcı state that: “Continuing along a multidimensional 
explanatory framework, we argued that Mardin’s center–periphery construct still 
maintains the overall salient characteristics of Turkish politics that shape and reshape 
the modern-day party system’s constellations of electoral preferences” (2011:27). Ersin 
Kalaycıoglu’s analysis of the data gathered in the 1990 Turkish Values Survey also 
reveals “the continued importance of the conflict between the values of the centre versus 
the values of the periphery,” which largely comes down to religiosity (1990:24).  In a 
recent study, Özbudun also notes the continuing explanatory power of the center-
periphery cleavage, with the periphery divided along religious-conservative and ethnic-
cultural-geographic lines and the center maintaining its secularist and nationalist outlook 
(2013).  In addition to the center-periphery cleavage, the emphasis of Özbudun and 
Kalaycıoğlu on the secular vs. conservative cleavage is in some respects reminiscent of 
the left-right cleavage in the context of the French Revolution.
20
   
Apart from party politics, ethnic and sectarian identity and religiosity also play a role in 
determining right-left alignments though the nature of these different modes of 
identification is quite volatile when it comes to voting patterns among the Turkish 
citizenry (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005:138; Sayarı and Esmer, 2002; Hale and Özbudun, 2010).  
In ‘The Nature of the Left-Right Ideological Self-placement in the Turkish Context’ 
Çarkoğlu’s statistical study (2007) focuses on three categories of Turkish society, 
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 As Mardin saw it, the center periphery cleavage was not only a null spatial metaphor. Rather, it 
involved a certain degree of the conflicts of value systems, such that the secular vs. conservative/religious 
became a dynamic variable of the center-periphery cleavage. 
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center, right and left, and emphasizes the significance of religion as a catalyst of left and 
right identity.  To Çarkoğlu, more tolerant, progressive and democratic individuals 
identify with the left, while happier, more authoritarian and less democratic individuals 
define themselves as rightists in Turkey. Employing a leftist perspective, Tanıl Bora also 
identifies nationalism, Islamism and conservatism as three phases of the Turkish right, 
which represent, respectively, the solid phase, liquid phase and gaseous phase that all 
might juxtapose to each other (Bora, 1999). In light of this categorization, Bora comes 
up with that the leitmotiv of the Turkish center-right is to a large extent conservatism, 
which enables the center-right to adopt and adapt other ideas with ease.  Furthermore, 
Bora postulates that the volatility within the farright and the center-right in Turkey 
might be explained by the intersections and co-transformations of these three 
characteristics of right ideology.  Nevertheless, the transactions between the center-left 
and center-right and even between the center-left and far-right are not considered by 
Bora the fact of which led him tocategorize both under the umbrella of “right”; however, 
this dissertation asserts that it is very necessary to divide the center-right from the far-
rights due to the sui generis of the center-right from its counterparts. On the other hand, 
what Bora initially looks at are the ideological debates and intellectual representatives of 
the right-wing ideology without paying much attention to political parties.  Bora also 
looks at the issue from a leftist point of view that in some ways leads to negative value 
judgments of the author towards the issue. 
Beşir Ayvazoğlu, from a rightist point of view, explains what being rightist correspond 
to in Turkey as the representation and expression of divergent affiliations of “the real 
mass” (1991:32).  For him, consisting of the great majority of the population, “the real 
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mass” is the one that was ousted from the power realm as well as the one that is 
perceived to be obliged to pay taxes without intervening in the active political 
discussions (1991:32-2).  Looking at the intellectual literature rather than party politics, 
Ayvazoğlu concentrates on two main lines of the right in Turkey which are 
Islamist/conservative and nationalist, which occasionally overlap with each other.  
Furthermore, what Ayvazoğlu disdains is implicitly the center-right with its partially 
democratic, occasionally statist and brutally opponent character vis-a-vis the reactionists 
that holds the political and economic power (1991:32).  Despite accepting the center-
right position as one of the components of right-wing ideology in Turkey, he does not 
deal with the center-right in particular.  Similarly, Süleyman Seyfi Öğün concerns 
himself with conservatism
21
 and nationalism as two main pillars of right-wing ideology 
through focusing more on the sociological aspects without considering the center-right 
ideology and politics separately.  Ali Yaşar Sarıbay also renders the religio-Islamic 
dynamics within the right-wing ideology, but he still does not distinguish center-right 
either.  Therefore, the prevailing understudied status of the center-right in Turkey is 
extant in the right-wing intellectuals’ studies too.   
As one of the rarest studies that completely focuses on the center-right in Turkey, Nuray 
Mert, in “Merkez Sağın Kısa Tarihi” (A Brief History of the Center Right in Turkey), 
asserts that being at the center, for a political party, connotes being legitimate (2007:7). 
She furthermore reveals the dual function of the center right in Turkey: Its goals are to 
represent ‘the nation’s will’ and to get the approval of the masses on behalf of the 
Republican regime.  In other words, Mert reveals that the center-right parties have been 
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 For example, Süleyman Seyfi Öğün. 1998. “Türk Muhafazakârlığının Açık İkilemleri Üzerine”, Doğu 
Batı Dergisi 3(3): 75-77.   
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capable enough to attract the people without threatening the regime.  One of the main 
differences of Mert’s study from this dissertation is Mert’s tendency to compare the 
center-right mentality with the Islamic and nationalist far-right approaches per se 
without paying attention to the division and integration lines of the center-right and the 
center-left.  Furthermore, identifying the strategies of the center-right towards the 
“economic development” as a means for the modernization of the center-right as well as 
the representation of the masses’ values   is without any doubt justifiable.  However, 
reducing the center-right political strategies to these two concepts may lead to an 
incomplete understanding of the center-right in Turkey, so that is why this dissertation 
introduces three main parameters, which also occasionally overlap with these two.  
Though it offers some critical points, Mert’s study is largely a descriptive political 
history with a prevailing negative judgment of the center-right.  Basing her choice of 
research methods on the premise that Political Science jargon could not evaluate the 
center-right issue adequately, she utilizes chronological explanations more (e.g. Mert 
2007, Chapter 1).  What I offer instead in this dissertation is a Political Science 
perspective that facilitates a comprehension of the center-right in Turkey with the help 
of its conceptual and analytical framework. 
Ümit Cizre is also interested in center-right politics, especially the post-DP period, yet 
she does not compare the concept to center-left and far-right ideologies. Cizre 
contributes to the study of the center-right by adding such terms as pragmatism, 
spontaneity, conjunctural policy making and ambiguity. She critically reconsiders the 
characteristics of the center-right and its various relationships to the state.  Nevertheless, 
without engaging in comparison, she sometimes attributes as particular to the center-
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right aspects of Turkish politics that are far more general and widespread. For instance, 
she argues that one of the main characteristics of the Turkish center-right is leader 
dependency, but this is likely true for other ideologies as well.  On the other hand, she 
makes her operationalization on the basis of parties rather than mentality or ideology, 
which is different than this dissertation
22
. 
Analyzing the fragmentation of the center-right, Tanju Tosun argues that in the post-
1980 coup period, Turkish politics became an apolitical arena under the economy-
oriented influence of neo-liberalism (1999). Although they represented distinct 
sociological and ideological coalitions in the 1970s, center-right parties later began to 
seek legitimacy in the eyes of the state instead of society, which raised questions of 
reliability. Without internalizing conservatism, nationalism and liberalism, the center-
right commonly utilized these ideologies on the popular level, and to Tosun, those ideals 
were then obtained by their real possessors (1999). Tosun’s study is useful in its analysis 
of the failure of classical center-right parties as well as its theorization of what center-
right indicates in the Turkish context. 
Another scholar who builds his study on the basis of political parties is Tanel Demirel.  
Tanel Demirel’s two books on the Justice Party and the Democratic Party are significant 
sources for evaluating these two parties’ politics and discourses with special reference to 
the center-right in Turkey.  His works offer an integration of a broad scope of methods.  
Yet Demirel’s account ends in 1980, and does not deal with the Motherland Party and its 
key role in center-right politics in Turkey.   
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 As stated above, the main objective in this dissertation is to investigate and to formulate what center-
right mentality is in Turkey, and the political parties are just a unit of analysis.  
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Any picture of the literature review on the Turkish center-right would be incomplete 
without a reference to İdris Küçükömer.  According to Küçükömer, who likens the left-
right distinction to a progressivist vs. elitist and traditionalist vs. revolutionist cleavage, 
the Turkish right corresponds to the left and the Turkish left corresponds to the right 
when being compared to standard international conceptions of left and right 
(Küçükömer, 1994).  If we are to look for a correlation between socioeconomic 
background and ideological positioning, research measuring political behavior reveals 
that, in general, the base of the left is comprised of relatively wealthier and more 
educated people whereas the social base of the right is comprised of poorer and less-
educated people, which may to some extent support Küçükömer’s diametrical 
opposition of left and right in Turkey (e.g. Çarkoğlu and Avcı, 2002; Rienner, Esmer 
and Sayarı, 2002; Esmer, 2002:100-102; Tosun, 1999; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; 
Çaha, 2009; Hale and Özbudun, 2010).   
Despite these debates and the sometimes contradictory divisions of left and right, we 
should not conclude that the terms left and right are entirely antagonistic and contrary to 
more global understandings of these terms; to do so would risk introducing a 
reductionist way of using these terms to analyze Turkey.  What is crucially revealed 
across these discussions is the blurred and bizarre utilization of right and left in the 
Turkish context, which requires further operationalization of these terms to make them 
more analytically powerful. In order to simplify this operation, in what follows I shall 
suggest utilizing three main perspectives that may distinguish center-right politics and 
discourse in Turkey: democracy, state and secularism.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
 DEMOCRACY AND THE TURKISH CENTER RIGHT 
 
 
3.1. The Content of Democracy 
 
Before evaluating the Turkish center-right in the context of democracy, it is first 
necessary to establish what democracy refers to through a consideration of its various 
interpretations.  Specifically, two main lines of investigation inform our consideration: 
the procedural vs. the substantive employment of democracy.  The former requires 
universal participation (that everyone is enfranchised), the principle of equal vote and a 
degree of responsiveness towards general expectations during periods when the majority 
obtains the power to rule.  The substantive interpretation of democracy, meanwhile, 
attends to democratic ends as well as democratic means, and entails assuring the well-
established principle of the rule of law, the earnest protection of basic liberties and the 
prevention of the abuse of majority rights—all with an eye to social and economic 
equality.  Defining these two categories will give clarity to our evaluation of the Turkish 
center-right’s approach to democracy, which was largely procedural rather than 
substantive. 
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In the minimalist explanation of procedural democracy, elections are given particular 
weight.  Such a theory of democracy dates back to Aristotle’s reflections on democracy 
as a method of achieving a “well-ordered commonwealth” and refers at a basic level to 
allowing the people to make decisions that directly affect government (Aristotle 1981).  
Schumpeter’s reinterpretation of democracy points out some of the unsatisfactory 
dimensions of classical democracy: that it conflated rule by the people with the 
obscurity of the content of the common good, of the procedures to reach that common 
good, of people’s willingness to reach the common good.  Schumpeter also thought that 
classical democracy failed to specify exactly who ‘the people’ are regarding their social 
stratification, sex, age and so on (Schumpeter 2006:243-245).  These and other 
shortcomings led him to propose a more comprehensive concept of democracy.    To 
begin with—and we must keep in mind that democracy is largely procedural in the 
Schumpeterian approach—he argues that the main dynamic of democracy is the “free 
competition for a free vote” (2006:271).  He also calls attention to the necessity of 
additional measures to make democracy more viable.  ‘The people’ central to the 
concept of democracy, he argues, must have a developed sense of morality and capacity, 
which in turn links up to four further prerequisites: the scope of decision making allotted 
to politicians should be restricted by the parliament, decision-making procedures on 
particular issues should be left to specialists and to a loyal and talented bureaucracy, the 
democratic self-control of politicians should be guaranteed without intervening in their 
political power, and tolerance and respect for different opinions should be well-
established (Schumpeter, 2006:290-5).   
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Along similar lines, for Przeworski, democracy “is but a framework within which 
somewhat equal, somewhat effective, and somewhat free people can struggle peacefully 
to improve the world according to their different visions, values, and interests” 
(2010:16).  He emphasizes that, in addition to certain economic, political and 
institutional conditions, the quality of democracy is critical to its very survival 
(2003:16). To describe the transformation of the concept of democracy across time, 
Przeworski compares two editions of the Encyclopedia Britannica (1771 and 1955) and 
identifies an important divergence. The former focuses on the principle of government 
by the people whereas the latter considers free elections, representative institutions, 
responsibility, the liberty and equality of the people and the method of governing as 
central to democracy (Przeworski, 2010:4-2).  Thus, our expectations of democracy 
have expanded over time, pushing its definition beyond a simple electoral system. 
Przeworski’s argument for increasing the quality of democracy also points to four 
challenges that inhibit democracy today: “(1) the incapacity to generate equality in the 
socioeconomic realm, (2) the incapacity to make people feel that their political 
participation is effective, (3) the incapacity to ensure that governments do what they are 
supposed to do and not do what they are not mandated to do, and (4) the incapacity to 
balance order and noninterference” (Przeworski, 2010:1-2).  Democracy emerges from 
his account as an imperfect, unstable theory requiring continual improvement to address 
unmet needs and weaknesses (1999; 2010).  Along similar lines, Rustow postulates 
democracy as a learning process entailing shared attitudes among both politicians and 
citizens, and democratic consolidation comes only after a habituation phase (Rustow 
1970). 
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Linz and Stephan also focus on the consolidation of democracy, and note how, in the 
absence of behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional challenges to the democratic 
system, democracy has become the “only game in town” (1996:5).  Consolidation 
assumes the existence of a state, freedoms promoting a viable civil society, an 
autonomous political society, rule of law, a bureaucratic structure capable of 
implementing democratic norms and an “institutionalized economic society” acting 
between the state and the market (1996:7,11).  Similarly, for Diamond, the presence of a 
constitutional system, along with free, fair, regular and multiparty elections, assure an 
electoral democracy—which cannot be said to exist in a satisfactory fashion either in the 
absence of the rule of law, pluralism, accountability and individual freedoms or in the 
presence of reserved domains for military, bureaucracy or oligarchical powers (2003:34-
35). Against the fetishization of elections in democracies, Terry Karl warns that 
elections generally exclude the preferences of a considerable proportion of the electorate 
compelling them to choose one among many strong alternatives—what Karl dubs the 
“fallacy of electorialism” (1986).   
As the scope of democratic expectations gradually increased in the academic realm, at 
the same time, the emphasis of discussions turned to the substantive side.  
Pseudodemocracy (Highhey and Gunther, 1992), quasidemocracy (Haggard and 
Kaufman, 1992), protodemocracy (Kohli, 1993), facadedemocracy (Lipset, 1994) and 
similarly skeptical terms for democracy underscore that free and fair elections alone are 
not enough to evaluate the degree of democracy in a particular context.  Rather, many 
dynamics—the absence or weakness of civil liberties, public participation in decision-
making procedures, accountability of rulers, the rule of law, a well-established checks 
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and balances system, institutional maturity, a coherent political culture, economic well-
being, the existence of reserved domains and arbitrary rule—must be considered.  
Despite advocating procedural democracy in his 1956 dated Preface to Democratic 
Theory, Dahl argues that the substantive aspects of democracy are as significant as the 
procedural ones, but he notes that in the contemporary world, emphasis is usually on 
broadened procedural tenets (1989).  Nevertheless, his former position leads Dahl to 
coin the term polyarchy.  Evaluating many existing democracies, Dahl distinguishes 
polyarchy from democracy
23
 as a more realistic system defining polyarchy as a 
consensus on the presence of opposition, participation and civil liberties (1971).  Dahl 
asserts the need to secure for citizens the right to formulate and make clear their choices, 
which should be equally valued in the eyes of government (1971:3). Without reducing 
polyarchy to a basic definition of procedural democracy as the presence of free and fair 
elections, Dahl argues that inclusive suffrage, the right to be elected, freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and access to alternative sources of information 
should be present in a polyarchy (1989:221).  Defending polyarchy, O’Donnell adds the 
stipulation that one should also consider accountability and the rule of law in comparing 
existing systems (2010).  Fishkin also underscores the importance, in the context of 
voting, of extensive political participation for a well- running democracy (1995:28).  He 
also offers a schematic definition of substantive democracy based on five prerequisites: 
equal access to accurate information, a substantive balance of divergent thoughts, 
diversity, equal consideration of all positions and conscientiousness (1995). 
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 To Dahl, democracy consists of two dimensions, contestation and inclusion (1971). 
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Unsatisfied with the narrow procedural perception of democracy, which he terms 
“politics as zookeeping”, Benjamin Barber calls for a more participatory “strong 
democracy” that  
[R]ests on the idea of a self-governing community of citizens who are united 
less by homogeneous interests than by civic education and who are made 
capable of common purpose and mutual action by virtue of their civic 
attitudes and participatory institutions rather than their altruism or their good 
nature. Strong democracy is consonant with -indeed it depends upon- the 
politics of conflict, the sociology of pluralism, and the separation of private 
and public realms of action (1984:117). 
 
Regarding the presence of various conceptualizations, Gutmann comes up with six 
alternative definitions of democracies considering their institutional strength, 
inclusiveness and provision of justice.  The six definitions are Schumpeterian, populist, 
liberal, participatory, social and deliberative democracies (1993).  Lijphart also 
distinguishes between majoritarian and pluralist democracies regarding their 
institutional framework and cultural structures.  He sees pluralist democracies as better 
able to provide a broader space for participation, inclusion and consensus (Lijphart, 
1999).  In addition to the institutional prerequisites for a well-running democracy, 
Putnam emphasizes the crucial role of social capital, which transforms gradually 
alongside institutional changes (1993).  Similar to the scholarship on procedural 
democracy, students of substantive democracy have also pointed to a number of 
dimensions that impact the outcomes of democracy, including economics, gender 
equality, ethnic dimensions, social conditions and participation factors (e.g. Basette, 
1980; Cohen 1997; Phillips, 1999; Benhabib, 1996).   
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In general, whereas procedural approaches to democracy are a methodological tenet, a 
substantive perspective stresses the outcomes of democracy.  While the former carries 
the risk of leading to a tyranny of the majority, substantive approaches are often 
criticized as inefficient.  Substantive democracy tends to be more inclusive and 
egalitarian than procedural democracy.  As we shall see in the following sections, this 
distinction sheds important light on the relationship of the Turkish center-right to 
democracy. 
 
3.2. Democracy in Turkey 
 
A persistent theme in the literature on procedural democracy is the centrality of free and 
fair elections to a democratic system. Thinking in terms of very basic procedural 
democracy, then, small steps on the road to democratization began in Turkey just before 
the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.  Unlike the Western tradition 
wherein the history of democratization rested on medieval feudal traditions composed of 
“a legally defined and mutually binding division of powers between a relatively weak 
central authority and well-entrenched local centers of power” corresponding to the 
relative autonomy of the guilds, the church and cities, the Turkish experience did not 
actively possess such catalysts—namely political pluralism and a representative 24 
tradition—for the rapid development of democracy (Özbudun in Brown, 1996:143-2).  
Eventually, following the preliminary spread of elections for the lower local councils in 
                                                             
24
 Özbudun postulates that, though consultative bodies seemed to constitute a tradition of representation, 
in fact they functioned as the supportive bodies of the government without being representative.  The 
establishment of the Grand Council of Justice during the era of Mahmood the 2nd could be seen as a first 
step, encouraging the discussion and preparation of new laws regarding representation (Özbudun in 
Weiner and Özbudun 1982:329). 
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1867, the first Ottoman Constitution of 1876 began to introduce a degree of 
representation.  Yet in the absence of a multiparty system, the first Constitutional period 
preserved the Sultan’s superiority by declaring that “the Sultan was irresponsible for his 
acts”; sovereignty and the right to declare a state of siege remained, in other words, the 
sole power of the Sultan (Devereux, 1963:63-2).  Thus, despite the fact that the 
constitution was still valid, the representative system was shut down within a year, and 
the Sultan did not reconvene the Chamber of Deputies for three decades until transition 
to the Second Constitutional Era (1908-1913), which was launched by the 1908 Young 
Turk Revolution
25
.  
As Özbudun observes, the shift to a constitutional form of government was not the result 
of a widely supported mass movement but of a struggle of a small elitist group, which 
did not lead to any considerable reaction by the people against these changes (in 
Özbudun and Weiner 1982:333-2). With an outcome of the single-party regime of the 
Committee of Union and Progress (the İTC), the Second Constitutionalist Era also led to 
reciprocal coups, suppression of the opposition and the manipulation of 1912 elections 
termed as “elections with a stick” (Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun, 1982:335; Ahmad, 
1993:6-2; Frey, 1965:299-2).  However, by the Second Constitutionalist Era, Ottoman 
politics experienced, for the first time, a system of competitive political party 
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 For a detailed anaylsis of the Young Turks, see: Şükrü Hanioğlu. 1995. The Young Turks in Opposition. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press; Şükrü Hanioğlu. 2001. Preparing for a Revolution: The Young Turks 
1902–1908. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Sina Akşin. 1980. Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki (The 
Young Turks and the Union and Progress). İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi; Carter V. Findley. 1980. 
Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire: the Sublime Porte 1789–1922, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, Chp. 6 and 7; Erik Jan Zürcher. 2010. The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building. 
London: I.B. Tauris. 
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representation
26
 despite the fact that the government, under İTC, occasionally set limits 
on the opposition.  Thus, what the Ottoman heritage to Turkish politics provided was a 
partial institutionalization of democratization—elections and political parties—though 
the Second Constitutional Era did foster a degree of political citizenship and political 
mobilization in the traditions of Turkish politics (Kayalı, 1995:283-2). 
A year after the last Ottoman Chamber of Deputies elections, the Grand National 
Assembly was elected in 1920 during conditions of war yet with considerable 
representation and freedoms.  Given the ethnically, socially and occupationally 
cosmopolitan character of the first Assembly, Frey describes it as a “remarkably 
heterogeneous, cantankerous, and insecure body” (1965:306).  To overcome the 
prevailing heterogeneity and unpredictability of the composition of the first Assembly, 
Mustafa Kemal, a successor of İTC thinking, organized more loyal deputies under the 
roof of the Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti (Defence of Rights Group) in 
1921.  A heterogeneous Second Group splintered from the first group and mainly rested 
on opposition to Mustafa Kemal’s authority.  The former group captured 197 deputies 
compared to the second group’s 118, and 122 deputies belonged to neither group (Frey, 
1965:307).  By the end of 1923, as war conditions ended, a new Assembly was elected 
by a two-stage system,
27
 composed to an important degree of members of the Müdafaa-i 
Hukuk Grubu, which then evolved into the Halk Fırkası (Republican People’s Party, the 
                                                             
26
 Nevertheless, among the six elections conducted in the Ottoman times, the 1912 elections as an 
exemption was called as “sopalı seçimler” (big stick elections) due to lacking competitiveness.  On the 
other hand, this election proliferated the political mobilization.  See Hasan Kayalı. 1995. "Elections and 
the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire," International Journal of Middle East Studies 27: 265-86. 
27
 In fact, this was a continuation of the Ottoman Electoral Law of 1908 that only abolished the taxpaying 
requirements to become an part of the electorate.  Franchise was also lowered to 18 year old males and in 
1930 included women for municipal elections, which expanded in 1934 for the General Elections for 
women who were now also been elected (Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun 1982:337). 
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CHP).  In other words, Mustafa Kemal, who cautiously determined the candidates for 
the new Assembly, purged the opposition from the parliament while his party 
appropriated all the assets and local organizations of the Müdafaa-i Hukuk Grubu 
(Zürcher, 2004:160).  The CHP center also continued to determine candidates in the 
following years.  Despite a small shift after the 1931 elections, only a few nominees—
gradually increasing from four to 30—were allowed by independent candidates in a 
largely symbolic gesture (Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun, 337-2; Frey, 1965:344-2).  
Thus, the Turkish experience until 1946 was based on a single-party regime neither 
more competitive nor more representative than the Second Constitutionalist Era
28
.   
In a single-party system, it is obviously impossible to adequately consolidate and 
strengthen democracy.  After the establishment of the Republic, there were two early 
and short-lived attempts to shift to multiparty politics: the first attempt followed the 
declaration of the Republic in 1923 and the second followed the abolition of the 
Caliphate in 1924 and the resulting adoption of the 1924 Constitution.  As part of the 
new Constitution, a new party, the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver 
Cumhuriyet Partisi, or the TCP) emerged from intra-party opposition within the 
People’s Party (Halk Partisi –the CHP-) in response to the less centralist and 
transformationist—instead of revolutionist—tenets established on 17 November 1924.  
Political and economic liberalism, decentralization, the regulation of the election system 
and respect for religion were central to the TCP’s programme29.  As Ahmad suggests, 
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 Despite two brief attempts in the transition to a multiparty system, in fact, neither the TCF nor the SP 
were able to participate in general elections.  The 1923, 1927, 1931, 1935, 1939 and 1943 elections thus 
all effectively represent a single-party regime (Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun 1982:337). 
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 According to Article 6 of the TCP programme, “The party is respectful to the religious thoughts and 
beliefs” (Fırka, efkar ve itikad-ı diniyyeye hürmetkardır).  This in turn became the rationale for the closure 
of the party.  For further details about the TCP, see Erik Jan Zürcher. 1991. Political Opposition in the 
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excluded groups in the new Turkey, mostly consisting of religious elements, found an 
alternate place to represent themselves with the establishment of the TCP (1991:71).   
After the Sheikh Said rebellion (a rebellion that took place in 1925 to revive the Islamic 
Caliphate through utilizing Kurdish nationalism), the new party was accused of 
colluding with this rebellion, given the widespread perception of the party, among CHP 
circles as a reactionary malformation. The TCP also rejected the Law on the 
Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu) along with martial law provisions that 
provided extensive rights to the government.  With the power gained by this law, the 
government eliminated opposition groups, media and the TCP on the grounds that they 
were supporting the rebellion and exploiting religion for political purposes (Zürcher, 
1991:172).  The party was closed down hastily on 3 June 1925.   
The short experience of the TCP is important in many senses, not the least of which is 
the story it tells of the emergence and definition of a center-right in Turkish politics, 
which arose from opposition to and conflicts over particular issues related to 
representation, economy, religion and the nature of the state.  Furthermore, the demand 
for democracy and liberation for suppressed groups grew with time.  Because the TCP’s 
politics were also based on pragmatism (Ahmad, 1991:79), another shared position of 
the TCP and the Turkish center-right tradition has to do with the mass-oriented political 
strategies they followed in pursuit of political power.  Despite possessing certain 
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similarities with successor center-right parties and serving as a source of inspiration, the 
TCP represents a brief and inexperienced attempt to govern the country. 
In the years following the renewal of the Law of the Maintenance of Order, which lasted 
until 4 March 1929, the austere political atmosphere in Turkey prevented the formation 
of other opposition parties.  In the course of the repeal of the Law on the Maintenance of 
Order as well as the general social discontent brought about by the 1929 Great 
Depression, there emerged a new, more vigilant opening for a multiparty regime.  With 
the support of Mustafa Kemal for a “loyal opposition party with the twin aims of 
channeling the social discontent and of shaking up the lethargic RPP” (Zürcher, 
2004:178), the Free Party (Serbest Fırka) was founded.  Regarding the party 
programme, it is necessary to note here that the party defended republicanist, secularist 
and nationalist tenets while pursuing a more liberal economic framework
30
.  Similar to 
the previous opposition party TCP, the Free Party suggested a more liberal agenda than 
the CHP focusing on individual rights as well as liberal economic policies
31
.  The 
implementation of direct elections rather than a two-tier system, popular control over 
administration and the liberalization of foreign investment and economic development 
were among the party’s expectations (Emrence, 2006:73-3; Frey, 1965:340).  The ruling 
elite of the party
32
 was furthermore composed of Mustafa Kemal’s friends, distinguished 
by their opposition to İsmet İnönü rather than to the Kemalist republic. Moreover, 
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 For further details about the Free Party, see Walter F. Weiker. 1973. Political Tutelage and Democracy 
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31
 Democratic Party leader Adnan Menderes also first became active in politics in the Free Party.  To 
Menderes and Akyol, this clearly indicated the liberal-conservative stance of Menderes and the DP 
(2011:10). 
32
 As Frey interestingly notes that, in comparison to the CHP elite, both the Progressive Republican Party 
and the Free Party elite were less local, more intellectual and more likely to have been born abroad 
(1965:329-13). 
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although the party gave no place to Islamist or Kurdish precepts in its official 
documents, it became an alternative for opposition groups (Weiker in Heper and 
Landau, 1991:88-2).   In the 1930 elections, the Free Party won roughly 6% of 
municipalities in an overtly suspicious election environment.  This was also the time of 
the Menemen Incident, which is widely interpreted as a reactionary movement 
demanding the return of Sharia.  In the aftermath of the election and the Menemen 
incident, Mustafa Kemal could no longer remain impartial paving the way for the 
closure of the party by the party chairman Fethi Okyar who was also his friend. 
Thus, the single-party tenure in Turkey shows limits in its capacity to serve as a 
competitive, representative and suitable arena for political participation and 
mobilization.  The period appears to have been a process of institutionalization and 
consolidation for the young Republic and its secular and nationalist principles.  The era 
of 1923-1945 was, so to speak, a period of training or an apprenticeship that the 
Republican regime used to experiment with educating the masses and refining the 
details of its civilizing mission (Özbudun in Özbudun and Weiner, 1982:339; Göle, 
1996:57-5). 
According to the existing literature on Turkish politics, the democratization of Turkey is 
synonymous with the transition to a multiparty period after May 1945 (e.g. Zürcher, 
2004; Ahmad, 1993; Özbudun, 2000; Heper et al. 1998; Goloğlu, 2013; Burçak, 1979).  
This process is defined as a consequence of “apocalyptic days” and particular 
disappointments (Lewis, 1968:487).  As a result of domestic economic problems and the 
international conjuncture following the Second World War, the CHP was obliged to 
propose a political alternative that thereby paved the way for the democratization 
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process in Turkey with the rise of multipartyism.  The international environment, 
foreign influences and domesstic socioeconomic changes combined with the rise of a 
commercial bourgeoise made this transition more feasible (Zürcher, 2004; Eroğul, 2003; 
Koçak, 2010).  Alongside the external political and internal economic factors, the 
opposition’s moderation and enthusiam also likely expedited the process of change.  In 
particular, İsmet İnönü’s positive and mature attitude towards the transition to 
democracy greatly facilitated the transformation (Heper 1998; Özbudun in Weiner and 
Özbudun, 1982:341; Burçak, 1979:53).  Hence, any picture of Turkish transition to 
democracy would be incomplete without considering “the spread of intense, personally 
salient democratic conviction over important portions of the Turkish elite” (Frey, 
1965:349). Turkish transition to democracy can be said to have taken place in a 
relatively peaceful, conflict-free environment.  However, it is hard to describe the 
process as swift as even after the transition, some authoritarian figures from the CHP 
such as Recep Peker tried to limit opposition activities (Özbudun in Özbudun and 
Weiner, 1982:341).   
Alongside five overt or covert military interventions such as those in 1960, 1971, 1980, 
1997 and 2007 and the persistent domination of the bureaucratic classes, the imperfect 
attitudes of civil politicians also paved the way for the spread of democratic dissensus in 
Turkey.  The positions of the various center-right parties on matters of democracy are 
relatively consistent and coherent and constituted the backbone of the establishment of 
Turkish democracy as these parties ruled the country for years.  We can thus analyze 
how the Turkish center-right implemented democracy in two main domains: 1) the 
extent to which pro-democratic policies and discourses—which emphasized both 
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elections and the national will— were intended to foster close relations with the masses 
and establish the center-right as the representative of the periphery and 2) the relatively 
limited implementation of democratic reform, due to the parties’ reliance on a 
procedural democratic ideal rather than a pluralist, substantive and inclusive one.  To 
further understand the Turkish center-right’s perception of democracy, it is necessary to 
analyze more closely the policies and discourses of the Democratic Party, Justice Party 
and Motherland Party since these three right-wing parties were capable of ruling the 
country as one-party governments for years.  
 
3.3. The Democrat Pary and Democracy 
 
DP’s policies and discourses stressed representation of the periphery, mobilization of the 
masses, advocating the national will and the institutionalization of free, fair and 
competitive elections. The DP took a number of steps towards the further 
democratization of the country with regards to freedom of speech, social cohesion and 
the abandonment of arbitrary state rule.  Nevertheless, the DP could not develop a 
comprehensive liberal and substantive democratic framework.  Tanel Demirel notes that, 
without considering checks and balance mechanisms, a classical understanding of 
democracy as the “freedom to do everything unless disturbing other individuals” was at 
the core of the DP mentality (2011:65).  Sütçü evaluates the DP’s approach to 
democracy with special emphasis to Menderes and Bayar as a minimalist interpretation 
of democracy (2011).  This dissertation also argues that, despite representing a more 
democratic alternative compared to its center-left and far-right alternatives, there were 
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particular limits to the DP’s espousal of democracy, which occasionally impeded the 
spread of a more robust form of democracy.  Procedural explanations as well as 
majoritarianism may help to explain DP’s relationship to democracy.  To analyze both 
sides of the coin, it is possible to evaluate the issue under two main headings: the 
democratic policies of the DP on the one hand and, on the other hand, limits of the DP’s 
perception of democracy.   
 
3.3.1. Democratic Policies of the DP 
 
Before the establishment of the DP, the intra-party opposition within the CHP, out of 
which the DP rose, was also to some extent related to differences of opinion on the 
function of a political party and on what is to be expected from politics. During the 
period of one-party rule, a second group arose from the CHP and proposed what it called 
Dörtlü Takrir (the Memorandum of the Four) in order to address what it saw as a 
democratic deficit in terms of rule of law, political rights and liberties and national 
sovereignty.  Having future implications on the DP’s perception of democracy, the 
Memorandum of the Four states that it is necessary “to search for the measures 
necessary to enable Parliament’s supervision (over the executive) in accordance with not 
only the form but also the spirit of the Constitution given that the parliament’s authority 
to control the government is the most natural result of the principle of national 
sovereignty” as well as “[t]o provide the opportunity for the citizens to use the political 
rights and freedoms granted in the 1921 Constitution (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye)” and “[t]o 
restructure the party studies in accordance with the aforementioned objectives” (Sütçü 
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2011:39).  After the rejection of the proposal
33
, three of the four deputies in question, 
namely Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Refik Koraltan, were ousted from the CHP.  
Celal Bayar, the fourth member of the Memorandum and a close friend of Mustafa 
Kemal, decided to resign from the party.  These people were also the founders of the 
Democratic Party and the backbone of Turkish center-right politics, which from the 
outset emphasized representation of the masses in the prevailing center-periphery 
cleavage.   
To some scholars, beyond democratic demands, it was The Land Reform Bill (Agrarian 
Law) that was central to the debates within the CHP.  This law, it has been argued, was 
behind the desire of Menderes and his friends to establish a new party (Eroğul, 2003; 
Aydemir, 1976; Zürcher, 2004; Ahmad, 1993).  In addition to economic concerns, the 
rejection of the Land Reform by the founders of the DP was also closely related to the 
acceptance of particular social interests against the populism of the CHP, which echoes 
the struggle between a monolithic center vs. heterogenic periphery duality. Yet the DP 
founders’ opposition to land reforms was not solely economic in nature. Rather, they 
opposed the reform on constitutional grounds framing it as a violation of property 
rights
34
. Thus a statist vs. liberal opposition, along with a center-periphery cleavage, was 
present from the very foundation of the DP which nourished the DP’s democratic 
stance
35
. 
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 According to Metin Toker, President İsmet İnönü demanded the rejection of this proposal as a tactical 
move meant to force these four deputies to form a new party (1991a:67) . 
34
 For details of the discussions, see: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 01.06.1945, 04.06.1945 and 11.06.1945. 
35
 This dissertation is close to the idea that the rise of the DP as a new party was closely linked to the 
center-periphery cleavage.  Nevertheless, there are various readings on the existence of the DP.  As 
suggested above, to Ahmad, Eroğul, Zürcher and Aydemir, the foundation of the DP was strongly related 
to the socio-economic concerns that rested on social class.  For example, Eroğul analyzes law number 
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When the DP was first established, Celal Bayar responded to claims of collusion by 
stating “Our sincere desire is that: it is very necessary to realize the national will and 
national sovereignty in accordance with the laws” (Son Posta, 08 Ocak 1946).    The DP 
program, which aligned itself with liberalism and democracy (Eroğul, 2003:31), 
reserved a prominent place for a number of issues related to democracy: serving for the 
improvement of democracy (Article 1), perceiving democracy as the most proper 
principle for realizing national interest and human honor (Article 3), dealing with 
matters of human rights and liberties (Article 4, 8), the right to found associations 
(Article 7) and being neither outside nor above the nation (Article 19).   
After the contested 1946 elections, in the 1950 elections, the DP obtained 53.3 percent 
of the votes which corresponded to 83.57 percent of the seats in the parliament, namely 
408 deputies out of 487 (Koçak, 1989:153)36.  As a result of this victory, the DP became 
the party in power. On this period, Samet Ağaoğlu wrote “the victory of the Democrat 
Party means the victory of democracy and of liberty, which is also consonant with a 
world trend” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 02.06.1950 p.94).  To the Democratic Party 
mentality, their party represented the “will of the nation” in opposition to the RPP and 
its elitist cadre.
37
   
                                                                                                                                                                                   
4785 regarding the nationalization of all forests accepted on 09.07.1945 and the land reform debates as a 
breaking point of the DP from the CHP (2004:19, 26-2).  Utilizing Marxist jargon, Eroğul states that: 
“The DP was the comprador; the main feature of the party was this” (2004:273).  Islamist Necip Fazıl on 
the other hand argues that the establishment of the DP depended on a simple antithesis of the CHP rather 
than a grounded worldview.  He states that the DP “Unified around the thoughtlessness thought” (Fazıl 
1993:48) To Hakan Yılmaz, the foreign influence was the main motive on the formation of the DP. See 
Hakan Yılmaz. 1997. “Democratization from above in Response to the International Context,” New 
Perspectives on Turkey 17(4)1-38. 
36
 In the same elections, the CHP gained 69 seats with 39,9 percent of the votes. 
37
 Certain skepticism towards the will of nation is evident in the works of elite who were close to the 
CHP.  Aydemir for instance describes the post-1950 elections by saying “now the speech belongs to the 
crowds” with an implied suspicion towards the rationality of the masses (1976:157). 
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In the first DP Government Programme, which emphasized respect for human rights, 
rule of law and a balanced and stable system based on the principle of separation of 
powers, Menderes declared that, as the first government in Republican history coming to 
power by the national will, the party should rebuild the institutional framework to ensure 
the national will and citizen rights (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29.05.1950 p.30).  
Motivated by having come to power with great national support, the DP took specific 
steps towards the democratization of the country. Among these changes, the DP 
abandoned the extensive privileges of the government related to control of the press and 
ended arrests without trial in 1950.
38
  Furthermore, the DP changed Law Number 5545 
by introducing the principle of examination and approval by the Higher Election 
Council (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu –the YSK) during elections39 allowing the extension of 
religious rights
40
 and abolishing certain arbitrary laws such as the so-called road tax.
41
  
The DP government issued an amnesty on 14 July 1950 that applied to a number of 
significant intellectuals and artists such as Nazım Hikmet, who was a well-known left-
wing poet.  This can be evaluated as a step towards the institution of social peace and 
tranquility.
42
  To the DP, the aim of this law was to initiate a process of reconciliation 
and to rebuild social cohesion after some of the more regrettable instances of the past 
few decades, during the democratic transition, the Republican reforms or the years of 
the Second World War, for instance (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 13.07.1950, p.1-8).  
Nevertheless, such measures, however much they aimed to enhance the democratic 
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 Law Number 5687.  See debates related to this law: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 14.07.1950, p.721-21. 
39
 On 17 February 1954 this change was made with Law Number 6272.  
40
 These issues will be evaluated in the Secularism chapter. 
41
 Road Tax enforced the citizens to work on the road construction processes unless they paid a large 
amount of money.  See Assembly discussions related to abandonment of this law: TBMM Tutanak 
Dergisi, 25.02.1952. 
42
 This Law was interpreted as an attempt of the opposition to eface the CHP heritage. (e.g. Eroğul 
1993:101) 
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atmosphere, were simply not enough to establish a liberal and substantive democratic 
framework.  Despite making frequent mention of “the national will” and democracy in 
speeches and documents, one may argue that the discursive position of the DP with 
regards to democracy was not adequately reflected in its policies after the early 1950s.
43
   
The DP’s waning enthusiasm for democracy was reflected in the policies of subsequent 
government programmes as well
44
.  The 2
nd
 Menderes Government Programme (1951), 
for instance, defined the main duty of government as the protection of the “14 May 1950 
Reform”, which was basically composed of the protection of a very minimalist form of 
procedural democracy as well as some attention paid to freedom of conscience and 
freedom of thought.  Unlike the first programme, this programme introduced certain 
limits on the freedom of the press (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 30.03.1951 p.61-2).  The 3
rd
 
Menderes Government Programme (1954) emphasized the abuse of the democratic 
atmosphere by the opposition party and the press (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 24.05.1954 
p.23), which was reflected in the following programmes as well.  Again unlike the 
previous Menderes government programmes, the 5
th
 Menderes Government Programme 
(1957) began with issues of economic development rather than democracy (a pattern 
followed by DP’s center-right successors) (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 25.11.1957). When 
center-right parties were unable to formulate considerable pro-democratic policies, they 
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 In that sense, Demirel notes that to the DP, coming to government with great national support and 
removing the CHP from the government were perceived as the indicators of a perfect democratic system 
whereas the expansion of liberties was not in the core of the DP agenda (2005:499).  
44
 Despite losing the enthusiasm to liberalize the democracy, one may argue that up until the 1960 military 
intervention, the DP continued to utilize national will and sovereignty rhetoric.  In that regard, on 18 May 
1960, Menderes declared in his Turgutlu speech that “the ones who assault the government, are in fact 
resisting the national sovereignty” (Burçak 1998:734). After the 27 May military intervention, to the 
officers trying to arrest him, Celal Bayar stated that “I am here by the will of the nation; only the will of 
the nation may remove me from here” (Ağaoğlu 1972:145).   
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preferred to focus on economic development and economic growth issues, in which they 
are generally successful. 
As reflected in the party programmes, the emphasis that the DP placed on substantive 
democratic change decreased in time.  In other words, perceiving democracy as a means 
to obtain power, DP struggled to establish an idea of sovereignty belonging to the nation 
rather than to the state. In the eyes of the DP, the excessive rights enjoyed by CHP and 
the state were to be transferred to the will of the nation while granting absolute power to 
the representative of the masses (Zürcher 322-2)45.  The problem was the party’s facile 
understanding of“a minimalist procedural approach todemocracy” that concentrated all 
power in the hands of the governing party simply on the grounds that they were elected.  
For this reason, Menderes was sometimes accused by the opposition of trying to 
establish a regime of irresponsibility (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 04.12.1957 p.58-2) 
without concerning itself with checks and balances.   
Democracy discourse of the DP was also molded with a considerable amount of 
romanticism
46
 along with mysticism as well. The tendency to perceive democracy as a 
sacred thing was observed in the speeches of the DP members.  While describing the 
establishment period of the DP between the years of 1946-1950, Ahmet Hamdi Başar 
noted a belief among party members that “democracy, like other sacred things, may 
survive only if it is faithfully respected” (Koraltürk, 2007:24).  Menderes often 
compared democracy to “an exotic flower which requires additional things to make it 
                                                             
45
 It is necessary to mention here that the existing 1924 Constitution during the DP reign did not provide 
domains for balancing mechanisms such as a second Assembly or the Constitutional Court.  For a detailed 
analysis of the 1924 Constitution, see Ergun Özbudun. 2012. 1924 Anayasası. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
46
 In those years, an article justifying that kind of romantic perception of democracy was published. See 
John M. Anderson. 1950. “Romantic Democracy,” American Quarterly 2(3): 251-258. 
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survive” (Ağaoğlu, 2004:117).  Ağaoğlu also described the National Assembly as a 
sacred and holy place and suggested making the 14
th 
of May a national festival (TBMM 
Tutanak Dergisi, 02.06.1950 p.96-5).  Similarly, on 6 September 1958 Menderes 
described the CHP’s “intention…to assault our holy Kaabe, the Grand National 
Assembly (…) and come to power without elections” (Aydemir, 1976:315).  And in the 
3
rd
 DP Government Programme (1954), again employing a mystical language to talk 
about democracy, Menderes pointed to a combination of respect and aspiration in the 
hearts as the steadiest guarantee of democratic administration (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 
24.05.1954 p.23-2).  The DP understanding of democracy thus deployed a mystic and 
romantic rhetoric occasionally even linking this attitude with patriarchal themes—for 
instance, in the motto that likened their political struggles not to “an issue of democracy 
but…an issue of blood feud” (Aydemir, 1976:309).  In the second DP congress on 20 
June 1949, the DP declared the “violation of the ballot equal to the rape of our decency” 
(Tunaya, 1952:676; Eroğul, 2003:76), which suggests a predilection to use such 
combatant rhetoric to communicate their understanding of democracy.   
Hence, in these early years of Turkish democracy, the DP’s perception of democracy, at 
least if assessed in relation to substantive democracy theory, was far from satisfactory. 
And indeed, as we saw above, their approach to procedural democracy also could have 
been expanded and improved.  The DP, however, did not deal much with such 
improvements and anchored its sense of democracy to two main points: 1) establishing 
close relations with the people so as to position themselves as the representative of the 
national will resulting in both popular support and a degree of responsiveness to the 
demands of the masses and 2) emphasizing free and fair elections, which helped to 
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consolidate the institutionalization of elections in Turkey.  That said, there were clear 
shortcomings in the DP’s approach to democracy—specifically, in its relations with the 
opposition, the press, universities and the issue of the Committee of Investigation. 
Nevertheless, structural deficits and the CHP’s relatively more authoritarian perspective 
made the DP the most viable defender of democracy at the time.  
 
3.3.1.1. Forging Close Relations with the People: the DP as the 
Representative of the “National Will” 
 
The Turkish center-right, unlike its center-left rivals, was able, to a considerable degree, 
to mobilize masses with the claim of representing their interests far more than the CHP 
blind attitude to the existence of particularistic social interests.  Appreciating the center-
periphery cleavage—which preceded and was strengthened during the DP’s tenure—is 
of central importance in understanding how center-right parties were able to establish 
close relations with the masses as well as how they differ from the center-left. 
Adapting Shils’s center-periphery metaphor47 to the Turkish case, Şerif Mardin argues 
that the center represents a set of core values that enable the state to work accordingly.    
The periphery, meanwhile, corresponds to social, institutional and geographic spaces 
beyond the center.  Informed by a state mentality and by a fascination with rational 
bureaucracy, the Young Turk Movement and the Müdafaa-i Hukuk Grubu during the 
War of Independence, which, as noted above, eventually became the CHP, became the 
default representative of the center. At the time of the War of Independence and the 
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 To Shils, every society has a “center” composed of influential values and authority that provides its 
institutions an important space to maneuver. The state, in most cases, conveys and constitutes the center.   
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Turkish Revolution, the social composition that produced the CHP could be defined by 
the alliance of the military, bureaucracy, intellectuals and local notables (Özbudun, 
1981:82; 1976:43), largely opposed to the periphery.   
As proof of the center-CHP amalgamation, in the 4
th
 General Assembly meeting of the 
CHP on May 2, 1935, the party acknowledged the unification of party and state; the 
Minister of the Interior became the Vice Chairman, and governors were appointed to 
provincial chairmen of the CHP.  On 13 February 1937, the six arrows of the CHP 
(Republicanism, Statism, Secularism, Nationalism, Populism and Reformism) were 
written into the Constitution.  Summarizing the function of the CHP, Frey notes that 
“not surprisingly, the standard Kemalist attitude toward the role of the political party 
was to view it primarily as a mechanism for social control from above” (1965:304).  
Therefore, before the transition to multiparty politics, the CHP was an instrument for 
introducing top-down reforms rather than a mediator between the government and the 
public.  With the establishment of the DP, this perception began to change; the DP 
began to seek popular support, which altered (however slightly) the CHP’s vision of 
what a political party should be
48
.   
Following the transition to multiparty politics, the existence of the DP was cause for 
concern for the CHP and its bureaucratic allies.  The suspicions of the bureaucrats 
towards those who gained political power through the DP rested on a belief that the 
country needed to be governed by a skilled and experienced cadre, more than by 
populist politicians, so as to develop much-needed public policies (Heper, 1976:516; 
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 During the 1945-1950 period, the CHP, under ballot pressure, pursued more compromising policies 
with the periphery, especially in the religious realm.  More on this in the chapter analyzing the center-
right’s approach to secularism. 
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1992:175).  The CHP, meanwhile, was reluctant to concede offices to the Democrats so 
suddenly in the 1946 elections.  In other words, given the Kemalist modernization 
project’s denial of mobilization and social commitment as essential elements of political 
strategy, the CHP espoused “the old Ottoman idea of the state being solicitous of the 
interests of its subjects: the protective state disturbing justice on the one hand, and 
abundance on the other.  But this time it was the periphery who had preempted this 
stance” (Mardin, 1973:184). Illustrating the attitude of the CHP to the masses, İnönü 
rhetorically asked, “Was it ever heard of that any dictator travelled from one place to 
another one in order to be approved by the citizens?”—the subtext being, he was not a 
dictator because he worked to gain the support of the public (Burçak, 1998:43). Further 
interpreting this statement, one may argue that the CHP perceived the propagation of 
their policies as somewhat degrading, even in the election process. Similarly, across DP 
governments, the CHP elite stated that “It is enough! We [have] suffered too much from 
the government depending ignorant majority” (Ağaoğlu, 1972:186).  Similarly, in the 
course of the 1950 elections, İnönü made it a point of pride that he did not reestablish 
the Independence Tribunals and was tolerant of criticisms and discussion (Burçak, 
1998:45)—which hints at the poor perception of the CHP’s democratic record. The 
state-party equation of the CHP and their elitist and condescending attitude towards the 
masses gave rise to the DP, who managed to reach the masses through successful 
methods of communication and interaction further bolstering their claim to be the true 
representatives of the periphery. 
In an effort to win the support of the periphery, the DP claimed that no single class or 
ideology united DP supporters since it was ‘the people’, not a platform, that constituted 
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the core of the party (Ağaoğlu 1972:46, Tunaya 1952:649, Bayar 1968:41-2; Koraltürk 
2007:20-2).  The DP intended to embrace the periphery—that is, all who were excluded 
from participation in governance during CHP’s tenure. Yet the periphery, one may 
recall, was not homogeneous; DP supporters included peasants, workers, new 
intellectuals, tradesmen, people with hybrid identities and would-be rural-urban 
migrants (Sencer, 1971:232-8; Ağaoğlu 2004:63; Aydemir, 1976:220; Eroğul, 2003; 
Sarıbay in Heper and Landau, 1991:121, Demirel, 2011:37, Zürcher, 2004:329). 49  
Stressing the diverse character of the periphery, Özbudun states that “The DP was able 
to unite the peripheral, cultural (i.e. religious), and socio-economic (i.e. bourgeois) 
oppositions” (1976:55). Celal Bayar has also written about how the suppression that 
CHP introduced in certain rural areas to get the support of the people had a boomerang 
effect, and the DP enjoyed widespread support in such areas (1969:72-2).   
The DP thus resonated with many who felt previously disregarded and excluded. 
Analyzing the emergence and ascent of the DP, Ağaoğlu lists, as important factors, the 
DP’s ability to reach small villages as well as to listen to public and articulate the 
demands of the people (Ağaoğlu, 1972:7-2). Similarly, Ahmet Hamdi Başar notes that 
peasants unable to enter the office of the district governor during the CHP period began 
to come to Ankara and share their problems with ministers—even the prime minister—
during the DP’s rule (Koraltürk, 2007:288). Metin Toker also relays an example from 
Cumhuriyet on 8 June 1950, an announcement stating that formal requests are no longer 
required to see the President: “Anyone who wants to visit Celal Bayar may see him in 
the Çankaya Palace” (1991a:45). Other center-right leaders adopted the same policy.  
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 To Eroğul and Sencer, the DP was primarily a bourgeois party, yet they also accepted the cosmopolitan 
character of the DP supporters. 
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When the Assembly was on holiday, DP deputies were expected to travel to the regions 
they represented to listen to local problems, something above and beyond simply 
greeting the public, and quite uncommon before DP rule (Burçak, 1998:79).  Ağaoğlu 
also notes that, in order to witness the court case of a DP member subjected to arbitrary 
state punishment due to his political leanings, Ağaoğlu himself walked for six hours to 
reach Erzurum on a cold winter night, an act that greatly impressed local citizens. In 
Ağaoğlu’s account, the respect that people developed for him and for the DP more 
generally had to do with their efforts to defend the national will vis-à-vis the state 
(1972:80-2, 1992:316).  The DP tenure, in short, brought about unprecedented forms of 
mobilization and involvement of the masses in politics.  
In the view of the DP elite, the party was determined to carry out transformation from 
the bottom up.  Celal Bayar contrasted this determination to a style of top-down rule in 
place since Sultan Selim III  (1969:41).  The party claimed to respond to the demands of 
the people rather than trying to shape them according to the state’s expectations. 
Framing itself as responsible to the national will, the DP likened itself to and allied itself 
with the masses and portrayed itself as the true representative of the nation. Menderes 
thus declared it “almost impossible to remove the power of liberty from the heart of the 
Turkish nation… If you are able to expunge the Democratic Party from this country, 
first of all you should remove the burning love of liberty from every citizen’s heart” 
(Esirci, 1967:74).  Tevfik İleri thus equated Menderes’ probability of defeat on the 16 
September 1951 mid-term elections to the “defeat of the country” if such a thing were to 
occur (Toker, 1991a:145).  As the well-known DP motto “Enough, the word belongs to 
the nation” (Enough, now the people have their say –Yeter! Söz milletindir!) suggests, 
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the party conscientiously positioned itself in opposition to arbitrary bureaucratic rule, 
which can also be interpreted as a shift of power from statist to political elites (Sarıbay 
in Heper and Landau, 1991:119; Özbudun, 1995:16-2; Demirel, 2011:55).  The ascent of 
the DP, in other words, “can be interpreted as the victory of the periphery” (Özbudun, 
1976:52).  
The cosmopolitan origin of the DP elite (composed of farmers, artisans, intellectuals and 
professionals who opposed the military-bureaucratic structure of the CHP) enabled the 
DP to become more convincing in the eyes of the people. In comparison to the CHP 
elite, the DP elite was younger, less experienced in politics, more local, likely to have 
been born in the Aegean and Marmara regions and more likely to have pursued 
professional occupations instead of working in the public sector.  The number of 
bureaucrats and soldiers was low among DP deputies, while the number of lawyers and 
businessmen was quite high (Frey, 1965:351-2; Özbudun, 1995:9; Zürcher, 2004:21).  
Despite being a former CHP notable, the economist Celal Bayar was different than 
İnönü and Atatürk in that he was raised in a religious family without obtaining a higher 
education degree; he also did not come from a military background (Aydemir, 
1976:176-3; Frey, 1965:351).  In Menderes and Akyol’s terms, Celal Bayar was “the 
unique civilian portrait of the early Republic” (2011:143).  Similarly, Adnan Menderes 
was a large-scale farmer and landowner with a good understanding of the problems and 
conditions of the periphery.  His interests were largely in land and productivity rather 
than bureaucracy.  These interests were far from irrelevant for Turkey in the 1950s, 
 89 
when the majority of the population lived in rural areas and worked in agriculture
50
.   
Representing the periphery and establishing close relations with the masses not only 
depended on the occupations and social backgrounds of Democrats but also on the 
ability of DP elites to successfully craft a public image. As stated above, the DP elite 
visited rural areas, even villages, and made efforts to enter into the daily lives of the 
masses.  DP members in leadership positions, especially Menderes, tried to show that 
their daily life practices resembled those of the masses. Thus Ağaoğlu states that 
“Menderes’ attitudes and behaviors resemble those of an Anatolian peasant, different 
than arrogant, educated city dwellers.  In that regard, Menderes does not prefer to go to 
the cinema, opera or such of activities by himself” (2004:35-2). By the same token, 
Menderes’ principal clerk Yavuzalp also notes that on foreign visits Menderes did not 
go shopping for luxury goods and preferred a modest menu (Yavuzalp, 1991:60,110-2).  
Menderes also frequently visited the construction areas of state investments and drank 
tea with the workers (Menderes and Akyol, 2011:135), which became a tradition for 
subsequent center-right leaders, especially Demirel, Özal and Erdoğan.   
Compare this, however, to the fact that Menderes graduated from the American College; 
attending the college implied an extraordinary background in those times. His wife also 
belonged to a noble family composed of politicians, men of letters and intellectuals. 
Both he and his wife had a modern outward appearance as well.  However, what 
differentiated the DP elite from the CHP was their capacity to adopt and strategically 
deploy both traditional and modern styles of living.  This shifting, pragmatic nature of 
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 However, the distinction between the DP and CHP elite should not be reduced to such basic elements as 
regime and Republic. Since many of them came to the DP after having held CHP chairs, the DP elite 
generally opposed neither the Republican regime nor the basic tenets of Kemalist reforms.   
 
 90 
the DP and, more generally, of the Turkish center right helped the DP and its successors 
gain a reputation for being the authentic representatives of the periphery. 
A main dynamic differentiating the DP from the CHP was the human factor—by which 
we mean both party members and supporters (Ağaoğlu, 1972:46; Tunaya, 1952:649; 
Aydemir, 1976:174).  Positioned on the crowded peripheral wing rather than the 
bureaucratic center and pursuing a political strategy to please the people made the DP 
the forerunner of democracy in the Turkish context and enabled the party to mix easily 
with the masses. The party’s main problematique from the outset focused on democracy, 
which primarily referred to the national will and the ideal of national sovereignty vis-à-
vis the center’s domination. Briefly, the DP’s approach to democracy emphasized 
people’s increased involvement in politics, even if the scope of this involvement largely 
had to do with voting and developing personal relations with policy-makers. Since CHP 
was not concerned with winning the support of peasants to expand its popular support 
(Özbudun, 1976:44, 53; Dodd, 1983:81), the DP successfully capitalized on this 
situation and fostered a peasant-noble collaboration via the mobilization of the masses.  
The DP explained its rule through a slogan declaring that “sovereignty belongs to the 
nation and the nation elected the DP; thus the DP represents the nation”, which resulted 
in the conclusion that the sovereignty belongs to the DP.  In the eyes of the DP, then, 
free and fair elections were one of the most significant instruments to realize the 
national will.  Along these lines, to better understand the DP’s relationship to 
democracy, we should consider how the DP employed free and fair elections. 
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3.3.1.2. The Question of Free and Fair Elections 
 
Even the most minimalist procedural theory of democratic theory recognizes the 
significance of the institutionalization of free and fair elections.  To the DP, free and fair 
elections were one of the most important indicators of the establishment of national 
sovereignty. Emphasizing free and fair elections in the Party Programme, the DP states 
that any behavior that blemishes the freedom of the elections should be counted as a 
crime against national sovereignty (Articles 9 & 10). Immediately following the 
establishment of the DP, the party struggled to guarantee free and fair elections.  The 
CHP, as the state party, meanwhile, made use of vast government privileges during the 
municipal and general elections of 1946, which was harshly criticized by the DP.  
Analyzing various instances of transition to democracy, Joseph employs the concept of 
“democracy as deception” (1998:56,59).  Shedler similarly interprets this concept as 
saying that when authoritarian rulers “stand for elections not to lose power but to 
legitimize their continuity in office, they commonly try to distort and control the 
electoral process in order to minimize the risk of defeat” (Schedler, 2002:103).  It is 
possible to argue that the CHP followed the same strategy during the 1946 elections, 
which provided one more term in office for the party.  Nevertheless, this deceptive 
democratic experience only aggrieved the DP and laid the groundwork for the party to 
build its image around the demand for free and fair elections, which were framed as 
essential to the actualization of the nation’s will and true democracy. 
The 1946 election process is crucial to understanding the insistence of the DP on free 
and fair elections, and thus deserves further attention.  Debates and suspicions in fact 
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began before the elections.  The ruling party threatened to cancel the multiparty 
elections—a threat, of course, to the DP.  Nihat Erim from the CHP warned, in an 
attempt to legitimize the arbitrary election process, that “in the event of disturbance in 
the social structure, it is then necessary to cover the god of liberty with a shawl 
(temporarily forget about liberty)” and to construct a top-down authority (Ulus, 
30.05.1946).  Just before the elections, on June 5th, the Election Law was changed, and 
the date of the election was declared just 18 days before voting, in an effort to limit the 
advance of the newly emerged opposition party (Bayar, 1969:56).  Thus, with law 
number 4918, single-stage elections with an open vote and secret counting principles 
were carried out without any judicial oversight while election councils, composed of 
people close to CHP, were authorized to announce the results (Albayrak, 2004:84-2).  
Thus the ruling party’s unfair supremacy on the election process led, in turn, to 
widespread suspicions among the public and the opposition. 
Menderes also weighed in on these elections, arguing that the governing party’s 
precautions were meant to complicate the increasingly favorable light in which much of 
the country viewed the DP as well as to suppress the masses via governors, the changing 
of the election date, and weakening the DP (Vatan, 18.07.1946).  In order to indicate the 
extent of the unreliability of the election process, Celal Bayar, along with many DP 
deputies, argued that the CHP utilized fake election documents.  CHP interference in the 
elections also included monitoring phone calls and written communication between DP 
members, restricting communication between the DP center and party organizations and 
removing of DP placards (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 21.02.1951; 26.08.1946 p.95; Bayar, 
1969:55-2; Ağaoğlu 1972:119-11).   Fuat Köprülü further notes that CHP attempts to 
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control the elections even included burning the votes of the opposition (TBMM Tutanak 
Dergisi, 26.08.1946 p.120). 
Another criticism of the absence of free and fair elections accused the CHP of taking 
advantage of its access to state opportunities to attract public support in the elections.  
For instance, Bayar argues that, before the elections, the Ministry of Interior propagated 
flyers supporting the CHP and criticizing the DP via Türk Kuşu planes belonging to the 
state (1969:72).  Köprülü has shown that district governors had village headmen take an 
oath to work for the benefit of CHP before the elections (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 
26.08.1946 p.121).  Some of these arguments were also verified by state administrators. 
Istanbul governor Lütfi Kırdar acknowledged the pressure on him to modify the 1946 
election results in favor of the CHP (Sarol, 1983:224).  The 1946 elections were, thus, 
far from free and fair and would continue to be discussed in the following years as 
well.
51
  Even though the DP won the government, the DP continued to refer to the 1946 
elections in its political rhetoric.  In 1953 for instance, Menderes recalled the 1946 
elections with these words: “They lost in the 1946 elections but they did not.  They 
could not win in 1946 but they won with intervention that enabled them to stay in 
power.  In 1950, they lost in the face of the great national mutiny” (TBMM Tutanak 
Dergisi, 04.12.1953 p.175).  Hence, this issue remained a point of political contention in 
the following years. 
In short, when the DP emerged as a new political actor, the one-party state system and 
its privileges were still in force with the first elections between CHP and DP ending in a 
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 These criticisms generally took place in the Assembly meetings and public speeches of the DP.  Media 
sources could rarely relay these discussions due to government pressure. The newspapers Yeni Sabah and 
Gerçek were closed, for instance, after they published Celal Bayar’s claims related to the 1946 elections 
(Albayrak 2004:90-2). 
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failure of democratic means.  In such a circumstance, the DP saw elections as one of the 
most important requirements of democracy and maintained that only the establishment 
of a free and fair election system would bring about the power and legitimacy of the DP.  
The unfair defeat of the DP in the 1946 elections also helped to accelerate its attempts to 
increase its public identity (Bayar, 1969; Burçak, 1970; Demirel, 2011).  As the 
aggrieved party in the elections, the DP built its image on a concern for free and fair 
elections since the party both relied on and respected the nation.  In the Party 
Programme, the DP underscored this stance stating that the party “believes in the 
political maturity of the Turkish nation” (Article 3). The Democrats also frequently 
condemned the CHP’s perception of the people.  Köprülü notes “In contrast to the DP, 
the CHP doubted the rationality of the electorate on the pretext of their low education 
level and underdeveloped consciousness” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 26.08.1946 p.120).  
The DP began to frame itself in contrast to the purported elitism of the CHP.  Presenting 
their own party as egalitarian Democrats, the DP rejected the inequality of votes
52
 and 
derided CHP as the party of the aristocratic intelligentsia as opposed to their party’s 
support of democracy (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 26.08.1946 p.192).  And from the 
beginning of multiparty politics in Turkey, Menderes had declared the need for 
introducing a secure and reliable election law to be one of the major issues facing the 
country, which constituted the core point of struggle for the DP (Menderes in  Kılçık, 
1991: 420).  
Central to the DP’s understanding of democracy, the election issue occupied a 
significant place in the first great congress of the DP on 7 January 1947 where demands 
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 Equality of votes is perceived as the “right of rights”, a sine qua non of any democratic system.  See 
Jeremy Waldron. 1999. Law and Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press. 
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were voiced calling for clear structural changes to the election system
53
.  Despite 
setbacks, the very fact that the party was able to hold the congress was seen as a victory 
in the eyes of the Democrats. At the congress, Ağaoğlu stated “The desire for liberty 
collected us here.  The decision to end one-man and oligarchic rule also brought us 
here” (Ağaoğlu, 1993:43).  The Hürriyet Misakı (The Freedom Pact), which consisted of 
the decisions made during the aforementioned congress, was declared on 19 January 
1947.  In the Freedom Pact, the DP demanded: 
1. The abolition of undemocratic laws 
2. Specific changes to the election system for the purpose of ensuring national 
sovereignty and the protection of the votes of citizens   
3. The separation of the roles of head of state and head of party (Bayar, 1947: 12-2, 
Bayar, 1969:70-2, Zürcher, 2004:214, Ağaoğlu, 1972:49-2, Eroğul, 2003:48-3).  Bayar 
summed up the first DP congress stating “I understood democracy, I endorsed 
democracy, I justified democracy and I will justify democracy” (1969:68).  Thus, while 
the question of free and fair elections maintained a prominent place in the party’s 
agenda, procedural tenets more and more informed the DP’s approach to democracy. 
 The DP continued its insistence on free and fair elections by boycotting the local 
elections on 17 October 1948 on account of a lack of judicial oversight and the 
undemocratic nature of the existing election law.  On 20 July 1949, the DP convened its 
second congress and approved the Milli Tesanüt Andı (National Solidarity Oath).  The 
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 Throughout the congress, the DP encountered a number of obstacles.  The party congress took place in 
the Ulus Cinema after hotels and congress centers refused to accommodate the DP under pressure from 
the governing party.  Moreover, hotel reservations of delegates were cancelled, forcing them to stay in the 
homes of DP members based in Ankara (Bayar1969:67). Similar problems occurred during the AP era. 
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oath emphasized heeding the national will and again stressed the importance of free and 
fair elections (Bayar 1969:98).  The press and people close to CHP dubbed this act the 
Oath of Enmity since the DP argued that as long as the CHP rejected a free and fair 
election process, the people would be the enemy of the CHP (e.g: Eroğul, 2003:76).  
Another motto of the Turkish center-right, sine-i millete dönme (returning to the people 
or the common folk), also emerged at this time.
54
  In a dispute between Peker and 
Menderes, the Democrats raised the stakes of their protest against the CHP circles and 
boycotted parliament meetings.
55
  They argued that, rather than join the Assembly, they 
would prefer to turn back to the country as the true representative of the people.  Facing 
such a threat, President İsmet İnönü sought consensus between the DP and the CHP and 
published a declaration on 12 July.
56
  In the declaration, İnönü supported the legitimacy 
of the opposition party as well as the necessity to guarantee the perpetuation of its 
activities.   İnönü’s declaration not only legitimized the existence of the opposition and 
the multiparty system,but also by and large implied the impartiality of the President 
(Zürcher, 2004:214, Aydemir, 1976:230, Bayar, 1969:78-8, Ağaoğlu, 1992:414,455)57.  
Following the declaration, Peker’s cabinet was replaced by Hasan Saka’s, and by a 
program that included democratization measures.  Nevertheless, the government did not 
survive this ordeal and eventually Saka called “none of the previous laws passed by 
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 ”Returning to the people” was a concept that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk deployed at the start of the 
Independence War.  The DP adopted the phrase in their own political rhetoric, and subsequent center-right 
parties routinely used the same concept when referring to go to the elections or referendum.  
55
 Discussing the 1947 budget, Prime Minister Recep Peker portrayed Adnan Menderes as a psychopath 
whereupon the Democrats left the assembly and boycotted its meetings for a number of days.  For details, 
see Aydemir 1976:193-6; Zürcher 2004:214; Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun 1982:341. 
56
 Shaw and Shaw argue that the need for foreign aid played a more crucial role than domestic factors in 
this declaration.  See Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw. 2006. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern 
Türkiye Cilt 2, İstanbul:E Yayınları, p.469. 
57
 After this declaration, some DP members were dissatisfied and deviated from the DP as Müstakil 
Demokratlar (the Independent Democrats) and formed the Nation Party (Millet Partisi, or MP) (Eroğul 
2003:66-2).   
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Parliament antidemocratic” (Bayar, 1969:91). We thus see that, before coming to power, 
the Democratic Party struggled with an unfair election system while clearly aligning 
itself with the people and thereby creating a political project based on “the national will” 
in the course of the transition to a multiparty system.   
The DP’s insistence on the establishment of a fairer and freer election system continued 
with intensity until 16 February 1950, when Law Number 5545 was approved, 
introducing a new election system resting on a single, equal and secret ballot majority 
system and the principle of open classification.  The 14 May 1950 elections were carried 
out in accordance with this law, and the DP won the elections.  This encouraged the DP 
in their belief that it had identified the significance of the establishment of a fair and 
competitive election system, such that on 29
th
 May 1950, in his first government speech, 
Menderes stated that “With the 14 May elections, the most significant reform in the 
country was attained which cannot be compared with the previous reforms” (TBMM 
Tutanak Dergisi, p.24).  After a considerable struggle to convince others of the 
importance of voting as a political instrument, the Democrats acted accordingly, 
especially in their early terms. Bayar points out that the top leadership of the DP, and 
Menderes in particular, had a great deal of respect for the vote and for elections; 
considering intra-party conflicts, even when in the minority, he abided by the will of the 
majority (Bayar, 1969:61).  The same position can be observed in the pre-1954 election 
period as well.  In response to the opposition party’s complaints about dubious election 
conditions, Menderes gathered together the General Administrative Board of the party 
and declared that the elections were to take place in a secure atmosphere that would 
raise no doubts.  In that regard, he demanded that the opposition party was to be 
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provided with a copy of the register of electors, that the election records were to be 
approved by the YSK (Higher Election Board) instead of the Grand National Assembly 
and that the radio would ensure fair and equal broadcast time to all parties (Burçak, 
198:191).   
The DP’s concern for free and fair elections occasionally combined with intolerance to 
criticism regarding election practices.  The DP was proud of the lack of complaints 
received regarding the elections; only ten appeals were received related to elections, all 
of which had to do with potential procedural mistakes (Burçak 1998:292-2). The DP 
also took many precautions to prevent the spread of negative rumors about the elections. 
For instance, in the summer of 1955, CHP General Secretariat Kasım Gülek was 
arrested after having accused the DP of manipulating the results of the 1954 elections 
(Toker, 1991b:138; Sarol, 1983:916-3).   
Without trying to increase representation in the Assembly, the DP, as the representative 
of the masses, benefited from the existing electoral system, which promoted 
majoritarianism.  Despite not winning a significant number of votes from the CHP, the 
DP gained a majority in the Assembly thanks to the election system, especially in the 
1957 elections.  Yet the DP’s demand for free and fair elections existed in a fragile 
political environment.  People were prohibited from nominating a candidate who had 
been a candidate in another party before, and the 1956 elections were postponed in light 
of the DP’s interests in institutionalization.  Similarly, in the early 1960’s, the DP was 
not eager to set an election date, which, according to some, helped to act as a catalyst for 
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the military intervention (Koraltürk, 2007:573-6; Eroğul, 2003:247; Aydemir, 
1976:392)
58
.   
In sum, the DP’s emphasis on free, fair and competitive elections as one of the most 
important requirements of democracy is strongly felt in its platform, yet its reticence to 
enact liberal democratic improvements in other realms may raise questions about the 
nature of the DP’s approach to democracy—which, in the last analysis, was not a project 
of fostering inclusiveness, consensus and equality. The manipulation of the election 
system in the late DP period underscores that a limited sense of democracy—namely, 
elections—informed the DP’s approach and brought it to power.  Burçak cites 
Menderes’ idea that the rule of liberty is equal to rule by popular vote and relays this 
quote: “In a democratic country, the elections precisely mean acting on liberties and 
protecting freedoms” (1998:131).  Tanel Demirel also quotes an election campaign flyer 
from the DP stating that “if you are able to give your vote to whomever you want, this is 
democracy” (Demirel, 2011:151).  If we consider that free and fair voting is the ultimate 
legitimacy of the democratic decision-making process (Waldron, 1999), then devoting 
more attention to elections than anything else (assumed to be the main requirement of 
democracy) portrays the scope of the DP’s espousal of democracy, which concentrated 
on procedural dimenions democracy and was far from a substantive understanding.  
 
 
 
                                                             
58
 Nevertheless, DP circles believed that this demand was not innocent as it threw into question the 
legitimacy of the DP as a political actor (Sarol 1983b:1070-2; Ağaoğlu 1972:117).  
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3.3.2. Limits of the DP’s Perception of Democracy 
Distinguishing liberal democracy from its electoral form, Karl offers the concept of the 
“fallacy of electorialism”, by which she means to call attention to the ways in which 
procedural democracy perceives elections as the most important indicator of democracy 
without attributing equal significance to other political dimensions (1986; 1995).  
Similar to Karl, Powell thinks that “majoritarianism uses elections to bring [the] power 
of the people to bear on policymakers” (2000).  In this regard, the DP’s perception of 
democracy largely matches the procedural description of democracy rather than the 
substantive one.  Lijphart’s two models consisting of majoritarian (Westminister) vs. 
consensual (pluralist) democracy may also help to explain the DP case.
59
  Nevertheless, 
the scope of the negative aspects of majoritarian democracies differs from case to case.  
The United Kingdom and New Zealand were categorized under the majoritarian 
framework, yet these countries have certainly adopted a more liberal democracy than the 
Turkish version of the DP tenure.  Dahl also devised two dynamics—inclusion and a 
degree of public contestation—as crucial to a well-functioning polyarchy. Inclusion 
refers to the equal participation of people while contestation describes government 
tolerance of protests and criticism as well as its degree of liberalization
60
 (1971).  The 
DP was lacking especially in the latter case.  Briefly, we observe in DP policies and 
discourse a minimalist version of procedural democracy concentrating on elections and 
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 The two-party system based on a left-right cleavage with limited protections of minority interests as 
well as an election system based on plurality rather than proportional representation, and a strong 
centralized system with an extensive parliamentary sovereignty are all observed in majoritarian 
democracies.  Thus, while the consensual models are more open to inclusion and maximization of the 
number of the ruling majority, majoritarian modes tend to be more authoritarian (Lijphart 1999:33). 
60
 To fulfill these two requirements, Dahl elicits eight conditions: 1) freedom to form and join 
organizations, 2) freedom of expression, 3) franchising, 4) eligibility for public office, 5) the right of 
politicians to compete for support, 6) availability of alternative sources of information, 7) free and fair 
elections and 8) institutionalization of the system (1971). 
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seeing voting as the main role of the masses rather than fostering a free public sphere to 
develop public opinions that might influence the policy-making process and an absence 
of concern for the ends of democracy.  An uncompromising and intolerant attitude 
towards the opposition and the press as well as hostility towards specific institutions was 
also observed in DP policy and discourse. 
Regarding the 1950 elections, a DP member posited that “the first national edict” 
(ferman)
 61
 was realized in history” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 02.06.1950 p.100).  Here, 
using such an authoritarian terminology while referring to elections might be perceived 
as a small early sign of the future authoritarianism of the DP, which some even was 
likened to dictatorship.
62
  Evaluating the position of the DP, Mete Tunçay argues that, 
especially in the post-1957 term, authoritarianism is probably more accurate than 
dictatorship since although the DP was not located along a pluralist-liberalist spectrum, 
the party continued to depend on ‘the will of the nation’ (Tunçay in Akşin, 1989:184)63.  
Tunçay’s argument deserves more explanation in line with the concept of procedural 
democracy since the DP frequently legitimized its authoritarian stances, especially 
regarding elections, on the pretext of representing the nation’s will. 
Parallel to the procedural democratic worldview, winning an election was seen as the 
main gateway to rule the country.  Interpreting this principle in a broad way, the 
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 Ferman is a type of imperial edict authorized by Ottoman Sultans. 
62
 For instance, Ahmet Hamdi Başar defines the DP government as “a dicta-regime depending on the 
national will” (Koraltürk 2007:291), which was supported by a previous DP deputy Fahri Belen in his 
remark that the “dictators of our era have national assemblies” (Belen 1960:46).  Similarly, Lijphart 
provides an example of majoritarian democracy: “Because of the concentration of power in a dominant 
cabinet, former cabinet minister Lord Hailsharo (1978, 127) has called the British system of government 
an "elective dictatorship' ” (1999:12). 
63
Aydemir argues that the iron white horse (Demirkırat-the DP) corresponds to Adnan Menderes and the 
DP ruling elite since the elites of the DP learned politics in the one-party system’s authoritarian 
atmosphere and they reflected this authoritarianism when they held power (Aydemir, 1976:161-3).   
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extensive power of other domains such as judiciary or bureaucracy was not tolareted 
since they did not catch the electoral support.  Without appreciating the principle of the 
separation of powers, to Bayar, the 1924 Constitution—which had no such principle—
was more democratic than subsequent Constitutions (1969). In this line of thinking, the 
separation of powers together with the authorization of superior institutions was the 
main means of sharing a nation’s rule. The parliament ought to be the utmost sovereign 
body that is responsible to the nation from which its power is derived. Otherwise, 
granting significant rights to non-elected bodies would invite trouble and threaten the 
oligarchic power of the few. The 1961 Constitution, for instance, provided some 
institutions such as the Senate, Constitutional Court, National Security Council, the 
autonomous university and the State Planning Organization a degree of sovereignty not 
approved by Bayar (1969:11)
64
.  To Bayar, the Assembly should depend on a strong 
majority for powerful governments and on a stable system, and the election system 
should rest on majoritarianism rather than proportional representation.  He posited that 
unless all political powers are closely guarded, weaknesses in the state administration 
would be inevitable (Bayar, 1969:42,108,164).  Similarly, for Ağaoğlu, allowing 
proportional representation in elections “might bring chaos to the extent of anarchy” 
(Ağaoğlu, 1972:63).  For Menderes, getting just one more vote than one’s competition 
was enough to procure legitimacy and did not require any concern over opposition 
groups.
65
  This affinity of the DP was also criticized within DP circles.  According to 
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 Some DP members such as Samet Ağaoğlu criticized Bayar for this stance.  Ağaoğlu argues that DP 
circles were not entirely against a degree of checks and balances such as the Constitutional Court 
(Ağaoğlu, 1972:59-3). 
65
 Before the confidence vote of the second Menderes government, a DP deputy Enver Adakan suggested 
that Menderes resign from party leadership.  Menderes declared that “if I am able to get a single more 
vote, I will continue to serve” (Burçak 1998:82).  This anecdote demonstrates how Menderes legitimized 
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Menderes and Akyol, one of the mistakes of the DP was the underestimation of CHP’s 
votes and public support, which corresponded to at least 36 percent of votes.  The DP 
never dealt with or tried to explain this significant percentage of the population 
(Menderes and Akyol, 2011:78)
66
.   
The DP was very reluctant to share its power. The party, especially after the 1954 
elections and even more so after the 1957 elections, turned into a less tolerant, less 
inclusive actor as reflected in its policies and discourse.  To complete the picture, it is 
necessary to evaluate the DP’s attitudes towards the opposition, press, universities and 
its implementation of Tahkikat Komisyonları (Committees of Investigation).  
 
3.3.2.1.Weak Relations with the Opposition 
Dahl distinguishes democratization from the polyarchy in terms of the development of a 
public opposition.  Whereas the former demands responsiveness to citizens’ preferences, 
the latter requires a more inclusive system (1971:1-2). In the light of this distinction, we 
can suggest that the DP could not permit the development of public opposition by liberal 
means. In fact, not only the DP and center-right representatives, but also the Turkish 
political elites in general could not develop a tolerant attitude towards oppositional 
forces (Kalaycıoğlu, 1988:54; Mardin, 1965:375-13, Frey, 1975:45-19; Özbudun, 
2000:74).  Nevertheless, as the parties that based their identity on advocating for 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
his authority within a majoritarian framework.  This perception also structured the DP’s relationship to its 
opposition. 
66
 Lijphart employs Rae’s term “manufactured majorities” in explaining majoritarian democracies: “This 
system tends to produce highly disproportional results…‘manufactured majorities’ that are artificially 
created by the electoral system out of mere pluralities of the vote” (Lijphart, 1999:15; Rae 1967:74). 
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democracy, the center-right parties’ intolerant attitude towards the opposition can be 
evaluated as a shortcoming for the establishment of a substantive and inclusive 
democracy.   
In that regard, the DP did not begin with harsh attitudes towards the opposition.  In the 
1950 election and the beginning of their period of rule, the DP promised to refrain from 
questioning and investigating the actions and policies of the single-party period 
(avoiding Devr-i Sabık).  It seemed that the DP intended to establish a tolerant and 
peaceful understanding while in office with a fresh start instead of dealing with previous 
issues.  This promise was quite important for the consolidation of democracy in the 
country since previous CHP governments, as founders of the state, at times engaged in 
arbitrary acts. A period of revenge might have brought further problems and chaos to the 
country.  By the same token, after the DP Program was read in Parliament, the CHP 
demanded time to evaluate the program, which was a demand the DP accepted.  This 
was an important reconciliation step if we consider that when the party program of the 
Peker government was being read after the 1946 elections, Menderes criticized the new 
government for having neither shared the program before the vote nor provided time for 
consideration after the program was declared (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 14.08.1946 
p.60).  Regarding the attitudes of the opposition party, Menderes justified the right to 
speak for the opposition declaring that his government welcomed criticism as a 
requirement of a democratic system (Bayar, 1969:154; Menderes and Akyol, 2011:19).  
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However, such diplomatic attitudes towards the opposition did not represent the general 
stance of the DP in the following years.
67
 
During ten years of DP rule, President Bayar and the opposition leader İnönü met once 
(Aydemir, 1976:263).  And just as they met infrequently in person, they also rarely saw 
eye to eye in terms of ideas. In particular after the autumn of 1952, government relations 
with the opposition weakened.  On 5 October 1952, in his İzmir speech İnönü argued 
that CHP’s political security was threatened.  The DP interpreted this statement as a 
serious provocation, prompting CHP to accuse the government of fostering chaos.  
İnönü said “I am warning that I am seeing a threat” (Burçak, 1998:122-3)68.   The 
transfer of some CHP assets to the state treasury and the closure of Public Houses (Halk 
Evleri) were two significant sources of the increasing tension resulting in major crises 
between DP and CHP.   
Eroğul perceives the revocation of the privilege of immunity of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın 
(CHP’s Kars deputy) due to an article Yalçın published in Ulus on 18 April 1952 as the 
first signal of the DP’s tendency towards shifting to a “tyranny of the majority” 
(2003:124).  The DP’s attitude towards the Secretary General of the CHP Kasım Gülek 
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 One should also note that government-opposition party relations did not gradually worsen.  It is 
possible to talk about at least four terms of reciprocal tolerance and peace in these relations (Burçak, 
1998; Toker, 1991a; 1991b).  To Menderes and Akyol, the number of these periods was roughly seven 
(Menderes and Akyol, 2011:81-2).  During these terms, the opposition party members also met with 
Menderes.  Menderes also spoke about the unity of the government and the opposition party’s stance as 
being beyond the common values of the two parties. On 18 January 1953, for instance, Menderes declared 
that “the CHP was a party molded by the soul of national unity and it is necessary to accept that what 
dominated the CHP is patriotism” (Burçak 1998:131).  To Belen on the other hand, in the course of the 
intra-party crisis, the DP fostered such periods of peace with the opposition party as a political strategy in 
order to deal quietly with internal problems (Belen 1960:53-2). 
 
68
This attitude of the opposition parties continues today. Turkish center-right and far-right parties are 
usually criticized by the opposition parties as damaging the regime under the name of a “threat”.  Even in 
the 2009 elections, a headline in the pro-CHP daily Cumhuriyet asked “Are you aware of the threat?” 
harking back to CHP-DP relations. 
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was also problematic.  He was arrested in Zonguldak, and while being transferred to 
Istanbul he was subjected to harsh treatment by the police (Aydemir, 1976:155; Toker, 
1991b:138). Even İnönü’s visits and meetings were sometimes impeded, and he was 
subjected to physical and psychological violence at times as in the case of the Kayseri 
and Uşak incidents (Zürcher, 2004:349; Öymen, 2013:335-6; Eroğul, 2003:238-2; 
Aydemir, 1976:155,263; Burçak, 1998:508,518).  The DP’s intolerance of the 
opposition occasionally extended to taking severe precautions to limit  the self-
expression of the opposition.  Long ignoring the proposals of the opposition party 
deputies and refusing to discuss them in the Assembly (Burçak, 1998:626-4)69, limiting 
CHP’s open-air meetings (Eroğul, 2003:194-2; Öymen, 2013:337-2) and prohibiting, 
just before the military intervention, the political activities of the opposition outside of 
the Assembly on 18 April 1960 (Zürcher, 2004:349) were among the more remarkable 
instances of DP’s intolerance.  
This behavior of the DP towards the opposition was not limited to the CHP.  Before 
coming to power, the party supported CHP’s efforts to close the Turkish Socialist 
Worker and Peasant Party and all periodicals and newspapers close to this party (TBMM 
Tutanak Dergisi, 16.12.1946).  Nor did this position change during the DP’s rule.  On 
27 January 1954 The Nation Party (Millet Partisi) was closed in a single night as though 
it was “an ordinary association” without a second thought on the pretext of its purported 
opposition to Atatürk and his reforms (Eroğul, 2003:129).  The secret procedure carried 
out in this case was also criticized by the opposition (Burçak, 1998:136).  The Turkish 
Peasant Party and The Republican Nation Party declared before the 1954 elections that 
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This issue was discussed in the National Assembly on 15 February 1960. For further details see TBMM 
Tutanak Dergisi. 
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they would not join the elections because of the undemocratic stance of the DP 
government (Burçak, 1998: 228).   Not surprisingly, seeing this protest as 
inconsequential, the DP made no effort to reach a consensus with these parties. 
Osman Bölükbaşı, a former DP deputy and chairman of the Republican Nation Party 
defeated the DP in the 1954 elections in Kırşehir, though this victory was suppressed by 
the DP by changing the province’s status to town despite the many serious critiques 
against this action by much of the CHP (See TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 30.06.1954 p.357-
4 ).
70
  Just before the 1957 elections, Kırşehir became a province again, but Osman 
Bölükbaşı was arrested as well as his privilege of immunity revoked in the pre-election 
process (Eroğul, 2003:198; Öymen, 2013:72-2).  Similarly, İnönü’s election region, 
Malatya, was also divided into two, and Adıyaman became a new province after the 
1954 elections. 
Although this undemocratic stance of the DP towards the opposition was sometimes 
criticized within the DP, the party leadership supported by a strong president usually 
justified the necessity of these decisions in a demagogic manner. The DP leadership 
wanted to control and make decisions with as much independence as possible, which 
would also prevent lenience to intra-party opposition.  In that regard, trying to restrict all 
political activities of the previous DP members who went against their party, ousting 
dissident members from the party, and forcing all ministers to resign in 1955 despite 
remaining the prime minister and delaying the party congress due to intra-party 
problems are among the antidemocratic methods used by the DP leadership against 
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 Interestingly, in the village headman (muhtar) elections following this incident, the DP won 74 out of 
76 villages in Kırşehir (Burçak 1998:231).  
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intra-party opposition
71
 (Toker, 1991b:115; Burçak, 1998:430-7, Aydemir, 
1976:268,311; Karaosmanoğlu, 1968:226).  An absence of a delegation of authority and 
a dearth of trust for party members, which can be seen reflected in a lack of consultation 
and discussion within the party, were embedded DP practices.
72
  The DP elite were thus 
eager to exclude all forms of opposition including intra-party opposition, CHP 
opposition,  other opposition parties and opposition from the press. 
 
3.3.2.2.The DP and the Press  
There is no clear-cut story to the relationship between the DP and the press.  Especially 
before coming to power, the DP followed a liberal inclination regarding freedom of the 
press though this was not sufficiently pursued while in office.  During the opposition 
years of the DP, the CHP’s pressure on the press and on journalists who were close to 
the DP also motivated the party to struggle for freedom of the press.
73
 Initially, the DP 
supported changing Article 50 of the Press Law, which previously granted the 
government the right to close newspapers and periodicals in the case of any disturbance 
of the country’s general politics (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 13.06.1946 p.285; Topuz, 
1972:170; Eroğul, 2003:43).  One of the earliest attempts of the DP government was 
also to limit the government’s sweeping authority over the press through Law Number 
568 in addition to introducing Press Courts.  On 13 June 1952, another law (number 
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 For the evaluation of intra-party discipline procedures in the DP, see Ergun Özbudun. 1968.Batı 
Demokrasilerinde ve Türkiye’de Parti Disiplini. Ankara: Başnur Matbaası. pp.219-3. 
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 Mistrustful of others and reluctant to delegate authority, Menderes’ son also acknowledged that Adnan 
Menderes dealt with very minor things as a prime minister. For instance, he states that his father watched 
over the repair of street lamps in Florya because he wanted to follow up on things himself (Menderes and 
Akyol 2011:85). 
 
73
 For details, see Alpay Kabacalı. 1994. Türk Basınında Demokrasi. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları. 
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5953) meant to regulate the working rights and improve the social conditions of press 
members was passed.  Such concrete attempts of the DP were strengthened by the 
liberal statements of party elites regarding freedom of the press.  On the same topic, just 
after becoming prime minister, Menderes stated that “the freedom given to the press 
would make it possible to clarify all the prevailing problems in the country and see the 
realities” (Bayar, 1969:114).  He also suggested that democracy could only be improved 
if the press were free (Toker, 1991a:34).  The DP elite thereby emphasized that 
compared to the pre-1950 period arbitrary rule over the press had been considerably 
lessened (Ağaoğlu, 2004:132; Bayar, 1969:149).    Bayar even claimed that the “liberty 
of receiving and publishing news was not as free as in any place of the world as it was in 
post-1950 Turkey” (1969:149). 
In time, the liberal position of the party changed, and the DP espoused a more 
authoritarian tone in its relations with the press.  To the DP elite, the main reason behind 
this change was the press’s insistent attention to the so-called abuse of liberties by the 
DP (Bozdağ, 2004:183; Bayar, 1969:184; Ağaoğlu, 2004:135). Thus, the DP elite 
developed an intolerant pattern of to repressing criticism.  In order to expedite the 
judicial process directly through judges, law number 6123 provided the right to 
prosecute critics of government policy regardless of the appeals of ministers (TBMM 
Tutanak Dergisi 23.06.1953).  On 6 June 1956, Law number 6733 was debated in the 
Assembly.  That law established limitations on the freedom of the press and made 
censorship easier.  In this meeting, the DP group explained the necessity of the law in 
this way: “in the name of critique and discussion, every kind of aspersion, gossip, and 
insult (…) was done as a continuous and systematic threat against the government 
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activities [and] against the people of administration (…) which also blemished the 
harmony of the community”74 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 06.06.1956 p.97).  In 1956, the 
Right to Propose (İspat Hakkı) became another matter of conflict for the DP.  The Right 
to Propose aimed for the abolition of the right to prove the claims of the press against 
DP ministers especially regarding corruption and abuse of their positions. The DP 
government under the leadership of Menderes decided to abandon this right which led to 
a split with the party and led to the formation of the Freedom Party (the Hürriyet Partisi, 
or HP) (Öymen, 2013:163-6; Ağaoğlu, 2004:118; Toker, 1991b:104-8; Burçak, 
1998:325-6). 
After these institutional changes, journalist arrests increased.  Ahmet Emin Yalman, 
Nihat Erim, Bedii Faik and Cahit Yalçın were sentenced for committing libel against the 
government (Ağaoğlu, 1972:222,233; Koraltürk, 2007:297; Burçak, 1998: 258) 75 .  
Toker describes the absurdity of his arrest in the spring of 1955 due to an article he 
published in Akis.  His arrest was based on the pretext of “making publications in order 
to defame the government and showing probability to repeat this crime” (Toker, 
1991b:96-3)
76
.   
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 This explanation did not satisfy the opposition party, and İnönü interpreted this law as proof of the 
transformation of the regime into a closed and scandalous one (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 06.06.1956 
p.100). 
75
 Menderes and other Ministers such as Mükerrem Sarol granted clemency to some such as Nihat Erim, 
Sefa Kılıçoğlu and Falih Rıfkı Atay.  However, President Bayar typically resisted Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes’ forgiving attitude towards the press (Burçak, 1998:624-2; Ağaoğlu, 2004:134). 
76
  Whatever its defensive stance toward the press, some people close to the DP justified the government’s 
pressure on the press.  For instance, Menderes and Akyol complained about the broad scope of criticisms, 
especially those in Akis and Akbaba across the DP years (2011:94). 
 111 
Apart from introducing considerable press restrictions, the DP also took advantage of 
government privileges to benefit from media power.
77
  In 1951, a decree regulated the 
allocation of official advertisements.  This enabled the government to use economic 
means to support some members of the press and punish others who were critical 
towards them (Tunçay in Akşin, 1989:179).  The government prevented other parties 
from broadcasting during the election period despite widely expressing itself by  radio.  
During the 1957 elections, the state radio began to broadcast on behalf of the 
government at the end of the elections at approximately 14:30 pm.  This was illegal and 
might have influenced the election process (Toker, 1991b:115).  Furthermore, 
announcing that people had joined the Fatherland Front (Vatan Cephesi) over state radio 
(Öymen, 2013:457-9; Zürcher, 2004:348) could be interpreted as the utilization of the 
media by the DP for political purposes.
78
   
In conclusion, despite certain positive steps in the beginning, the DP’s overall record on 
freedom of the press is inadequate.  While in power, the party pursued an intolerant and 
exclusive attitude, reflected in its legislation, in the arrest of journalists and in the 
promotion of government supporters.   
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 Mükerrem Sarol reports that Menderes was aware of the power of the press.  To him, labeling the press 
as the fourth power corresponded to an underestimation of the press (Sarol, 1983:177). 
78
 On 12 October 1958 Manisa speech, Menderes declared that it was necessary to organize a Fatherland 
Front against the dissention front (nifak cephesi) of the opposition.  To Menderes, the purpose of the 
Fatherland Front was unifying the citizens around progress and democracy that in practice turned ino the 
arbitrary rule of the government (Öymen 2013:461-5). 
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3.3.2.3.The DP and Universities 
Similar to its dealings with the press, in the early years, the DP developed a very 
positive relationship with universities.  This relationship later devolved significantly.  
Article 38 of the DP Program emphasized the scientific and administrative autonomy of 
universities along with the necessity of improving the quality of university education 
and the significance of scientific research (1946:11).
79
  The importance that the party 
program attached to universities was reciprocated by university elites, who supported 
the party until it took hold of the government (Eroğul, 2003:32; Burçak, 1998: 157).  In 
its first term in power, the DP increased the budgets of universities dramatically and 
initiated an effort to spread universities to the east of Turkey (Bayar, 1969:116).   
Yet despite their initial support, universities came to take the government to task for its 
authoritarian tendencies and for making universities disreputable.  DP elite countered 
that despite their positive attitudes towards and respect for the university, it was 
impossible to soften the conservative mentality and idee fixe embedded in universities 
(e.g: Bayar, 1969:116 and Burçak, 1998:642).  To Bayar, in the eyes of the university, 
the legitimacy of the government depended on obeying the university’s thoughts 
because the university elite perceived themselves as a shareholder of the state (1969:15).  
Embracing the majoritarianism without almost any effort to provide inclusiveness, the 
government proved itself, in the case of its relationship to universities, unwilling to 
share its ultimate power with other institutions. 
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 On 18 June 1946 the CHP government passed a law (Law Number 4936) and provided a degree of 
autonomy to the universities. 
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A number of institutional changes also catalyzed the dispute between the government 
and universities.  On 21 July 1953, a new regulation banned university staff from 
engaging in political activities even as it expanded the scientific autonomy of the 
universities (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 21.07.1953, p.935-31).
80
  In the relevant 
Assembly meeting, Köprülü endorsed the new law, saying “the purpose of the law was 
not to restrict freedom of thought; instead, this law provides universities a chance to 
accomplish their institutional duties” while also underscoring the economic dependency 
of the universities to the state (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 21.07.1953 p.948).  Another law 
was implemented on 5 July 1954 stipulating that university staff be taken under the 
authority of the Ministry of National Education with the Senate’s approval. 81   A 
Professor of law Hüseyin Nail Kubalı82 became one of the first victims of this law after 
criticizing changes to the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure (Burçak, 1998:538-2; 
Öymen, 2013:598-3).  In December of 1956, the Dean of the Faculty of Political 
Science, Turhan Feyzioğlu, was taken under the Ministry of National Education on 
account of his engaging in politics, which was an act protested by the other university 
members (Eroğul, 2003:193).  Tensions grew in the pre-military intervention years; 
some professors, such as Sıddık Sami Onar, were even exposed to physical violence 
(Öymen, 2013:653-2; Karaosmanoğlu, 1968:236; Aydemir, 1976:415).  The tension 
soon spread to university youth. On 28 April, an uprising against the government took 
place at a number of universities along with the motto “Menderes resign, hurray Turkish 
                                                             
80
 For details see: Law Number 6185 and Law Number 4936. 
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 Law Number 6435.  This law also covered all officers except soldiers.  The main target of the law was 
interpreted to be university professors (Aydemir, 1968:171). 
82
 The same professors such as Hüseyin Nail Kubalı would inspire the organization of the DP protests in 
the universities in the aftermath of the 1960 military intervention (Öymen, 2013:645). 
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soldiers”. Rather than trying to solve the problem through more moderate measures, the 
government introduced martial law (Sarol, 1983:966-5; Koraltürk, 2007:596-3).   
In conclusion, the DP government could not articulate a tolerant attitude towards the 
criticisms coming from the universities.  Addressing the universities, Menderes declared 
that “we, as a cadre rules the whole country, will we be defeated by two streets of 
İstanbul and Ankara?” (Aydemir, 1976:414).  In that regard, perceiving the issue as a 
“capability to control” without allowing criticism escalated the problems among the DP 
government and the universities. 
 
3.3.2.4.Committee of Investigation (Tahkikat Komisyonu) 
 
The DP’s unsuccessful management of its relationship with the opposition, the press and 
universities, especially in the post-1957 period, caused a considerable degree of social 
unrest, which led the DP to take more and more harsh precautions. In response to CHP’s 
negative claims about the DP damaging human rights and judicial security, its utilization 
of state radio for political purposes and its partisan administration of and pressures on 
the press, the DP government accused the CHP of trying to eliminate the DP by making 
use of illegal and underground methods (Eroğul, 2003:241-2; Ablayrak, 2004:530; 
Aydemir, 1976:412).  İnönü’s remarks on the illegitimacy of the government were read 
by the DP as a clandestine agreement between İnönü and a probable military 
intervention (Karaosmanoğlu, 1968:227). In order to determine whether the opposition 
activities were illegal and destructive or not and to determine the motive behind the 
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activities, a Committee of Investigation composed of 15 people was established on 18 
April 1960
83
.  During the Assembly meetings on the Committee of Investigation, both 
the government and the opposition party reciprocally utilized an uncompromising 
language which escalated the tension (Öymen, 2013:527-15) 
The Committee had extensive and exclusive rights, including the right to make 
independent judicial decisions, close and collect publications and documents, ban 
political meetings and demonstrations and take any sort of precaution, regardless of 
objections, if it felt necessary (Resmi Gazete 10491, 28 April 1960 Law Number 7468; 
Eroğul, 2003:244; Ağaoğlu, 2004:142).  A considerable number of professors of law 
denounced the committee’s work as unconstitutional.  The government reacted by taking 
disciplinary action against these professors (Zürcher, 2004:240). Forming such a 
Committee was interpreted by CHP circles as an effort to eliminate the opposition.  
People close to the DP, however, claim that the main aim of the commission was a 
simple precaution rather than the closure of the CHP (Menderes and Akyol, 2011:100; 
Burçak, 1998:661-14).  Whatever the aim, in the event of a crisis, the DP preferred to 
take severe measures rather than seek a more moderate form of consensus.  The DP 
banned the broadcast and publication of Assembly Meetings at the time. İnönü was 
obliged not participate in the 12 Assembly meetings after having criticized the forming 
of the comission (Öymen, 2013:619-6; Zürcher, 2004:350; Burçak, 1998:686-2).  Thus, 
operating on a very minimalist vision of procedural democracy, the DP believed it could 
do whatever it wanted justifying itself in the legitimacy of being the elected government.   
After realizing that the party preferred to limit and ban almost all threats against 
                                                             
83
 For further details, see: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 18.04.1960. 
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government authority including any group critical of it, the opposition, the press, 
intellectuals, the university elite and university students mobilized against the DP laying 
the ground for military intervention on 27 May 1960.   
 
3.4. The Justice Party and Democracy 
The center-right tradition in Turkey was first formed in the DP years.  The left-right 
issue became more pronounced after the mid-1960s.  But to properly understand this 
history, it is necessary to evaluate another pivotal center-right actor, the Adalet Partisi 
(the Justice Party – the AP), with special reference to its single party government era 
(1965-1971).  Obtaining the support of the majority in the 1965 and 1969 elections, the 
party reflected its mentality in its policies with more comfort when it was the single 
party in power.
84
  The AP then formed the Nationalist Front (Milliyetçi Cephe) 
coalitions with two partners, one nationalist far-rightist and one Islamist far-rightist.  
Coalition governments could not make good on the promises of each party, and a 
coalition partner could at best only share control of the decision-making processes 
(Laver and Shepsle 1990).
85
 Therefore, one would be strained to try to analyze the 
actions of the Nationalist Front governments as wholly representative of the center-right 
mentality in Turkey. A cosmopolitan coalition of the right wing, in those years the dose 
of far-right rhetoric considerably escalated even in AP discourse. Nevertheless, the 
reasons behind the loss of the parliamentary majority of the AP in the 1973 and 1977 
elections also deserves further analysis within the framework of democracy.  Before 
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the strict observation of military rule.   
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considering the AP’s uses of a discourse of democracy, it is first necessary to clarify the 
political-historical conjuncture of the 1960s. 
The increased authoritarianism of the DP was a pretext, in a political culture that could 
not seek a smooth consensus among the governing and opposition parties, for the 
upsurge in tension in the late 1960s in Turkish politics.  Student demonstrations on 28 
and 29 April 1960 paved the way for the declaration of Martial Law and were “the 
perfect opportunity for military intervention” (Ahmad, 1977: 159).  In fact, the center’s 
displeasure due to their loss of power, prestige and income brought about the 1960 
military intervention (Özbudun in Diamond, 1994:198).   Carried out by middle rank 
soldiers, this intervention was obviously welcomed by the bureaucratic center, the press, 
intellectuals and university circles.  The 1960 coup might thus be explained by the 
center-periphery cleavage as well (Özbudun in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:61; Demirel, 
2004:27; Sherwood, 1967:54), which was basically a reaction of the center against the 
elected DP government who claimed to represent the interests of the periphery.   
In a tragic outcome, the former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes along with his two 
ministers, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan, were executed on September 17, 1961.  
Levi succinctly summarizes the issue: “Thus while Menderes and two of his ministers, 
who enjoyed strong support in parliament and with the electorate, were convicted and 
hanged for violating the constitution, the same constitution was declared void by non-
elected officers, advised by non-elected professors” (Levi in Heper and Landau, 
1991:135).  Far from being exemplary of a democratic framework, the 1960 military 
intervention can be read as the challenge of the center aimed at elected civilians. 
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In addition to capital punishment, many pivotal DP politicians were arrested and banned 
from active politics.  Even if some Generals called for the release of certain DP 
parliamentarians, professors did not allow this on the justification that “all of them are 
potentially guilty” (Levi in Heper and Landau, 1991:135).  In beginner-level 
democracies, authoritarian power holders may wish to control the democratization 
process and retain certain guarantees for shares of power, and when they see necessary, 
they might interrupt the regime (Özbudun, 2000:105-11) even in the name of preventing 
“potential” crimes that had not yet taken place.  This intervention represented such an 
exit guarantee in favor of the center.  Those upset by the recent events were mostly the 
peripheral masses that supported the DP in the previous years.  Despite the 
undemocratic character of the coup and its subsequent effects, this intervention had little 
reverberation in Turkish intellectual circles at the time. After the military intervention, a 
military-academic-bureaucratic collaboration prepared a new constitution, which 
provided a number of vigorous exit guarantees against possible threats in the future.   
By the time of the arrival of the 1961 Constitution, the National Security Council—
composed of the president as the head of the Council, ministers to be determined by law, 
the chief of the General Staff and representatives of the army, navy and air forces—was 
founded to assist the Council of Ministers during the decision-making process.  The 
1961 constitution further provided the 23 members of the National Unity Committee the 
privilege of being lifetime deputies of the Senate of the Republic.  Even the election of 
General Cemal Gürsel to the Presidency took place under considerable military pressure 
over Parliament (Özbudun, 2000:112-2; Zürcher, 2004:242).   Despite the National 
Unity Committee’s initial promise to remain an above-party administration, the 
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subsequent process proved such claims of impartiality to be meaningless. It became 
clear that the National Unity Committee was openly opposed to the dissolved DP.  The 
CHP on the other hand enjoyed close relations with the military after the military left 
government to civilians in 1961. In that regard, thanks to the election procedure, the 
Senate was largely dominated by CHP (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009:15).  After the 
closure of the DP, new elections were conducted and did not provide an opportunity for 
the organization and unification of the electoral base of the DP.  The CHP thus emerged 
as the strongest party.
86
 
All in all, the 1961 Constitution was a product of increased suspicion of the center 
towards elected politicians despite the enhanced civil liberties and social rights granted 
to citizens (Özbudun, 2000:54).  The 1960 coup thus initiated a new era in Turkish 
politics, which provided checks and balances for democratic means including 
constitutional review, judicial independence, a bicameral system, and also introduced 
exit guarantees and reserved domains to the center through sharing the power of elected 
officials.  The 1960 military intervention was also exempted from judicial process.  
Hence, at the cost of undemocratic means and strengthening the position of the center 
vis-à-vis those who were elected, individual rights expanded by the 1960 regime.   
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 However, the AP and the New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi–the YTP) who tried to win over the 
DP base successfully obtained 34.7 and 13.7 percent of votes respectively vis-a-vis 36.7 percent of the 
CHP.   
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3.4.1. The AP as Successor of the DP 
 
In an atmosphere wherein sympathy for the DP was considered a reason for exclusion 
from the political sphere dominated by the junta regime and its alliances, the AP was 
founded on 11 February 1961 with the less explicit claim of being the heir of the DP.  In 
fact, the founders of the AP were a heterogeneous group composed of disgruntled 
soldiers, secondary rank DP politicians and even some opponents of the DP (Demirel, 
2004:30-2).  Ragıp Gümüşpala and other ex-military staff also joined the AP and played 
a pivotal role in the party along with people on the extreme right (Levi in Heper and 
Landau, 1991:136-2).  However, the AP primarily consisted of secondarily important 
DP members who could not gain significant positions in the DP but who were sincere 
supporters of the party.  Many closed DP organizations reshaped and reemerged as AP 
organizations, and many former party members resumed similar positions in the local 
branches of the AP. 
Karpat suggests that “the Justice Party appeared as the victim of the old ruling groups 
while the intelligentsia and even the Republican Party appeared unwilling to abide by 
popular will” (1972:364).  Thus, the AP carried on the DP’s mission of representing the 
periphery and continued to frame this position in contrast to the center—a strategy that 
this time proved even more powerful.  As in the case of the DP, the prevailing 
government was undecided regarding the survival of the AP.  The party was unable to 
even find a central place to hold their first great congress (Turgut, 2000:175; Demirel, 
2004:33-2).  When the congress finally materialized, the spokesmen of the party pointed 
to the imprisonment of the former DP elite as an example of a deficit of democracy.  
Delegates demanded amnesty for those branded as political criminals claiming that to 
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them amnesty was more necessary than bread and water (Milliyet, 01.12.1962).  
Ironically, the party positioned itself as not apposed to the 1960 military intervention 
and stressed that they did not seek vengeance (Milliyet, 03.12.1962). The reason behind 
this position without any doubt was the party’s fear of the 27 May alliance.  The 
probability that the AP would be excluded by the center to a significant degree limited 
the maneuvers of the party at the outset. The AP thus went about its method of 
opposition in a rather silent way. For instance, on April 9, 1963, 117 AP deputies 
refused to join the Assembly meeting to mark the 27 May as an official festival (Ahmad 
and Ahmad, 1976:260; Cizre, 1993: 59).  Instead of voting against the regulation 
openly, the majority of the party preferred not to attend the parliament. Thus, until 
nearly 1965, the AP tried to legitimize itself in the eyes of the state elite even as the 
party tried to communicate a message to the DP base that the AP was the heir of the DP.  
Until the reestablishment of the Democratic Party in 1970, the AP mostly represented 
the DP legacy as the main center-right political actor.
87
 
The military perceived Ragıp Gümüşpala—a retired soldier— the first chairman of the 
party, as an insurance against the potential demands of the AP in case it sought revenge 
against the DP (Ahmad in Kasaba, 2008:243).  The death of Gümüşpala opened a new 
avenue for AP self-expression, and Süleyman Demirel’s election to AP leadership in 
1964 also accelerated the AP’s ideological and political identification.88  Demirel, as a 
prominent DP technocrat, resigned from his prestigious position after the military 
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 After the 1960 intervention, in order to attract the DP base, the New Turkey Party was also founded by 
Ekrem Alican, who had previously founded the Freedom Party in 1955 after disagreements with 
Menderes.  Nevertheless, the scope of influence of the New Turkey Party was notably less than that of the 
AP.  Alican’s party gathered 13.7 percent of votes in the 1961 elections.  This rate decreased to 3.7 in 
1965 and 2.1 in 1969 (Ahmad in Kasaba, 2008:242).   
88
 In fact, Demirel represented a more Western, more moderate image than his contender Sadettin Bilgiç.  
He quickly settled on the center-right heritage. 
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intervention and chose to work in the private sector rather than continue with the Junta 
elite (Cılızoğlu, 1988:3).  He joined the AP in 1962 and declared that if such a military 
breakdown did not occur, he would prefer to stay away from politics.  He underscored 
that what attracted him to politics was to a large extent the aggrieved position of the DP 
elite (Cılızoğlu, 1988:13).  Criticizing the 1960 intervention for disregarding the free 
will of the nation and for attempting to discuss the place of the nation (1975:10), 
Demirel posited that his party’s politics were the only certain continuation of the DP.  
The ambivalent position of the AP regarding the claim of the DP legacy thus ended with 
Demirel’s clear statement.  He postulated that “after the DP period, the vote gained 
meaning and Turkish citizens began to be considered as a pivotal element of 
administration” (Demirel, 1977:34).  In his election speeches, Demirel reminded his 
audience of the corruption of the 1946 elections (Milliyet, 22.09.1965), in an effort to 
claim a DP heritage, as the 1946 elections had been a repeated source of conflict 
throughout the DP tenure. Demirel also changed the emblem of the AP (which was 
previously a book and a rising sun) into a prancing white horse, since the masses knew 
the DP by the phrase ‘iron horse’ (Demirkırat).89  In the election campaign, the AP 
effectively made use of the image of the white iron horse.  Demirel’s car entered cities 
following a galloping white horse (Milliyet, 22.09.1965).  Furthermore, close relatives of 
the former DP elite also supported the AP in the 1965 elections.
90
  Thus, Demirel, from 
the very beginning of his leadership, tried to clearly communicate to the masses an 
organic link between his new party and the former DP mentality. 
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 The state elite focused their criticism on this change.  For instance, President Gürsel said “What is the 
purpose of the AP? I do not think that this horse is a glorified animal. I do not need any other cautions” 
(Donat, 2005:7). 
90
 Ahmad notes that, in addition to two well-known persons, Celal Bayar’s daughter Nilüfer Gürsoy and 
Adnan Menderes’ son Yüksel Menderes, Refik Koraltan’s son, Samet Ağaoğlu’s wife and sister and 
Namık Gedik’s wife also struggled under the banenr of the AP for the 1965 elections (1977:237). 
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3.4.1.1. The Justice Party and National Will 
 
Similar to the DP, the AP founded its ideology on the prior and pivotal place of the 
national will in a populist fashion.  Populism appeals to the people against the 
established system (Taggart, 1996; Canovan, 1999).  The AP dealt with the legacy of the 
27 May intervention, and the new regime reformulated how it made use of the ‘national 
will’ in discourse by significantly transforming the system.  The strengthened position 
of the center in opposition to the periphery and the civilian governments with the 1961 
Constitution was usually defined, in the eyes of the AP, as an important handicap before 
the AP government’s representation power.  Populism was thus an efficient remedy with 
which the AP could rally the masses against the dominant center.  The AP as a 
pragmatic actor, on the other hand, tried to evade drastic confrontation with the 27 May 
elite.  Thus, the national will as the most innocent card was played often in an attempt to 
garner the support of the masses.   
In the official platform of the AP, the main goal of the party, under the ‘general 
principles’ section, was described as an effort to “serve the national unity and the 
establishment and realization of the true national will” (Adalet Partisi Tüzüğü, Article 2 
1969:43). Similarly, the party portrayed itself as “an outcome of national sovereignty” 
(Demirel, 1973:37) while implying the CHP was a product of the center instead of the 
nation.  In a similar vein, Demirel criticized those who evaluated the national will as an 
ignorant majority of voters (1973:81), and underscored that his AP “expects respect for 
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the nation” from those who would dismiss such a will (Demirel, 1973:31).  Against the 
center’s dominance of the policy-making process, he also underlined that “no one 
should argue that he is smarter than the nation (..) The purpose is (..) being with nation 
and staying within the nation” (Demirel, 1973:34).  Thus, the AP enthusiastically linked 
its project to and justified it with reference to the national will.   
The national will thus emerged as the ultimate panacea for a range of problems. In that 
light, Demirel said that “If it is believed that sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the 
nation and its requirements are fulfilled unconditionally, all complications disappear. All 
sorts of crises could be easily avoided” (Demirel, 1973:227).  To Demirel, “amongst all 
reforms, being aware of accepting national sovereignty is the greatest” (1973:16).  He 
stated that “If any other factors besides the national will are playing a role in 
determining political authority, then this cannot be called democracy” (Demirel, 
1973:94).  Thus, the leitmotiv of the AP’s perception of democracy was shaped around 
the question of national will.  However, the deployment of the national will by the AP 
contained a problematic aspect as well:  The party portrayed itself as the representative 
of the nation, which predicated the idea of the nation as if it were a homogenous entity 
in opposition to dominant state elite (Demirel, 2004:128; Komsuoğlu, 2008:281).  The 
party was thus conceptually ill-equipped to embrace the minorities and differences that 
constituted the nation— reminiscent of DP’s majoritarianism. 
The phrase “Democratic Republic”, though it did not draw on the concept of republic 
per se, was embraced by the leader of the AP to imply that the prevailing Republic 
lacked democracy and that a Republican regime without democracy was null (Demirel, 
1973:22; 1975:17).   Demirel was explicit on this point, stating that “calling [something] 
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a republic is not enough, it is necessary to say democratic republic based on human 
rights and national will” (Demirel, 1973:37).  To Demirel, a democratic republic entails 
the equality of rulers and ruled (1973:225). Nevertheless, this perception of equality did 
not refer to a substantial democratic equality.  Instead, what Demirel meant was to a 
large extent composed of the equal vote principle and a criticism of the concept of the 
superiority of the center over the people. 
The AP pursued an ambivalent attitude towards the 1961 Constitution; the party 
criticized the extensive powers of the judiciary and the bureaucracy while trying to stay 
within the boundaries of the regime (Özbudun, 2000:55; Özbudun and Gençkaya, 
2009:17).  To Demirel, the judicial and bureaucratic domination of the political realm 
almost made the national will void, such that the AP government, as the representative 
of the national will, would be severely restricted.  Demirel noted that “according to the 
1961 constitution, governments have duties but have not authority and rights” (Demirel, 
1973:309).  In many cases, having decried the principle of the separation of powers, to 
Demirel this principle enabled unauthorized entities to share in the national will.  
Ironically, in other cases he also posited that the separation of power, along with free 
universities and a free press, also hindered the establishment of a dicta-regime (Milliyet, 
21.09.1965).  Criticism of the Constitution was far from coherent.  And it is worth 
noting that this incoherence was reflected in AP policies as well. Though there were 
many Constitutional weaknesses to the AP elite, Levi notes that “On one point only, and 
this only with the help of the RPP, was the constitution amended.  It concerned the 
political rights of ex-DP members” (Levi in Heper and Landau, 1991:145).  
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All in all, while demanding the further realization of national will and blaming the 
constitution for hindering its realization, the AP acted within the limits of the 
Constitution.  When Demirel became Prime Minister, he often recalled Menderes and 
his tragic end due to accusations of violating the Constitution, and in response,Demirel 
typically carried the Constitution in his pocket and tried to act accordingly (Donat, 
2005:266).   
 
3.4.1.2. Close Contact with the People 
 
Establishing direct and close contact with the periphery is doubtless one of the main 
tenets of the Turkish center right, which reached a peak during the AP era.  Following 
the DP’s practice of visiting many provinces, even villages, and listening to people’s 
problems and expectations, the AP made use of close personal contact with the masses 
as an efficient political instrument.   
The leadership of Demirel, in terms of both his personal history and his idiosyncratic 
style of politics, was also a considerable factor in the establishment of a direct and 
sincere link with the masses. Arat describes Demirel as “the first prominent Turkish 
leader of truly peasant origins” (Arat in Heper and Sayarı, 2002:87) since even those 
previous members of the DP elite hailing from the countryside were also the elites of the 
periphery. As “a self-made man” (Zürcher, 2004:250; Ahmad, 1977: 236), a smart son 
of a modest peasant family, Demirel won scholarships early on in his high school years 
and attended Istanbul Technical University, one of the most prestigious universities in 
Turkey.  Eligible for Fulbright and Eisenhower scholarships, he continued his successes 
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in the United States.  His brilliance was noticed by the DP as well and he became a 
prestigious technocrat.  As a construction engineer, he built successful dams, which 
were crucial for Turkey in those years due to long droughts.  His occupation also 
differentiated Demirel from previous leaders.  Being an engineer also corresponds to a 
specific pragmatic and service-oriented mentality that entails problem-solving skills and 
technical and logical approaches instead of abstract ideologies (Göle, 1990:172-3).  
Therefore, Demirel’s educational background improved the classical Turkish center-
right to consider a material development of the people rather than a culturaland 
symbolic one.   
Süleyman Demirel with his rural origin, peasant accent and mastery of the art of oration 
was capable of convincing people easily and quickly.  A smart man aware of the 
significance of the role of images in politics, he said that “80 percent of politics is 
appearance.  In other words, image…You should give an outlook that ‘this man could 
do this’.  For sure, knowledge, education, experience and merit are important as well.  
But these all add up to only 20 percent. 80 percent is… the influence you made in the 
eyes of the public” (Donat, 2005:276).  This awareness is reminiscent of the DP elite; 
Demirel could act either as a refined gentleman or a peasant according to the 
circumstances.  Portraying himself as a poor village boy who earned his success, the 
status shift in his personal life was one of the pivotal messages that Demirel delivered.  
As a prominent figure, Demirel represented a hope for disadvantaged groups. Only 
Demirel, as a role model, nearly an idol, could create the circumstances whereby they 
might enjoy a similar socio-economic transition.   
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The results of the 1969 elections also indicate that those villages that supported AP were 
to a large extent relatively developed or open to development suggesting that the 
parochial voting support of the AP correlated with rural modernity (Özbudun, in Akarlı 
and Ben Dor 1975; Kudat, in Akarlı and Ben Dor 1975:52-2).  Özbudun and Kudat’s 
studies in particular suggest that those villages that were completely isolated did not 
demand change, and they preferred to support the CHP while those villages that were 
open to the world, the populations of which could obtain at least a primary education, 
and could form party organizations, demanded change in their living styles.  Thus, the 
AP and certainly its eminent leader Süleyman Demirel, with his unique biography, were 
perceived as signals of future prospects for change and progress.   
Albertazzi and McDonnell state that populism “pits a virtuous and homogenous people 
against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who were  depicted as depriving (or 
attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity 
and voice” (2008:3).  The concept that Alberazzi and McDonnel are describing was 
skillfully practiced by Süleyman Demirel.  The AP leader frequently asserted that “I am 
the son of this territory, who well knows your problems and who sincerely seeks 
solutions to your problems” (Donat, 2005:8-2). In the 1965 elections, the AP made use 
of the motto “whoever loves the public should be close to the public”.  This was an 
attempt to distinguish AP’s stance towards the masses from the elitist CHP.91   The AP 
visited more than 20 cities during the campaign.  During AP’s tenure, the integration of 
peasant masses into politics expanded to a considerable degree.  In election meetings, 
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 In fact, the CHP in those years experimented with making reference to leftist ideology in an effort to 
attract the votes of workers and rural migrants.  Nonetheless, the AP preferred to position the CHP in the 
elitist wing of the political structure. 
 129 
Demirel pronounced village names, even the names of village headmen, and generally 
asked questions about local problems in an interactive way (Donat, 2005:288-2) in 
another attempt to assure the masses that Demirel knew them very well.  He insisted that 
a regime would not weaken so long as it was close to the public; it would only gain 
strength (Demirel, 1973:243). 
Hence, the AP, following the DP tradition, was a direct party, wherein the leader and 
local branches developed strong relationships without devoting significant tasks for 
intermediary branches such as the Secretary General (Güler, 2003:43-2).   Like 
Menderes, Demirel painted himself as an accessible leader giving people the sense that 
local branches of the AP and the popular masses could easily arrange to visit him.  
Demirel’s image of accessibility increased his followers’ personal attachment and 
loyalty to him (Acar in Heper and Landau, 1991:189; Demirel, 2004:125-2).  He saw 
this approach as a good model for a wider party policy as well: “I suggest my friends 
catching the [attention of the] citizens, if the citizens won’t come to us, we should go 
them” (Demirel, 1973:174).  Thus, trying to establish strong and sincere relations with 
the masses, the AP pursued one of the most effective election strategies in party 
politics.
92
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 To Magleby and Nelson, candidates who pay great attention to personal contact with the masses stand a 
higher chance of gaining votes. For further details, see: David B. Magleby and Candice Nelson. 1990. The 
Money Chase. Washington: The Brookings Institute. p.62. 
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3.4.2. Democracy as a Procedural Virtue 
No picture of the Turkish center right would be complete without analyzing various 
parties’ tendencies to perceive democracy on a merely procedural merit.  The AP, 
similar to the DP, pointed to democracy as the fundamental principle of the party.  AP 
policy and discourse also indicates more importance given to the procedural tenets of 
democracy than to its substantive aspects.  Along these lines, in the first Article of the 
party program, the goal of the party was defined in this way: “the AP works to make the 
Turkish nation a democratic, progressive and affluent member of the Western liberal 
world” (AP Programı, 1969:3).  In Article 2, it was stated that “we perceive the 
Western
93
 democratic order as befitting human honor, respect to citizens’ freedom of 
thought, freedom of movement and freedom of conscience; realization of…human 
welfare and happiness, virtuous, the most progressive and perfect social order” (AP 
Programı, 1969:3).  Unlike the DP, the AP also reserved a place for decentralization in 
the party program’s description of a viable democratic system (Articles 4 and 87).  The 
party further emphasized the necessity of the principle of the rule of law (Article 3).  
However, in the discourse of the protagonists of the party, “a democratic rule of law 
should be based on the nation[‘s] will” (Demirel, 1973:35), and thus they heavily 
criticized the extensive scope of the judicial powers. 
Similar to the DP, elections were the main instrument that provided power for the AP in 
the legitimate democratic realm.  What differentiated the AP from the DP—the latter’s 
demand for the presence of free and fair elections—was already institutionalized in the 
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 Cizre posits that the emphasis on ‘the West’ in AP discourse was a strategy of legitimizing the AP and 
an attempt to differentiate the party from the DP (1993:39).  The party also utilized the concept of 
“modern Western civilization” (çağdaş Garp medeniyeti) in the first party programme of 1961. 
 131 
AP’s term.  Therefore, the AP’s main problematique was the probability of state elites 
underestimating (but not tampering with) election results.  For instance, following the 
1961 elections, the AP’s considerable election success was not seen as a sufficient 
reason to grant the party a role in sharing governmental power.  Even after the 1965 
election victory, Demirel was unsure whether state elites would allow him to form a 
government.   
These experiences made Demirel especially suspicious of the limits of governmental 
power—to a different degree than Menderes.   Considering that the reserved domains of 
state elites and the new Constitution would not permit the AP to dominate all realms of 
politics, the AP government put in place a number of specific amendments to enjoy 
majoritarian democracy even as they stressed the value of elections and vote.  In this 
vein, when the AP took power, the TBMM elections relied on a d’Hondt version of 
proportional representation while Senate elections relied on a majority system.  Both 
majoritarian Senate and d’Hondt versions of Parliament election rules changed after the 
AP’s emergence as the candidate most capable of drawing the majority’s support 
(Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun, 1987:344).  As a party whose pragmatism was 
prized far more than its democratic credentials, the AP was also crucially set against the 
representation of minor parties in the parliament.  On election procedures, Demirel 
usually reacted negatively to the national remainder system
94
 (milli bakiye sistemi) 
which he interpreted as an instrument for the domination of minorities over the national 
will (Milliyet, 21.09.1965).  To Demirel, the purpose of this system was to prevent the 
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 Only the 1965 elections were carried out according to the national remainder system; this regulation 
was abandoned on 01.03.1968. 
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establishment of a strong single party government by eroding the national will (Milliyet, 
26.09.1965).   
As a procedural democrat, Demirel usually emphasized the value of votes: “…ballot is 
not simply a piece of paper. Conceptions of national sovereignty and national will, as 
the cornerstones of the regime, become applicable through the voting institution  (…) 
after voting, a citizen should follow its vote, should possess it all” (Demirel, 1973:178).  
Apparently, what he understood from the vote was not every single vote, but rather 
majority votes. Against criticism of the populist vote approach, Demirel posited that: 
“concern for votes is the fundamental element of democracy.  If the vote were to 
disappear, there wouldn’t be an electorate, and if [the] electorate were to disappear, 
there wouldn’t be [a] democracy.  If the concern [for the ]vote were to disappear, there 
wouldn’t be responsibility and effort” (Demirel, 1973:38-2).  Clearly, votes and working 
to win elections were the fundamental requirements of the AP’s approach to democracy.  
Demirel was also proud that the AP was able to gather the votes of a wide range of 
society comprised of peasants, workers, merchants and businessmen (Demirel, 
2004:79).  As a party that relied on such broad popular support, one of the particular 
demands of the AP was to introduce the referendum procedure for conflictual issues.  
Demirel stated that the “referendum should be a way of directly using the right of 
national sovereignty in every necessary conjuncture” (Demirel, 1973:275), which 
verifies Westlind’s hypothesis that the referendum is perceived by populist leaders as a 
means of direct democracy (1996:209).  The AP experience, with its emphasis on the 
ballot box as the most apparent and dominant factor of democracy constituted a classical 
center-right attitude, which tended to reduce democracy to elections.   
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3.4.2.1. Limited Perception of Democracy 
Its partially inflated, procedural perception of democracy led the AP to see nothing 
wrong with limiting individual and group rights and freedoms.  Thus, AP policy and 
discourse sometimes veered in a more authoritarian direction, which was unacceptable 
for either a substantive or a liberal democratic structure.  
The AP elite tended to accuse the 1961 Constitution of overtly expanding individual 
rights such as freedom of publication, freedom of congregation demonstration and 
protest, freedom to establish associations and political parties without the government 
approval, and freedom of the expression of thought—all of which were, according to the 
AP a threat to the regime and brought chaos to the country (Demirel, 1973:13-2).  
Holding such basic liberties as a handicap before the regime was an obvious sign of the 
limits of AP’s democratic perception.  In this regard, the AP government tried to set 
limits on the scope of freedoms.  For instance, on March 1969 the autonomy of TRT 
(Turkish Radio and Television Institution) was restricted by accusing TRT of becoming 
“a state within a state” (Ahmad, 1977: 245).  With this regulation, if the government 
found it necessary, it obtained the right to change the head of TRT.  Furthermore, the 
content of the broadcasts were rewritten according to the ‘values’ of society, for the 
protection of the people against dangerous ideologies (Milliyet, 20.03.1969).  Students 
protested this draft and were concerned about the government’s intention to use TRT for 
its own political aims (Milliyet, 22.03.1969), which unsurprisingly did not change the 
government’s decision. 
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As stated in the second chapter, a dominant assumption in democracy theory suggests 
that a viable and robust civil society is one of the essential preconditions for the 
consolidation of a liberal democracy through broadening political participation and 
enabling more efficient control of the elected by the people.  In that regard, satisfying 
only the most procedural tenets of democracy, the AP was reluctant to share its 
governmental power with civil society.  In Article 77 of the party program, which took 
for granted parliament’s role as the fundamental institution of public administration, the 
party openly rejected the intervention of interest groups and other institutions in 
government and posited the freedom of government, free of all external influences, as a 
sine qua non for democratic order (1969:32-2).  Thus, a majoritarian appeal to 
democracy dominated the AP mentality, which was ready to ignore civil society 
entirely.  A similar disposition can be detected in the discourse of Demirel: “neither 
opposition outside the parliament nor interest groups are the partners of sovereignty” 
(1973:314).  Thus, elections were perceived as the main instrument of political 
participation (Demirel 2004:226) and the power obtained via the elections was not to be 
shared by any other forces. 
Apart from the instrumentalization of TRT and the reluctance of the party to grant the 
right of speech to non-elected bodies including civil society, leftist movements enjoyed 
one of the largest gains from the AP’s limits on democracy.  We have identified that 
DP’s ambivalent and flexible self-positioning in the left-right spectrum, a shade to the 
left of CHP on some issues and a shade to the right of CHP on others in the very 
beginning. Nonetheless, the DP then also began to indicate the left wing ideologies as a 
threat.  As the perpetuation of this tradition, the AP, clearly represented itself as a right 
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wing party, describing communism, in official party documents, as one of the greatest 
threats to the unity of the nation.  To the AP, the left represented the internationalist, 
anti-traditionalist and less religious wing that aimed to damage the values of the nation 
as well as the democratic system.  In that vein, the AP government did not refrain from 
suppressing the left, and even relied on police violence (Demirel, 2004:245). One of the 
tragic outcomes of this attitude occurred in February 16, 1969 with the death of two 
leftist activists who, in an anti-imperialist discourse, protested the 6
th
 fleet’s arrival to 
İstanbul (Milliyet, 16.02.1969).  The AP also tried to close down the socialist Turkish 
Worker’s Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi – the TİP); some AP deputies tried to lynch TİP 
deputy Çetin Altan in the TBMM (Demirel, 2004:246).  That the leftist trio Deniz 
Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan and Yusuf Arslan were subjected to capital punishment further 
demonstrated the vengeance of the trio Menderes, Polat and Zorlu in AP circles 
(Demirel, 2004:248).  The head of the court Ali Everdi, who ordered the execution of 
Gezmiş, İnan and Arslan was furthermore awarded by the AP, which named him a 
deputy.  Such an intolerant attitude of the AP towards the left can also be seen in their 
approach to workers’ unions.  As a rival to TURK-IS, a moderate workers’ union,95 a 
more left wing union was founded under the name of the DISK (Confederation of the 
Revolutionist Workers’ Union).  AP passed a Trade Unions Law in 1969 and 1970:  “a 
strike was permitted only after the conflict had been discussed in a special court (…) 
resignation from a trade union could become valid only if it was registered by a public 
notary; a confederation could receive the right to represent the workers of a certain 
branch only if more than 50 per cent of them were its members” (Levi in Heper and 
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 In the mid-1970’s, TURK-IS lost its close relationship with the AP by accusing the Nationalist Front 
governments of disloyalty to the regime. 
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Landau, 1991:143).  Hence, the AP restricted the representative power of DISK, which 
acted on behalf of TURK-IS.  Thus, one may argue that AP, deprived of revealing a 
certain opposition against the 27 May elite and against the institutions founded by the 
coup directed its hostility towards the far-left.   
The AP’s attitude towards the left did vary from period to period.  The leader of the 
party sometimes struggled with intra-party opposition; Demirel, as a relatively moderate 
leader, refrained from despotic measures against the left.  Nevertheless, the soft attitude 
of Demirel was rarely interpreted as an earnest response to the demands of the left by 
the AP members.  Thus, in 1968, one of Demirel motto’s emerged from an intra-party 
conflict over the student movements.  In an Ankara Province Congress, a delegate 
accused the government of remaining silent on the issue of leftist student meetings and 
protests.  Demirel supported the freedom of protest and of assembly as a Constitutional 
right, and said that “the roads would not be eroded by walking” (yollar yürümekle 
aşınmaz), and unless the groups engaged in violence, they could comfortably make use 
of their right to protest (Donat, 2005:10-2; Demirel, 1973:39-2).   Similarly, Cizre 
suggests that Demirel refrained from strict authoritarianism in order to save the party 
from the same tragic fate of the DP (Cizre, 1993:64-2). This motto can also be 
interpreted as an apathetic leaning of Demirel, ignoring youth demands (Arat in Heper 
and Sayarı, 2002:95).  In other instances, he made clear his position to such protests: “to 
whom and why to resist in a country where liberties are widely exercised?” (Demirel, 
1973:55). The AP believed that liberties were sufficiently widespread in Turkey since, 
along with the guarantee of basic rights, institutionalized elections determined who 
would govern the country.  With self-confidence in the perpetuation of such a system, 
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the AP saw no harm in either the suppression of the leftist opposition or apathy towards 
their expectations. 
The AP’s intolerance towards the opposition was not only reserved for the left.  The AP 
also took issue with the Islamic far-right.  For instance, Necmettin Erbakan, a pro-
Islamist figure was elected as chief of TOBB (the Turkish Union of Chambers and 
Commodity Exchanges) despite the government’s clear efforts to prevent this.  As a 
reaction to Erbakan’s election, the AP set limits on TOBB’s right to set export quotas 
(Demirel, 2004:228).  It is worth noting here that the government’s resistance to 
Erbakan was not reducible to Erbakan’s Islamic identity.  It had more to do with the 
divergent economic worldviews of the AP and Erbakan. Before being elected, on May 
1968 Erbakan harshly criticized the government for making Turkey an open market for 
Europe and America, resulting in the government taking a hostile stance towards him 
(Ahmad, 1977: 245).  Erbakan’s election thus shows again the AP government’s lack of 
tolerance for oppositional forces. 
Demirel was also reluctant to provide political rights to former DP members, as 
proposed by İnönü in 1969 (Demirel, 2004:47).  Waiting until November 1969 for the 
Constitutional change granting the political rights to the Democrats—despite the 
promulgation of an amnesty law in 1966—suggests that the main reason behind this 
delay was Demirel’s predilection to eliminate his political rivals and in particular to 
prevent Bayar’s political reappearance in AP circles.96  At the same time, AP senators 
rejected this Constitutional change under the pressure of the military, which was 
                                                             
96
 As a response to the AP’s indolence, a new pressure group called “Our Home” (Bizim Ev) under the 
leadership of Celal Bayar was founded. 
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interpreted at the time as a major appeasement (Cizre, 1993:79-2; Demirel, 2004:48).  
As a result of this process, symbolically important people such as Bayar’s daughter 
Nilüfer Gürsoy and Samet Ağaoğlu’s wife Neriman Ağaoğlu resigned from both the AP 
and deputyship and Bayar called for former DP supporters to refrain from voting in the 
1969 elections, which led to a small decrease in AP votes (Ahmad, 1977: 244).  After 
the elections, Demirel founded a self-made cabinet without concerning the intra-party 
opposition’s demands that convened around Sadettin Bilgiç.  This group did not give a 
vote of confidence to the new AP government which led to the immediate resignation of 
the government (Demirel, 2004:58).  The AP responded by simply expelling those 
deputies from the party.  Thus by the end of the 1960’s, both the former DP cadre and 
the intra-party opposition were ousted from the AP as a result of the party’s exclusive 
mentality–all of which foretold a forthcoming further polarization within the party. 
Gradually the AP began to abandon its democratic concerns after the 1969 elections.  In 
its 1969 government program, the AP began to stress the necessity of being vigilant of 
the abuse of rights and liberties.
97
 The party now began to challenge the 27 May regime 
more openly by criticizing of the scope of its approach to democracy, accusing it of 
being too liberal instead of questioning the legitimacy and the approach of the 27 May 
coup.  Nevertheless, the 1971 memorandum was a milestone after which the AP’s 
perception of democracy contracted significantly. 
 
                                                             
97
 In the previous government program, the party positioned itself as loyal to the 27 May regime while 
also trying to garner respect for a civilian government. 
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3.4.2.2.The 12 March Memorandum and the Weakening of the AP’s 
Emphasis On Democracy 
The increased authoritarianism of the AP to some extent resembled DP’s position.    Yet 
the AP showed its intolerance to the opposition in more subtle ways than the DP until 
the 1971 coup, if only because the AP could not win as significant of a parliamentary 
majority as the DP during its period of rule.  In spite of using authoritarian means to 
some extent, in the last analysis neither the DP nor the AP governments deserved such 
military interventions.  In fact, what prepared the grounds and gave ostensible 
justification for the 1971 intervention had to do with the inability of the AP government 
to adequately deal with the current situation it faced. 
In the 1969 elections, popular support for the AP dropped to 46.5 percent, corresponding 
to 256 out of 450 seats in Parliament. Especially after the 1969 elections, Demirel to 
some extent lost his credibility within the party.  This was also a result of Demirel’s 
reluctance to reinstate the political rights of former Democrats and to share 
governmental power with the intra-party opposition centered around Bilgiç.  Turkey was 
also influenced by more worldwide changing political dynamics.  Left and right wing 
workers and university students were polarized.  In addition to increased levels of 
political violence, even some landless peasants attempted to occupy the lands of large 
landholders (Özbudun, 2000:33).  The mass media began to note the deficiencies of the 
AP government.  The political instability of the government complicated governmental 
efforts to deal effectively with the growing instability.  On 11 February 1970, Demirel 
resigned from the prime ministry.  The AP’s arithmetical weakness undermined further 
government shifts until 1971.  
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On 12 March 1971 a memorandum was published by the military allegedly to end 
anarchy, strife and economic unrest, placing the responsibility for the current chaotic 
situation on the government and parliament.  Interestingly, the timing and motives of the 
memorandum were not well grounded and the justification of the memorandum was 
quite weak (Ahmad, 1977:205).    The military urged civilian politicians and especially 
the governing AP that unless they could found a “credible” government, the military 
would seize power.
98
  In the following two years, supra-party governments composed 
largely of bureaucrats and technocrats ruled the country. 
Demirel stated that “On 12 March 1971, they did not take the government from my 
hands, instead, they took the core of the regime, they deteriorated democracy” (Donat, 
2005:86).  Such complaints by Demirel and the AP notwithstanding, the party in fact did 
not take a clear side against the memorandum and tried to survive with a hope of at least 
sharing governmental power.  The AP thus supported the further actions of the interim 
governments of 1971-1973 through providing ministers from the AP to these 
governments, supporting the emerging Constitutional amendments and speaking 
positively of the military.  Within a two-year period, 55 Articles of the 1961 
Constitution were changed and the AP supported a great majority of these amendments 
(Cizre, 1993:111).  Hence, with the support of the AP, some particular liberties were 
restricted while the executive and the military aspects of government were empowered 
(Özbudun, 2000:34, 57; Harris in Heper and Evin, 1988:188). Without seriously taking a 
position against the memorandum, the AP seemed to be thankful to the coup elite, 
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As Cizre suggests, even Süleyman Demirel’s moderate attitude towards the military and his willingness 
to respond to almost every military demand could not prevent the memorandum.  It could only have 
perhaps been prevented through punishing the culprits of the 1960 coup and taking precautions to 
encourage discipline within the army (1993:85). 
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seeing that they did not close the AP—a fact that considerably bolstered the military’s 
role in Turkish politics in the subsequent years (Cizre, 1993:94).  Apparently perceiving 
the military as a natural political actor, Demirel stressed the importance of a harmonious 
relationship between the military, government, and the parliament (Cizre 1993:96).   
In addition to keeping silent on the empowerment of the military as a political actor, 
Demirel also condoned unfair attempts at targeting the AP.  For instance, as the 
champion of elections in the past, the AP did not challenge any sort of unfair practices 
against it.  Levi shed light on this, saying “In different elections, the High Election 
Council invalidated the JP candidates after the elections, when they were already 
winners. In many cases, the RPP candidates who lost in the elections received the 
nomination. Against these decisions, the JP could do nothing (…)” (in Heper and 
Landau, 1991:146).  Furthermore, buttressing the State Security Courts (Devlet Güvenlik 
Mahkemeleri)
99
 and martial law procedures strengthened the AP’s collaboration with the 
12 March regime and its suppression of the Kurds as well as far-leftists (Cizre, 
1993:133).  Thus, accepting the exceptional role of the military in a system and leaving 
unchallenged the unfair measures taken against the AP, the party moved away from its 
previously strong democratic rhetoric. 
As a party that claimed to be the heir of the DP, that justified itself with reference to the 
national will, and that was recently injured by a military memorandum, the silent and 
moderate attitude of the AP could be explained by the party’s miscalculation of the 
means by which it could stay in power.  The AP had hoped for a future AP government 
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 These courts were abolished in 1976 but were reintroduced after the 1980 intervention and lasted until 
2004. 
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and took for granted the support of the masses. Thus, the party pragmatically planned to 
develop unproblematic relations with the 12 March elite—precisely what later was seen 
as the major handicap of the AP government, since in Turkish politics, nothing can be 
taken for granted, including public support. 
So, the AP largely abandoned its democratic discourse and tried to collaborate with the 
military.  This can be interpreted as suggesting that the main concern of the AP was to 
stay in power or at least to share in power rather than to end the crisis in democratic 
rule.  Such an apparent stance cost the party votes: specifically, a decrease of popular 
support down to 29.8 percent in the 1973 elections.  Even in the 1977 elections, the AP 
could not regain its previous position, and received only 36.9 percent of votes.  In 
addition to the AP’s changing stance on democracy, the increased polarization of the 
left-right division accelerated the nationalist right, the Iranian Revolution influenced 
Islamic uprisings, and the former Democrats reorganized under the flag of the 
Democratic Party as a center right rival.  All these factors played a significant role in the 
AP’s loss of support.100 Turkish politics shifted from a stable and moderate two-party 
political system to a more fragmented, volatile and polarized one (Özbudun, 2000:74; 
Ergüder and Hofferbert in Heper and Evin, 1988: 84-5).  In the subsequent years, AP 
continued in its role as the major partner in coalition governments or as the main 
opposition party concerned with matters of security and the democratic authority of the 
state, or of defending the country against communism, having largely abandoned its 
concerns with the expansion of democracy and the representation of the national will. 
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 One of the main reason for the split of DP from AP was the latter’s ambivalent attitude towards 
granting political rights to former Democrats.  This protracted process ended with a suggestion of the 
President and some AP senators rejected a bill granting those rights in 1969.   
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In other words, following the 1973 elections, a new composition of the parliament 
brought two clear outcomes.  First, no stable single party government was able to rule 
Turkey until the 1980’s.  Second, the political right in Turkey was mostly fragmented 
and the AP was no longer the only possible option for the right-wing electorate.  After 
the unsuccessful coalition attempts of CHP and MSP, Demirel asked the fragmented 
right wing parties to form a coalition of the right.
101
  Demirel thus returned to the prime 
ministry supported by the rightist Nationalist Front (Milliyetçi Cephe).   
The Nationalist Front resembled to a more tragic version of the Fatherland Front 
experience of the DP, considering their confrontational and harsh rhetoric.  Yet the 
quarrel now slid more into the emerging rifts between left and right.
102
  A strong defense 
of rightism began for AP when Demirel remarked that the rightist wings could never 
harm the country because their national responsibility prevented them from creating 
chaos (Demirel, 2004:72).  The main motive of the Nationalist Front was described as 
democracy, nationalism, hostility to communism as well and the struggle against 
poverty (Ahmad, 1977:347).  Hence, alongside AP’s increasing nationalism, the anti-
socialist identity of the party outweighed its classical center-right democratic stance.  
The AP thus developed a more confrontational attitude towards the left and began to 
drift towards a position calling for a strengthened state mission at the cost of democracy.  
In that vein, blaming Ecevit and the CHP for supporting radical left and Kurdist 
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 Different than far-nationalist and far-Islamist parties, the DP under the administration of Ferruh 
Bozbeyli as the center-right alternative of the AP did not want to join such kind of coalition.   This 
setback led to the longest ministerial crisis of Turkish politics, which lasted for 213 days (Ahmad, 
1977:348).  Then, as a reaction to Celal Bayar’s resignation from the DP, a great majority of the DP 
deputies decided to support Demirel’s Nationalist Front coalition. 
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 Especially after the year 1965, the entrance of TİP into parliement with 15 deputies and CHP’s 
positioning itself to the left of center in the 18th Grand Congress accelerated AP’s identification as right 
wing. 
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separatists the AP elite began to report the CHP to the military (Özbudun, 2000:37-2; 
Cizre, 1993: 236-2).  Hence, though it did not develop similar relations with the 
religious right, the AP did see no harm in mobilizing and supporting nationalist youth in 
opposition to the “communist threat”.  Engaging and spearheading such a coalition 
linked the AP ever more tightly to the nationalist far right.
103
 Ahmad suggests that the 
asymmetrical power of MHP in the streets in comparison to its very limited power in 
parliament provided useful energy for the AP (Ahmad, 1977: 347).  The AP thus 
broadened its nationalist discourse even criticizing Ecevit for his use of the term 
Türkiyeli (an inclusive territorial identification simply meaning ‘one from Turkey’) 
instead of Türk (Turk, a word with ethnic and racial connotations, at least within its 
nationalist uses).  We thus see that during the 1970’s polarization on the basis of a left-
right cleavage escalated in Turkey and the AP’s policies and discourses to an important 
degree became more marginalized in comparison to the AP of the 1960’s. 
In the pre-1980 period, anarchy, Kurdism, and secessionism created rifts in Turkish 
politics and made it difficult to seek reconciliation among AP and CHP. Although 
martial law handed over police power to the military, as a result of which a restrictive 
administration was introduced, no positive outcome resulted (Özbudun, 2000:35). 
Tensions escalated in particular because of the hopeless process of electing a new 
President as well as the reluctance of AP and CHP to form a coalition government. The 
political crisis, which rejected all possibilities for compromise, along with the increasing 
chaos in the streets meant that the governments of late 1970’s were unable to handle the 
situation. The military in that vein saw it right to interrupt civilian politics. 
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 The main distiction between the AP’s and MHP’s nationalism probably comes down to the fact that the 
former had a western outlook and was less localist and more moderate (Cizre, 1993: 39).   
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3.5. ANAP and Democracy 
A classical center-right procedural understanding of democracy was also apparent in 
ANAP policy and discourse, especially during the prime ministry of Özal, but with more 
of an emphasis on liberalization.  Far from being a passive president, Özal paved the 
way for the considerable expansion of a liberal democratic framework in Turkey.  In 
addition to ANAP, he also worked with the DYP- SHP coalition as well. Before his 
death, Özal, as the most prominent leader of ANAP, raised his criticisms towards ANAP 
due to its authoritarian and undemocratic inclinations.  Without any doubt, ANAP under 
the influence of Özal took significant steps towards the further democratization of 
Turkey. Yet in ways no different than its predecessors, ANAP also had clear limits to its 
approach to democracy.  Before considering ANAP’s relationship to democracy, it is 
first necessary to consider the context within which ANAP took power.  
As previously mentioned, the 1980 coup tended to see almost every civilian political 
actor as responsible for the crisis, which unsurprisingly eliminated all civilian political 
parties and other significant political actors from the political realm.  This purge covered 
mayors and municipal councils as well as parliamentarians and installed the National 
Security Council as the main power holder and Kenan Evren as the self-proclaimed head 
of state (Zürcher, 2004:278).  After the intervention, the military—without 
distinguishing military rulers from active commanders of forces (Hale, 1994:249)—
enjoyed a great scope of power under martial law and strictly controlled the press, 
education, trade unions and almost all segments of political life. 
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As a result of the intervention, though ideological polarization and violence decreased, 
the military elite—now the political elite—reshaped the political structure entirely by 
introducing a new constitution written by the Consultative Assembly, which endured 
beyond the intervention. The Consultative Assembly (wherein state elites had the 
ultimate power) was less representative than the House of Representatives of the 1961 
Constitution.  But this time, the Consultative Assembly was more dependent on the 
National Security Council (Özbudun, 2000:58; Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009:19).  The 
main theme of the new Constitution was composed of two incentives.  First, the 
extended rights and liberties granted by the 1961 Constitution were to be restricted such 
as freedom of speech, freedom of association and the rights of trade unions.  Second, as 
a reflection of mistrust of civilians, presidential power was strengthened.  Thus, high 
court judges and university rectors began to be appointed by the president since the 
military regime viewed both the judiciary and universities as crucial institutions 
(Özbudun, 2000: 59).   Having hindered many forms of opposition propaganda and 
made voting compulsory,
104
 the Constitution was accepted with 91.3 per cent yes votes 
on 7 December 1982, which also automatically made Evren the president of Turkish 
Republic for the next seven years. 
In such a context, where all political life was under the control of the 12 September 
regime, the approval of the military elite played a crucial role in any party’s 
sustainability.  In this context, Özal was the technocrat behind the 24 January decisions 
implemented in 1980 and meant to combat economic shortfall and to some extent 
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 To demonstrate the undemocratic nature of the referendum process, Zürcher notes that: “Voting was 
made compulsory and anyone who chose not to – or neglected to – vote, not only had to pay a fine but 
also lost his or her right to vote for five years” (2004:281). 
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integrate the isolated Turkish economy into the world economy.  This process also 
enabled the rise of Özal to the position of undersecretary in charge of economics in the 
AP government.  Özal had the opportunity to give briefings to high-ranking soldiers to 
explain this program before the intervention.  His image was that of an intelligent and 
smart economist after the intervention, and since economics was an overlooked area 
within the military, Özal was invited into the military government as deputy prime 
minister to manage economic matters.  Despite his resignation after two years of 
collaboration with the military regime, in 1983 he founded ANAP with the approval of 
President Kenan Evren (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:143). 105  This was crucial for the 
survival of the party, since all other parties were closed down by the junta government 
except ANAP and two other parties.  ANAP was thus able to participate in the 1983 
elections as a party that was approved but not supported
106
 by the military elite. 
Consequently when ANAP won a parliamentary majority with 45.1 per cent of votes
107
 
and 211 seats, the conjuncture of Turkey was far from a completely civilian political 
atmosphere.  Even the place of the prime minister within the state protocol was seventh 
in rank, behind four council members—an open absurdity for a liberal democracy.  
Predictably, Özal was not sure whether Evren would give the right to form the 
government to himself or not.  In such an atmosphere, Özal was invited to the 
Presidency, and in his first meeting, he kissed the cheeks of Evren, which was an 
extraordinary act and attitude for a state official.  Some observers have suggested that 
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In spite of approving of ANAP, the military regime was far from allowing the free organization of 
ANAP. Seven founding members of the party were vetoed.  Evren stipulated that Özal not allow far 
rightist and far Islamist people to join the party (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:160,181). 
106
 Evidently, Kenan Evren announced that he would support General Turgut Sunalp’s Nationalist 
Democracy Party just before the elections (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:188-2).  However, the image of 
‘having not been supported by the junta elite’ might increased popular support for ANAP.  
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 In the 6 November 1983 elections, HP and MDP obtained 30,4 and 23,2 per cent of votes respectively. 
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this attempt was the first sign of the civilianization of Turkish politics (Birand and 
Yalçın, 2009).  However, things were not so straightforward.  The composition of the 
cabinet had changed in accordance with the president’s suggestions (Cemal, 1983:66-2). 
Even the National Security Council was abolished on 13 December 1983.  Martial law, 
suppression of the press and of trade unions continued along with two significant cases, 
namely the DISK case and the Turkish Peace Association case (Dağı in Sezal and Dağı, 
2001:252; Hale, 1994:253).  As a result, particularly until the 1984 local elections, the 
scope of power available to the civilian Özal government was quite limited. In the 1984 
elections, ANAP obtained 41.5 per cent of votes which corresponded to almost 1000 
municipalities across the country (Cemal 1989:193).  After the local elections, ANAP 
government’s self-reliance expanded and began to be less dependent on the 12 
September regime. 
 
3.5.1. National Will Emphasis as the Heir of the Center-Right 
 
Despite the party’s own identification as neither left nor right, but rather a combination 
of different tendencies, a study conducted by Cumhuriyet in 1987 found that 85 per cent 
of the electorates perceived ANAP as being on the right of the political spectrum (Cemal 
1989:187, Cumhuriyet 06.11.1987).  Furthermore, 50 per cent of people who voted for 
ANAP in the 6 November elections previously voted for AP in the 1977 elections.
108
  
With regards to the 36 percent showing of AP in the 1977 elections, it is possible to 
argue that almost 75 percent of AP electorates voted for ANAP, seeing the party as the 
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 Another 28 per cent voted for the CHP, 15 per cent voted for the MSP and 5 per cent voted for the 
MHP in 1977 (Cemal 1989:79). 
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successor of, or at least the most suitable alternative after, AP.  However, Özal refrained 
from claiming any ties to the AP heritage which was probably the result of the different 
nature of the DP’s and the AP’s bitter ends, of which the former one was a victim of an 
undemocratic military intervention whilst the latter one following the 1971 military 
memorandum, somehow accepted to become the puppet of the soldiers.  Instead, he 
emphasized the need for change, offering the concept of ‘new politics’.  When he did 
link his party to the past, he preferred to frame it as the heir of DP rather than AP. 
Similar to DP and AP, ANAP founded its ideology on the concept of the national will.  
In the first article of its party program, ANAP placed national sovereignty and the 
superiority of the nation along with national unity and integrity above all else (Anavatan 
Partisi Programı 1983:17), which takes on more meaning after a military intervention.  
ANAP’s emphasis on national will was thus also wrapped up in a mission of fostering 
national integrity and reducing the polarization and political terror experienced in the 
late 1970’s.  Özal stated: 
Rejecting from the start the dichotomy inherited from the past and which it 
felt had no relevance to the present, the Motherland Party took general 
reconciliation as its starting point.   It accepted into its ranks adherents of old 
movements in order to form, with their participation, a new synthesis, while 
at the same time trying to establish cordial relations with the other political 
parties (1991:305).  
 
Özal’s famous gesture of locking his hands on his head also gave the message of unity 
and togetherness.  In the government programs, the party claimed to be the 
representative of everyone rather than of ANAP electorates per se (e.g. TBMM Tutanak 
Dergisi, 19.12.1983 p.62).  ANAP thus claimed to be a conglomeration of different and 
sometimes confrontational dispositions where liberals, nationalists, and Islamists found 
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a place.  Despite some arguments to integrate the left under ANAP’s umbrella as a 
fourth tendency, in practice, the left was not sufficiently represented.  But this argument 
was largely intended to foster social peace and to decrease political tension in the 
country (Sezal in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:167).  Nevertheless, the anti-communist 
discourse of DP and especially of AP was abandoned during ANAP times.  In that vein, 
Çetin Altan, a former TİP deputy was a close friend of the Özal family, an important 
symbolic gesture suggesting the end of a war against Socialists (Cemal, 1989:309).  By 
the same token, despite the criticisms both within and outside the party, former TİP 
leader Behice Boran’s official funeral was permitted by the ANAP government (Birand 
and Yalçın, 2009:215).  In the non-official funeral in Istanbul, the public representation 
of Socialism was also allowed (Milliyet, 19.10.1987).  Similarly, Cem Karaca, a famous 
singer, who had a warrant issued for him during the intervention years due to his 
“separatist and leftist thoughts”, was allowed to return to Turkey at the invitation of 
Özal (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:224-3).  The ANAP government was thus relatively 
more tolerant towards different ways of thought, including Socialist ones.  Portraying 
anarchy and terror as the main threats against national integrity, ANAP’s vision of 
national will and sovereignty targeted the entire nation, with the exception of 
“terrorists”.  
Thus, the party’s emphasis on national will to some extent differentiated it from DP’s 
and AP’s invocation of the term. The DP and the AP of the 1960’s explicitly framed the 
will of the nation as something very much opposed to the center and the status quo.  
What these parties referred to as the national will to a large extent corresponded to the 
electoral majority.  ANAP, without ignoring these differences, rather tried to attract all 
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people.  And the party never raised its voice against the 12 September elite, unlike DP’s 
and AP’s initial stance.  In a conjuncture wherein the military regime did not allow 
many parties to participate in elections, defending the national will went hand-in-hand 
with expressing gratitude to the military.  Hence, the first ANAP government program 
expressed appreciation for the military for protecting the national sovereignty of the 
nation (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 19.12.1983 p.63).  In the same program, ANAP 
promised to join the national and state will—a new idea in center-right ideology.  
Despite the fact that AP tried to seize and make us of state authority, especially in the 
1970’s, it did not refer to such a combination of national and state will.  Yet ANAP, 
coming to power after a period of political turmoil, envisioned closing the prevailing 
gap between the center and the periphery in the interests of social peace. 
Similar to DP and AP, a procedural understanding of democracy carried into ANAP’s 
approach, though with some additional expansions.  In ANAP’s government program, 
national sovereignty was identified as the only fundamental principle of democracy 
(TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 19.12.1983 p.67).  In that vein, very similar to its antecedents, 
ANAP did (like its predecessors) toy with the election system, which helped the party to 
remain in power.
109
  For instance, despite receiving 8.6 per cent fewer votes in the 1987 
elections in comparison to the 1983 elections, ANAP gained 80 more deputies in 1987.  
Citing the need for stability as pretext, these kinds of arbitrary amendments on the part 
of ANAP suggest a vision of democracy as a procedural virtue, which may have 
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 Among the amendments to the election system, one may consider Law No: 2972 on 18.01.1984; Law 
No: 3270 on 28.03.1986; Law No: 3330 on 19.02.1987; Law No: 3370 on 23.05.1987; Law No: 3403 on 
10.09.1987; Law No: 3404 on 17.10.1987. 
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provided short term benefits to the party but estranged the party from liberal democratic 
ideals. 
 
3.5.1.1. Democratic Reforms 
 
One of the main peculiarities of Özal’s policies was his emphasis on economic 
development as a prerequisite for a viable liberal democracy.  Hence, during his prime 
ministry, liberalization largely focused on the economic realm.  After his presidency, he 
increasingly emphasized political democratization.  Our analysis of ANAP’s democratic 
policies considers three main areas: the civilianization of politics, the expansion of 
individual rights, and the emphasis of collective and ethnic freedoms. 
Özal was aware of the necessity of the civilianization of politics for a liberal democracy. 
This explains his wish for linking the Chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of 
National Defense (Milli Savunma Bakanlığı - the MSB), appointing the assistant 
secretary of the MSB from the ranks of civilians rather than the military, and 
demilitarizing the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) (Cemal, 1989:224).  Yet 
because of the 1980 military intervention, none of the reforms were carried out 
satisfactorily during Özal’s reign.  For instance, Özal appointed Hiram Abas, a civilian, 
to head MIT, but this did not last long.  For the civilianization of politics, the ANAP 
government changed the place of the prime minister within the state protocol or state 
hierarchy by eliminating the four Council member generals above the prime minister.  In 
1987, against the planned appointment of the Chief of the General Staffs, Özal acted 
courageously and appointed Necip Torumtay to this position (Milliyet, 30.06.1987).  
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This was an extraordinary initiative and went against the established practice of the 
army, which paved the way for the civilianization of politics.   Özal’s decisions 
underscored the superiority of governmental power and lowered soldiers’ expectations 
of future political positions.  
Another significant step in the ANAP period for the civilianization of politics was the 
election of Turgut Özal as president.  As a country accustomed to seeing ex-Generals as 
presidents, Özal made an effort to break this tradition.  Before and after he declared his 
candidacy, the press and secular groups resisted his presidency, since, with his religious 
practices and his informal style, he could not be the head of the Turkish army (Cemal, 
1989:260).  In fact, it is possible to find a link between Celal Bayar and Turgut Özal’s 
presidencies insofar as Bayar became the first civilian president elected after the 
democratization process in Turkey.  Celal Bayar, though hailing from a Kemalist 
ideological background, was distinguished from his predecessors Atatürk and İnönü on 
the basis of his background as an economist.  Turgut Özal also opened the way for the 
civilianization of the presidency in Turkey after a major breakdown in the democratic 
process.  Civilianization also had an impact on center-periphery relations.  Having 
largely transformed the center to the military, the 1982 constitution formulated a strong 
president who would hail from the center and protect the state from the periphery, yet 
Özal’s presidency interrupted this plan.  Winning the presidency as a civilian, he paved 
the way for the subsequent election of civilians to this position.  In a sense, then, Özal 
reinstated the gains of DP’s tenure with regard to the presidency. 
On the expansion of individual rights, ANAP aimed for universal standards through 
signing a number of conventions, although it was often unable to adequately implement 
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their conditions.  In the course of its application to full membership in the European 
Community (the EC), ANAP accepted the individual right of appeal to the European 
Commission on Human Rights, although the main motivation was to show that Turkey 
was “politically mature enough to be a full member of the EC” (Dağı, 2001:34).  The 
European Social Charter and the Paris Charter were also signed in this term (Özbudun in 
Sezal, 1996:109).  By the same token, in response to the West’s criticism of Turkey on 
matters of torture and maltreatment, ANAP first founded a commission to study these 
claims and then accepted the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment as well as the UN Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Cemal, 
1989:315; Dağı in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:274). In line with these conventions, ANAP 
abolished Articles 140, 141,142, 163 of the penal code and initiated a significant process 
of political liberalization (Özbudun in Sezal, 1996:108; Birand and Yalçın, 2009:329-2), 
which also ended the ban on speaking Kurdish. Furthermore, though unable to abolish 
the death penalty, capital punishment largely stopped during ANAP’s rule. 
The 1982 Constitution set certain limits on the development of a viable plural civil 
society.  ANAP was simply unable to reshape the institutional structure.  Despite two 
amendments by ANAP in 1988 and 1991, the legal framework was still far from 
satisfactory for a liberal democracy.  Nevertheless, in practice, the Özal family tried to 
be a role model for society with Semra Özal’s initiatives such as founding The 
Association for the Empowerment of Turkish Women in 1986.
110
  Furthermore, 
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 This association is also accused of spreading a clientelistic network, due to the fact that the association 
collected considerable amounts of donations and in turn distributed a number of grants to its members 
(Cemal, 1989:140-2). 
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changing political dynamics, in the atmosphere of globalization, such as the growing 
expectations of Islamic and ethnic groups’ vis-à-vis pro-secularist protectionism 
(Keyman and İçduygu, 2003:223) along with ANAP’s tolerance to the expression of 
divergent thoughts paved the way for an increase in the scope and number of civil 
society associations during ANAP rule.  
Beyond these transformations, ANAP’s symbolic incentives promoted pluralism in 
society.  In addition to a number of gestures to leftist intellectuals and musicians 
mentioned above, ANAP also abolished the stage ban on Bülent Ersoy, a transsexual 
singer banned in the aftermath of the 1980 coup.
111
  Turgut Özal and his wife even 
attended Ersoy’s night club concerts (Cemal, 1989:140), an apparent indication of the 
respect of the Özal family of her identity.  Matters of gender often have been an index of 
left-right cleavage, especially in the post-materialist context.
112
  In that vein, ANAP’s 
support for Ersoy, which included passing a law allowing her to obtain a pink (female) 
identity card, could be seen as reformist politics.  ANAP also made abortion a legal and 
routine operation in state hospitals (Milliyet, 07.01.1984).  Abortion is often considered 
a litmus test separating left and right in the post-materialist literature, which suggests 
that right wing parties are usually reluctant to accept or expand abortion rights (e.g. 
Inglehart, 1990; 1997; Eysenck, 1976, Nolan, 2000).  In this regard, ANAP was far a 
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typical conservative rightist party.  Instead, in many ways it exemplified a party of 
change, tolerance and pluralism. 
One of the most telling democratic contributions of the ANAP government and 
especially Özal’s presidency was indubitably opening the door for discussion of the 
Kurdish issue.  This was a courageous step for the Turkish Republic due to the 
nationalist and Turkist-Kemalist founding ideology’s strict approach.  However, it is 
hard to argue that ANAP pursued a singular line on this issue.  First of all, the party 
framed the issue in economic means.  After the presidency of Özal, the cultural aspect of 
the issue began to be considered, which brought, to an extent at least, a softening of 
government policies with regards to Kurds and Kurdish politics.  
ANAP tended to see the question as a primarily a matter of economic backwardness, 
and thus popularized the idea that if the eastern region were to develop economically, 
there would be no need for ethnic uprisings. With this incentive, and in parallel to a 
party program that envisaged decentralization as a solution to the implementation of 
quick and efficient policies, the government granted certain rights to municipalities and 
expanded their economic status.  For instance, the authorization of public development 
and construction (imar yetkisi) was delegated to the municipalities, and municipal 
expenditures rose from 111.5 billion dollar to 1 trillion 298 million dollars between 
1981 and 1987 (Cemal, 1989:321-2).  However, the security structures of the state were 
also strengthened in this era.  In 1985, a temporary koruculuk (village guard) system was 
introduced, and continued for years to be a dubious problem-solving mechanism.  
Additionally, in 1987, Martial Law Governance (OHAL Valiliği) and the Public Order 
Army Command (Asayiş Ordu Komutanlığı) were founded to struggle against separatist 
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Kurdish fractions (Gençkaya in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:109).  The position of ANAP—
their views on economic development along with the continued militarized approach to 
the PKK—to some extent continued in Özal’s presidency period.  In 1990, the 
Southeastern Anatolian Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi or GAP) began to promote 
the economy of the region by building multiple dams to enable irrigation for agriculture 
and energy production.  A law introduced in 1990 also envisaged the compulsory 
resettlement of people living in eastern villages (Gençkaya in Sezal and Dağı, 
2001:109). We should note here that in general Özal preferred neither compulsory 
resettlement of the Kurds nor their voluntary migration (Heper, 2007: 136). As GAP 
projected, the initial intention was to keep people in their own regions while the state 
fostered economic development. ANAP only considered resettlement when the 
government could not cope with terror. 
Especially after Özal’s presidency, the Kurdish issue became more pronounced. 113  
Having distinguished the individual and collective rights of Kurds from separatist terror, 
Özal also offered to discuss such collective matters as opening local TV stations and 
allowing for education in Kurdish (Heper, 2007:135-2; Milliyet 19.08.1992).  
Approaching ethnic and cultural diversity as a source of richness, Özal began to 
emphasize Islam as a unifying source (Gençkaya in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:129).  He tried 
to build dialogue with representatives of the Kurdish movement.  In that vein, he invited 
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Furthermore, the international conjuncture also influenced his stance.  On the influence of the Gulf War 
on Özal’s Kurdish policies, see also Ömer Faruk Gençkaya. 2001. "Turgut Özal’in Güneydoğu ve Kürt 
Sorununa Bakışı,” inIhsan Sezal ve Ihsan Dagi (eds). Kim Bu? Özal, Siyaset, Iktisat, Zihniyet. İstanbul: 
Boyut, pp.143-3; Birand and Yalçın, 2009. The Özal…pp.451-2. 
 158 
HEP deputies to Çankaya114 in a show of his willingness to allow payment of HEP from 
the state treasury.  He also sent messages to Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK 
movement, in an effort to end the violence (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:455).  He met with 
Barzani, the Kurdish leader in Northern Iraq and allowed such Kurdish activists as 
Kemal Burkay and Ahmet Türk to meet with Öcalan (Birand and Yalçın, 2009: 475-2).  
As a result of these negotiations, the PKK declared an armistice that lasted for two 
years.  Unlike previous politicians, Özal also broached the subject of federalism, even 
while underscoring that he did not find this a feasible option (Heper, 2007:133; Birand 
and Yalçın, 2009:454-4).  Such a liberal attitude was further strengthened by Adnan 
Kahveci’s report, presented to Özal in 1992, that foresaw military approaches to the so-
called Kurdish question as liable to push the country into civil war and underlined the 
necessity of recognizing Kurdish identity and specific cultural rights (Heper, 2007: 138). 
Before ANAP won the 1983 elections, the military regime passed a law banning 
Kurdish in everyday speech and in publications.  This law was abandoned on 12 April 
1991 by the ANAP government
115
 (Özbudun in Sezal, 1996:108; Birand and Yalçın, 
2009:476).  Justifying the implementation of such a law as a significant step for 
democratization, ANAP deputies portrayed the former ban as a backwards measure, in 
hopes that this would bring a much-needed social peace (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 
11.04.1991 p.401).  Opposition deputies accused ANAP of exploiting the sensitivities of 
Kurdish citizens by taking measures to promote Kurdish (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 
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11.04.1991 p.387).  By the same token, a broad amnesty was introduced that freed many 
Kurdish activists (Milliyet, 13.04.1991).  Yet we should note that even if the policies and 
discourses of ANAP regarding the Kurdish issue were rather reformist considering the 
conditions of the late 1980’s and the early 1990’s, classical center-right pragmatism was 
present in ANAP policies as well.  For instance, one of the rationales for tolerating a 
Kurdish party in the Assembly was motivated by the goal of dividing the electoral base 
of the SHP on the left.  Furthermore, despite passing an amnesty law in 1991, in 1988 
the same Özal and ANAP government opposed a very similar proposal by SHP and 
accused the party of negotiating with terror and separatist movements (Gençkaya in 
Sezal and Dağı, 2001:136).  It is thus hard to claim that the priority of ANAP and Özal 
was further democratization.  Yet even if the main concern of the party was on 
pragmatic calculations, ultimately these policies gradually helped to initiate the 
normalization of the Kurdish issue in the future. 
Özal also conducted a second transformation program composed of a draft constitution 
that framed the state in terms of technical rather than ideological functions (Bozkurt in 
Sezal and Dağı, 2001:190).  The same position could be observed in the DP and the AP 
in the 1960’s as well; both spoke of the state as a service oriented paradigm rather than 
an ideological apparatus.  Özbudun also notes that his proposed constitution was to a 
large extent composed of a bill of rights (Özbudun, 2000:60).  Three liberties—freedom 
of thought, of conscience and of enterprise—were typically the main paradigms of the 
ANAP mentality.  As Barlas says, in order to evaluate the Özal period adequately, it is 
first necessary to look at the pre-Özal period.   Color TV was banned by the DPT so as 
to not waste money, possessing Marlboro or whisky was considered a crime; private 
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communication was restricted for not using digital network (Barlas 1994:259-21).  The 
scope of the democratization policies of Özal did not consist of these three headings per 
se.  The considerable transformations of lifestyles and their visibility in the public realm 
along with a developmentalist mentality also paved for the rise of a more free society.  
However, as observed in DP and AP, ANAP did not hesitate to place limits on 
democracy as well. 
 
3.5.2. Limits on Democracy 
The most apparent shortcoming in ANAP’s understanding of democracy had to do with 
the relationship between the government and its opposition.  Despite efforts to integrate 
Turkey into the West and liberalize its system, ANAP did not, in fact, represent a 
sufficiently mature attitude towards the opposition.  Recalling that the 12 September 
regime eliminated all but three parties from the political scene, ANAP often made use of 
the coup conditions as a pretext to hinder other parties’ competitiveness.  As a party 
nurtured by a considerable dose of pragmatism, the ANAP gave a bad exam in that 
respect. 
The first example of ANAP in this regard can be seen in the party’s reluctance to issue a 
bill that would allow SODEP, the DYP and the RP to participate in the 1984 local 
elections.  The party showed an apathetic attitude towards demands from the opposition.   
However, after polls indicated that ANAP could win even if these parties entered the 
elections (Milliyet, 06.01.1984), the ANAP government eventually passed a bill, just 
two months before the elections, that allowed opposition parties to compete with them in 
 161 
the local elections.  ANAP thus prevented to a significant degree newcomer parties from 
sufficiently preparing for the elections, such that the ruling party received 41.5 percent 
of the votes. 
Another feverish debate at the time concerned the ban on prominent leaders from the 
pre-intervention period, particularly Süleyman Demirel of the DYP, the center-right 
rival of ANAP.  In a reference to articles that introduced five and ten year bans on 
former leaders, Özal said “I entered politics relying on the provisional clauses of the 
constitution.  Otherwise, I would not make politics” (Cemal 1989:23).  This phobia of 
Özal persisted even after he won one general and one local election.  After 1985, 
demands for the repeal of the bans on former leaders became more pronounced.  Özal 
continued to claim that the President was the main handicap for the required 
amendment.  Eventually, disturbed by Özal’s implications, Evren acknowledged on 7 
May 1986 that he was in favor of the repeal, leaving Özal no room to escape (Cemal 
1989:213).   As a political engineer, before responding to the pressures on him to restore 
the political rights of the former leaders, Özal first went to a by-election on 28 
September 1986 (for 11 deputyships) before Demirel’s entrance to the political arena 
and obtained 32 per cent of votes.   
Özal then pursued an undemocratic process while deciding to take the decision to a 
referendum, with the excuse that “the public made this ban, and if necessary the public 
should abandon this ban”.  As stated above, the referendum conditions of the post-
intervention period were far from free and the public was more or less forced to vote in 
favor of the 1982 Constitution.  In spite of this, ANAP subjected the former leaders’ 
right to engage in politics to a referendum instead of accepting this issue as a natural 
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democratic right.  This incentive was far too undemocratic and unnecessary (Özbudun, 
2000:62; Yayla in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:438).   
More importantly, ANAP’s position throughout the referendum process was a great 
trouble.  Despite initially promising to remain impartial, with time the party clearly 
opposed granting these politicians political freedom.  Operating the debate as the ANAP 
against the all other parties’ coalition, Özal expected to benefit from such confrontation.  
Özal therefore announced on television that he would vote against the measure (Cemal, 
1989:213).  The party furthermore made frequent use in their propaganda of the color 
orange (the color of no).  For instance, Güneş Taner from ANAP wore orange T-shirts 
with the word “no” to political rallies, where squares were decorated with orange 
banners (Cemal, 1989:215).  Suggesting that a vote for “‘yes’ would mean a return to 
the nightmare of violence and chaos that had provoked military intervention” (Ahmad, 
1993:196), Özal suggested that voting “yes” was by no means related to democratic 
motivations.  The campaign of the ANAP was largely successful and the “no” votes 
were almost equal to the “yes” votes, with less than 1 per cent margin.  Although the 
political rights of the former leaders were restored, ANAP demonstrated the limits of its 
pro-democratic stance and drew serious criticisms from liberals.
116
 
Regarding intra-party relations, ANAP under Özal represented a different style of policy 
making.  In Turkey, given the prevalence in nearly all parties of leader domination 
regardless of left or right, Özal transformed the contents of leader domination.  Without 
spending much time in the office, especially until 1987 Özal governed the country 
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Cemal, 1989:309-2) 
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primarily from his home alongside his family.  Surrounded by close friends, he preferred 
to pass decree laws (Kanun Hükmünde Kararname – KHK) from the cabinet instead of 
engage in Assembly legislation, thus bypassing dispute in the parliament.
117
  In contrast 
to Özal’s liberal and tolerant image, he occasionally preferred to establish an oligarchy 
of sorts while governing the country.  In that vein, Özal saw no harm in arbitrary 
changes.  One of the most telling examples was the rejection of the head of the 
Assembly under the suggestion of Özal to call an extraordinary meeting to annul the 
early 1987 elections proposed by 100 deputies which was contrary to the procedures 
(Cemal, 1989:248).  Even after his presidency, when Semra Özal became the Istanbul 
chair of the party, Turgut Özal tried to manipulate the policies, lists, and candidates of 
ANAP through his wife.   
As part of a new generation of politics, ANAP actively utilized the media. A monthly 
TV programme called İcraatın İçinden (From within the Accomplishments), meant to 
share the government’s activities with the masses, began to broadcast during the Özal 
era.  The party thus found a space for self-propaganda.  Similarly, before the 1987 
elections, the disproportional use of the media by ANAP resulted in unjust 
representation.  Hasan Cemal reports that before the 1987 elections, ANAP appeared on 
the screen for 65 minutes, compared to 11 minutes for the SHP and 10 minutes for the 
DYP and the DSP (Cemal, 1989:252).  It is also worth noting that the first private TV 
station was founded by Özal’s son Ahmet Özal and his partner Cem Uzan which also 
helped to expand support for ANAP.  
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In comparison to its predecessors, ANAP built longer-standing and better relationships 
with the press, particularly by the end of the 1980’s.  Özal called columnists on the 
telephone and discussed the prevailing debates in the country directly with them.  He 
also tolerated many disdaining caricatures of himself.  That said, on the other hand, 
press censorship proliferated during his tenure. After Özal’s by-pass surgery and the 
intense opposition of some columnists to ANAP’s attitude to restoring former leaders’ 
political rights, relations between ANAP and the press became more problematic.  The 
one-time tolerance towards journalists and intellectuals gradually diminished.  For 
instance, Bekir Coşkun’s research into the Özal family was halted by resorting to the 
court to stop publication of this research Cemal, 1989:270). 
Furthermore, the scope of a bill entitled “küçükleri muzır neşriyattan koruma yasası” 
(the bill on the protection of children from harmful publications) was extended twice 
during ANAP’s tenure.  The aim of a publication, the message it delivered, images, and 
the scientific (ilmi) value of a publication were all investigated within this law.  
Newspapers that published risque photographs of celebrities were closed as well 
(Milliyet, 31.05.1986).  Many books were withdrawn from circulation, many publishers 
and intellectuals paid considerable penalties and more than 2700 intellectuals, including 
very well-known names such as Ahmet Altan, Duygu Asena and Pınar Kür, were judged 
after the implementation of the amendments of this law (Cemal, 1989:312-2).  Similarly, 
during Metin Emiroğlu’s tenure at the National Education Ministry, reading Voltaire, 
Moliere and Camus was prohibited at schools on account of those authors’ negative 
views about the Turkish nation (Cemal, 1989:163).  Thus, a center-right attitude that 
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might favor conservative social norms over freedom of thought is sometimes observed 
in ANAP as well. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
All in all, losing its astonishing position after the presidency of Özal, ANAP was 
dissolved after Özal’s death and became a minor party in the center-right.  As president, 
Özal criticized ANAP and the DYP for being too conservative, as those parties could 
not attract votes in the eastern part of Turkey, resisted change, and were hesitant to 
introduce new politics.  As Lipset envisages, the longer a party stays in power, the more 
probability its authoritarianism (1960).  This was observed in all center-right parties in 
Turkey, which might be a somehow natural result of their stay in power so long, they 
began to place some limits on their prior democratic stances.  The ANAP also increased 
its limits on democracy especially after 1987 and engaged in few substantive aspects of 
democracy.  Thus, in the late periods of its government in 1990’s, the party grew closer 
to the status quo against the nation will. 
In the subsequent years, the center-right parties engaged in a number of coalition 
governments.  As Tosun observes, corruption claims along with the will of sharing the 
state power took the place of claims to represent the will of the nation.   This resulted in 
the center-leftization of these parties in terms of their employment of democracy (1999). 
In that vein, identity politics (which promised a more ideological framework than the 
center-right) began to catch on with more people with its Islamist, Kurdist, and Turkist 
options.  Islamic parties successfully mobilized the masses by combining a conservative 
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populist worldview with a service-oriented policy–which had been pursued by center-
right parties before–as well as strong personal one-to-one or door-to-door interaction118. 
Public support for the National Outlook tradition was halted by a military intervention 
(called as “post-modern coup”) in 1997. That process accelerated the center-leftization 
of center-right parties in terms of their repositioning within the secular vs. religious 
cleavage.  Especially ANAP lost ground, having kept silent about the repression of 
religion in the public sphere in the aftermath of the 28 February process, but so did the 
DYP.  The National Outlook movement also split into a more moderate and a more 
Islamist camp, from which the Innovators led by Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül 
founded the AK Party in 2001.  The center-right’s basic claims to represent the will of 
nation, respect election results, guarantee basic rights (including the religious rights), 
and establish close relations with the people through contrasting peripheral 
representation to state domination were to a large extent collapsed in the center-right 
parties’ attitudes.  All these principles were also successfully endorsed by the AK Party. 
One of the last suicides of the center-right took place during the 27 April 2007 crisis 
wherein party leaders Erkan Mumcu and Mehmet Ağar decided to take a stance against 
the AK Party regarding the issue of presidential election, allegedly approving the 
military’s initiative.  The center-right parties thus violated one of their most basic 
claims, the defense of the will of the nation, and hence moved closer to the center. All in 
all, the already diminished public support for those parties completely dissolved after 
this event. Süleyman Soylu, who represented one of the most promising classical center-
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right leaders, also became the leader of the Democrat Party (a unification of center-right 
parties), joined the AK Party in 2012.  
In a nutshell, the center-right parties in Turkey were close to the procedural 
understanding of democracy that gave importance to national will, free, fair and 
competitive election, and respect for the majority’s decisions while building close 
contact with the masses. They were usually an accessible organization for the periphery, 
which had been overlooked by the center for decades. Especially after Özal’s tenure, the 
procedural understanding of democracy shifted from a minimalist interpretation to a 
broader understanding. Nevertheless, the Turkish center-right did not deal with 
substantive means of democracy which was observed in these parties’ relationships with 
opposition parties, intra-party oppositions, the press, minorities and so on. Along with 
other political dynamics taking place in the 1990’s, the former center-right parties 
affinityy to slide into semi-authoritarianism, and their eagerness to abandon the national 
will rhetoric and embrace the center’s interests instead of the periphery led to a 
considerable loss of their public base, which was eventually filled by the AK Party in 
2002.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
  THE STATE AND THE CENTER-RIGHT IN TURKEY 
 
4.1. PART 1: In Terms of Power 
 
 The center-right in Turkey maintains a ‘love-hate’ relationship with the state.  
On the one hand, the center-right parties frequently deploy a critical discourse and 
policy in regards to the state; on the other hand, they never give up exerting efforts to 
take charge of it. It should be stressed straightaway that the strategies of the ANAP were 
more innovative than those of the DP and the AP and the center-right parties acted in 
accordance with the tides of the conjuncture. To unpack this a bit; whereas the DP 
struggled against the founding ideology of CHP and the AP dealt with the Constitution 
of 1961 that strengthened and expanded state control via institutions such as the 
National Security Council, the Supreme Council of Judges, radio, academia etc.; the 
ANAP endeavored to establish a modest relationship with the two guardians of the state 
- a strong president and a constitution reinforced by the military coup of 1980. In this 
context, given the transfer of power from state elites to the political ones and vice versa, 
the political elites of the center-right strived to extend their spheres of influence without 
running counter to the state elites. Before dwelling upon how the center-right in Turkey 
assesses the state and the ways with which it copes with it in view of the above-
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mentioned three parties, first of all, it is necessary to present brief information on the 
state tradition in Turkey. This will be followed by an examination of the interactions 
between the state and the center-right in Turkey: firstly, the focus will be on the 
interactions between the center-right and bureaucracy (the civil and military 
bureaucrats) and secondly, the onus will be put on the economic assessments of the 
politics put into practice by the center-right. 
A variety of perspectives stretching from rational choice to behavioralist theory and 
post-modernism present differing views on state. This study, which will not pursue these 
lines of inquiry, approaches the concept of state on institutional grounds stressing its 
“greater independence…vis-a-vis other associations or collectivities” (Heper, 1985:86; 
See also J.P. Nettl, 1968; Evans et.al., 1985; Akarlı in Akarlı and Ben-Dor, 1975). 
Given the par excellence achievement of the Ottoman experience in this regard (Heper, 
1985), the state tradition in Turkey was to a large extent influenced by that of the 
Ottoman Empire.
119
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Westview Press, 99-125.   
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The Ottoman state was a strong one, where the Sultan held the absolute power and a 
system called “circle of justice”120 prevailed. From the outset, the Ottoman center was 
separated from the periphery with a clear-cut distinction between the two on the basis of 
function within the Ottoman polity and tax paying function.  The ruling elite residing in 
the former versus the masses (Reaya) located in the latter. The ruling elites (Askeriler) 
were more or less functioned as the instruments of imperial power up till the 19
th
 
century. In light of Findley’s analysis,121 it is convenient to categorize the ruling elites of 
the Ottoman Empire in three main groups; bureaucratic representatives of the supreme 
power of the Sultan (ehl-i kalem), protectors and administrators of the state (ehl-i 
örf/ehl-i kılıç) and the protectors of the moral order (ehl-i şer).  The ehl-i kalem 
composed of the bureaucrats related to diplomacy, state treasury, and official records of 
the state and so on. The ehl-i şer contained the judges as well as the religious scholars 
(Ulema) who were responsible for the education of the new scholars for maintaining 
justice. The ehl-i örf constituted the military-administrative establishment: the men of 
the sword (Seyfiye), servants of the Sultan, and the royal family.  
As there was no viable civil society and socio-economically defined classes to play an 
intermediary role between the ruler and the ruled, to a significant extent, the Ottoman 
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state was autonomous
122
 in that the Sultan concentrated the entire power in his hands via 
the loyalty of his ruling elites, devoted to the state rather than any individualistic 
concern or group interest (Özbudun in Brown, 1996:145-3; Özbudun in Diamond, 
1994:190; Heper, 1985; 16, 94; Heper in Heper, 1991:95; Black and Brown, 
1992:50).
123
 Even at the height of his rule, the Sultan consulted with these loyal elites 
and shared a degree of state power with them.
124
  Whether the Sultan began to share his 
supreme power with interest groups or not was a question of inquiry that, at the last 
instance, gave an idea about the nature of the ‘Sultanic power’.125 It was never shared 
with any social class except the devoted elites of bureaucracy. That's why the Deed of 
Alliance (Sened-i İttifak - 1808) was not a Magna Carta Libertatum since it did not 
adequately share the supreme power of the Sultan with the ayans (Shaw and Kural 
Shaw, 1977:3). In this context, in the late Ottoman era, it is fair to claim that an 
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 172 
autonomous strong state tradition was maintained without any real power sharing with 
civil society.  
Nevertheless, the changing composition of the ruling elite soon altered the political 
balance. Findley proposes that at the end of the 19
th
 century, while the religious and 
military establishments started to lose their grips on power due to various reforms, a 
civil bureaucracy (Mülkiye) began to emerge, mainly as a result of “a desire within the 
ruling class to acquire safeguards against the dangers inherent in its traditional slave 
status, and in the process, to take on the privileges typical of a European official 
aristocracy. The pursuit of this desire in a period of cultural change gave the elitist 
apparatus of the ruling class” (1980:16). Accordingly, Kalemiye or ehl-I kalem 
transformed into Mülkiye and the power grip of this new form of strengthened 
bureaucracy that avoided representing any kind of personal interest, stretched beyond 
the servants of the palace and the men of religion. Kazancıgil observes that “what 
Weber called the ‘traditional status oriented attitude of the bureaucracy towards rational 
economic profit’ was reflected in the modernizing Tanzimat elites’ lack of interest in 
economic matters, which they only considered in connection with the improvement of 
the finances of the state” (Kazancıgil in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981:46; See also: 
Weber in Roth and Claus eds., 1968:1109). Akarlı also points out that during late 
Ottoman era, those government employees’ “official earnings were in principle tax-
exempt, a clear indication of the privileged position enjoyed by government employees 
within Ottoman society” (Akarlı, 1992:456). Such tax exemption might be interpreted as 
more than a privileged position: it might also be considered as an identification of 
government employees’ with the state. As the state gradually slipped away from the 
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grasp of the Sultan, the civil bureaucrats or the ‘center’ dominated by Mülkiye became 
the real owner of the state to a large extent.
126
 Metin Heper concisely explains this 
transition below:  
It is tempting to identify the person of the sultan with the state. One may be 
justified in doing so with respect to the classical period when the sultans 
ruled as well as reigned. It becomes difficult, however, to see an identity 
between the sultan and the state in later centuries when at times the sultans 
became puppets in the hands of military, civil, and/ or religious 
bureaucracies, and/or of various cliques in the palace itself. The ruling 
groups in time became the servants of the state rather than those of the 
sultan
127. (…)  The state was seen as the provider of nizam (order). By 
‘center’ we mean here those groups or persons who tried to uphold the 
state's autonomy and supremacy in the polity (1980:85).   
 
The paternalistic features of this tradition penetrated into the Turkish state as well. As a 
result, ‘bureaucratic ruling tradition’ was consolidated in the Ottoman-Turkish 
experience, where the state elites as the guardians of the state deemed they knew the 
best for the masses (Özbudun in Diamond, 1994:194; Heper, 1976:508; Rustow, 
1967:79). As all-knowing agents, these state elites were also skeptical about the 
rationality, capability and intention of the masses. Ahmad pointsf to a connection 
between the single party, “which includes within the whole nation and not just a 
section” and the paternalistic features of the state, guiding people impartially (In 
Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981: 157). It was difficult for the masses to challenge such a 
paternalistic state, since it was a common belief that the state could think for its citizens 
better than they could think for themselves (Heper, 1985:103; Özbudun in Brown, 
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1996:137). Özbudun summarizes this mind-set as “a feeling of respect for a strong but 
benevolent state” (In Brown, 1996:138).   
Having mapped out the terrain on which the strong, autonomous and paternalistic state 
features were transferred to the Turkish experience let me turn to the persistence of state 
elites’ supremacy throughout the early Republican era. The Kemalist state, generated by 
state elites in the course of a ‘revolution from above’ (Trimberger, 1978: 41-42), paved 
the way for Turkish politics to be shaped as ‘elite politics’ (Frey, 1965). At the time, 
state elites introduced the ideology of state as a project of modernization to the 
periphery. Nelson succinctly emphasizes the significance of ideology in relation to the 
concept of state as below: 
To these basic structural characteristics of territoriality, sovereignty, 
centralized government, and coercive law, must be added some 
corresponding form of state consciousness or ideology of legitimation. 
While theoretically a state could exist in the structural sense without it, in 
reality no state could survive without some operative myth that legitimized 
it. And it is characteristic of all states that the legitimizing ideology is 
framed in terms of some myth of foundation by which they were initially 
formed, by the Gods in the earliest states or, in the modern state, by an act of 
rational consent (2006:8).   
 
Thus, the state elites, who “could decide rationally that is through enlightened debate, 
what was best for the country” (Heper in Heper, 1991:17), now began to construct a new 
Turkey that was planned to consist of citizens capable of “acquir[ing] the capacity to 
reach consensus not through multiple confrontations, but by attaining a higher level of 
rationality” (Heper, 1985:64).  The ideological shift from a religious one to a rational 
and secular one, which had its roots in the period of Tanzimat, was at this time more 
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pronounced.
128
 In the context of a single party system, the state party CHP had a great 
advantage for the indoctrination of the people with respect to the principles of 
Kemalism.
129
  In Sakallıoğlu’s words, the early Republican era was a scene for “the 
superimposition on society of the political ideals of the state bureaucracy entrenched in 
the ruling party, the RPP” (1992:712). The ‘Turkification’ of the masses along with the 
precedence of secularism formed a deeper gap between the state elites (center) and the 
periphery. As a consequence of the autonomous, strong and paternalistic state tradition 
described above, masses remained reluctant in making use of democratic means as a 
way of revealing their discontent, except the ballot box. 
 
4.1.1. Bureaucracy and the Democrat Party 
 
One of the prominent features of the center-right in Turkey has its origins in 
controversial relations between the center-right parties and bureaucracy.
130
 As 
previously noted the bureaucratic center and the statist CHP were the ones that mainly 
shaped the parameters of politics in Turkey prior to the forming of center-right 
governments. The CHP displayed an exemplar of Huntington’s “exclusionary one-party 
systems,” where the party, detached from society, was suppressing any societal 
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opposition (Özbudun in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981:94; Sayarı in Akarlı and Ben-
Dor, 1975:121).  That being the case, where the political arena was taken hold of by the 
state elites per se, the transition to the multi-party system revealed clearly the depth of 
the cleavage between the center and the periphery. 
Following the establishment of the DP on January 7, 1946, the CHP was faced with a 
real rival for the first time in the political arena and this led to a gradual decrease in its 
monopoly on the decision-making processes. In view of insights gained from Roos and 
Roos (1970:69), as competition gained impetus in the political system, bureaucracy 
started to lose its grip on power in Turkey following the first free and fair elections held 
in 1950. It is possible to frame this period in light of the concept of “de-
bureaucratization” or in Heper’s terms, ‘anti-bureaucratization’ (1985:94).  Hence, “not 
only did official elites lose their once preeminent presentation in parliament and their 
strong ties with political elites but their overall influence, status, prestige, security, and 
income declined sharply as well” (Özbudun in Diamond, 1994:198).   
In order to view the issue from an alternative angle than the one provided by Roos and 
Roos – namely, when competition rises in a political system, the power of bureaucracy 
declines – one can consider Huntington’s account as well. He argues that the decline of 
bureaucracy might also stem from the relative increase in the political engagement of 
the periphery. According to Huntington (1968:74-2), this is apparent in “ruralizing 
elections” held following the decline in the power of center. The elections of 1950 in 
Turkey conformed to his argumentation.
131
 Despite the fact that CHP pursued an 
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election campaign in the villages via the motto of “Do not oppose the state” (Bayar, 
1969:73); the DP’s triumph indicated to the fact that people sided with the civilian 
politicians rather than those of the state.
132
 When considered from this point of view, the 
elections held in 1950 amounted to a turning point in Turkish politics since these 
elections, not only differentiated between the state elites and the civilian ones, but also 
made it clear that the latter was perceived as the representative of the periphery.
133
  
It goes without saying that the periphery or the society was not a monolithic entity.  The 
major common ground uniting the periphery was its lack of power, which was utilized 
by the center per se.  On this point, Özbudun asserts that:  
The Committee of Union and Progress and the RPP represented the 
authoritarian domination of the bureaucratic center, and the victory of the 
DP in 1950 can be interpreted as the strong reaction of the periphery to such 
domination when it was given a free choice for the first time. This explains 
both the strong electoral appeal of the DP throughout the 1950s (and that of 
its successor, the JP in the 1960s) and the heterogeneity of its social base of 
support (in Weiner and Özbudun, 1987:346).   
 
Building on Özbudun’s point, it is fair to claim that the success of the DP derived from 
its competence in melting various problems experienced by diverse groups into a single 
pot, in the shape of a popular consensus against the bureaucratic center. It was indeed 
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such a melting pot that even the illegal Communist Party supported the DP in the 
elections of 1950. Taking the extent of the support for the DP in these elections into 
account, Keyder describes the cleavage between the center and the periphery as “a mass-
elite confrontation, because the political contestation of the time was a declaredly 
populist one: ‘the people’ had been politically dominated, socially oppressed and 
economically exploited by the bureaucratic-bourgeois bloc” (Keyder, 1987:122). In the 
context of such a fragmented political climate, it hardly needs pointing out that the 
relations between the DP and the state were tense at the outset. 
 
4.1.1.1. Mutual Suspicion  
 
The political elites of the DP and the state elites were vested with a considerable amount 
of suspicion towards each other. State elites mistrusted the elected politicians on the 
presumption that ‘while the politicians reflect upon the next elections; bureaucrats 
envision the next generations’134.  Such mistrust stemmed mainly from the defeat at the 
ballot box, which not only led to a psychological discontent among the state elites, but 
also, to a certain extent, brought about a necessity to revise their self-evaluations as the 
‘omniscient agents of modernization.’ Heper speculates that “the delineated set of norms 
imposed upon and adopted by the civil bureaucracy gave it a sense of cultural 
guardianship in the society. As such it did not have a favorable attitude toward the 
emergence and development of new social groups with (potential) political leverage” 
(Heper, 1976: 513). Therefore, to a significant extent, state elites, considering 
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themselves as the prominent agents of the modernization project, perceived the electoral 
success of the DP as the defeat of the reforms and modernized life-styles this project 
endeavored to give rise to. Demirel quotes Bedii Faik’s observations right after the 
elections of 1950.
135
 In Faik’s account, the boulevards and avenues of Ankara, where 
people were previously arrayed in top hats and modern clothes, were ‘occupied’ by 
peasantry, with all their costumes and vehicles (Demirel, 2011:145; Faik, 2001:77). 
Faik’s description reveals the psychology of the center at the time: the owners of the 
state began to feel suppressed by the periphery, not only in the political arena, but also 
in the social space. 
The DP reciprocated state elites’ mistrust as well, fearing from a possible intervention 
on part of the center into their power realm. This fear echoed in DP’s party program of 
1951, in which the party underlined that every direct/indirect abuse of authority 
regarding the enactment of public services was going to be ended (Demokrat Parti 
Tüzük ve Programı 1951, Article 25).  What's more, in the immediate aftermath of DP’s 
rise to power, a serious purge aimed at the provincial Generals and Governors followed 
suit. The government, not only suspected a possible military intervention projected by 
these generals, but also considered the strong ties between these governors and the CHP 
as worrying (Demirel, 2011:132; Burçak, 1998:53; Tunçay in Akşin, 1989:178; Toker, 
1991a: 41). Hence, the DP endeavored to take precautions in order to secure the 
subsequent maneuvers of its government.
136
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 Nevertheless, the government formed by the DP neither dismantled bureaucracy, nor it was capable of 
creating absolute control over the bureaucrats. According to various scholars, the DP indeed endeavored 
to establish an easy-going relationship with the bureaucracy by avoiding conflicts (Demirel, 2011; 
Eryılmaz, 1998:159-2). Demirel, not only provides examples of many bureaucrats, who retained their 
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Despite coming to power by rallying great support, the DP was not confident about the 
optimal operations of the democratic procedures. The government formed by the DP 
usually accused the state elites of their plea for reserved domains in the name of 
securing the country. Such accusations set the tone of the Assembly Meeting of the 
Parliament held in the autumn of 1952. In the meeting, Celal Bayar, the President, stated 
that the ones, who argued that the reforms were in danger, were as harmful as the 
reactionary ones (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 01.11.1952). By this logic, the DP made its 
position clear: the party was not only against the ones who claimed that the state was in 
a so-called crisis, but also in opposition to the ones who threatens the principles of the 
state. Therefore, the DP did not oppose the state, itself but opposed to those who 
claimed to be the guardians of the state. The discourse of the DP accompanied by its 
certain initiatives such as the replacement of old-timer bureaucrats aroused anxieties on 
part of the center and gave rise to a vicious circle of suspicion. 
 
4.1.1.2. The ‘Dream’ of the DP: A Small, Yet Strong State 
 
According to the elites of the DP, the fundamental difference between the DP and the 
CHP evolved out of their contradictory mentalities concerning the state. For the DP, the 
real owner of the state was the nation; for the CHP, it was the military and the 
intellectuals (Bayar, 1969: 9-2). Since CHP’s identification of the party with the state 
was a deep-rooted threat, the DP strived to reserve the political sphere for the masses, 
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instead of the components of bureaucracy, either civil or military. Such a reservation 
had repercussions in the party programs of the 1946 and 1951. The Article 11 of the 
Party Program of 1946 stated that the party was against the political activities of all 
government employees, with the exception of academicians.
137
 The government formed 
by the DP deemed government employees as civil servants rather than the owners of the 
state. Similar arguments were advanced in the Article 19 of the Party Program of 1951. 
This article, not only underlined the necessity of abandoning ‘the bureaucratic 
mentality’, but also sought to limit the power of the civil servants in order to prevent 
them from any sort of arbitrary rule (DP Programı, 1946; DP Tüzüğü ve Programı, 
1951).   
The conventional motto, ‘people for the state’ was reversed in the party programs of the 
DP. In these programs, the main objective of a good administration was defined not only 
as providing the security of the citizens in all of their activities, but also setting firm 
grounds for reliability and thrust between the citizens and the state (DP Parti Programı, 
1946; DP Tüzüğü ve Parti Programı, 1951, Article 19). Similar objectives appeared in 
the government programs under Menderes as well, and underlined the necessity of 
rationally restructuring the state apparatus.
138
 When he was in office, Menderes 
frequently complained about the privileged positions of the bureaucrats. On immunity, 
he stated that “under the rule of law, all power is absolute. All sorts of power reclaimed 
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by public officers bring along certain responsibilities” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 
13.05.1957).  On the status of public officers, Menderes affirmed that not only 
exaggeration, but also underestimation would be equally dangerous. What made the 
public officers’ position unique, in his account, was their duty to serve the nation 
(Milliyet, 09.07.1953). In this respect, according to the DP, the significance of the status 
of ‘public officer’ did not derive from any sort of superiority vis-a-vis masses, rather it 
stemmed from the duty of public officers to serve the nation.  
On the other hand, in the Article 23 of 1946 Party Program, the government pledged to 
improve the living standards of the civil servants on the basis of merit and hard work. 
For doing so, it sought ways to get rid of the burden brought about by the abundant 
salaries of the government employees (DP Programı, 1946; DP Tüzüğü ve Parti 
Programı, 1951, Article 24). Hence, the initial approach of the DP concerning civil 
servants was shaped by the policies of scaling down in order to not only work with the 
most qualified ones, but also to improve the living standards of the remaining few.
139
 
Nevertheless, in practice, the party neither managed to lessen the number of the civil 
servants, nor improved their living standards.
140
 In contrast, during DP’s term, both the 
salaries and the purchasing power of bureaucrats (both military and civil) diminished to 
a significant extent because of DP’s stance against bureaucracy and inflationary 
economic policies (Özbudun in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:61; Dodd, 1969:53).   
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In the next party program, the Article 23 rendered it possible to appoint a government 
employee to a higher rank without taking into consideration required educational 
qualifications (DP Tüzüğü ve Parti Programı, 1951, Article 23). By enforcing such an 
amendment, the DP revealed not only that it had experienced a significant change of 
mind, but also its intention to reward partisanship rather than a formal diploma or 
education. To remind, while the state elites mainly paid attention to procedures and 
formal assessments, the DP emphasized practical application, capability and harmonious 
operations with the government. On a parallel front, during DP’s term of government, 
the increase in the infrastructural investments alongside various initiatives for economic 
enterprises subsidized by the state led to the creation of a new type of bureaucrat, which 
may be defined as ‘technocrat.’ Technocrats gained a superior position in the decision- 
making processes and enjoyed better income levels, yet faced a lower job security in 
comparison to traditional bureaucrats (Şaylan, 1984:303). Such developments reinforced 
the idea that the DP had in view a hard-working bureaucracy with limited power who 
would also try to win the hearts of the government.
141
 This mentality based on a 
technocratic vision of state administration later morphed into one of the preeminent 
aspects of the Turkish center-right that distinguished it from the bureaucratic rule of the 
center-left. 
Several other initiatives taken by the government - such as the law numbered 6435 that 
granted the right to remove government employees from office - also disturbed the 
comfortable conditions of those working in public services. Moreover, regulations about 
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the ministerial orders and obligatory retirement narrowed down the autonomy of 
bureaucracy and increased the dependence of bureaucrats to the government to a 
significant extent (Zürcher, 2001:335; Şaylan, 1984:305). Similar initiatives were taken 
regarding the judiciary as well. In view of Menderes, judicial institutions should not 
have enjoyed any privilege since in his account privilege meant moving beyond the 
national will (Sarol, 1983a: 382, Demirel, 2005: 504-505). Within this scope, according 
to the DP, as the state existed for the nation, it was automatically existed for the 
government, better-said, the representative of the nation as well.   
The relatively non-bureaucratic cadre of the DP was well established in its 
understanding of the mode of governing as well. Even Bayar, who represented the 
statesmanship in the DP, limited the state protocol during his presidency (Bayar, 
1969:122). Bayar’s resignation from the party leadership after becoming the President 
was one of the indicators of him, being against the identification of the party with the 
state, which was commonplace in the single party era.
142
 He did not wish to continue his 
presidency as the ultimate head of the state (Ağaoğlu, 1972:142) and as a consequence, 
his resignation strengthened the position of the prime minister. Abandoning 
accompanying adjectives, such as ‘the national chief’, attributed to the owner of the 
presidential office suggested that the DP perceived these positions as time-bound. 
Similarly, certain traditions such as hanging the picture of the president on the walls of 
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 Mete Tunçay proposes that this was a crucial step concerning the impartiality of the president and it 
was sustained by the following presidents as well (1989:178). However, this institutional impartiality has 
not morphed into a viable impartiality. Especially right after the elections of 1957, Bayar engaged in 
politics actively by organizing public meetings. In these meetings, he openly directed accusations at the 
CHP, while advocating the DP, see: Milliyet, 08.10.1957; 11.10.1957; 14.10.1957; 21.10.1957. At the 
outset, even if he had declared not to make any speeches on the elections; he usually compared the 
previous government formed by the CHP with that of the DP, emphasizing the successful economic 
developments during the latter’s term, see: Milliyet, 12.10.1957. 
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the public buildings and printing his picture on money that put special emphasis on the 
head of the state were relinquished during DP’s term. Within this context, Menderes was 
often criticized for not knowing the protocol adequately and being less sensitive about 
the records and rules, which were all perceived as deficiencies by the state elite 
(Aydemir, 1976:120-2; Ağaoğlu, 2004:98).  In a nutshell, in line with DP’s resilience 
concerning the overestimation of the status of bureaucracy, a bureaucratic working style 
was not embraced by the DP as well and this brought about a new mode of governing. 
However, the initiatives concerning the scaling down of the civil servants while 
improving their living standards and qualifications remained on paper, better-said, in the 
frameworks of party programs and could not be transformed into concrete policies. 
 
4.1.1.3. The Relations between the DP and the Military 
 
Needless to say, in a liberal democratic system, the military do not get any privileged 
positions that allow soldiers to intervene in policy-making processes. In the early 
Republican era, a clear prohibition of soldiers’ engagement in politics prevented the 
army from being an influential actor in the political sphere. As ‘a supportive element’ 
behind the CHP (Hale, 1994:308), the army was defined as the genuine guardian of the 
secular regime and of the unity of the state, where the government and the military 
operated in harmony.  It was suggested that “together with the civilian bureaucrats, the 
Turkish army historically built the republic and subsequently modernized it along a 
western path” (Cizre Sakallıoğlu, 1997:154).  In that regard, the military supported the 
policies the governments formed by the CHP, while at the same time, refraining from 
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active participation in the policy-making processes. In this respect, in 1944, the Chief of 
the General Staff was rendered accountable to the prime minister and in 1949, to the 
Minister of Defense, but these institutional arrangements could not adequately reflect 
the nature of the relations between the civilian and military elites during the subsequent 
years under the governments formed by the DP (Hale, 1994:308). 
The tension in the relations between the DP and the military bureaucracy escalated 
exponentially compared to the level of that between the DP and the civilian bureaucracy. 
This was evident in the completion of this period by the coup of 1960. Having pointed 
out to the distinction between political elites and state elites brought about by the 
governments formed by the DP,
143
 Demirel maintained that “the Turkish army's 
perception of itself as the ultimate guardian of the state renders it difficult for soldiers 
fully to accept the principle of civilian supremacy” (Demirel, 2004:127). As a result of 
this ongoing mistrust since the very beginning of DP’s term of government, the party 
worried about a probable military intervention.  Indeed, in the first months of its term, 
then the Prime Minister, Menderes declared that they had confidential information about 
certain preparations of a coup by the military and this led to an extensive displacement 
of certain generals (Aydemir, 1976:222). Thus, throughout its governmental terms, the 
DP, claiming to be the representative of the periphery struggled against the constituents 
of the center, especially the military by limiting the prospects of its status, political 
engagements and job security.  
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 This study argues that the main reason behind the shift in the post-1950 civil-military relations was 
rooted in the center-periphery cleavage. Nevertheless, different ways of approaching this particular issue 
compete and coexist with one another.  For example, Zürcher states that “the trouble was that by the late 
1950s this no longer guaranteed the government the loyalty of the whole officer corps. The reason lay in 
the fundamental changes wrought by NATO membership and US assistance in the armed forces” 
(Zürcher, 2001:238). In Hale’s account, foreign policy affairs indirectly conditioned the standpoint of the 
military (Hale, 1994: 95). 
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The cadre of the DP did not contain as much military elements as the CHP. DP’s leading 
members, even Celal Bayar - the member of the DP most akin to the state - was not 
coming from a military background. While in the single-party era, the representation of 
the military officers on top ranks was more than 30 per cent, during DP’s term this 
percentage was dwindled to less than 5 per cent (Frey, 1965:260). Throughout its ten-
years of rule, the DP had only four ministers coming from military backgrounds 
(Ağaoğlu, 1972:88), yet, two of them resigned after a short period of time in office 
(Hale, 1994:98). Lerner and Robinson state that “[a]bout one-sixth of the Assembly in 
1920 was of military origin, about one-eighth in 1943, one-ninth in 1946, one-twentieth 
in 1950 and 1954, one-twenty-fifth in 1958” (1960:28). By the same token, considering 
the occupational backgrounds of the deputies, Frey points out to the fact that with the 
rise of the DP, the military lost its ground and degraded from 2
nd
 to 7
th
 place among 
twelve occupational groups, which amounted to a shift from approximately 20 per cent 
to 4 per cent (1965:182-2). Therefore, military’s losing of its power grip coincided with 
DP’s rise to the power. Besides, the retreat of military in the occupational composition 
of the deputies was also related with the strong connections of the DP with the 
periphery, whereas the military “had fewer local connections than any occupational 
group, and there appears to be no sizable local element within the group” (Frey, 
1965:120).  
The length of the military service was also shortened on July 12, 1950, in the immediate 
aftermath of DP’s forming of the government (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 12.07.1950). 
This initiative was interpreted as an attempt to weaken the significance of military. In 
the electoral campaign of 1954, the opposition made use of a motto “the DP assaulted 
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the army” and the DP replied with “the DP began to regulate the army” (Burçak, 
1998:208). Additionally, the socio-economic conditions as well as the prestige of the 
soldiers gradually diminished in these years and paved the way for the coup of 1960 
(Frey, 1965:261; Özbudun in Diamond, 1994:198).  
The job security of the soldiers was on the wane as well as the prospects of political 
representation and occupational prestige. In 1955, three generals were dismissed on 
account of disobeying the orders of the prime minister within the context of the 
September, 6-7 Events (Burçak, 1998:316-3). In the beginning of 1958, the ongoing 
tension between the government and the military reached to a level that the government 
openly accused the military of planning to stage a coup.
144
 A couple of months later, the 
arrests of nine military officers for plotting a coup were reported and the limited extent 
of these arrests was underlined in order to keep a low-profile (Milliyet, 17.01.1958). In 
the course of this event, the planner of the coup, Cemal Yıldırım, was released, but the 
informing soldier was sentenced (Bayar, 1969:119-2; Bozdağ, 2004:156-3). Hence, the 
DP preferred to close the file without dwelling much on the details of the coup plot as it 
could not counteract the military at the time.  
Despite the fact that the relations between the government and the military were not on 
very friendly terms as discussed above, the government did not accentuate its mistrust 
and carried on with its pragmatic policies in many cases. For instance, in the second 
government leaded by Menderes, Seyfi Kurtbek, an extremely militarist ex-soldier, was 
appointed as minister to modernize and encourage the army (Demirel, 2011:235; Hale, 
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 Samet Ağaoğlu mentions a difference of opinion between Menderes and Celal Bayar on this particular 
issue. While Menderes preferred to close the file immediately without going further with its investigation, 
Bayar aimed at holding on to the file and to punish its real culprits (Ağaoğlu, 1972:143).  On this matter 
of concern, the President and the Prime Minister did not display a unified reaction towards the military. 
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1994:97). Likewise, the Assembly dominated by the DP sustained the tradition of 
publishing the record that presented tribute, greetings and trust to the army in the 
Official Gazette (Demirel, 2011:237). It is worth mentioning that the defense expenses 
were on the rise during the terms of DP as well (Ahmad, 1993:124; Hale, 1994:99).  On 
the one hand, the DP wanted to make sure that the military would not go beyond its 
occupational sphere of influence; on the other hand, the economic and technical 
assistance provided by foreign aids was allocated to the army. Zürcher notes that “more 
than $2 billion of military aid was spent on modernizing and mechanizing the Turkish 
army, and American teams assisted in the training of personnel” (2001:239). 
Nonetheless, these pro-military actions of the government fell short of avoiding the coup 
as the cleavage between the government and the military was deeply rooted and both 
parties attributed differing roles to the state elites and the elected ones.
145
   
It is commonly stressed that Menderes’ following words just before the coup in 1960 – 
“I will put an end to the mentality of Pashas (generals). The army can be handled even 
via reserve officers” served as an accelerator of the military coup (Aydemir, 
1976:368).
146
 Similarly, the rumors about the Chief of the General Staff, helping Ethem 
Menderes, then the Minister of National Defense, to put on his coat stirred up 
discomfort on part of the military as well (Yavuzalp, 1991:84). In the last instance, as 
Demirel properly suggests, the above-mentioned rumors that signaled to a tendency to 
legitimize the coup in 1960 reinforced an exaggeration concerning the cynical attitudes 
of the DP (2011:243). Similar to those between the DP and the civil bureaucracy, the 
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 Hale argues that the military supported the state party, CHP to a significant extent (1993). 
 
146
 Ağaoğlu states that these words were not articulated by Menderes (2004:126). 
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relations between the DP and the military revolved around the tension stemming from 
the differing answers given to the following question, ‘who owns the state?’ At the time, 
the military was reluctant to reserve a legitimate place for civilian governments except 
for the CHP.  
 
4.1.1.4. The Instrumentalization of the State 
 
Having discussed above the latter side of the ‘love-hate’ relationship between the 
Turkish center-right and the state, it will be complementary to take up the former side at 
hand as well. To start, in spite of criticizing bureaucracy, the DP also intended to protect 
the myth of state in order to make use of the state for its own purposes when the wind is 
fair (Demirel, 2005:489). As Cizre observes “[the Turkish center-right] never intended 
to lose its grip on the penetrative power of the state through populist controls and 
bureaucratism” (Cizre, 1996b:147). This was quite valid for the DP since its main 
concern actually revolved around the nature and ideology of bureaucracy.  Even though 
the deployment of a less-bureaucratic discourse and the creation of technocrats as a new 
bureaucratic entity mainly shaped the policies of the DP, its augmentation of the number 
of government employees
147
 considered along with its view of the state as an asset of the 
government, indeed, indicated to the fact that the state was neither minimized, nor 
weakened during its terms.  
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 While the total number of the government employees in 1950 was 199.723, it turned out to be 389.303 
in 1960.  For details, see: DİE. 1962. Memur istatistikleri, 1939-1960: Genel Bütçe, Katma Bütçe, Özel 
İdare, Belediye ve İktisadi Devlet Teşekkülleri. Ankara: DİE Yayınları. 
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Celal Bayar, the closest figure to the state among the DP members, underlined that 
“being a party member and being the President are totally different things,” and 
“security and the interest of the state are the only things I shall consider as a President” 
(Bayar, 1969:146).  In that regard, in line with the tradition of ‘the state, as the 
caretaker,’ he usually emphasized “justice and benevolence for all citizens, without any 
discrimination with regards to their social classes” (Bayar, 1969:41). The 
conceptualization of the state as the caretaker have not challenged but supported the 
paternalistic state tradition. He, who formed the cabinet, also controlled the state (Oktay, 
2003:120-3; Demirel, 2011:256).  In this respect, what differentiated the DP from the 
CHP did not derive from the differing roles attributed to the state, but stemmed from the 
answer given to the question of ‘who would control the state?’ The DP continued to 
grasp the state as a ‘fatherly caretaker’ that not only treated its citizens with tenderness, 
but also disciplined them if necessary. 
Hence, the DP and its successors have not abandoned the myth of state. They habitually 
paid their respect to the state, considering it almost as a sacred entity. Another important 
ingredient that contributed to the ideology of the Turkish center-right therefore has its 
roots in the principles of the state. In that regard, the DP remained within the boundaries 
demarcated by the rule of law and maintained a great respect for the state apparatus. 
Bayar’s testimony right after the unfair elections of 1946 confirms such respect, where 
he stressed that even after these elections; they respected the rule of law and carried on 
with their struggle within its limits (Bayar, 1969:59).  Menderes also endeavored to keep 
the radicals in the party at arm’s length when it comes to decision-making processes to 
keep them away from challenging the principles of the state.  Given this standpoint, one 
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may argue that the struggle of the DP was against the elements of the ‘center,’ namely 
the civilian and military bureaucracy as agents of the state, rather than the state, itself 
and the DP was apparently in pursuit of taking hold of the state power. 
This proclivity of the DP, which was also shared by the AP, might be grasped following 
Heper: “The ‘anti-bureaucracy’ political parties tried to (…) capture the state from 
within” (Heper in Heper, 1991:94). To straighten things up between the DP and the 
bureaucracy, the DP projected to create a bureaucracy of its own, composed of its 
supporters, instead of keeping the bureaucracy outside of the political realm. The 
discourses of its members in the immediate aftermath of the elections of 1950 clearly 
revealed DP’s discontent with not being able to take hold of the entire state apparatus. 
At the end of 1950, some of its members even criticized DP for its incapability to 
control the state power and according to them, this incapability led to a lack of response 
in face of the peripheral expectations concerning the reformation of the administrative 
units (Toker, 1991a:108). Thus, even at the outset, DP’s willingness to control the entire 
state apparatus and to rearrange it in line with its worldview was evident.  
The idea endorsed by the DP - ‘the party that forms the government, automatically owns 
the state’ paved the way for the utilization of various state resources for its own political 
purposes.
148
 One of the most tragic examples of this approach was the utilization of state 
radio solely by the DP for getting across its policies, while depriving opposition parties 
of their right to broadcast on state radio. Following the establishment of the union by the 
CHP and the Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi), the DP set up a new organization titled 
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 To remind, the utilization of state resources by the CHP for its own good was previously one of the 
main sources of controversy between the two, when the DP was in opposition. Economic allocation of 
state resources for political purposes during the term of the DP will be examined in detail in the section on 
Clientelism. 
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‘Homeland Front’ (Vatan Cephesi) to contend with the strengthened opposition. In order 
to gain the support of uncommitted voters, the DP announced the names of the 
participants in the ‘Homeland Front’ (Vatan Cephesi) on state radio. Facing such 
propaganda, people felt left out if they had not joined the front. The discriminatory 
discourse prevalent in the ‘Homeland Front’ integrated the government and the state into 
a harmonious unit against the CHP and its popular support, accusing them of 
dismantling ‘the state order.’ Even during the Ramadan Fest, in the aftermath of a 
speech on the importance of reconciliation, the state radio continued to broadcast the 
names of the new participants in the front and drew reactions from the people (Burçak, 
1998:602). The use of the police force for DP’s purposes was another example revealing 
the fact that the state was possessed by the government (Aydemir, 1976:301). All things 
considered, the tension between the DP and the bureaucrats did not stem from their 
differing views on the role and the nature of state. Rather, the main problem derived 
from their contradictory answers to the question of ‘who should control the state?’ The 
answer presented by the DP was clear: ‘the party that gains the majority vote should also 
be the one that not only controls the entire state apparatus, but also enjoys all the 
privileges such a control may bring about.’ 
 
4.1.2. The AP and the State 
 
Following the footsteps of the DP, the AP sustained the ‘love-hate’ relationship with the 
state as well. Yet, the circumstances, which were different than that of the DP in the 
aftermath of the coup of 1960 and the Constitution of 1961, mainly designated the 
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nature of the relations between the AP and the state. On the one hand, the composition 
of the center was rearranged. On the other hand, the positive attitude of the AP 
regarding the governments formed in the aftermath of the military intervention in 1971 
was a turning point in this relationship. In the aftermath of the intervention of 1971, 
from the view point of the AP, the positive side of the relationship weighed more than 
the negative one. In a way, the AP tried to take a side next to the center rather than the 
periphery given the political climate of 1970’s, in which the military-civilian relations 
acquired greater importance. In this context, this section that focuses on the relations 
between the AP and the state is divided into three parts. The first describes the 
transformation of the center with regards to the Constitution of 1961 and the standpoint 
of the AP vis-à-vis bureaucracy in 1960’s. The second is a presentation of the 
memorandum process in 1971 as a milestone for the AP. The third section evaluates the 
relations between the AP and the military that gained an active role in the political realm 
as the third party.   
 
4.1.2.1. The Transformation of the Center and the AP 
 
As the successor of the DP, the AP carried on with representing the periphery. It was the 
center that underwent a functional and compositional transformation in the aftermath of 
the coup of 1960. On functional grounds, on top of the “top-to-down modernization,” 
namely the Turkish Revolution (Trimberger, 1978; 1980), this time the junta elite 
intervened to restore the Republic by reinforcing the center as well as the modernization 
of the nation. In this period, on the one hand, the center, considering the former 
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Democrats and the ones alike as potential threats for the regime, endeavored to keep the 
system fixed and stable; on the other hand, the ones that claimed to be the voice of the 
periphery stressed the need for change. Mardin succinctly describes this political 
atmosphere as follows: 
The Revolution of May 27, 1960 once more underlined the cleavage between the 
center, now identified with the preservation of a static order, and the periphery, the 
real "party of movement." The old polarization of center against periphery acquired 
a new form: the preservers of the Procrustean, early Republican order against those 
who wanted change (1973:186). 
Many scholars observed that as the Constitution of 1961 granted extensive powers to 
bureaucracy (to cite a few: Özbudun in Diamond, 1994:200; Özbudun and Gençkaya, 
2009:16; Heper, 1976: 489; 1985:88; Yazıcı, 1997; Cizre, 1996; Kili, 1998), the AP was 
expected to deal with a strengthened center, while trying to remain within the 
boundaries of the system.   
Concerning the circumstances in the aftermath of the military coup, Karpat remarks that:  
[…] the military had already undertaken a series of measures, and passed 
altogether 125 laws supposedly to correct the Democrats' errors and speed 
the society's modern progress. Among these measures the most important 
ones were the literacy programme, the establishment of a State Planning 
Organization, the founding of Turkish Cultural Societies (this was a new 
name for the People's Houses, which was used until 1963), the university 
reform which led to the summary dismissal of 147 university professors, the 
programme to rejuvenate the army according to which about 7,000 officers 
were retired, and finally the revamping of the High Court of Justice in order 
to try the ousted Democrat (1972:259).   
 
Along with the continuation of the modernization program in a fashion similar to the 
one envisioned by Kemalism, further steps were taken by means of restrictions on the 
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opposition, the installment of checks and balances such as the separation of powers in 
order to empower bureaucracy vis-à-vis legislation. 
As a reaction to the DP, the center, not only instituted exit guarantees and reinstated 
itself as the dominant actor in the political realm, but also brought about a disconcerting 
suspicion against all civilian politicians as was the case during the tenure of the DP.  In 
taking up this stance, the center ensured its predominance on both institutional and 
psychological grounds. This is reminiscent of Heper’s conceptualization of “negative 
politics,” according to which bureaucracy made use of “bureaucratism as an effective 
weapon…to undermine the policies of the government” (1976:490). Correspondingly, 
on account of the suspicion inflamed by bureaucracy regarding the civilian politicians, 
the AP frequently complained about various impasses such an approach compelled the 
apparatuses of state into (Demirel, 1973:259). This distant and mistrustful approach 
towards the AP was accompanied by the political preferences of the center as well.  A 
study conducted in Ankara during the elections of 1973 suggested that in the 
neighborhoods, where the high-middle class and high-ranked bureaucrats had resided 
largely, the AP was not warmly welcomed (Özbudun, 1977:289).  More precisely, the 
bureaucracy of 1960’s and 1970’s was apparently not in favor of the AP both on 
institutional grounds and political preferences. On the other hand, focusing on the job 
satisfaction levels of the administrative elites in the years of 1956 and 1965, Roos and 
Roos (1971) brought to light that the bureaucrats during the AP term appeared to be 
more satisfied, possibly owing to the empowerment of the center by the Constitution of 
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1961.
149
 Given this outlook, it is possible to argue that not only could the DP not reach 
its objective of constituting a proponent democracy, but also the coup of 1960 left the 
AP facing a stronger center by purging the remaining Democrats from the cadres.  
The nature of the relations between the AP and the state had its roots in the cleavage 
between the center and the periphery as well. Compared to DP’s term, the composition 
of the center notably changed and as a result, the opposition party no longer represented 
the core of the center. As a reminder, among the main components of the center, the DP 
would previously cite Kemalist, bureaucratic and military elites along with the CHP. 
However, during AP’s term, the CHP leaned over to the left and decreased the defense 
of Kemalist principles receded into the background, especially in the aftermath of the 
election of Bülent Ecevit as its leader. In this respect, ever since the mid-1960s, the 
center was no longer mainly dominated by the CHP.
150
 In lieu of the CHP, the military 
appeared as the major agent of the coup on May 27, 1960 and in its aftermath, it has 
been converted into an even more influential political actor due to the foundation of the 
National Security Council in order to assist the Council of Ministers. Most of the 
bureaucrats, who had taken office in the newly-formed institutions, such as the State 
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 Roos and Roos indicated to several other factors that eased the conflict between the bureaucrats and the 
politicians as well. Among these factors they cite the development of a mutual understanding between the 
two camps along with a more cautious attitude adopted by the politicians in consideration of the coup 
(1971:220-2). 
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 Özbudun marks that at the time, the center-periphery cleavage began to gain socio-economic bearings 
as well. In that regard, underlining “less clear[ly] perceivable” changes in the AP, Özbudun states that the 
AP came closer to the big business groups, while the CHP began to stress the principles of social-
democracy (Özbudun, 1976: 58-2). In the following years, this functional cleavage had its impact also on 
the nature of bureaucracy. Heper argues that in mid-1970s, with the erosion of the ruling tradition based 
on bureaucracy, the civil bureaucracy was mainly formed by functional elites rather than old-timers 
(Heper, 1976: 520). For details, see: Metin Heper. 1976. “Political Modernization as Reflected in 
Bureaucratic Change: The Turkish Bureaucracy and a ‘Historical Bureaucratic Empire’ Tradition,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies  7(4): 507-521. 
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Planning Organization, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Council of Judges, 
were among the strong partners of the center as well.   
In spite of the crucial role played by the universities prior to the coup of 1960, the DP 
only managed to maintain a somewhat volatile relationship with academia throughout its 
term. In the aftermath of the coup of 1960, many academicians displayed strong support 
for the Constitution of 1961. In the immediate days following May 27, General 
Madanoğlu consulted with certain professors and “the same professors gave legitimacy 
to a military regime which had, according to them, ‘original power to rule’” (Levi in 
Heper and Landau, 1991:135).  This collaboration rendered supportive academicians as 
one of the active partners of the center at the time. 
On the other hand, following the footsteps of the DP, the AP continued to rally 
peripheral support. As Tanel Demirel observes, until the very beginning of 1970’s, the 
supporters of the AP were distinctive in their union against the bureaucratic-statist 
alliance composed of military, bureaucracy, academia, press and the CHP (Demirel, 
2004:79). In view of Frey, local interests, which were mainly represented by the AP, 
began to be voiced more frequently following the unveiling of the political tutelage 
(Frey, 1965:397). One may discern various similarities between the elites of the AP and 
those of the DP. For example, as that of the DP, the number of AP deputies coming from 
bureaucratic backgrounds was far less than those coming from trading and other 
professional sectors. In the aftermath of the elections of 1965 and 1969, the percentage 
of its deputies coming from bureaucracy (both military and civil, including the 
education sector) was only 23 per cent and 36 per cent respectively (Weiker, 1981:22). 
Among its parliamentarians, professionals (such as lawyers, doctors, engineers and so 
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on) came first with 46 per cent according to both election results (Weiker, 1981:22-2; 
Tachau, 1977). Süleyman Demirel played a crucial role in consolidating the peripheral 
support as well. As an engineer, coming from a modest peasant family, with his unique 
personal history, Demirel managed to make room for himself in the largely elite-
dominated landscape of politics in Turkey. Therefore, recognizing him as one of their 
own, masses raised hopes that he could adequately represent their interests.   
However, the successor of the DP could not adequately respond to peripheral 
expectations straightaway owing to the strengthening of the center at the time. 
Following the elections of 1961, despite coming in second, the AP could not take part in 
a governmental coalition given the pre-dominance of military-bureaucratic alliance. 
Thus, under the leadership of Ragıp Gümüşpala, the AP endeavored solely to remain 
institutionally open without challenging any of the checks and balances or claiming to 
take hold of power. This attitude somehow resembles that of the DP, especially its initial 
retreat following the unfair elections of 1946. Only after Demirel grabbed its leadership, 
the party formulated a new strategy. The AP, then, clearly stressed that it advocated the 
‘national will’ against the predominance of the center in the parliament, yet played it 
safe by prudently avoiding any direct confrontation with the center. In line with such 
prudence, in the party program it was stated that “we are against all sorts of totalitarian 
ideas and dispositions that intend to bring the individual, the citizen under political 
tutelage; that aim to disrespect human dignity by considering man as a means and 
instrument of the state and the political authority” (AP Parti Programı 1969, Article 3). 
Since the DP and the AP considered the parliament as the focal point for taking hold of 
the state (Demirel, 2004:264), their main intention was to strip the state from the 
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bureaucratic oligarchs instead of considerably minimizing and liberalizing it. The 
discourses of the AP on state generally stressed that it should be kept under the control 
of the parliament - that is to say in AP’s account - the government.  To give a supporting 
example, one can cite Demirel’s use of “we” interchangeable with “the state” especially 
when reading out the government programs. Thus, both the DP’s faith in the ‘myth of 
state’ and its accented reference to the role of the elected ones in its control were 
pursued by its follower, the AP as well. 
Following the forming up of the government, the AP customarily accused bureaucracy 
of restricting government’s room for maneuver. In that regard, Demirel stated that “who 
will be responding to the question of ‘what’s happening?’ if it is not within the powers 
of the political authority to prevent acts deemed undesirable by the citizens, and if 
certain persons and bodies unaccountable to the public are endowed with those powers 
instead?” (1973:131). The main problem brought to light here by the AP was the 
possible influence of the center on policy-making processes without any accountability 
to the public. It was argued that while the unelected forces mainly shaped the decision-
making processes, the elected politicians accountable to the public were only called 
upon in explaining these policies to the public. That being the case, one of the key goals 
of the AP was to limit the influence of judiciary on behalf of the executive. The AP was 
of the opinion that with respect to the arrangements brought about by the Constitution of 
1961, the judiciary significantly gained power. Demirel complained about this as 
follows: “if elected boards are addressed as a formality and in practice their powers are 
conveyed to bureaucracy, such a state cannot fully operate” (Demirel, 1973:111). To 
whitewash the elected ones in face of the suspicion raised by the bureaucrats, Demirel 
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also stated that “there is no justice or point in considering politics as a dirty game and 
the politician as a dirty man as one cannot rule without politics” (Demirel, 1973:101). 
While the center garnered suspicion towards the AP, the AP brought the capabilities of 
the bureaucrats into question as well. Encouraged by the AP’s parliamentary majority, 
Demirel occasionally highlighted that “the work of the representative councils cannot be 
executed by high specialists” (Demirel, 1973: 98) since in his account “relying on the 
free will of a nation is safer than relying on the so-called wisdom of a minority” 
(Demirel, 1973:102).  Thus, despite the fact that AP clearly set its position against that 
of the all-knowing center, its challenge was not as stern as the one posed by the DP on 
account of the fear generated by potential interventions. 
AP’s first and second government programs envisaged the state as a ‘servant of the 
people’ rather than an unreserved autonomous entity. Underlining the necessity of 
impartiality and respect for citizens as the main principles of the state, its foremost duty 
was defined as providing security and freedom to all. In a similar vein to the DP, the AP 
aimed at minimizing the state while rendering it more efficient. While stressing the need 
for an administrative reform, the AP intended to establish an effective state that is 
planned, swift and economical as well (Demirel, 1973:253). The criticism directed 
against the centralist state apparatus with all its burdening formalities was followed by 
pronouncements stressing the need for a new administrative approach (Cumhuriyet 
Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi, 03.11.1965 p.19). In the second program, such an approach 
was devised under the rubric of rationalization and for the reasons of coping with 
inefficiency, red-tape and high costs accompanying the operations of the state apparatus. 
This approach was comprised of policies that intended the efficiency of public officials, 
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such as the division of labor, the delegation of authority from the prime minister to the 
cabinet, decentralization, ministerial appointment and dismissal of high-ranked 
bureaucrats, the establishment of a viable system of rewards and punishments etc. 
(Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi, 07.11.1969 p.166). However, this program was 
carried into practice quite ineffectively and only partially. 
In fine, the AP aimed at putting an end to the predominance of bureaucracy. For doing 
so, it endeavored to effectuate certain arrangements as is seen not only in its party 
program, but also in the government program. As Levi puts: 
The government should be free to choose its chief executives, the State Planning 
Organization (SPO) should be reduced to a consultative body, and the autonomy 
of the universities assigned to the academic field only and the power of the 
Constitutional Court, Council of State and the High Election Council limited, 
also. For all this, the constitution should be changed. But the JP never had the 
two-thirds majority needed for this (Levi in Heper and Landau, 1991:145).   
 
Thus, the AP was far from putting a comprehensive administrative reform into effect 
during its single-party government and the strengthened center was more eligible to 
shape the parameters of politics at the time.   
 
4.1.2.2. Subsequent Developments Following the 1971 Memorandum 
 
Despite the unpersuasive rationales behind the 1971 Memorandum, in its aftermath, the 
AP tuned its discourse down on state, mainly because it felt threatened. The AP felt the 
need to do so in order to avoid an institutional collapse and therefore adjusted its 
relations with the military. Following the memorandum, the AP did not only strive for 
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the approval of state elites, but also endeavored to build new bridges with the center. In 
doing so, the AP showed its adherence to the military by intensifying its nationalistic 
discourses in opposition to the leftist movements as well.   
Having taken a major blow by the 1971 Memorandum, the AP had in view to maintain 
its pragmatic approach when it comes to the military-bureaucratic interim governments 
of 1971-1973 by not only supporting their policies, but also providing them with 
ministers. Hence, the AP mainly tried to share power with the interim governments and 
by doing so planned to confirm its obedient approach in the eyes of the military. Yet, 
such an unprincipled standpoint was neither appreciated by the center, nor welcomed by 
the periphery.   
On the other hand, the AP embarked on emphasizing the nationalistic tones of its 
worldview to a significant extent in this process. Nationalism was put forth not only as a 
cure for sewing up the gap between the AP and the state elites, but also came in handy 
as a unique framework bringing together all the right-wing parties. To this extent, the 
AP made use of a particular nationalism vehemently that presumed a special bond 
between the state and the nation (Demirel, 2004:268).   In a similar vein, Süleyman 
Demirel underlined the significance of paying respect to the state while describing the 
three prerequisites for development (1973: 214). Demirel, implicitly considering the 
state elites and the bureaucrats as the natural power holders, also remarked on the 
features of a strong coalition that would bunch together the elites, bureaucrats and the 
public (Demirel, 1973:229).
151
 So, the AP glorified the state and the state elites in order 
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 Demirel sustained this position in the following years as well. Donat notes that Demirel criticized Özal, 
then the prime minister, for ignoring bureaucracy and stated that “you should govern the country via 
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to close up the prevailing gap between the state and the periphery. A sort of paternalistic 
state image akin to that of the DP was developed by the AP especially in the aftermath 
of the 1971 Memorandum.  Along the lines of this paternalistic view of state, 
considering himself as the head of the state, Demirel also endeavored to enjoy especially 
the benevolent attributes of “father” figure: “[the fair] one [that] protects and listens to 
everyone…[the] one you [consult with] when in trouble” in the years that followed suit 
(Arat in Heper and Sayarı, 2002:87; Akman, 1999:47). To summarize, while the AP 
claimed to be in control of the state owing to its majority vote in the elections in 1960s; 
in the following decade, it confined itself to sharing state power with the bureaucracy.
152
 
Accompanied by nationalism, the ‘perpetuity of state’ also appeared as one of the major 
themes emphasized by the AP. To the question of “[h]ow could we cut the state free 
from radical movements?” the AP replied by stressing the nation alongside the special 
forces of the state
153
 (Demirel, 1973:53). Demirel defined the most distinctive feature of 
the AP as its sensitivity concerning the indivisible unity of the country (Demirel, 
2004:129). Özbudun proposes that “this <gemeinschaft outlook> which is present in 
both elite and mass cultures, finds perhaps its most poignant political expression in the 
excessive <fear of national split>” (Özbudun in Özbudun and Weiner, 1987:354). Thus, 
the AP, thrilled by the so-called “fear of national split” drew closer to the center and its 
understanding of guardianship. In the account of Demirel, the main problem of Turkey, 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
bureaucrats. If you want to put aside or ignore bureaucracy, you will soon be out of breath and stranded” 
(Donat, 2005:76). 
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 For a brief and clear categorization of interactions between the state and bureaucracy in the 
transcendental and instrumentalist states, see: Metin Heper. 1985(b). “The State and Public Bureaucracies: 
A Comparative and Historical Perspective,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 27(1): 86-110. 
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with no doubt, was related with the prospects for stabilizing and sustaining the state 
administration (Demirel, 1973:87). At this point, one can discern that the mission of 
minimizing and liberalizing the state had taken a backseat and had been transformed 
into an intention of taking hold of a portion of state power. AP’s discourse against the 
status-quo faded away especially after March 12, and instead, the party pragmatically 
embarked on extracting benefits within the framework of the status- quo (Demirel, 
2004:80) In the aftermath of March 12, Demirel even exaggerated that “[t]he Turkish 
Armed Forces respects democracy and nation’s right to live in freedom more than 
anyone else” (1973:31). 
While the former state-party CHP acknowledged the Kurdish groups and expanded its 
horizons concerning issues revolving around ethnic nationalism, the AP almost 
repeatedly quoted the official state ideology and expressed disapproval of Ecevit’s 
position in every single opportunity. In this respect, Demirel ascertained that “[t]hose 
who claim to be from Turkey (Türkiyeli) have no rights in Turkey; those who declare 
that they are Turkish (Türk) have their rights guaranteed in Turkey” (Demirel, 2004:200-
2).  Thus, in 1970’s, the AP went far beyond its populist precedents and parted company 
with the softer tone of the Turkish center-right when it comes to nationalism. According 
to Demirel, positioned in between the secular/Kemalist understanding of nationalism 
and that of the far-rightists (mukaddesatçı), AP’s standpoint differed from the former by 
its nationalistic worldview coupled with Ottoman-Islamic elements, yet diverged from 
the latter by its low profile when it comes to these elements (Demirel, 2004:203).  
At this point, it goes without saying that the founding cadre of the far-nationalist 
Republican Peasant National Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi) not only 
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previously operated under the umbrella of the AP, but also occasionally repositioned 
AP’s understanding of nationalism by stretching it from civic to ethnic grounds 
(Demirel, 2004:198). However, such an emphasis was never compatible with another 
viewpoint common in the party, namely the synthesis of Turkish-Islamic elements. 
Since the AP had no ideological foundation, it provided a convenient, communicative 
and protective platform for far-nationalist groups that enabled them to get a foothold in 
bureaucracy. In fact, the AP was in pursuit of a win-win relationship with these groups 
to stay in power rather than spreading an ethno-religious ideology. Demirel, thanks to 
his habitual pragmatism, defined his understanding of nationalism as follows: “In our 
view, nationalism is about providing the peasants of Urfa or Mardin with water; it is 
about putting an end to their misery; to ensure them with better employment 
opportunities; to open up a school in the illiterate Köprü village in Ağrı” (Demirel, 
1973: 69). 
More importantly, this trump card provided by nationalism was one of the rare common 
grounds between the center and the AP, which had to be retained by the AP via its 
efforts in reshaping bureaucracy while avoiding any confrontation with the military. 
Ideological orientations of the National Front governments clearly made an impact on 
the bureaucratic structure, rendering bureaucracy considerably politicized within this 
process (Heper, 1985:114; 1979: 105; Özbudun in Diamond, 2004; Demirel, 2004:238-
2). The civil and military bureaucracy was not pleased with the policies of AP, 
especially with reference to its alliance with the far-nationalist and far-Islamist groups. 
In the account of Heper (1976:489), the coalition of the National Front launched “a 
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fierce fight against the civil bureaucracy” by reshuffling certain civil servants and drew 
reactions of the center. 
Within these confines, under the leadership of Gümüşpala, the AP kept a low profile in 
order to avoid dealing with a case of closure. The main concern of the party was about 
the prospects of amnesty: concerning not only the former Democrats, but also the 
members of the AP, who were perceived as potential threats by the state elites. Under 
the leadership of Demirel, the AP left behind its low profile to a certain extent and 
turned into a proactive political actor focusing on the defense of peripheral interests vis-
à-vis those of the strengthened center. However, in the aftermath of 1971 Memorandum, 
the AP put these peripheral interests on the back burner, trying to forge a reconciliatory 
ground between the center and the periphery by reinforcing undemocratic ways of the 
military elite. Within the scope of the coalitions formed from within the National Front, 
nationalism was put forward in increased doses in search of a common ground with the 
center.  However, the center did not receive such attempts favorably, considering them 
as initiatives of the AP for setting up a partisan bureaucracy. Concerning the relations 
between the state and the civilian politicians, the AP put its claim aside quite early 
compared to the DP. On top of that the AP preferred to pursue a contradictory path to 
this account in the aftermath of 1971 Memorandum and as a matter of course 
contributed to the downfall of its own popular support. To crown it all, the AP proved to 
be incapable of preventing the coup of 1980. On the other hand, owing to the arbitrary 
rule of unstable governments and the frequent reshuffling of civil servants, the 
bureaucracy (with the sole exception of military), not only lost its coalescence, but also 
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has been politicized to a significant extent in late 1970’s (Özbudun in Diamond, 
1993:259-2; Heper, 1985:114). 
 
4.1.2.3. The Relations between the AP and the Military 
 
It is worth dwelling upon the relations between the AP and the military in light of those 
in between the AP and the state. Cizre suggests that the AP contributed to the rise of 
military as an influential actor in the political arena since it put forward a double-edged 
discourse on military - sometimes half-hearted, at other times somewhat encouraging 
(Cizre, 1993). According to Cizre, the ambivalent nature of the relations between the AP 
and the military was founded in the aftermath of the elections held on October 15, 1961, 
when the Turkish Armed Forces intervened into the functioning of the elected 
parliament, where the AP had 158 seats (1993:49). In the wake of 1960’s, new putsches 
followed suit and deterred the normalization of politics as well.
154
 The AP opted for 
avoiding confrontations with the military as it had also done in relation to the civil 
bureaucracy under the leadership of Gümüşpala. Yet, Demirel proposed to follow a new 
path fluctuating between convergence and neutralization (Cizre, 1993:49). 
Since the outset, the military had taken the AP with a grain of salt owing largely to the 
non-military occupational backgrounds of its deputies
155
 as well as due to its self-
representation as the heir of the DP overthrown by the military. Notwithstanding 
Demirel has taken the party leadership stressing his modesty vis-à-vis his more 
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of the CHP (Karpat, 2009:101). 
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conservative rival, Bilgiç group, the military continued to keep the AP at its arm’s 
length. Indeed, especially before the 1971 Memorandum, within the context of 
Demirel’s appeasement policy regarding the military, as a gesture of convergence, the 
AP supported the presidency of Cevdet Sunay in 1966, who was nominated by the 
military circles (Hale, 1994:173; Arat in Heper and Sayarı, 2002:95). Among the 
conciliatory steps taken towards the military in 1960’s by the AP one can cite the 
fulfillment of nearly its every need, such as the purchases of modern weapons and 
equipment; raises in salaries; regulations guaranteeing its authority and autonomy 
accompanied by respect to the National Security Council (Cizre, 1993:22, 71; Özbudun, 
2000:56; Hale, 1994:185-3, Karpat, 1972: 365). In spite of these efforts on part of the 
government,
156
 in March 1966, the National Liberation Committee called for unity and 
action against the “anti-national governmental policy” (Ahmad, 1977:195).   
It is fair to mention several daring moves on part of the AP in this period that criticized 
the involvement of military in daily affairs. For example, Demirel discharged Cemal 
Tural, then the Chief of the General Staff, from office due to his frequent statements on 
daily affairs. In a similar vein, the AP also blocked the presidency of General Faruk 
Gürler.157 
Despite AP’s efforts to please the military, Demirel could not manage to impede the 
1971 Memorandum. At the time, the AP embarked on a new strategy of neutralization in 
                                                             
156
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(Cizre, 1993:31). 
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  Cizre asserts that the main reason behind such a blockage was not related with Gürler’s military 
background.  Instead, the AP was skeptical about his ability in developing coherent relations with the AP. 
As a result, another General was appointed (Cizre, 1993: 96-2). 
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order to dissociate the military from the CHP.
158
 More precisely, instead of ending or 
limiting the politicization of military, the AP intended to decouple the military and the 
CHP via the neutralization of the former (Cizre, 1993:73). In that regard, Demirel stated 
that “the Turkish Armed Forces is not a source of concern…rather it is a source of 
security; and it neither takes side with, nor against any political organization” (Demirel, 
1973:327). Hence, the problem posed by the politicization of the military persisted and 
the military remained as the third party in the political arena. 
As part of this neutralization strategy, the AP intensively developed discourses that 
favored state authority at the expense of individual rights.  In the context of such 
discourses, one of the main concerns of the government emerged as the “proliferation of 
state’s democratic authority,” which implicitly legitimized not only the 1971 
Memorandum, but also the interim government (Cizre, 1993:23). The AP referred to the 
National Security Council without questioning its role and legitimacy in order to 
complain about the CHP while perceiving the military as a natural supra-governmental 
body. 
The AP did not run counter to the military in the post-1971 era, except over the odds of 
amnesty. Furthermore, the AP incorporated proponents of the 1971 Memorandum, 
namely Cemal Süer, Kemal Gökakın and Ali Everdi (Demirel, 2004:67). These 
militarist tendencies were indicative of its considerable drift away from the basic tenets 
of the center-right. While the emphasis on the ‘national will’ was replaced by the 
‘security of state,’ the military was also bestowed with immense power vis-à-vis the 
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played a crucial role in the neutralization of the military as well. 
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civilian elements of politics. In doing so, better-said, by approaching to the center while 
drawing away from the periphery, the AP, not only lost its strong public support, but 
also could not manage establishing sincere and trustful relations with the military. 
Eventually, prompted by the lessons drawn from December 27, 1979 Memorandum, the 
AP let go of its strivings to meet the extraordinary demands of the military. 
Nevertheless, as Cizre observed, the AP could not take issue with the military in the 
atmosphere created by the 1979 Memorandum (Cizre, 1993:203). In such an 
atmosphere, existing political parties could not deal with the increasing political tension 
on the streets and the military came to the fore. The military abused its privilege 
provided by the martial law and did not intervene in the events until the very end in 
order to get involved by way of the coup of 1980, hinting the premeditated nature of its 
involvement (Karpat in Heper and Evin, 1994:149).   
 
4.1.3. The ANAP and the State 
 
As we have discussed previously, even in the years before the coup of 1980, the military 
has already been the third party in the political arena (Cizre, 1993). Yet, the coup of 
1980, by rearranging the composition of the center once again, provided a new basis for 
the relations between the ANAP and the state.
159
 Describing the extent of the 
disorganization in civil bureaucracy, Özbudun points out that “when the military 
intervention of 12 September 1980 took place, the military was about the only 
bureaucratic institution that was by and large able to insulate itself from such 
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fragmentation, infiltration, and colonization by political parties” (Özbudun in Diamond, 
1993:262). Thus, the military in 1980, not only emerged as the active third party in 
politics, but also it was the only bureaucratic structure in the country that remained 
standing. That being the case, it is not surprising to observe that it strengthened its 
position in the following years as well. 
On this period, Heper states that: 
The present state-civil society cleavage differs in another fundamental 
respect from the earlier one. The new state elite, unlike the post-Atatürk 
intellectual-bureaucratic elite, take Atatürkian thought not as a political 
manifesto. When they intervened the military adopted the monetarist 
economic policy that the Justice Party had developed prior to the 
intervention, and recruited the primary architect of that policy, Turgut Özal, 
as Assistant to the Prime Minister responsible for economic affairs. Later, 
President Kenan Evren also allowed Turgut Özal and his party to participate 
in the elections, and, when Özal won the majority of the votes in the general 
elections of November 6, 1983, President Evren allowed him to form the 
government (In Heper and Evin, 1988:8). 
 
Thus, while the ANAP was expected to deal with the far-reaching impact of the military 
in policy-making; in fact, it had a more comfortable relation with it ideologically 
compared to the center-right parties previously dwelled upon.
160
 The coup of 1980 was 
not interested in the social transformation of the society. Its main concern revolved 
around stabilization, better-said, putting an end to political violence while preserving the 
economic policies outlined by the previous center-right government (Hale, 1993:246).  
Hence, this time, the military emerged as the main constituent of the center, 
substantially disregarding its other components. Given the obscurity surrounding the 
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separating line between the rulers of the country and the active commanders of the 
military in this period, the military, enjoying complete powers of the executive and the 
legislative, not only raided almost equally rough over the activists both from the left-
wing and the right-wing, but also eliminated them from the political scene via 
instruments provided by the Martial Law and the Penal Code, especially the articles 141 
and 142 of the latter.
161
 Within these confines, the power of the higher courts was 
diminished contrary to the regulations of the Constitution of 1961 and the proponents of 
the CHP, even those on bureaucratic duty were injured in contrast to the previous coups. 
The academicians, who were the critical proponents of the coup of 1960, were repressed 
by means of the Higher Education Law. This law was introduced to end their autonomy 
since the military elite had taken universities somehow responsible for the polarization 
of the society and the political turmoil experienced in late 1970’s (Hale, 1993: 253). 
Thus, the preparation phase of the 1982 Constitution was under the sway of a militaristic 
point of view, evident in none of the groups represented in the Constituent Assembly, 
which was mainly formed by the Consultative Assembly along with the National 
Security Council (Özbudun, 2000:57-4; Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009:18-3). What is 
more, General Evren, taking the chair of the President, became the “head of the state” 
and was endowed with additional supreme powers on the basis of the 1982 Constitution 
such as the right to adjourn the parliament and to call an election following that.
162
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In a nutshell, at the time when the ANAP formed the government, the center was 
dominated by the military. In less than three years of time, the military inscribed its 
mentality into the state apparatus. However, instead of the restoration of Kemalist 
principles by way of a ‘top-down modernization approach’ as experienced in 1960, the 
new center envisaged a framework where more disciplined mechanisms of control and 
punishment were accompanied by people with less ideological affiliations. Under these 
circumstances, the ANAP formed relations with the state on a less formal milieu, yet 
insisting on campaigning via ‘the state should be the servant of the nation’ discourse. 
Such relations were built on two main grounds: the first one was the search of reaching a 
compromise with the state elites and the second one was the pursuit of introducing a 
new public management strategy.  
 
4.1.3.1. In Pursuit of a Compromise with the Center 
 
The ANAP endeavored to establish a reasonable relationship with the state elites to a 
significant extent by seeking grounds for consensus since it was well aware of the tragic 
faith that had awaited the previous center-right parties who had run counter to them. 
Turgut Özal, son of two government officers, had the chance to carefully observe what it 
meant to be in the service of state in Turkey. In view of Özal, government employees - 
even junior ones - were the ones, who were not only the true transformers of the regime, 
but also the very agents of the Kemalist Revolution. They were to act according to the 
ideals presented and spread by modernization (Barlas, 1994:83). Being well aware of 
such a missionary preexistence facing the government employees, Özal urged the 
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provincial party leaders as follows on May 2, 1986: “do not fight with the bureaucracy; 
otherwise you will destroy the party. (…) if we make the same mistake, that the 
Democrat Party did, we will lose (…) the reason behind the execution of Menderes and 
his two ministers was the bureaucracy, rather than the People’s Party” (Cemal, 
1989:118). Thus, based on his implicit presumption about the real owners of the 
systemic control, namely the civil and military bureaucrats, the ANAP pursued a very 
cautious path in its relations with the state elites, especially with the military.  
On account of his work experience in the State Planning Association, the occupational 
background of his family and his modern inclinations, Özal somehow enjoyed 
recognition on part of the state elites to a certain extent (Taşkın, 2012: 71). Such 
recognition was reflected on the elections of 1983, where the ANAP came first in 
quarters largely resided by military circles (Cemal, 1983:61). In other words, on the 
grounds of Özal’s previous post in the military government and despite various 
differences in their viewpoints, the ANAP enjoyed the support of state elites to a 
significant extent: at least, not being repressed from the outset facilitated its survival.  
The ANAP aimed at defusing the tension between the center and the periphery 
(Özbudun in Sezal, 1996:107). In the elections of 1983, it remained close to the 
periphery on the one hand; it was well aware of the power of center on the other hand, 
which necessitated developing good relations with it in order to meet the requirements 
of a civilian government. In the first government program, rather than considering the 
state and the nation as existential rivals, Özal argued that the state, not only existed for 
the nation, but also it is the actual reflection of the nation (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 
19.12.1983: 68). In order to adopt a more conciliatory stance regarding the relations 
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between the elected politicians and the state elites, Özal endeavored to please the latter, 
especially the President Kenan Evren, by avoiding any possible objections against him. 
Despite Evren had previously declared his poor opinion on Özal as an unreliable man, 
after his electoral victory, Evren, well-known for his stern and formal standing, 
consented to Özal’s friendly approach (Cemal, 1989:20-3). With no doubt, Özal was 
pragmatically in pursuit of putting an end to the prevailing conflict between the elected 
politicians and those from the center. From this vantage-point, Özal had regularly 
consulted with Evren in order to win his heart by attaching value to his words and 
opinions (Cemal, 1989:71). Özal declared in the first government program that the 
President - as an impartial agent - represented the unity of the nation and the state on the 
highest possible level (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 19.12.1983: 67). Along the same line, in 
the first years of Özal’s premiership, Necdet Üruğ, then the Chief of the General Staff 
enjoyed a great autonomy when it comes to military affairs since he was effective in 
keeping the soldiers under control (Cemal, 1989:75). On the other hand, the military 
kept on making use of the National Security Council as a means to express its opinion 
on the course of daily politics in the country. As Evin suggests the ANAP refrained from 
running counter to the military elites and preferred an easy-going approach. It was rather 
the opposition leaders, namely Cindoruk and Ecevit that called for a new civilian 
constitution and the civilianization of the regime on the grounds of an intensive anti-
militarist discourse in the middle of 1980’s. The ANAP has never embraced such 
discourses (Evin in Heper and Evin, 1994:28). 
Then again, the government formed by the ANAP every now and then complained about 
the secretive attitudes of the bureaucrats towards them. For instance, the National 
 217 
Intelligence Service dominated by the military elite, restricted government’s sphere of 
influence by not sharing some crucial information with not only the Prime Minister, but 
also the Minister of Internal Affairs (Cemal, 1989:70). The ANAP exerted efforts to 
substitute a civilian and obedient executive for managing this crucial institution, yet this 
initiative had also backfired in a short span of time and the military elites carried on with 
their patronizing approach over the government. There were several other source of 
controversy between the ANAP and the center as well, revolving around the election of 
a civilian President and the appointment of certain generals with respect to the 
preferences of the government. Regarding these issues of concern, the ANAP 
endeavored to take further steps towards the civilianization of politics.
163
 Furthermore, 
the ANAP vigilantly attempted to delimit the power of the President. After a while, the 
temporary articles were also annihilated and the presidential control on legislation was 
lessened in favor of majority representation. This was a significant step since Kenan 
Evren, not only represented the presidency, but also he was the major constituent of the 
center. 
More precisely, military’s immense sphere of influence was eventually reduced to a 
certain extent, despite the fact that it was far from meeting the criteria to be considered a 
civilian liberal democratic order due to various institutional predicaments. To give an 
idea on the level of civilianization of politics in the country, one can remind the limited 
involvement of the military in the decision-making processes concerning the Gulf War 
that stirred up trouble between the military and the ANAP and led to the resignation of 
the General Necip Torumtay at the end of the same year. This instance signaled to the 
                                                             
163
 This issue –“the civilianization of politics” has been discussed in detail in chapter 3.  
 218 
fact that Özal, who appeared as an obedient figure vis-à-vis Kenan Evren at the outset, 
acquired room for maneuver in the course of events even it comes to military affairs. 
However, as a pragmatic actor, the ANAP waited for the most appropriate conditions in 
order to take the political realm under its control and until then, it avoided challenging 
state elites.  
However, this initially peaceful approach of the ANAP could not be maintained with 
regards to certain non-military affairs. Having ascertained that the military was out of 
non-military issues, the ANAP had taken plenty of measures in order to reorganize 
bureaucracy. 
 
 
4.1.3.2. Introducing the New Public Management 
 
The ANAP had a new way of thinking on the administration of state, which was not in 
tune with that of the bureaucrats. Following the world-wide trend of the new-right, this 
new mentality rested on key tendencies as follows: the minimization of the role of the 
state and bureaucracy, attaching value to ends rather than procedures and engaging in 
informal ways of administration. 
It was underlined in the party program that owing to the main tasks of the state, namely 
defense, security and justice, the state should in general undertake only a mission of 
control concerning the social and economic life (Anavatan Partisi Programı 1983, 
Article 2). Özal claimed that the argument that considered bureaucrats, professors and 
judges as the potential liberators who could put an end to the dire ways in the country 
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was out of date since these liberators were too prudent to take risks owing to their 
arrogance and suspicion (Barlas, 1994:117-2). In the account of Özal, bureaucrats 
carried on with the attitude of İnönü, that is conservative and status-quo oriented, 
without leaving much room for the maneuver of elected politicians (Barlas, 1994:118). 
Thus, the government formed by the ANAP under the leadership of Özal - a “man of 
service rather than man of bureaucracy” (Barlas, 1994:92) – intended to endorse a shift 
from the classical understanding of bureaucracy to a new mode of public management. 
To stress the ‘unreasonable’ approach of bureaucracy, Özal stated that “we should 
neutralize the bureaucrats who give priority to the procedures instead of essences” 
(Cemal, 1989:250). In this direction, the laws and procedures that were considered as 
burdens escaped close examination in this period. Özal contributed to this affinity with 
his well-known dictum: “nothing is going to come out of infringing the constitution for 
once” (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:255). If the rules stood in the way of any actions 
envisaged by the government, the ANAP immediately tended to stretch the laws 
accordingly. Özal also gave directions to his new bureaucrats to shorten, clarify and 
simplify complex regulations. Such an action-oriented approach led to swift decisions 
on new regulations and amendments in order to pave the way for the elimination of the 
works causing incoherence between the old-timers and the ANAP. That being the case, 
the Constitutional Court appealed thirty-seven laws enacted by the governments formed 
by the ANAP within six years of Özal’s premiership (Cemal, 1989:117).  
The ANAP obtained more than what had its predecessors gained by way of this systemic 
reformation of public management. Özbudun suggests that the most distinctive aspect of 
the relations between the ANAP and the state rested on former’s ‘de-bureaucratization 
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formula’ that differ not only from the “virulent anti-statist rhetoric” of the DP, but also 
the “sweeping purges” method of the AP (In Diamond, 1993:263). In contrast to the 
lasting job security of the old-timers in bureaucracy, the government formed by the 
ANAP employed contracted servants at the SEEs and the newly-found state institutions 
in order to allow the market to determine their working conditions (Yılmaz in Sezal and 
Dağı, 2001:99). Furthermore, a new generation of bureaucrats with overseas education 
and experience, namely the “princes of Özal,” who held positions in international 
organizations and private sector, were appointed to top rank bureaucratic posts despite 
their inexperience in public sector. This was very unlikely from the point of the 
established tradition of classical bureaucratic circles. Autonomous public institutions, 
such as the Capital Markets Board and the Istanbul Stock Exchange, were established in 
this period as well.  
Moreover, despite the centralized nature of the state apparatus prevailed, the local 
governments were also empowered in this period (Görmez in Sezal, 1996:66-4; 
Kalaycıoğlu in Heper and Evin, 1994:93-6). On the one hand, in line with the Article 
127 of the 1982 Constitution that perceives central administration as the main legal 
authority, having “the power of administrative tutelage over the local administrations,” 
the governments formed by the ANAP sustained the reliance of local governments to the 
central authority.
164
 On the other hand, further steps were taken for de-centralization. 
The ANAP reinforced municipalities via budgetary increases, additional personnel 
recruitment and the boost of facilities (Kalaycıoğlu in Heper and Evin, 1994:91-9).  In a 
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 Despite its aim of increasing the control of central administration over local bodies, the government 
formed by the ANAP enacted a decree that granted power to provincial governors to remove mayors from 
office. This decree was then annulled by the Constitutional Court. For details, see: Ersin Kalaycıoğlu. 
1994. “Decentralization of Government,” in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (ed.). Politics in the Third 
Turkish Republic. Oxford: Westview Press, 87-100.  
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similar vein, the metropolitan municipalities were granted with further power 
opportunities. 
Özal’s endorsement of fast and effective public services restructured via dynamic 
servants was criticized due to his extensive informality. In the aftermath of the coup of 
1980, Özal’s somewhat sincere and sportive photos in swimming suits vis-à-vis those of 
his bureaucratic and rigid rivals, Sunalp and Calp, gave the first hints of his informality. 
Such informality was soon reflected on his governing style as well. For instance, the 
Özal family was to play an extraordinary role in the decision-making procedures by-
passing bureaucracy, parliament and even ministers, except from a couple of their close 
friends (Cemal, 1989:149-2). As the most relaxed prime minister ever in Turkey, Özal, 
not very fond of bureaucratic formalities, not only preferred to work at home instead of 
in the prime ministry; but also as not a very punctual man, he was often late for his 
appointments. Unlike Menderes or Demirel who preferred to remain within reach to all, 
Özal mainly constructed good relations with certain businessmen and the friends of his 
family. These businessmen, friends and even ministers frequently visited the Özal 
residence, the so-called ‘government house’ at the time. That being the case, the 
leadership style of Özal was usually condemned by the center for being informal and 
prone to nepotism. 
On the whole, the governments formed by the ANAP followed the footsteps of Margaret 
Thatcher’s initiative165 and aimed at concrete and measurable results in the realm of 
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public management rather than intending the justification of abstract ideas, such as the 
common good stressed by the classical bureaucracy. In line with this viewpoint, the state 
apparatus was minimized while the status along with the salaries of the government 
employees was considerably scaled down. On the trail of Toffler’s theory, the 
governments formed by the ANAP had in sight a technocratic, rapid and flexible state, 
instead of a bureaucratic one. Therefore, drawing upon individual and market-oriented 
tenets, the ANAP governments applied various strategies counter to the red tape and the 
bulk of the state (Bozkurt in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:174-2). In this respect, the organizing 
principle of public service was defined as efficiency in rapidity (Anavatan Partisi 
Programı 1983, Article 2). Hence, the ANAP brought new-right into Turkey by 
importing the governing style initiated by Thatcher and Reagan. At this point, one might 
find a similarity in between Turkey under the rule of the ANAP and Greece, Spain and 
Portuguese models of center-right politics on the basis set by the duel between the 
‘national will’ and the ‘domination of the state’ (Ergüder in Heper and Landau, 1991: 
154). All in all, unlike those previous examples of the center-right parties in Turkey, the 
political approach of the governments formed by the ANAP could easily and adequately 
be placed within related world trends as well as the left-right spectrum. 
On the other hand, the liberal state could not have been consolidated in particular areas. 
For example, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National Education 
remained dominated by conservative or nationalist wings of the ANAP, while in the 
meantime, “the reformist, secularist, and tutelary weltanschauung of the old bureaucratic 
center was further weakened and fragmented” (Özbudun in Diamond, 1993:264). Thus, 
one may argue that on the one hand, the governments formed by the ANAP favored a 
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conservative standpoint when it came to cultural realm and the education of new 
generations; on the other hand, they intended to constitute a market-oriented state 
administration in order to put the lid on the guardianship of state elites in politics.
166
 
Such hybrid policies were apparently widespread in all new-right politics.  
 
 
4.1.4. Conclusion  
 
Özal’s predominance endured during his Presidential term under Yıldırım Akbulut’s 
premiership. Mesut Yılmaz, unlike Akbulut, was less responsive to the demands of Özal 
and their paths began to drift apart.
167
 This trend was accelerated in the aftermath of the 
elections held on October 20, 1991 by the coalition governments formed by the DYP 
(the True Path Party) and the SHP (the Social Democratic People’s Party). In general, 
Özal era opened up a new scene in Turkish politics that transformed the nature of the 
relations between the state and the civilian government to a significant extent by way of 
strategies such as the minimization of the state, the empowerment of the local 
governments and the endorsement of a new-right mentality. In the meantime, Özal was 
in pursuit of controlling all the policy-making processes, which created a tension not 
between the center and the periphery this time, but between the governments and the 
presidency. 
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 Özbudun suggests that while Mesut Yılmaz was closer to Demirel’s populist egalitarian style, the 
subsequent leader of the DYP, Tansu Çiller was more akin to Özal’s market-oriented policy making style 
(2000:96). 
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Özbudun asserts that “in the 1980’s and 1990’s, no single party emerged to stand for the 
values and interests of the center or received the kind of electoral support the CHP had 
received in the past” (2000: 81). Put differently, the center no longer constituted a strong 
coalition since its main constituent, namely the military lost its prominence. After all, a 
similar fragmentation among right-wing parties that previously claimed to represent 
peripheral interests could also be detected. However, what remained crucial in this 
process was the divergence between the value systems of the center and that of the 
periphery that surfaced via the Islamic and Kurdish demands rather than the spatial 
connotations. 
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4.2. PART 2: The Economic Orientations of the Center-Right in Turkey 
 
In order to fully grasp the relations between the center-right parties and the state in 
Turkey, one must take into account the economic orientations of the Turkish center-right 
as well, which might well be associated with three main characteristics; liberal, 
developmentalist and clientelist. Yet, it goes without saying that the extents of these 
characteristics vary from one party to another. For instance, the DP put forth a liberal 
approach, yet in practice, it was the state investments that gradually broadened their 
scope. However, given the state of the economy, deprived of private capital 
accumulation, it was actually a pragmatic approach not only to create the necessary 
infrastructure, but also to support private enterprises, rather than signaling to an 
ideologically statist tendency. Even the ANAP, considered as the most liberal party ever 
on economic grounds, exerted efforts to set up several state-led institutions such as the 
Board of Public Housing and the Public Partnership Fund. That being the case, it is hard 
to consider the economic policies of the DP or those of the other center-right parties as 
purely liberal in international terms. Instead, one must take into account both the 
clientelist networks inscribed in their pragmatic approaches and pro-development 
incentives for evaluating the economic policies of the center-right parties in Turkey. 
Before we move on to take up this matter in detail, it is valuable first to address the 
economic atmosphere at the time of the first center-right government, the DP. 
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The political economy envisioned by Kemalists was based on an understanding of social 
structure that denied the existence of socio-economic classes (Ahmad in Kazancıgil and 
Özbudun, 1981:146; Özbudun in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:57). State elites formulated 
an economic program in pursuit of state interests rather than those of particular groups. 
In the shadows of the disastrous World Wars and within the limits imposed by the 
Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey carried on with an economic model based on free-
enterprises in line with the decisions taken up during the Izmir Economic Congress held 
in February 1923.
168
 Within these confines, on the one hand, the state played a 
supportive role for the private entrepreneurship via particular subventions and incentives 
up until 1929: on the other hand, the state had a complementary role as it retained 
monopoly on specific products, such as sugar, oil, iron, and electricity. However, in the 
absence of accumulated private capital and experienced entrepreneurs, this system did 
not work very well. 
In 1929, not only the government was faced with the corrosive impact of the Great 
Depression, but also the obligatory Ottoman tariffs had come to an end and given these 
developments, the government had an opportunity to impose more protective duties on 
the imports (Boratav in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981: 170). In this context, the 
Kemalist government tried various economic models up until 1933. The Kemalist 
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principle of statism,
169
 defined as a “synthesis of statism and protectionism,” was 
enforced in the years following 1933 (Boratav in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981:167). 
In view of this principle, it was considered necessary not only to impose restrictions on 
foreign trade and foreign capital, but also to nationalize foreign investments like those 
on railways in order to assure economic development without excluding any foreign 
imports, at least in principle (Boratav in Kazanıgil and Özbudun, 1981:174). 
Nevertheless, the changes brought about in 1928 on the 1924 Constitution justified state 
investment by virtue of the necessities of the time and pursuant to the development of 
the country (Özbudun, 2012:9). That being the case, despite previous emphasis on 
liberal economic incentives by the state, with the inscription of CHP’s six principles into 
the Constitution in 1937, such an accent fell completely off the agenda on both 
ideological and practical grounds (Özbudun, 2012:4, 12). In a declining economy, the 
state was taken to be the one and only redemptive agent capable of efficiency in 
production and investments. Accordingly, the objective set forth in the first Five-Year 
Industrialization Plan covering the years between 1934 and 1938 that prescribed an 
increase in the role of the state concerning the production of vital goods was attained to 
a certain extent and as a result, by 1938 more than half of the manufacturing sector came 
under the control of the state (Mardin in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:39). The second 
plan covering the years between 1939 and 1943 intended to develop state-led heavy 
industries as well. However, it could not get off the ground as did the former plan owing 
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to the tragic circumstances of the Second World War (Hale, 1981:101; Keyder, 
1979:15).  After 1939, the Five-Year Development Plans began to lose effect and the 
statist policies started to fade away due to a pinch of foreign integration. 
 
4.2.1. The DP Period: Economy as a Field of Controversy between the 
Center and the Periphery  
 
It will not do justice to situate the entire economic policies of the CHP within statist 
confines, given its enforcement of free-market economy in 1920s, its search for a variety 
of economic models between 1929 and 1933 and its gradual renouncement of statism 
after 1939.  One of the most intense debates in the CHP revolved around the role of state 
in the economy. The CHP not only paved the way for a transition to multi-party system, 
but also set the scene for a limited liberalization of the economy. The relative 
liberalization of the economy was then pronounced in the Five-Year Development Plan 
enforced in 1946, which was followed by Turkey’s accession to the IMF and the World 
Bank in 1947. In these years, the US administration along with the World Bank 
counseled Turkey to reduce the role of the state in the economy, as well as to take some 
measures for attracting foreign investments (Aydın, 2005:29).  Therefore, small steps 
towards the liberalization of Turkish economy as well as foreign integration have 
already been taken before the DP came to power.   
To remind, the pro-liberal intra-party opposition within the CHP was spear-headed by 
the founders of the DP. These figures raised their voices especially during the meetings 
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on the Land Distribution Bill (the Land Reform).
170
 During these debates, Adnan 
Menderes came to the fore in his defense concerning the property rights of big land-
owners against the elites of the CHP that advocated state control on private property. In 
this context, as one of the most remarkable disputes at that time, the Land Reform 
actually marked the emergence of the DP.   
At this point, it is worth underlining that it will not also do justice to assess the DP and 
the CHP through the lenses provided by the theories that only stress socio-economic 
parameters and left-right fractions. Better-said, it is quite difficult to label the DP as a 
totally rightist or the CHP as a totally leftist party. In a country without bourgeoisie as 
well as an organized working class, where the majority of the population was comprised 
of peasants residing in villages, the reasons behind the diversity of views on economy is 
to be found on the grounds of other fractions such as the one between the center and the 
periphery. Özbudun succinctly summarizes the difference of opinion between the CHP 
and the DP as follows:
171
 
Both the quite lively intraparty debate within the RPP in the single-party era 
and the RPP-DP conflict in the 1946-1960 period centered around the proper 
role of the state in social and economic matters. This was a typical center-
periphery issue in the sense we defined the term. The forces of the center 
(governmental bureaucracy and the bureaucratic faction of the RPP) called 
for greater state intervention in the economy and a broader scope for public 
economic enterprises, which meant greater power for the center.  The forces 
of the periphery (commercial and industrial middle classes and more 
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commercialized farmers), on the other hand, advocated less strict 
governmental controls and greater reliance on market and/or local forces –in 
other words, more power for the periphery (In Özbudun and Ulusan, 
1980:58). 
 
Despite the fact that the CHP put forth discourses stressing both sides of the 
modernization project, namely Westernization and industrialization,
172
 it is quite clear 
that it paid more attention to the former, cultural side of this project, rather than to the 
latter aspect concerning the economic development prior to the tenure of the DP. As 
Heper and Keyman propose, in the pre-1950 period, notwithstanding that the economic 
policies were considered as an integral part of Westernization, the theme of economic 
development rarely surfaced and it was to serve the modernization process (1998:261).  
It is to say that it had a secondary role. In that regard, the culturally alienated and 
oppressed ‘periphery’ could not improve their living standards on material grounds. 
Against such conditions and with a plea for ensuring peripheral interests, the DP largely 
focused on economic development. In this context, on the one hand, the living standards 
of the people stretching from urban and rural producers to petit bourgeoisie, land-
owners and farmers had been improved: on the other hand, the discomfort of the people 
with respect to the cultural transformation enforced by Kemalism eased off to a certain 
extent.   
Since the very beginning of its term, the DP laid emphasis on this cleavage. In the 
account of Menderes, the Turkish citizens rejected state elites’ all sorts of domination, 
not only in the political and administrative realms, but also in the economy. Menderes 
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described the situation as follows: “…a sort of interventionist and bureaucratic state 
structure emerged that gradually increased the costs of the state had restrained economic 
development by impoverishing the production and working life” (TBMM Tutanak 
Dergisi, 29.05.1950: 25). The DP perceived state expenditures as a burden that only 
served the interests of the center, while bringing no benefit to the majority of the 
population.   
As another expression of the cleavage between the center and the periphery, when the 
DP came to power, it endeavored to put an end to the privileged position of the CHP as 
the state party.  For doing so, the DP closed down the Community Centers in 1951 and 
confiscated their property over to the state treasury (Zürcher, 2001:223). In 1953, a large 
amount of CHP’s assets were expropriated while some of its tax and customs 
exemptions were signed off.
173
 Thus, the DP tried to delimit certain economic 
advantages of the state party. With no doubt, the rationale behind such stance rested on 
the DP’s pragmatic calculations to weaken the CHP, rather than to pursue a liberal 
economic policy. What the DP mainly opposed was the elitist fashion in which the CHP 
enjoyed state opportunities. However, the DP did not intend to prevent all political 
parties from taking advantage of state facilities. Instead, in place of the CHP, the DP 
deemed such benefit fitting for the one that manage to rally the support of the majority.   
In this respect, despite the differences between the discourses of the DP and those of the 
CHP, it is very hard to claim that during the tenure of the DP, a liberal economy had 
prevailed. It is possible to divide its economic policies into at least two terms: the first 
term was between 1950 and 1954 and followed by the second from 1955 to 1960. The 
                                                             
173
 For details, see: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 14.12.1953; Milliyet, 15.12.1953. 
 232 
first term was a period of success with regards to economic development. However, in 
the second term, despite the course of economic development endured in an unplanned 
fashion, the surfacing of various failures - such as the declining rates of surplus in the 
industrial production along with the declining growth rates in the industrial and 
agricultural fields accompanied by high inflation rates - rendered the DP’s economic 
policies unpopular. In the last years of the DP government, not only its increasing 
authoritarianism, but also the deprivation of foreign aid paved the way for the economy 
to be considered as one of the major concerns in the country. The DP could not carry on 
its primary success in its second term, yet, two of its distinguishing characteristics set a 
role model for the subsequent center-right parties in Turkey. During the terms of the DP, 
not only the relatively liberal and developmentalist economic orientation of the Turkish 
center-right had taken its roots, but also the seeds of the clientelist networks were sown. 
 
4.2.1.1. Economy as a Priority in a Developmentalist Framework 
 
The roadmap on the DP’s economic policy was specified as early as 1946 and the 
general economic principles were preserved in the Party Program of 1951 as well.  In 
the Article 7, it was declared that the economic organizations were as essential as the 
political ones in order to arrive at a harmonious development (DP Programı 1946, DP 
Tüzüğü ve Parti Programı, 1951).174 This article indeed signaled to a comprehension that 
differentiated the CHP and the center-right parties in Turkey. While the former mainly 
focused on the abstract and cultural aspect of the modernization project, the latter 
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emphasized its materialistic and economic aspect, namely the development.
175
 DP 
considered economic development as a primary objective, in itself. In line with its 
pragmatic strategies, the DP and its supporters aimed at lending an impetus to the 
development of the country as soon as possible. That being the case, the motto of “first 
act, and then think” governed the economic policies of the DP (Aydemir, 1976: 253-2).  
The DP identified strictly controlled and planned economies with the Soviet system
176
 
and argued that such planning is unrealistic for the Turkish case in face of many 
unpredictable features of its developing economy (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 20.02.1958: 
217-2). In this context, Özbudun properly indicates to a correlation between DP’s anti-
bureaucratic image and its reluctance to work within the framework of a plan (Özbudun 
in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:61).177  
Within the context of its goal of lending an impetus to development, the DP, neither 
totally rejected nor willingly cherished statism.
178
 The party fancied a liberal economic 
framework, yet, given the infrastructural deficiencies as well as the scarcity of private 
capital accumulation, it sufficed with a pragmatic economic policy, where the state 
acquired an active role. In this context, the DP put forth an inconsistent policy, 
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Tüzüğü ve Parti Programı 1951). 
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especially with regards to the state-owned economic enterprises (SEEs). In spite of 
discourses such as those of Menderes - “we are determined to diminish state monopoly 
(…) We can now announce that the era, where the state reigned over private 
entrepreneurship, came to an end” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 09.05.1950:28) -  in 
practice, not only the number, but also the scope of SEEs scaled up during DP’s term. 
To cite a few institutions founded during DP’s term: Maritime Bank, Tourism Bank, 
Fish and Flesh Organization, Nitrogen Industry Incorporation and Machinery and 
Chemical Industry Corporation (Albayrak, 2004:308-6).  
In the beginning of 1950s, there were favorable conditions for accomplishing the task of 
economic development. Within the confines of the tension between the US and the 
Soviet Union, the DP not only enjoyed economic aid provided by the Marshall Plan, but 
also it was endowed with military aid by the Truman Doctrine. Such foreign aid along 
with a pinch of integration rendered Turkey a supplier of food and raw material in the 
international market (Aydın, 2005:29). Celal Bayar, not only an economist, but also 
previously a representative of the liberal wing within the CHP governments, frequently 
underlined the necessity of foreign integration to cope with the economic problems 
(Bayar, 1969:48).  By the same token, the DP elite regularly visited and welcomed 
foreign statesmen in order to establish commercial partnerships. In 1954, the DP 
government issued a law to shape the foreign capital investment policy of Turkey (No: 
6224 - the Foreign Capital Incentives Law) that remained in force with minor changes 
until 2003.
179
 The Committee for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital was also 
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 Previously, in 1951, the law (numbered 5821) was enforced to relieve the strict limitations standing in 
the way of foreign investments. However, the government could not get what it intended within the 
confines of this law. 
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founded by way of this law and aimed at by-passing bureaucratic processes that slowed 
down foreign investments. Foreign companies were also allowed in the search for oil 
and its refinement under the Petroleum Law.
180
 Following these structural 
transformations, on the one hand, the US Ministry of Trade published a report in 1955 
that evaluated Turkey as a country fitting for investments (Milliyet, 08.07.1955). On the 
other hand, the opposition interpreted these developments as selling out Turkey’s 
resources, better-said within the context of treason felony
181
 (Milliyet, 26.04.1954). In 
the following years, similar debates have resurfaced with respect to various economic 
policies of the subsequent center-right parties and those of the CHP, in which the former 
emphasized integration to world markets while the latter stressed a more conservative 
and isolated economic structure.  
Nonetheless, the DP has never embarked on a full-fledged liberalization process and 
when the government found it necessary, it did not refrain from taking protectionist 
measures and intervening directly to the market. For instance, on July 13, 1954, a decree 
that not only limited profit rates, but also prohibited the import of certain goods was 
carried into effect (Milliyet, 14 July 1954).  Furthermore, on June 6, 1956, the National 
Security Law was reintroduced with several revisions.
182
 Moreover, new versions of 
certain laws were also enacted under the guise of dealing with black-marketing and the 
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 On the debates surrounding this law, see: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 07.03.1954. Law No: 6326. 
 
181
 In fact, the impact of these laws was not as wide as it was portrayed in the debates since such 
encouragements did not serve the purpose. Zürcher notes that less than thirty firms invested in Turkey 
during this period and their share was no more than 1 per cent of the total private investment (Zürcher, 
2001:225). 
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 This law (numbered 3780 - Milli Koruma Kanunu ) was first enacted in 1940 and its scope was 
broadened in 1944 to endow the government with the right to ban the import of ‘unnecessary’ goods 
(Resmi Gazete, No. 4417). This law was frequently criticized by the elites of DP when they were in 
opposition. 
 
 236 
monopoly on certain goods that provided the government with extensive rights in 
controlling, confiscating and managing private companies and factories via banning or 
limiting imports deemed ‘unnecessary’ by the government.183 Thus, in the context of the 
above-mentioned circumstances and in line with its emphasis on development and 
service, the economic policies of the DP oscillated between liberalism and 
protectionism. 
In the first government program of the DP, investments were underlined to be directed 
into the fields, such as mechanics, road constructions, transportation and public services 
(TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29.05.1950: 29). Indeed, the leading cause of DP’s electoral 
victory in 1954 was undoubtedly related with the economic performance delivered 
during the terms of the first and second DP governments. Reading out DP’s third 
government program, Menderes was proud of the economic developments such as the 
respective increases in state investments, state incomes, state budget, national income 
and capital investments along with the constructions of new roads, ports, irrigation lines, 
dams and power plants (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 24.05.1954). In almost every speech, 
the DP leaders, not only emphasized the importance of economic development, but also 
explicated their successful works in numbers, while, on all occasions, pointing out to the 
examples of economic scarcity during CHP’s term. On any account, the rhetoric on 
development accompanied DP’s actual works. 
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 On this law and related debates, see: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 04.06.1956 and 06.06.1956.  Hüseyin 
Balık, an independent deputy at the time, accused the government of blocking capital flows to Turkey by 
way of this law. In this respect, the DP that came to power via its stress on liberal economic initiatives 
was now criticized for its repressive policies. This law was also repealed on December 26, 1958 along 
with certain reductions concerning particular goods (Milliyet, 27.12.1958). On July 13, 1959, the 
enforcement of imports with waiver (imports without value allocation of foreign currency) had taken 
effect (Milliyet 14.07.1959). 
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The DP brought about considerable economic growth rates especially in between 1950 
and 1953 as sketched in the graph below:  
 
Figure 1.Data derived from the Development Bank and the graph generated 
accordingly. 
In 1953, the industrial growth reached 19.2 percent on sectorial basis and marked 
considerable success on part of the DP government (Eşiyok, 2006:13). The DP 
government paid significant attention to the industrial sectors that produced sugar, 
cement, textile and energy. Furthermore, in 1950s, DP governments exerted noteworthy 
efforts to construct roads all around Turkey. The length of the roads that was no more 
than 266 kilometers in 1950 had reached to 1216 kilometers in 1958 (Aydemir, 
1976:236). At this point, it would not be sufficient to consider such service only in terms 
of construction. Actually, it also brought about sociological consequences by connecting 
villages to the cities in order to enable peasants to be a part of the ongoing daily politics 
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in the country.
184
 Given the accompanying improvement regarding the means of 
transport, rural areas began to access more easily to the markets (Keyder, 1979:20). 
Turkey had an overwhelmingly rural and agricultural economy in 1950: not only half of 
its GDP was extracted from agriculture, but also almost 80 per cent of its working 
population remained in this sector (Derviş and Sherman in Özbudun and Ulusan, 
1980:87). In this context, the DP that put the onus on agriculture in its economic policies 
naturally rallied popular support. Despite the fact that the Kemalist government 
subsidized peasants by getting rid of the tithe and by introducing a price support system 
in 1925, in the aftermath of 1935, the policies pursued by the CHP put the small and 
medium scale farmers in a tight spot by imposing new taxes, especially during the 
Second World War (Keyder, 1979:15-3).  Mardin claims that “the symbol of the peasant 
as the "fundamental Turk" came up very early in the Kemalist movement, but Kemalist 
energies were devoted to the building of symbols of national identity, rather than to 
radically altering the place of the peasant in the system” (1973:183). Peasants 
considered the DP as a new hope owing to its concern with the peripheral interests and 
its interest in the problems experienced in rural areas.
185
 In this regard, it is worth 
mentioning that in DP’s every party program, approximately one fourth of the articles 
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 ‘Shared time’ was formed to a certain extent as people, who did not have any contact previously, got in 
touch with each other. See: Benedict Anderson. 2006 (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso; Eric J. Hobsbawm. 1990. Nations and Nationalism 
since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  Thus, in contrast to the 
strategies pursued by the CHP within the context of a top-down nation-state building process, the DP, 
most probably unintentionally, linked the peripheral/rural areas to the center and enabled them to take 
their place in the national political landscape. Therefore, the construction of roads, indeed, amounted to 
the establishment of a significant connection between the isolated periphery and the power holders.  
185
 At this point, ‘peasants’ refer to a general orientation common among rural people rather than standing 
for an over-arching category. It is also necessary to note here that peasantry in the Turkish society did not 
amount to a monolithic entity as Özbudun suggests in “Political Participation in Rural Turkey” in Akarlı 
and Ben-Dor eds., 1975:37. Besides, it would not be adequate to argue that the DP gained an ultimate 
success over the CHP in the underdeveloped areas of the country. Actually, the DP was successful in 
splitting the votes in these areas (Sayarı in Akarlı and Ben-Dor, 1975:129). 
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was reserved for issues directly related with peasants and agriculture. For instance, 
Article 56 stressed the agricultural development as the fundamental path to follow in 
order to lend impetus to the development of Turkey. In line with this onus on the 
agricultural sector, various policies - such as the commercialization of agricultural 
products (DP Programı 1946; DP Tüzüğü ve Programı 1951, Article 47), the state-led 
imports of agricultural technology and mechanics (Article 65), the introduction of 
specific credits and cooperative opportunities (Articles 59, 60, 63), and the portrayal of 
state as a complementary and supportive agent, rather than the rival of farmers (Articles 
64, 65) - were enforced by the DP governments that led to an increase in the 
productivity and profits of the farmers (Article 57). Farmers appreciated the annulment 
of certain taxes (i.e.: taxes on of roads and animals) during this period as well. Between 
1947 and 1955, the area allocated to farming was expanded to almost 70 per cent (Mann 
in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:198). In the wake of DP’s term in 1951, the agricultural 
growth reached its peak with 19.8 per cent (Eşiyok, 2006:13). The agricultural sector 
constituted the leitmotiv of the economic growth in these years. 
In brief, the strategy set forth by the DP on the basis of industrialization, mechanization 
and economic development set the scene for its successors in the center-right, while the 
center-left endeavored to ‘preserve cultural and political reforms’. To that extent, the 
center-right governments were considered to be on more practical grounds compared to 
the ones perceived to be more ideologically-bound. However, the pro-development 
initiative presented by the DP was faced with some unforeseen drawbacks. On the one 
hand, not only the rates of inflation and exchange, but also the deficit of foreign trade 
escalated especially after 1954; on the other hand, the Turkish lira was devalued in the 
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absence of a steady and stable macro-economic policy (Kazgan, 1999:101; Aydın, 
2005:33-2). The CHP criticized DP’s “election factories,” better-said its populist 
economic policies for their inefficiency and wastefulness (Özbudun in Özbudun and 
Ulusan, 1980:60). Hence, the impetus concerning the domestic economic development 
brought about by the DP could not have been adequately sustained.  Nonetheless, with 
no doubt, pragmatic economic policies of the DP paved the way for a rapid economic 
resurgence at the outset of its term. 
 
4.2.1.2 Clientelism 
 
Clientelism refers to a win-win relationship between unequal partners. On one side 
stands the patron or the political party that needs the support of adherents; on the other 
side rest the adherents that expect certain benefits in return of their support.
186
 In view of 
Sayari, clientelism operates “as a mechanism which regulates social relationships 
between individuals and groups with differential access to economic and political 
resources” where horizontal attachments are weak (1977: 103). In that vein, the roots of 
clientelism in Turkish society dates back to Ottoman era, where landlords (aghas) 
prospered in clientelist networks (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984:84-3).
187
 In the 
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 Following Lemarchand, Özbudun describes patron-client relationship as “a more or less personalized 
relationship between actors (i.e., patrons and clients), or sets of actors commanding unequal wealth, status 
or influence, based on conditional loyalties, and involving mutually beneficial transactions” (Lemarchand 
1972: 69 cited in Özbudun, 1981: 250).  For Sayarı, clientelism refers to a “reciprocal exchange whereby 
individual patrons and/ or political parties seek to mobilize the support of their followers in return of 
assistance and various brokerage services” (1977: 103). In that regard, reciprocity and inequality are 
perceived as the sine qua non of the clientelistic networks (Özbudun, 1981: 251; Sayarı, 1977:103). 
 
187
 In fact, this did not end with the Ottoman State.  On the political influence of aghas and land 
ownership in the Republican era, see: Özbudun in Akarlı and Ben-Dor, 1975: 44- 4; Ayşe Kudat. 1975. 
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following years, local notables continued to hold a mediatory position between the state 
and the periphery, yet not only the extent, but also the success of such role with respect 
to the local expectations was significantly questionable (Güneş-Ayata in Roniger and 
Güneş-Ayata, 1994b). However, since the Kemalist elites approached any particularistic 
interest with antipathy except from that of the state (Heper and Keyman, 1998:260; 
Güneş-Ayata in Roniger and Güneş Ayata, 1994b:50), the dissatisfaction of local 
expectations was not considered as an important problem in the eyes of the center. In 
this respect, Güneş Ayata argues that “[b]eing cut-off from the periphery was such a 
positive value that until 1946 elites did not go to their constituencies even for votes, 
arguing that to do so would legitimize primordial and local interests, which were a threat 
to national unity” (In Roniger and Güneş Ayata, 1994b:50).  Thus, the ‘high politics’ of 
the CHP considered it degrading to meet particular interests in exchange of political 
support (Heper and Keyman, 1998:260). 
In the aftermath of the transition to multi-party politics, by presenting itself as the 
representative of peripheral interests, the DP opened the door and let in the clientelism 
in Turkish politics. Sunar contrasts the strategies of the CHP and the DP and suggests 
that while the CHP was exclusionary in that it claimed to be representing the common 
good, whereas the DP challenged this strategy with its inclusionary, mobilizing and 
populist fashion (Sunar, 1990: 749). Stressing that clientelism may even provide people 
with more participatory possibilities in the political processes by creating a sense of 
togetherness that “desire[s] to establish the notion of ‘us’,” Güneş-Ayata notes that “the 
most important factor in the recurrence of clientelism is the generation of expectations 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
“Patron-Client Relations: The State of the Art and Research in Eastern Turkey,” in Engin Akarlı and 
Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds). Istanbul:Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 61- 87. 
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and hope, the individual’s feeling of being protected, or being able to depend on some 
‘patron,’ be it an individual or an organization” (Güneş Ayata in Roniger and Güneş-
Ayata, 1994a: 22, 24).  Thus, masses, who were not only tired of state’s imposition of 
unification on secularist and nationalist grounds, but also exhausted in face of its 
blindness to a variety of interests, started to believe that their interests might have been 
better protected by the DP against the bureaucratic center.   
The DP’s clientelism might be classified under two sub-groups. First comes the 
constitution of a win-win relationship with business circles and secondly, the provision 
of pork-barrel grants especially in rural areas. The DP was attractive for various interest 
groups with its relatively close ties with the masses, including private entrepreneurs, 
businessmen and farmers (Zürcher, 2001:321; Mardin, 1973, Öymen 2013:468-3).  To a 
large extent, the founding members of the DP - especially in the provinces and towns - 
consisted of merchants who had certain expectations from the government.
188
 Thus, at 
first sight, the DP government stood for a hope in the eyes of the private entrepreneurs. 
Then the party managed to forge strong ties with the business community and granted 
them certain privileges such as low-cost credits and loans, the easing of bureaucratic 
burdens concerning licensing and contracting along with the rearrangements regarding 
the import quota in return of their support and considerable donations to the party 
(Sayarı in Akarlı and Ben-Dor, 1975:129-2). What's more, in this period, not only the 
number, but also the influence of the Chambers of Commerce, which worked in concert 
with the government, was advanced to a significant extent. 
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 Frey argues that “[t]he Democrats were notably more professional and economic and less official in 
occupation” (1965:351).  Albayrak also states that in the first three months following the establishment of 
the DP, 40 out of 111 founding members of the DP in the provinces or towns were merchants and lawyers 
followed suit with a number of 16 out of 111 (Albayrak, 2004:76).   
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On the other hand, the DP government allocated pork-barrel grants to their electoral 
district in the shape of roads, waterways, schools, factories, dams, agricultural 
equipment, public services, and mosques.  Being a supporter of the DP guaranteed the 
enjoyment of these services as well. The DP’s never-ending toleration with regards to 
illegal squatter housing in the context of urbanization processes can be cited as one of 
the most visible aspects of the clientelism that prevailed in this period as well (Özbudun 
in Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 1981:261). Witnessed in the case of Kırşehir,189 the ones 
that abstained from supporting the DP ended up not only with certain punishments, but 
also resulted in the deprivation of public services. In this context, the DP governments 
transformed the traditional patron-client links into party patronage (Özbudun, 1981: 
258). Sunar briefly suggests that “[t]he clientelist incorporation of the rural population, 
the patronage-induced private initiative, and the great but haphazard social dynamism 
fueled by populism - all of these have not only outlived the DP, but have become 
permanent features of center-right politics, dominant in Turkey since 1950” (1990:752). 
In the subsequent period following that of the DP, parties - especially those from the 
center-right - strived to take hold of power and remain in government by way of 
patronage networks and when they were in government, in order to remain as such, their 
priority was set to meet the demands of their clients. Therefore, such a populist way of 
policy-making initialized by the DP governments evolved into one of the main 
characteristic of Turkish politics, especially the politics performed by the center-right 
parties. 
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 This issue has been taken up in the chapter on ‘Democracy.’ 
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4.2.2. The AP on Economy  
 
The Constitution of 1961 specified ‘social state’ as a constitutional principle and a 
prominent feature of the Republic and accordingly envisioned active state intervention 
into the social and economic life for achieving social peace and social justice.
190
 In this 
respect, the principle of statism, which had entrusted the state the role of not only 
regulating the relations between the labor and the capital, but also protecting livelihoods 
of the lower stratum, had broadened its scope. On the pretext of this principle, the 
bureaucrats
191
 interfered in the independent application of economic policies throughout 
1960s and saw no harm in challenging the liberal orientations of the civilian 
governments (Heper, 1976:489). Moreover, following the setting up of the State 
Planning Organization (DPT) in 1963, the government was obliged to work within the 
frameworks proposed by this institution and as a result, the economy was not under the 
complete control of the civilian governments in these years. To that extent, not only the 
plan imposed by the state elites was to be followed by the AP governments, but also this 
was to be done in the wider context provided by the constitutional prerequisite on the 
so-called “social state” principle. 
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 Özbudun points out to the fact that it was stated in Article 2 of the 1961 Constitution “the Turkish 
Republic is democratic and secular; it is based on human rights and on the principles of the right to work 
and social justice.” This proposition has been ambiguously changed into the following: “(…) it is based 
on human rights and social state” (Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:62). 
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 At this point, a general inclination among the bureaucrats is accented. There actually existed various 
struggles among them as well.  For example, Karpat dwells upon the competition over the control of the 
State Planning Organization between the socialists gathered around Yön (a Socialist Journal) and 
conservative-liberal intellectuals. At the end of 1970s, the latter gained the upper hand (2009:190). 
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The AP suggested a relatively liberal economic framework in its party program, which 
has not been carried into effect in its full extent due to various stringent structural 
variables. The party, focusing on the prospects of a liberal economic structure defined 
democracy as its sine qua non and supported private investment (Adalet Partisi 
Programı 1969, Article 13). The main economic function of the state was emphasized as 
the supporter of private capital accumulation, instead of considering it as the main 
manufacturer (Article 14). Demirel criticized the hostile approach put forth by the leftist 
ideology against private capital accumulation and stated that “in a country, where only 
living poor can guarantee safety, making money causes trouble for the individuals” 
(Demirel, 1973:149). The party theoretically embraced laissez-faire liberalism 
emphasizing that “we neither go along with the view that limits legitimate earnings and 
profits at a level ‘just enough to keep the body and the soul together,’ reminding us of 
the standpoint set forth in the Middle Ages, nor accord with the one that regards them as 
a cut stolen from the shares of the workers” (Article 5). Such statement revealed not 
only that the AP had taken a classical center-right position, but also made it clear that it 
both contradicted with Marxist theory on ‘Surplus Value’ and the nihilist approach to 
the materialistic world advocated by Sufi Islam.   
Within these circumstances, having assumed that there was no escape from the principle 
of social state, the AP considered this principle not in relation to an ideal for a socialist 
state, but as a requirement of a paternalistic state, whose benevolence necessitated 
caring for the lower income stratum as a matter of fact (Demirel, 2004:329-2). Since the 
main task of the welfare state was to offer equality in opportunity to all its citizens and 
to protect their liberties (Adalet Partisi Programı 1969, Article 6), the view of the AP 
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differed from that of the center-left in its predilection to reserve such benefits 
particularly for the rock-bottom poor
192
 (Özbudun in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:70).  
The ideas put forth in the party programs, however, largely remained on paper. During 
the term of the AP, neither the SEEs were privatized, nor were the state investments 
scaled down. The AP perceived public investments as a magic potion for economic 
development and for the regulation of income distribution (Demirel, 2004:46-2). In a 
country, where an economy was modeled around import substitution, the labor law was 
designed in favor of workers, the public investments proliferated, the age for retirement 
was brought down, the minimum wage was popularized, it is hard to argue that the AP 
carried out genuinely neo-liberal economic policies (Karpat, 1982:396; Demirel, 
2004:327; Keyder, 1987:203; Levi in Heper and Landau, 1991:140). In this period, not 
only the extent of Turkey’s integration with the institutions of international finance, 
such as the IMF and the World Bank was limited, but also the scope of direct investment 
by foreign actors still remained very low (Aydın, 2005:37; Kazgan, 1999:113).  Even 
with respect to the seemingly most liberal policies of the AP - such as ‘January 24 
Decisions’ and the devaluation on August 10, 1970 - the pragmatism, in Keyder’s words 
the “affirmative populism” of the party played a significant role (1987:204). All in all, 
the AP presented a liberal stance in its party and government programs following the 
footsteps of the DP, yet, its pragmatic concerns along with conjectural drawbacks led to 
the prosecution of a mixed economy. 
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 In line with AP’s comprehension of social justice prior to 1980, Demirel also introduced the “green 
card” for the ones deprived of housing, pension, family and so on in 1990’s, which enabled these 
disadvantaged groups to benefit from health services for free. 
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The economic policies of the AP had some unique features as well. On the one hand, the 
AP put emphasis on economic development and provided its supporters with services in 
line with the DP. Yet, on the other hand, the AP drew closer to the right-wing vis-à-vis a 
new vision on the rise in 1970s, the left-of-the center, put forth by the CHP under the 
leadership of Ecevit. 
 
 
4.2.2.1. Pro-Development Policies Hand in Glove with Patronage Networks 
 
The AP echoed the DP’s position on development. In a similar vein to the DP, the AP 
considered all pragmatic formulations justifiable in the name of economic growth. On 
this line of reasoning, Süleyman Demirel frequently stressed that in order to achieve 
economic development, politics was to be instrumentalized and as a consequence, social 
development would follow suit as well (Demirel, 1973:16; 1975:16). Demirel endorsed 
such a technocratic vision by indicating to the occupational backgrounds of the AP 
bureaucrats - mostly in engineering - and often endeavored to legitimize the 
instrumentalization of politics in the name of tangible outcomes (Demirel, 2004: 283). 
Undeniably, by the time, the AP arrived at its 10
th
 Assembly in 1957, engineering, 
proven to be a prominent occupation among elites, had already gained dominance in the 
parliamentary composition (Frey, 1965:182).  Given this outlook, it is fair to claim that 
the AP was never a school of ‘idealists’, but ‘exemplary pragmatics’ that replicated the 
DP’s emphasis on achieving concrete results in favor of economic growth. Yet, in a 
slightly different vein: their views diverged on the terrain of pragmatism. While the DP 
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suggested focusing on the agricultural sector for attaining economic growth, the AP - 
mostly composed of engineers- emphasized industrialization as the route to take. The 
motto of Demirel - “Get the job done” - crystallized such pragmatism, where there was 
clearly no tolerance for excuses standing in the way of achieving economic growth 
through industrialization (Donat, 2005:13). From the vantage point of the AP, “Great 
Turkey” was to rise on the grounds of modern technologies planned to infiltrate the 
entire production system along with the transformation and communication sectors. 
These technical advancements were assumed to pave the way for resolving social 
problems such as unemployment, poverty and desperation as well, with the support of 
the social and paternalistic state (Demirel, 2004: 273-2).   
The governments formed by the AP brought about a considerable economic growth that 
escalated from 3.1 percent to 12 percent with an average of 5.95 per cent between 1965 
and 1971 in order to carry such mission into effect (Eşiyok, 2006:16). The main focal 
plane of the AP was definitely the industry, yet it had never dispensed with the 
agricultural sector as evident in its policies such as the green plan, the agricultural 
modernization and the assurance of high-prices. The import substitution model 
accompanied by additional restrictions on imports considered alongside the preserving 
of the artificially achieved high value of the Turkish lira led to the production and 
consumption of domestic products (Zürcher, 2004:265). As a consequence, the average 
growth rate in the industrial sector came up to 9.2 per cent between 1965 and 1971 
(Eşiyok, 2006:16). That being the case, the role played by the agricultural sector during 
the term of the DP, as the catalyst of the economic development, was played by the 
industrial sector during AP’s single party term.  
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In this regard, public investments were carried on in order to cope with the economic 
underdevelopment prevalent in the country and to activate its potentials. The AP also 
exemplified center-right’s approach to the Kurdish issue for the first time and underlined 
that it perceived it in socio-economic terms. In this respect, the AP handled the 
economic development of the Eastern parts of the country separately as a specific and 
pivotal issue. Demirel presumed a direct correlation in between the levels of living 
standards in the Eastern regions of the country and the prospects for cultural integrity 
(Demirel, 1973:294).   
Nevertheless, the AP did not allocate economic resources evenly among all citizens. As 
noted previously, the AP focused on economic growth in a mechanical and quantitative 
sense rather than in a way that is sensitive to fair income distribution (Özbudun in 
Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:69). Like the DP, the AP got also involved in patronage 
networks via pork-barrel grants and personal relationships. Especially between 1965 and 
1971, the policies of the AP were wrapped up in a particular mode of patronage, in 
Ayata’s words “preferential resource allocation,” that took the form of providing water, 
electricity, roads, schooling, health services and so on (Güneş - Ayata, 1991b:54). 
Demirel’s clientelism was often merged with nepotism and his close relatives had taken 
advantage of his office to a significant extent (Arat in Heper and Sayari, 2002:93-2). 
The AP strived not only to influence certain associations such as the Union of Chambers 
and Commodity Exchanges in Turkey (TOBB) and the Confederation of Turkish Trade 
Unions (TÜRK-İŞ), but also to establish partnerships with big business groups, local 
notables and religious communities. The nature of these collaborations was to a large 
extent rested on personal relations rather than institutional ones (Demirel, 2004:119-2). 
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One of the main differences between the DP and the AP was certainly the softer stance 
taken by the latter with respect to planned economy. From the very beginning, the AP 
accepted the institutional prerequisites, refrained from challenging constitutional 
principles and pushed the perception common in the DP that identified planning with 
communist orientations into the background to a certain extent. The AP put into effect 
policies projected by five-year development plans designed within the framework of a 
mixed economy. Nonetheless, the Five-Year Development Plan concerning the years 
between 1968 and 1972 was also affected by the liberal agenda of the AP, which, on the 
one hand, emphasized private enterprise and economic growth and on the other hand, 
suggested to lessen the role of the state with regard to the regulations on production and 
social justice (Aydın, 2005:34-2; Özbudun in Özbudun and Ulusan, 1980:74). The party 
seemed to appreciate plans as guiding mechanisms providing scientific administration in 
the party and with respect to government programs. Yet, the excessive and insistent 
planning imposed by the bureaucratic oligarchy over the elected government was 
criticized as follows “development plan should function as a hope and an ideal 
document rather than a strictly bounding ultimatum” (Demirel, 1973:272). 193 
Furthermore, Demirel suggested including local branches in the planning process as in 
his view, central plans imposed from Ankara did not adequately take local realities and 
expectations into account (Demirel, 1973:212). Behind such criticism and suggestions 
laid not only the AP’s stance against the center composed of bureaucratic, military and 
university elites, but also its intention to decentralize the administration. Milor argues 
that the planning in 1960s amounted largely to collaboration between the state elites and 
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 For details, see: Vedat Milor.1990. “The Genesis of Planning in Turkey,” New Perspectives on Turkey 
4(1):1-30. 
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the business circles accompanied by a suspicion towards the elected governments 
(1990:3-2). In face of such suspicion, the government minimized the scope of the 
planning function of the DPT by the Law numbered 933 to put an end to drawbacks 
(Demirel, 2004:312; Ahmad, 1977:275-5).   
In a nutshell, the AP carried on with the mission set forth by the DP concerning 
economic development via providing particularly their adherents with services. 
However, as the time passed by, the AP gave priority to industrialization and forced its 
pace, while in the meantime endeavored to avoid losing the support of the farmers. 
Within the confines of the institutional structure formed in 1960, the AP had to go along 
with the five-year development plans, yet when convenient, tried to manipulate these 
plans and restrict bureaucratic superiority on planning. 
 
4.2.2.2. The AP as a Salient Advocate of Middle Class Interests in 1970s 
 
In the years following 1971, the AP’s rapprochement with the state elites was 
accompanied by its partnership with the businessmen, who were known to be also very 
close to the center. Meanwhile, the CHP strengthened its onus on class representation. In 
this context, Turkey was deeply fragmented on the grounds of leftist and rightist 
orientations. Especially, following 1976, the Turkish economy was in dire straits since 
the economic growth could not have been maintained and given the gradually growing 
political chaos. In 1979, the crisis reached its peak-point when the industrial growth 
dropped to -5 percent and the growth rate dropped to -0.5 percent (Eşiyok, 2006:16). 
The situation that spiraled out of control with the rising prices of energy and oil, high 
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rates of inflation followed by strict government control paved the way for not only 
economic deadlocks and nation-wide black-marketing, but also social unrest manifested 
in the active resistance of the workers’ unions (Zürcher, 2004: 268). In late 1970s, the 
economic aspect of the crisis was closely linked with and aggravated by the political and 
social turmoil that derived from the conflict between the left and the right standpoints 
(Aydın, 2005: 41). Within this context, while the CHP embarked on to represent 
workers, disadvantaged groups not only from the slums of the cities, but also all around 
the society, the AP forged closer ties with big business groups.   
In an atmosphere, where the private capital was heavily dependent on state incentives 
and investments, the AP, on the one hand, tried to ally with private sector; on the other 
hand, endeavored to integrate Turkish economy with the world markets. More often than 
not, these two goals could not have been met simultaneously. For instance, business 
circles had not supported the devaluation of the Turkish Lira in 1970 since such an 
initiative was going to lower their established advantage (Aydın, 2005: 38).  Even so, 
especially in late 1970s, while the AP government sealed an alliance with big business 
groups behind closed doors, the CHP drew closer to the workers. 
Despite the fact that the economic growth rate - especially in the industrial sector - was 
maintained between 1973 and 1977, at the end of 1970s, it has become clearer that the 
economic growth meant a parallel increase in the foreign debt as well. Indeed, the last 
government formed under Demirel just before the Coup of 1980 took serious structural 
measures, known as ‘January 24, Decisions’ in order to deal with the declining 
economy. Among these measures were not only the devaluation of the Turkish Lira and 
the facilitation of exports, but also comprehensive restrictions on state intervention into 
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the pricing mechanisms along with various institutional reforms. However, the political 
instability did not allow these measures to be implemented sufficiently. In the shade of 
these decisions, the skyrocketed inflation rate of 106 per cent in 1980, stemming from 
the public sector deficits, dropped off to 28 per cent in 1983 (Mango, 1989:25). On the 
other hand, in return of lower inflation and a more stable and predictable economy, the 
economic growth rates and real income had declined to a certain extent (Kazdağlı in 
Sezal and Dağı, 2001:461). In this context, the ‘January 24, Decisions’ can be regarded 
as the earliest form of the new-right policies in Turkey, which restructured Turkish 
economy, leaving behind the model of import substitution and turning a new page to 
liberalization. Yet, the real liberalization of Turkish foreign trade can be dated as of 
1984.   
To sum up, the private capital owners that collaborated with the military and the state 
elites in 1960s began to join forces with the AP in 1970s. In return, the AP started to 
protect the interests of the bourgeoisie for which the cleavage in the party system played 
a functional role. The middle class sought cooperation with the government in order to 
pursue its economic interests as well, since the public sector and state investments still 
amounted to the main economic sector in the country. The political turmoil and 
instability also found echo in the economy and led to the deepening of the crisis in late 
1970s. In spite of its liberal discourses in its official documents and speeches previously, 
the AP actually embarked on implementing liberal economic policies entirely with 
January 24 Decisions.   
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4.2.3. The ANAP on Economy 
 
In the eyes of the junta elite, the Turkish economy was not a policy realm of first 
priority. The rearrangements in this field were left to Özal, the architect of the ‘January 
24 Decisions’. The generals - even Haydar Saltık - supported market economy on the 
whole without challenging Özal’s liberal economic program (Cemal, 1989:28). The new 
governments had to cope with various problems that forged social discontent, such as 
economic shortage, black-marketing and high inflation rates. Kazdağlı mentions that 
even the Prime Minister’s Office was out of fuel oil at the time the January 24 Decisions 
were enacted (in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:445). In such tough circumstances and during the 
terms of military governments, Özal kept on ruling the economy. Soon after his 
resignation from the deputy prime ministry, he became the prime minister of Turkey and 
carried on with the implementation of revolutionary reforms to accelerate the 
liberalization of Turkish economy.   
The program of the ANAP clearly defended a market economy in which the state played 
only regulatory and complementary roles rather than being the guiding actor of the 
economy. The principles such as the competitiveness, free market and the natural rules 
of economy were stressed (Article 9) and the main duty of the state was defined as 
providing stability and security (Article 10). Unlike previous center-right parties, the 
ANAP attached priority firstly to the service sector considering it as a cure for 
unemployment (Article 17). The party and government programs of the ANAP were put 
into effect in the realm of economy to a considerable extent. 
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While the agriculture sector kept losing its preferential place in the economy, the 
urbanization was on the rise in line with the liberal economic program of the ANAP. 
Furthermore, the industrial sector embarked on updating itself in accordance with the 
world trends, which necessitated not only producing exportable goods, but also 
competing with the imported ones. Hence, the themes such as efficiency, high-tech and 
competitiveness appeared as buzzwords. Yayla asserts that the share of the industrial 
sector within the GDP rose up from 23 per cent to 31 per cent between 1980 and 1989 
(in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:432). Additionally, the service sector prospered in conformity 
with the party program. For example, in late 1980s the bed capacity in the tourism sector 
rose fivefold within less than a decade and almost 15 per cent of the government 
incentives were allocated to tourism investment (Kazdağlı in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:466-
2).  
Özal claimed to defend the rights of the middle class (orta direk) in the first years of the 
ANAP government. Aydın illustrates such approach as below: 
Urban squatter areas were particularly targeted through polices including the 
provision of quasi title deeds to land and property built on state lands, and 
VAT rebates for wage and salary earners. These policies were introduced 
not only to hide the cuts in vital services such as health and education but 
also to indirectly keep the wages low (2005:54). 
 
Thus, ANAP not only sought to present itself as the representative of a large portion of 
the middle classes that every now and then resorted to coercive means, but also joined 
forces with big business groups such as Sabancı, Koç and Enka. Thereby, the ANAP, 
leaving the mentality associated with the welfare state behind, did not claim to represent 
lower classes at all, especially until 1987. In this period, in face of the income 
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distribution having been tilted considerably towards the upper and upper middle classes, 
the World Bank announced Turkey as the seventh worst figure with regards to income 
disparity (Ahmad, 1993:204). Nevertheless, after 1987, the party gradually engaged in 
more populist schemes of income distribution by easing not only its strict financial 
approach, but also the accompanying new-right mentality. Hence, on the grounds of the 
preexisting discourses on economic liberalization set forth by the DP and the AP, the 
ANAP governments put such rhetoric into practice in parallel with the political 
competition that was on the rise in late 1980s. The ANAP started to distance itself from 
the orthodox principles of the center-right as well. On the other hand, along with the 
narrow scope of privatization and the escalation of clientelism, the underestimation of 
the role of well-established legal frameworks for a viable market economy can be 
considered as among the weak spots of Özal’s economic perspective (Öniş, 2004: 114). 
All in all, the ANAP tenure was a milestone in Turkish economy that integrated it with 
the world economy. To fully grasp the nature of the relations between the ANAP and the 
Turkish economy, it will be beneficial to dwell upon the liberalization of foreign trade, 
privatization and clientelism respectively. 
 
4.2.3.1. Liberalization of Foreign Trade 
 
The industrialization within the model of import substitution accompanied by broad 
prohibition regarding domestic products brought about an unrealistic and uncompetitive 
market structure in Turkey throughout 1970s and led to an imbalance in payments. Not 
only the AP government in 1980 and the subsequent ones, but also the international 
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community encouraged Turkey for the liberalization of foreign trade. Such 
encouragement gained impetus with the leadership of Özal given his commitment to free 
market economy (Öniş, 2004: 118).  
The governments formed by the ANAP had taken foreign relations not only in relation 
to the defense of the state, but also considered it as an economic priority to be defined 
with respect to the economic interests of the country (ANAP Parti Programı 1983, 
Article 35). In this respect, while these governments signed a number of cooperative 
agreements with various states, Özal, travelling with a variety of businessmen when 
paying his official visits abroad, strived to help these accompanying business groups in 
establishing further commercial partnerships. Engaging in personal contact in return of 
prospective improvement in foreign trade went hand in hand with the institutional 
rearrangements as well. In 1986, the Istanbul Stock Exchange (IMKB), the Saving 
Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) and the Foreign Exchange Market were founded to 
simplify foreign economic relations.  By the same token, in 1985 the Banking Law was 
reformulated to facilitate not only the activities of domestic banks abroad, but also those 
of the foreign financial institutions in Turkey. Furthermore, following the annulment of 
the Law on the Protection of the Turkish Lira, it was allowed to possess foreign 
currency and as a result, the Turkish Lira was rendered convertible. 
Only a few prohibited goods were listed while the rest of the products were considered 
free to import in contrast to the protective approach prevalent in the previous terms that 
determined which goods to be imported freely (Kazdağlı in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:462). 
During the budget talks of 1985, the government under the leadership of Özal projected 
to regulate the balance of payments and to increase foreign capital investments in the 
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subsequent years (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 09.12.1984), In a nutshell, the ANAP 
governments strived boldly to integrate Turkish economy with the global markets by 
forging one-to-one relationships, by removing the obstacles standing in the way of free 
trade, by rearranging and founding institutions. However, to be considered as the weak 
spot of this tenure, such initiatives were not taken on a well-structured legislative 
framework, which would have resulted in fertile consequences in such a transition 
period. The processes integral to the above-mentioned economic integration were not 
disparate from those of a social integration as well, since these processes introduced the 
world to the Turkish citizens. Anderson suggests that by way of establishing common 
temporal grounds and following similar consumption patterns, a sense of belonging 
appears (1983). As such, a number of Turkish citizens not only began to feel as part of 
the world community rather than a figure in an isolated country, but also reconnected 
with the dynamics of contemporary times. 
 
4.2.3.2. Privatization 
 
Within the tragic circumstances of 1970s, the SEEs - far from being competitive and 
efficient, yet privileged on import permits – posed significant problems with their 
deficits to be covered by the credits provided by the Central Bank (Kazdağlı in Sezal 
and Dağı, 2001:454). The need for their reformation - both on organizational and 
strategic grounds - had already been stressed in the Five-Year Development Plan 
targeting the years between 1979 and 1983. However, these measures could not have 
been put into effect thanks to the political chaos prevalent in the country. Indeed, the 
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IMF strongly supported a comprehensive reform regarding the public sector at the time, 
yet, the prevalent neo-statist orientation of Ulusu government stood in the way of the 
liberalization of the SEEs (Öniş, 1991:165).  
The liberalization of Turkish economy was set as a goal in December 1983 and the 
privatization processes were started off in early 1984. The DPT was rendered 
responsible for the privatization of the public sector and the Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Bank was asked to prepare the master plan for the entire privatization processes (Öniş, 
1991:166). To put an end to the monopoly of the SEEs, especially in the manufacturing 
sector, the related institutional framework was rearranged. Accordingly, not only the 
government was vested with the right to select the SEEs to be privatized, but also the 
newly-found, Board of the Mass Housing and Public Participation Fund
194
 was rendered 
responsible in monitoring the privatization process.  
Öniş suggests that the privatization processes enforced by the ANAP were distinctive in 
their reorganizational features rather than their direct challenge to the state (1991:167). 
Unlike the classical apprehension that envisions privatization as direct sales of the SEE 
assets, the ANAP government referred to two other strategies, which rested on “offers to 
sell management rights of an enterprise; and offers of certificates entitling the public to a 
share in the operating income of the enterprise” while there was also a third option 
reserved for the crucial sectors related with infrastructure, energy and communication 
(Öniş, 1991:167). In order to weaken the influential position of the SEEs vis-à-vis the 
private sector, their immunity from taxation was cancelled. Thus, the share of the SEEs 
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 This fund was entrusted with the management of extra-budgetary funds as well. The government was 
considerably autonomous concerning the utilization of these extra-budgetary funds as it did not have to 
give any account on them to the established bureaucracy and the parliament. 
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in the GDP dropped down to 2.4 per cent from 5.8 per cent between 1980 and 1989 
(Kazdağlı in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:469). What is more, as projected in the ANAP 
program, the expenditures of the state on education and health were scaled down by 
opening up private schools and health institutions (Anavatan Partisi Programı 1983, 
Articles 21 and 25).  To cut a long story short, the ANAP governments endeavored to 
minimize the role of the state in production, exerted efforts to limit the scope of state 
facilities and strived to transfer its tasks to the private sector, if possible. However, this 
transition has not been fully carried into effect owing to the structural deficits. Most of 
the direct privatizations could not have been enforced in those years. 
 
4.2.3.3. Clientelism 
 
The ANAP displayed a standard approach on clientelism common in many center-right 
parties, yet by way of new strategies. In line with its antecedents, the ANAP leader, 
Özal also provided its supporters with pork-barrel grants. He promised the residents of 
towns provincial opportunities in return of their support in the elections (Cemal, 
1989:350). On the other hand, the ANAP aligned itself with big business, such as 
ENKA and in return of their sponsorship provided them with governmental incentives. 
Furthermore, Özal was considerably engaged in patronage networks. For instance, he 
threatened to cancel Sweden’s entrusted tender unless she had supported Turkey in the 
European Council (Cemal, 1989:115). 
The seeds of nepotism were sown by Demirel and it came forth in its full-fledged form 
during the ANAP tenure. The Özal family, especially Özal’s wife, brothers and children 
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had apparently significant influence on governmental decisions. His brother, Yusuf Özal 
and his cousin Hüsnü Doğan served as ministers in the ANAP governments. A brand-
new Jaguar presented as a gift to Özal’s daughter also attracted criticism in those days 
and spelled out the extent of the nepotism and corruption the ANAP government was 
engaged in (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:267). In a similar vein, close friends of Özal’s 
children, the “Princes of Özal,” were appointed to critical bureaucratic posts without the 
necessary state experience thanks to their direct personal contact and trustable relations 
with the Özal family. They formed a new form of bureaucratic class with modern 
outlook and bright educational backgrounds, whose appointments to significant posts 
despite their lack of competence were extremely unusual in the Turkish state tradition.    
It is commonly suggested that corruption also followed suit nepotism and proliferated 
during the term of the ANAP. One of Özal’s statements – “My civil servants know their 
stuff well” (Benim memurum işini bilir) 195  – is usually interpreted as an apparent 
expression of ANAP’s tolerance on bribery. From an optimistic vantage point, on the 
one hand, it is argued that the ANAP governments put up with corruption just to 
encourage burgeoning private incentives: on the other hand, the proliferation of the 
means of communication made such instances more visible (Bozkurt in Sezal and Dağı, 
2001:30).  Nevertheless, the center-right pragmatism that generally emphasizes 
materialist development and concrete results, in fact, does not care much for ethics and 
abstract ideals. Therefore, it is not surprising that the clientelist networks, nepotism and 
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 There exist several standpoints concerning what Özal really meant by this statement. These 
perspectives stress that Özal actually did not refer to taking bribes at all. With respect to one point of 
view, Özal stated these words after having been informed so swiftly about the earthquake that took place 
in Erzurum-Kars in 1983, even before the news agencies. Another view suggests that in a group meeting 
on the salaries of the civil servants, Özal stated this sentence against the deputies of the ANAP that 
complained about his bureaucrats. 
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corruption are hand in glove with the habitual concerns of center-right parties such as 
electoral victory or success in everyday politics.  
 
4.2.4. Conclusion 
 
The center-right parties which are ideologically less bounded, to a large extent concern 
with economic development and service related issues.  For this end, they formulated 
their political agenda on the priority of technical modernization which is divergent from 
the cultural modernization mission of the Kemalist ideology.  To a large extent, they are 
capable to fulfill this incentive which is appreciated by the people and turns into 
continuing electoral support to these parties.  When they fail to accomplish economic 
well-being mission, they considerably lose their popular support as was experienced in 
1990’s.   
All in all, the center-right parties give a significant place to economic liberalization in 
their official party documents and discourses.  Nevertheless, the realization of this goal 
cannot be reached until ANAP era and thus, the state investments generally increased 
during the center-right governments.  By ANAP, crucial steps were taken for the 
liberalization of foreign trade and privatization. 
While providing economic progress, on the other hand the center-right parties are eager 
to engage in clientelism and patronage which leads to unequal distribution of state 
resources.  In that regard, they not only promote the ones who support these parties, but 
also punish the ones who withhold their political support to the center-right.  This 
clientelist stance occasionally flirts with corruption which especially in the 1990’s 
 263 
caused an economic turmoil which accelerated the collapse of the center-right parties’ 
electoral support. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 SECULARISM AND CENTER-RIGHT IN TURKEY 
 
 
As discussed previously in the second chapter, the distinctions between the leftist and 
rightist standpoints emerged in the context of the French Revolution. These standpoints 
rested not only upon differing understandings of rights and liberties but also were, most 
importantly, derived from the cleavage between those who argued for secularism versus 
those who emphasized the significance of religion. Moreover, various explanations 
based on socio-economic stratifications were explicitly or implicitly intertwined with 
religiosity or non-religiosity. Even in the post-Cold War era, the standpoints of the left 
and right appeared to be value-based and deviated from each other on the topic of 
materialism versus post-materialism. To that extent, religion played a significant role in 
setting apart the standpoints of the left vis-à-vis the right. To a large extent, whereas the 
left prefers behavioral patterns that are determined less commonly based on religious 
foundations, the political right relies on those that are religiously and traditionally 
motivated. 
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It is hard to situate the case of Turkey on the left/right spectrum by approaching the 
issue only from a socio-economic perspective. If the cleavages between those who stress 
secular methods versus those that emphasize religious ones are taken into consideration, 
one might put Turkey’s position on the political spectrum into perspective.  
In this respect, it should be noted right away that, here, religion not only refers to the 
Orthodox religious doctrine but also to the varying traditions and local interpretations of 
those doctrines. 
In the case of Turkey, Berkes argues that: 
We postulate that the formal outlook of a religious system remains in most 
cases ideal and theoretical and is found in actual social contexts in a 
modified, or interpreted form; that the institutional status of a religion is 
determined not exclusively by the principles of its ideal system, but by the 
institutional configuration of the society; and that in many cases the source 
of the ultimate values is identified with the religion in question when these 
values constitute the core of a sacred tradition and when the society is 
challenged by secularizing forces of change turned against the tradition” 
(Berkes, 1998:66). 
 
Hence, as mentioned in the previous chapters, the center-periphery cleavage not only 
remains one of the key conceptualizations in explaining the patterns of Turkish politics 
and society but also this gap between the center and the periphery has grown wider due 
to various changes within the value systems of the center throughout the modernization 
process of Turkey.
196
 Özbudun notes that “[t]he basic difference from Western European 
politics is that in Turkey, as in other Muslim-majority countries, there is no equivalent 
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 The value system and the accompanying strategies prevalent in the periphery have undergone a 
transformation with respect to political dynamics as well. On the one hand, the periphery has never 
intended to challenge the prevailing order with the exception of some minor religious-Kurdish rebellions. 
On the other hand, whenever the wind was fair, the periphery endeavored to voice its cherished values. 
What is more, the melting pot of secular thought, rational thought and modern education systems brought 
about a considerable metamorphosis over time regarding the value system of the periphery. 
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of the Catholic Church, with its autonomous structure and corporate privileges. 
However, a functionally similar cleavage developed between the ardent secularizers and 
the devout Muslims, combined with the center-periphery cleavage” (2013:6). Thus, 
since there was neither an official clergy as a social class, nor an institutionalized 
church, the Republic of Turkey endeavored to secularize in the context of a conflict 
between the center and the periphery. 
To that extent, from the very beginning, the Turkish center-right has sided with religion 
as a response to the fact that the center-left was poising itself to pursue secularist 
policies. Nevertheless, the extent of this religiosity did not amount to an extreme 
antagonism between religious and secular groups. Instead, the center-right in Turkey 
followed a middle ground in between the militant secularism of the state and the 
religious Islamic far-right. In the account of the Turkish center-right, religion and 
secularism were related values that could co-exist in harmony. In other words, the 
center-right in Turkey approached religion on moderate grounds while at the same time 
embracing secular principles. Before discussing the policies and discourses of the 
Turkish center-right parties on secularism, it is valuable to first address the concept of 
secularism. 
 
5.1. Secularism(S): A Variety of Connotations 
  
Despite the fact that the concept of secularism is generally considered to refer simply to 
the separation of religion from state affairs and politics, it is in fact far from having a 
simple, monolithic and coherent meaning. Indeed, among many influencing factors, the 
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conceptualization of religion especially affects the conceptualization of secularism. In 
that regard, Calhoun and co-authors posit that “[i]n all cases, secularism is defined in 
tandem with its twin concept, religion, and how we think about one of these paired 
concepts affects the way we think about the other” (2011:6).  Thus, the nature of 
religion, its value system and the accompanying worldly affairs, amount to only one 
aspect of the picture that forges the texture of secularism in a given context.
197
 The 
nature of the ancient regime along with that of the secularization process are other 
significant factors that must be taken into account. If top-down secularization takes 
place, the perception of the political elites on religion may influence the scope of the 
secularism as well. Furthermore, the structure of the state and society also impact the 
nature of secularism (Stepan in Calhoun et al., 2011).   
Given the prevailing multiple theories on secularism, it is necessary here to differentiate 
two clearly distinct forms of secularism in order to explain the Turkish center-right’s 
secularist incentive: the American style of secularism and the French version of 
laïcité.198 On one hand, the latter, better-said the hardliner, reactive and militant version 
of secularism was brought about by the intensive struggles against the authority of the 
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churches (Calhoun et al., 2011:15; Appleby in Calhoun et al., 2011; Berger et al., 
2010:17-2). The American version of secularism, on the other hand, advocates a more 
pluralistic worldview with respect to religious orientations that reserves a symbolic 
space for religion in governmental affairs. Joan W. Scott states that “[i]n France, the 
state protects individuals from religion; in America, religions are protected from the 
state and the state from religion” (2007:92). Berger and co-authors reveal that the 
principle of “freedom from belief” seems to have morphed into the principle of 
“freedom to believe” in the American case (2010). By the same token, McClay discerns 
negative and positive versions of secularism as follows: 
The former view, on the one hand, is a minimal, even "negative" 
understanding of secularism, as a freedom "from" establishmentarian 
imposition. For it, the secular idiom is merely a provisional lingua franca 
that serves to facilitate commerce among different kinds of belief, rather 
than establish some new "absolute" language, an Esperanto of post-
religious truth. The latter view, on the other hand, is the more robust, more 
assertive, more "positive" understanding of secularism with which I 
began- the one that affirms secularism as an ultimate faith that rightfully 
supersedes the tragic blindness and destructive irrationalities of the 
historical religions, at least so far as activity in public is concerned 
(McClay, 2002:63-2). 
 
On a parallel front, Ahmet Kuru points to a distinction between passive and assertive 
secularism. He positions Turkey on the grounds of the latter as Turkey preferred a 
similar approach to France even taking it further with respect to its endeavors in 
controlling religion via the state-led Directorate of Religious Affairs.
199
 However, in 
order to account for the experiences of Turkey (whose secularist incentive was stronger 
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 Özbudun hints atthe ambigous status of the Directorate as follows: “… the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) that serves the interests of the dominant Sunni majority is part of the 
public administration, and its public status is recognized in the Constitution (Art. 136). However, it does 
not have a legal personality of its own and is responsible to the prime minister, and the strictly secular 
Turkish Constitution does not, of course, recognize a state religion” (Özbudun, 2010a:215). 
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than France in the past), those of India (whose position was softer than the U.S.A as it 
provided certain subsidies to all religions) and many other divergent paths to secularism, 
one must formulate categories beyond the above-mentioned branches of secularism. For 
instance, Stepan underscores the significance of “twin tolerations” of religion and 
secularism for a viable system: “separatist,” “established religion,” “positive 
accommodation” and “respect all, positive cooperation, and principled distance” (Stepan 
in Calhoun et al., 2011). 
The Turkish center-right mainly approached the debates revolving around different 
understandings of secularism and the role of religion under the guidance of the 
following question, “which path to follow, assertive or passive secularism?” In that 
regard, while the Kemalist state elites along with the CHP have preferred a path close to 
the French version of secularism (Göle in Cady et al., 2010; Kuru, 2009;  Calhoun et al., 
2011:9), the Turkish center-right favored a more passive version (Kuru, 2009). 
 
5.2. The Secularization of Turkey 
 
Turkey’s secularization process date back to the very beginning of the Ottoman 
Empire’s modernization process. Within the Ottoman Empire, which was endowed with 
religious authority owing to the power of the caliphate, the citizenship (which was 
inherently reaya status) was defined in terms of being a Muslim or non-Muslim. Karpat 
states that “[t]he dominant social unit in the Ottoman state was the community, and the 
community was religious. Until the nineteenth century, at least, all inhabitants identified 
themselves first as Muslims, Christians, or Jews, not as Ottomans or as members of a 
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given ethnic group” (2002:759).  Even though the reaya was defined with respect to 
religion, non-Muslim elements were protected as well (Barkey in Kuru and Stepan, 
2012:21-3). Despite the religious undertones apparently shaping the relations between 
the state and the society, a peaceful co-existence of different religions endured in the 
Ottoman Empire. Underlining the tolerance towards religious diversities, Barkey states 
that “the Ottoman Empire is perhaps the best example of imperial accommodation of 
religion, in which a state carefully watches religious differences and shapes the role that 
religion should play in the imperial polity” (in Kuru and Stepan, 2012:13). Hence, the 
religious pluralism prevalent in the Ottoman Empire would fall to pieces in the 
monolithic Republican secularist state vis-à-vis the pluralistic society (Heper, 1991; 
Özbudun in Kuru and Stapan, 2010; Berkes, 1998).  
In order to fully grasp the issue at hand, one should refrain not only from 
underestimating but also overestimating the status of religion in the Ottoman Empire. 
The Kantian view--“concepts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts 
are blind” (2010)--was not far from the attitude that prevailed in the Ottoman Empire. In 
a similar vein, Şerif Mardin quotes from al-Gazali, who argued that “[w]hoever abstracts 
and isolates the outward from the whole is a Materialist and whoever abstracts the 
inward is a spiritualist [esoteric], while he who joins the two together is catholic, 
perfect” (Mardin, 1991:119). This was a prevalently espoused opinion in Ottoman 
society in general. In this respect, one can propose that the value systems of the 
periphery in Turkey were mainly shaped by a combination that brought several elements 
of spiritual life together with worldly concerns. Furthermore, the religious structure of 
the state in symbolic terms did not allow religion to guide all the policy-making 
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processes, and the autonomous state did not amount to a complete theocracy even at 
times that are considered the most religiously oriented (Heper, 1981:348; Berkes, 
1998:16; Mardin in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981:194). So, it is possible to argue that 
in the classical Ottoman era, the center and the periphery approached religion in a 
compatible way: both were religious, yet none of them refused the significance of daily 
affairs and worldly concerns in addition to religious aspects when weighing policy 
decisions.
200
 Thus, religion strengthened the relations between local forces and state 
institutions though it did not form the ultimate factor in the classical Ottoman decision-
making matrix (Mardin, 1991; Mardin in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981; Berkes, 
1998:69). 
Nonetheless, religion began to lose its ground and became absent in specific functions 
with respect to the state within the context of the modernization process. With respect to 
the Treaty of Küçükkaynarca (1774) that concluded the War between the Russian 
Empire and the Ottoman Empire (1768-74), the Ottoman Empire bent its knee and 
acknowledged Europe’s superiority. Starting with the reign of Selim III, such an 
acknowledgement led to military reforms and modernization of the state apparatus. In 
the aftermath of Selim III’s overthrow, Mahmud II on the one hand, started to abolish 
traditional institutions while founding new ones, and on the other hand reinforced 
institutional reforms concerning the practices of daily life. Berkes notes that “[t]he most 
significant aspect of the innovations initiated by Mahmud
 
II was the emergence of the 
                                                             
200
 Şerif Mardin asserts that “[f]or the population at large religion was a moral prop, something to lean on, 
a source of consolation, a patterning of life; for the ruling elite it was in addition, and probably much 
more, a matter related to the legitimacy of the state. Both groups could at times neglect religion or by-pass 
it, but the form of this by- passing was different: for the masses it consisted of breaking religious taboos 
and then atoning for it later; for the ruling it consisted in pushing religion into the background when 
required by secular political purposes” (Mardin, 1971:206) [Italics added] 
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idea of an Ottoman state, composed of peoples of diverse nationalities and religions, 
based on secular principles of sovereignty as contrasted with the medieval concept of an 
Islamic empire. The real beginning of modernization and secularization was in this 
change” (Berkes, 1998:90). In light of such an ideological shift, under the reign of 
Mahmud II not only the consultative function of Shaikh al-Islam (Şeyhü’l İslam) was 
diminished but also its  perception came to be related more to the affairs of millet than to 
governmental affairs (Berkes, 1998:98). The secularization process of education also 
came to the fore and gradually brought about a new generation of bureaucrats and 
intellectuals educated in modern schools or abroad accelerating the modernization 
process of Turkey.
201
 Moreover, not only the secularization of matters of jurisdiction, 
especially that of the penal code and the civil law, but also the provision of equal rights 
for non-Muslim citizens arose within the context of Tanzimat Fermanı and Islahat 
Fermanı. In the late Ottoman era, further steps were also taken in this direction, yet with 
the rise of divergent ideologies--stretching from Islamism and Ottomanism to Turkism 
and Westernism--a coherent secular system could not be formed.   
To a large extent, not only the strategy but also the depth of attempts at reinforcing the 
secularization process by the Kemalist regime was different from previous 
experiences.
202
 Since the very beginning, this regime had taken decisive steps in order to 
secularize the state and the society. In line with the Kemalist understanding of 
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 For details, see: Findley.1989. Chapter 4. Ottoman Civil Officialdom. pp.131-141. 
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 According to the account of Kuru, the reason behind such a rigid understanding of secularism was 
indeed a reaction mainly to the Ancient Regime, where the ulema and the Sultan collaborated on the 
grounds of Islamic institutions (Kuru, 2009:201).  For a bright comparison of the secularization processes 
of the Ancient Regime and the Kemalist era, see also: Şerif Mardin. 1971. “Ideology and Religion in the 
Turkish Revolution,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 2(3): 202-3. 
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modernization, it was suggested that religion be cut off from all the decision-making 
processes related with public life (Eisenstadt in Landau, 1984:9; Berkes, 1998:484; 
Yavuz, 2009:154; Kuru, 2009, 2007:571; Keyman in Cady and co-authors, 2010:144). 
In Max Weber’s or Steve Bruce’s terms, an enlightened account of secularism was 
principal in the case of Turkey, which presumed that rationality and civilization would 
bring about a less-religious society. Kemalist elites assumed that secularization of the 
state and society would lead not only to liberation from the archaic ways of thinking and 
living but also to a new kind of morality detached from the religion that was perceived 
as among the reasons for underdevelopment and full of superstitions and dogmas. To 
that extent, in line with a Weberian viewpoint, the version of secularism suggested by 
the Kemalist elites required the separation of value spheres and expected to place 
religion into the private realm and, if possible, only within the inner conscience (vicdan) 
of the people (Asad, 2003:185; Mardin in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981:211) 203 . 
Therefore, the secularism suggested by the Kemalist elites was based on two dynamics: 
institutional transformations and cultural revolution. 
The secularization processes that followed suit within the Republic of Turkey took more 
than two decades to get a foothold in the country. In the framework of the institutional 
reforms, in 1921, the principle of the “sovereignty belongs to nation” replaced the 
previous one, which was, namely, the “sovereignty belongs to the divine authority.” At 
that time, not only the legal justification for the Caliphate but also the following clause 
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 For an anthropological account of the privatization of religion in Turkey, see: Chris Hann. 2000. 
“Problems with the (De)Privatization of Religion,”  Anthropology Today 16(6): 14-20. 
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“the religion of the Turkish state is Islam” was preserved in the 1924 Constitution.204 
Furthermore, in the 1924 Constitution, the scope of the parliamentary authority included 
the enforcement of shariah law (ahkam-ı şer’iyenin tenfizi) as well while the deputies 
and the President continued to swear to God in their oaths (valahhi) until 1928. Despite 
these implementations, the Constitution strove to set up a secular system without 
explicitly identifying the regime as secular (Özbudun, 2012:8-2). Following the 
proclamation of the Republic in 1923, a series of reforms also intended to move the 
secularization process forward were rapidly introduced. Among these reforms were the 
establishment a unified system of national education under state control, the transition to 
a Latin alphabet, the adoption of the Gregorian calendar, the entitlement of women with 
equal rights, the regulation of social relations and dress codes along with the annulment 
of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Foundations (Şeriye ve Evkaf). Zürcher notes 
that some of these reforms were at first not directly related with religion; instead, they 
were aimed at burning bridges with the past (Zürcher, 2001:188). Soon after the Sheikh 
Sait Rebellion, the use of religion for political purposes was banned. Prior to the 
abolition of the Caliphate, all kinds of dervish lodges and religious brotherhoods were 
outlawed. In this context, secularism succeeded many reforms that had already been 
enforced and eventually gained a constitutional status in 1937.  
In line with the worldview of the Enlightenment, Kemalism considered education as one 
of the most efficient tools for putting the secularization processes into effect. In order to 
do so, almost all religious schools were closed down while not only the courses of 
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 Some deputies proposed to embed the clause of “the state’s official religion is Islam” into the 
Constitution, yet, this suggestion was not approved. For details, see: Şeref Gözübüyük and Zekâi Sezgin. 
1957. 1924 Anayasası Hakkındaki Meclis Görüşmeleri. Ankara: AÜSBF, 100-2; Ergun Özbudun. 2012. 
1924 Anayasası. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 13-2. 
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religion but also those of Arabic and Persian language were taken out of curriculums 
(Özdalga, 1999:418). In the course of these reforms, the Directorate of Religious Affairs 
and the Directorate for the Charity Foundations were established and rendered 
responsible directly to the Prime Minister in order for the state to control all religious 
activity and education via these institutions.
205
 As a result, the state had taken control of 
every legal
206
 religious activity, publication and education that paved the way for the 
creation of what Calhoun and co-authors call a ‘reasonable’ religion (Calhoun and co-
authors, 2011:7). A sort of Turkified Islam compatible with a nationalist and secular 
Turkey was put into practice (Dumont in Landau, 1984:30).
207
 Thus, the state attempted 
to formulate a ‘true’ religion by way of exerting systematic restrictions on the spiritual 
elements of religion while initiating an educational movement that would build personal 
commitment to a “reasonable” religion. Taylor calls upon such attempts at depoliticizing 
religion as the “replacement of secularism with the religion” (2005) while Berkes 
considers this Kemalist version of secularism as “shoddy legitimization for the 
persecution of Islam” (Berkes, 1998:480). Thus, the Turkish state, on the one hand, 
strove to depoliticize religion, and, simultaneously, on the other hand, endeavored to 
create its own “reasonable” religion while suggesting secular alternatives as new forms 
of morality for the people.  
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 Indeed, the Directorate of Religious Affairs took sides with the state for the most part. For instance, 
during the Events of February 28
th
 the Staff Officer Oğuz Kalelioğlu, who influenced and shaped the 
related statements of the Directorate, was the head consultant of the Chief of the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs.  
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 At this point, the word ‘legal’ is preferred since the illegal aspectsthe previous dervish lodges that went 
underground and endeavored to carry on with their activities outside the legal terrain--are  unknown. 
 
207
 With respect to this irony, Bernard Lewis notes that “[e]ven today, after thirty-five years of the secular 
Republic, a non-Muslim in Turkey may be called a Turkish citizen, but never a Turk” (Lewis, 1968:26). 
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5.2.1. The DP and Secularism 
 
The Republican modernization project intended to free Turkish citizens from 
superstitions and abstractions via rationality. Yet, such a mission could not be extended 
enough to contain populations on the periphery. As a result, the contradictions between 
the center and periphery have been sharpened. While the CHP was the founder and 
bearer of this rationalization project, the DP and subsequent center-right parties pursued 
pragmatic policies that gave space to religion in public life. Frey suggests that “[a]n 
alternative elite had developed. This elite had been neither co-opted nor quashed, 
possibly because the tremendous problem of eliminating anachronistic religion as a 
political force had monopolized the attention of the Kemalist high command” 
(1965:349). Thus, the attitude of political elites towards religion was one of the main 
separating lines between the CHP elite and that of the DP. 
It is worth mentioning that neither the programs, the activities of the center-right parties 
nor the party elites with regards to their thoughts and practices were essentially 
religious. They have just stressed the importance of religion in Turkish society and paid 
respect to religious concepts, practices and institutions. As pragmatic parties, they were 
also careful to abide by the state principles in the course of the secularization process. 
Bearing in mind the previous experiences provided by the emergence of the Progressive 
Republican Party (the TCF) and the Free Republican Party (the SCF), or in other words, 
the clustering of suppressed religious opposition around these alternative parties, the 
CHP began to pursue containment policies concerning religion in order to prevent a 
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religious grouping under the roof of the DP in the context of the multi-party system. As 
of the CHP Congress held on November 17, 1947, the party decided to soften its 
approach to religion. Thus, Recep Peker, then the Prime Minister and one of the most 
radical secularists in the party, was unseated and replaced with a more moderate name, 
Hasan Saka. This gradual reconciliation with religion was also carried on with Şemsettin 
Günaltay, the then Prime Minister in 1949, who was a theologian and a former mufti. By 
the same token, the strict ban on goingon pilgrimage was lifted in 1947. Furthermore, 
elective religious courses were re-introduced in curriculums
208
 while the Faculty of 
Theology at Ankara University was reopened. The religious vocational high-schools that 
offered religious education were also re-established in several cities.
209
 The number of 
Quran courses was also increased to 167 in 1949 from only 9 in 1932 (Ünsür, 1995:93). 
Nevertheless, these initiatives must not have been appreciated much by the population in 
general as the CHP was defeated at the ballot box in the 1950 Elections. One of the 
reasons behind this failure might have rested in the fact that, in the eyes of the periphery, 
the CHP was not considered to be sincere regarding its intentions towards religious 
policies. However, this short-lived pro-religious approach of the CHP was very crucial 
for subsequent Turkish politics as Kalaycıoğlu observes: “[o]nce the CHP began to 
exploit religion, the DP was morally and legitimately relieved from all restraints to 
exploit the religious symbolism of the majority of Sunni Muslims to its advantage 
thanks to the performance of the CHP governments of the late 1940s” (Kalaycıoğlu, 
2005:72). 
                                                             
208
 It is worth noting that the guidelines sent by the Ministry of National Education prescribed the elective 
courses to be given by primary school teachers yet not to be graded. (Yeni Sabah,  04.02.1949) 
 
209
 In fact, the idea of opening up these schools was put forward back in 1924. However, as a result of 
rigid secularist policies, it was abandoned in 1932.  
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While this was the case with the CHP, the DP pursued a dual policy from the very 
beginning. On the one hand, the DP promised that President İnönü would abide by and 
preserve secularist principles;
210
 on the other hand, it also employed a sympathetic 
discourse on religion that was capable of convincing people more successfully. In other 
words, the discourses and policies of the DP could be summarized under two headings. 
Firstly, the party formulated religion-friendly policies and provided a fresh approach vis-
à-vis the rigid secularist policies of the previous CHP governments. Secondly, the party 
embraced the memory of Atatürk and tried to protect secularist principles and symbols 
while punishing far-right Islamist orientations. 
 
5.2.1.1. Pro-Religious Policies of the DP 
 
At the outset, the civil and military bureaucracies were the two pillars of secularism in 
Turkey. The cadres of the DP that claimed to advocate the rights of the periphery 
comprised less than civil and military bureaucrats and such a configuration estranged the 
DP from the militant laïcité. In that regard, even Celal Bayar who was considered to be 
one of the most secular in the DP, knew Arabic very well and had a cleric as a father 
(Aydemir, 1976:146). Bayar declared that the religious sensitivity of Adnan Menderes 
had influenced them as well. When Menderes was in the American College, he warned 
Bayar against the missionary priests, who encouraged Muslim students to convert 
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 Aydemir quotes a conversation between İsmet İnönü and Celal Bayar that took place prior to the 
foundation of the DP: “İnönü -Will you toy with the religion? Are you going to instrumentalize the 
religion for political purposes? Bayar: No, secularism does not mean atheism” (1976:361; 389). 
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(Bayar, 1969:21-3).
211
 The personal characteristics of Menderes also comprised 
transcendental elements in addition to rational and pragmatic ones, which were, 
according to Aydemir, a result of being raised by his elderly and conservative 
grandmother (1976:22, 69). To a large extent, the DP elite joined in during ceremonial 
practices such as the feast of Sacrifice (eid-al-adha- kurban bayramı) and the feast of 
Ramadan (eid-al-fitr- ramazan bayramı) and participated in Friday prayers, both of 
which drew the DP elite closer to the masses. Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes and many 
other leading politicians in the party usually employed religious discourses in their 
public speeches. These figures not only made use of religious expressions throughout 
their speeches but also finished their speeches with religious idioms.
212
 In that sense, the 
DP elite did not hesitate to give religion-friendly messages on numerous and verying 
occasions. Ayata notes that “[t]he DP’s approach to religion involved the incorporation 
of Islam as a living cultural tradition into the mainstream of Turkish politics” (1996:43). 
In this respect, the religious attachments of the DP elite had a cultural and traditional 
character, which naturally echoed in the discourses of the party. In the eyes of many DP 
elites, who grew up in a religion-friendly environment rather than a religion-dominated 
one, using religious rhetoric and attending religious ceremonies were merely traditional 
practices. Thus, the DP developed a tolerant approach towards religion, yet, at the same 
time, it refrained from perceiving it as the omniscient source of guidance. At this point, 
it is worth pointing out a similarity between the approaches of the majority of the 
society and the DP. Both of them have a great respect for religion, yet, when they find it 
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 In those years, Bayar was a member of the Commitee of Union and Progress in its İzmir branch (İttihat 
ve Terakki Cemiyeti). 
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 For examples, see: Milliyet, 08.05.1950. 
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necessary, they could “by-pass”213 religion easily. What is more, unlike Celal Bayar, the 
DP elite liked to be viewed in religious places. For instance, several close friends of his 
declared that Menderes usually visited Eyüp Sultan Tomb when he was the Prime 
Minister (Ağaoğlu, 2004:55). By the same token, the survival of Menderes from a 
terrifying plan crash
214
 was also interpreted as a proof of his exceptional spiritual side, 
and he was known as “God’s distinguished man” (Eroğul, 2003:228-3; Ağaoğlu, 
2004:55). Two days after the crash, the press presented Menderes’ survival and recovery 
as a miracle (Milliyet, 19.02.1959).
215
 Actually, Menderes was neither a devoutly 
religious man, nor was he a piously practicing Muslim. However, unlike the CHP elite, 
he preferred to appear as such. 
The DP elite considered religion as a matter within the context of the freedom of 
conscience as well. On January 17, 1953, Menderes suggested that “[r]eligion is a holy 
and respectable issue. We intend to justify our religion as a freedom of conscience, as 
we have done with respect to other liberties as well” (Burçak, 1998:130). Bayar also 
underlined that the DP’s interpretation of secularism not only respected religion but also 
preserved an equal distance between all religions (Bayar, 1969:109). This standpoint 
was reiterated in the party programs of 1946 and 1951 (Articles 13 and 14).
216
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 For an analysis of the general approach to religion prevaling among the majority of the population, see: 
Mardin, 1971, p. 206. 
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 The plane crash occurred on February 17, 1959 in London and was called the “1959 Turkish Airlines 
Gatwick Crash.” Menderes and some other party members were on the plane, which crashed and led to 
the death of many passengers except Menderes and several others.   
 
215
 Yavuzalp, Menderes’ clerk, argues that this was an attempt at perception management as Menderes 
was substantially injured in the accident (Yavuzalp, 1991:15). 
 
216
 Different from that of 1946, the necessity of religious education was emphasized in the party program 
of 1951. 
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In the first government program, the DP promised to preserve Kemalist reforms that 
were embraced by the people. This promise implicitly indicated that some of the 
Kemalist reforms, probably the assertively secularist ones, were not welcomed by the 
people. In this regard, Menderes posited as follows: 
We will preserve the acquisitions gained until now in the course of our 
democratic revolution.  Indeed, we will offer further reforms in the 
Constitution with respect to the rights and liberties of the citizens as well as 
a stable state regulation (…) Accordingly, we will get rid of all 
undemocratic rules inherited from the single-party era (TBMM Tutanak 
Dergisi, 29.5.1950, p.30). 
 
The above-mentioned declaration raised a question about the prospects of the militant 
secularist policies of the CHP since these were the reforms that have been mostly 
rejected by the majority of the people. 
In the subsequent governments, the DP began to voice the need for freedom of 
conscience more loudly. For instance, in the second Menderes government, the DP 
leader stated that: 
We project keeping the worldly affairs and those of the religion separate 
from each other, and not repressing the freedom of conscience, which stands 
among the main principles of democracy (…) Neither the religious people, 
nor those who do not consider themselves as religious will suppress each 
other and in this way, the citizens (…), splitting into two enemy camps will 
never be allowed (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 20.03.1951 p.61).   
 
By virtue of the above-mentioned statement, the DP government stressed the freedom of 
liberties rather than pursuing blindfold secularism, and from this day forward, the 
policies of the DP strove to remain within such a stance.   
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5.2.1.1.1. The Language of the Call for Prayer 
The Kemalist reform that settled on the language of the call for prayer (hereinafter, 
azan)
217
 as Turkish, was not welcomed. As noted previously, the Republican elite 
thought that burning the bridges with the Ancient Regime could have only been possible 
with a great transformation. Accordingly, in 1932, Atatürk suggested the recitation of 
azans in Turkish along with similar secularist and nationalist maneuvers. In 1936, the 
recitation of azans in Arabic was subjected to punishment by an additional clause added 
to the Penal Code, Law numbered 526, which generated social discontent.
218
 (Bayar, 
1969:111; Burçak, 1998: 55-2). Public protests and declarations by preachers against the 
recitation of azan in Turkish led to various prosecutions, arrests and imprisonments.  It 
is worth noting that this reform targeted only the Muslim community, and both the 
Christians and Jews carried on worshiping in their original languages (Azak, 2010:59). 
During the single-party era, the government was quite determined to apply the rules 
against azans recited in Arabic as well.   
In the beginning of the multi-party era, as the assertive secularist atmosphere softened a 
little bit, the debates around the recitation of azans in Turkish came to the fore. For 
example, in 1949, Besim Atalay and M. Raif Ogan brought up this issue, and the 
opposition began to raise its voice against such a practice (Yeni Sabah, 01.05.1949; 
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 The call for prayer that took place five times a day had its specific rhymes and meter in Arabic, and 
almost all Muslim countries preserved its original Arabic version. 
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 It is worth noting that during the reformation period, in line with various translations of Quran to 
Turkish, the sermons at the Friday prayers began to be given in Turkish as well. These practices, however, 
did not cause a serious discontent unlike the case with changingthe recitation of azan in Turkish.   
 
 283 
02.05.1949; 03.05.1949). Thus, the existing social antipathy found fertile grounds to be 
declared more loudly, and intellectual debates began to take place.   
The DP brought up this issue on the agenda just after the forming of the government. 
The day before the month of Ramadan, on June 16, 1950, the freedom to recite azan in 
its original Arabic version was passed through the Parliament.
219
 The timing satisfied 
many and rallied popular support for the DP government from the very beginning of its 
term. People celebrated this event in a sentimental mood to the extent that they had even 
cried while listening to the Arabic version of azan.
220
 
Ahmet Gürkan, a deputy from the DP, strove to justify the bill that restored the Arabic 
version of azan by referring to secularism. According to him, the prohibition of the 
Turkish version of azan was indeed against secularism since such a practice was an 
attempt at controlling and intervening in the realm of the preachers and clergymen. The 
DP deputies accused the previous CHP governments of interpreting secularism as 
“being against religion” as well (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 31.05.1950). Evaluating the 
issue within the context of freedom of conscience, the DP managed to differentiate its 
understanding of secularism from that of the Kemalist one.
221
 On the other hand, the DP 
attentively tried to avoid being considered anti-secular or disrespectful of Atatürk as 
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 Accordingly, on July 16, 1950, on the same day that the recitation of azan in Arabic was restored, the 
bill proposed by the DP deputy from Ordu to delink the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Prime 
Ministry was rejected (Milliyet, 17.06.1950). 
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 For details, see:  Mustafa Armağan. 2010. Türkçe Ezan ve Menderes: Bir Devrin Yazılamayan 
Gerçekleri. İstanbul: Timaş. 
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 It is worth addressing that the CHP supported the annulment of the prohibition of the recitation of azan 
in Arabic. The party spokesman, Cemal Reşil Eyüpoğlu openly declared that they were not against the 
amendment (Bayar, 1969:112). On the other hand, Islamist Necip Fazıl complained that the main motive 
behind this amendment was democracy and the freedom of conscience rather than religious purposes 
(Kısakürek, 1993:132) 
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well. In that regard, Bayar highlighted the fact that the recitation of azan in Turkish 
along with several other reforms on language and history were to be considered as 
Atatürk’s experiments that he had conducted without being certain about their 
consequences (1969:110-2). Furthermore, the DP referred not to the regulations enacted 
in the times of Atatürk but to the amendment enforced by İnönü back in 1941 (Law No: 
4505) that prohibited the recitation of azan in Arabic.
222
 In these debates, Menderes was 
careful to leave the figure of Atatürk aside when trying to pass reforms or issuing 
criticism. He stated that “Atatürk put forth the recitation of azan in Turkish in order to 
get rid of dogmatism and in today’s Turkey there is no need to keep up with this rule, 
which contradicts with the freedom of conscience to some extent” (Burçak, 1998:56-2). 
Therefore, carefully distinguishing the heritage of Atatürk from the practices of the CHP 
and İnönü, the DP carried on with its opposition against the latter. Thus, on the one 
hand, the DP wanted to stick to its image of being aligned with policies supported by 
Atatürk despite its advocacies of policies that contradicted this platform; on the other 
hand, it aimed at getting the support of the periphery. In a nutshell, the DP stressed that 
it was for the freedom of conscience and that they would respect secularism and protect 
the Kemalist secularist institutions. In this sense, the DP forged a role-model for the 
subsequent center-right parties. 
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 In fact, it was in 1932 that the recitation of azan in Turkish had been launched. In 1933, the 
gendarmerie forces were rendered responsible for the prohibition of the Arabic version. 
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5.2.1.1.2. The Religious Activities Supported by the State 
Prior to the governments of the DP, the state had tried to reform and control all religious 
associations and promote a new “vernacular Islam” (Azak, 2010:60). When the DP 
came to power, it not only lifted the ban on religion but also, in view of the positive 
responses of the masses concerning the abandonment of the compulsory recitation of 
azan in Turkish, the DP put forth similar messages of encouragement that pleased the 
majority of the population.   
During the term of the DP, the recitations of the Quran along with religious broadcasting 
on the state radio caused an intra-party crisis in which Bayar yelled at Samet Ağaoğlu, 
and then the Deputy Prime Minister pronounced that: “You have transformed the state 
radio into a mosque! (…) If this was what you have understood from democracy, I 
assure you that you have been mistaken.” As a result of this incident, Ağaoğlu wanted to 
resign from his position, yet he was talked out of it by Menderes, the then Prime 
Minister. Menderes gave his support to Ağaoğlu by declaring that “[i]f necessary, the 
entire cabinet will resign” and told Bayar that “when my citizens listen to Mevlüt (a 
religious poem) and Quran via the state radio on the very night of kandil (Islamic holy 
night), then they will realize that the state takes after them” (Bozdağ, 2004:136-2). After 
this incident, the state radio carried on with its religious broadcasts. Nevertheless, the 
opposition continued to criticize the DP for making use of religion as a type of trump 
card. For example, Şemsettin Günaltay--not only a theologian but also a deputy of the 
CHP--criticized the DP for its broadcasts of the Quran, which were in his account 
disrespectful since the radio might have been listened to in various ‘unsuitable’ places 
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(Milliyet, 13.08.1951). However, on account of popular support, the DP elite defended 
their policy as follows: “the Turkish citizens are right-minded…Even the heavy drinkers 
respect Quran and know where to listen to the radio” (Milliyet, 13.08.1951). 
Religious education was also one of the most disputed policies of the DP governments. 
In the first government program, Menderes asserted that: 
On the affairs of education: It is usual that a community which does not 
rest on firm national and moral principles, and does not reserve a place for 
moral values in its spirit, no matter how advanced it is on material 
grounds, it would be dragged into ill-fate within the complicated 
conditions of the contemporary world. In a country that does not take such 
an objective into account in her training and education system, and cannot 
equip her youth with spiritual and humanitarian values in accordance with 
the national character and traditions, the proliferation of science and 
technical knowledge is not going to be enough to guarantee living as a free 
and independent nation. (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29.05.1950, p.29) 
 
This emphasis on the spiritual aspects of education echoed through the related 
discourses and policies of the DP. In that regard, Tevfik İleri, the Minister of National 
Education at the time often stressed the significance of raising a generation that is both 
intellectually and religiously equipped considering religious education as important as 
road building, school construction and other material services (Milliyet, 25.05.1952; 
13.08.1950). In line with this position, the DP introduced optional religious courses in 
primary and secondary schools, popularized Quran courses and helped to change the 
status of the religious vocational schools (İmam Hatip- Prayer Leader and Preacher 
Schools). Prior to this regulation, the religious vocational schools existed in order to 
provide an occupational education to imams. The DP turned these schools into 
secondary schools and high schools that were obliged to offer physics, mathematics and 
chemistry as well as religious courses. The main motive behind the establishment of 
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these schools was summarized by Tevfik İleri as follows: to raise an intellectual and 
religious youth that shall take significant positions in the future (Milliyet, 
25.02.1952).
223
 As a result, in the first seven years of the DP government, 17 religious 
vocational schools with the capacity of educating a class of 4000 students at any one 
time were founded (Milliyet, 15.10.1957). The High Islamic Institute was also 
established in Istanbul in order to educate theologians. In the inaugural speech of the 
Institute, İleri stated that Islam was not against progress (Milliyet, 20.11.1959). In a 
summary, the DP formulated religion-friendly policies especially in the realm of 
education and tried to create an Islamic understanding compatible with science and 
development.   
 
5.2.1.1.3. The Re-embracement of the Ancient Regime 
During the term of the CHP, the closure of dervish lodges and tombs to which people 
attached religious importance caused a silent discontent among the masses. The DP 
reopened some of these lodges and tombs: On July 14, 1950 the tomb of Fatih Sultan 
Mehmet, in August 1950 Dolmabahçe Mosque and on September 1, 1950 Eyüp Sultan’s 
Tomb were reopened for visitors (Ağaoğlu, 2004:55). In this respect the memory of the 
previous Sultans and dervishes appreciated by the majority were appreciate and 
reacknowledged. 
The manner in which the DP governments approached Istanbul and Ankara could also 
be understood not only on the grounds of the secular versus religious cleavage but also 
                                                             
223
 It is worth noting that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current Prime Minister also graduated from a 
religious vocational school. 
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with respect to the DP’s reconciliation with the past. In this respect, Menderes usually 
argued that the CHP was proud of Ankara for constructing a city without temples 
(Burçak, 1998:496). Thus, Ankara became the symbol and heart of the Republic because 
of its secularist silhouette that lacked the minarets that ornament Istanbul’s skyline. As a 
reaction to this image, the DP began to build mosques in many cities including Ankara. 
Furthermore, while the CHP governments refrained from making huge investments in 
Istanbul as the capital of the Ancient Regime, the DP lent importance to Istanbul by 
making considerable investments there. The DP also wanted to make Istanbul a center of 
the Islamic world with populist and economic objectives rather than pro-Islamist ones 
(Menderes and Akyol, 2011:112-2).  Accordingly, the DP elite promised to construct a 
second Kaaba in Istanbul as a pledge put forth in their election campaign (Zafer, 
23.10.1957). These might all be considered within the context of an attempt at 
reconciliation with the Ancient Regime and religion as well as a reaction deriving from 
pragmatic concerns about obtaining economic gains in addition to popular support.   
Considering the gradual increase in the number of alliances established between the DP 
and various Islamic groups, Ayata claims that “[t]he center right’s relations with 
organized religious groups have included symbiotic relations, temporary alliances, and 
long-term affiliations” (1996:44). By the same token, the DP forged particular alliances 
with certain religious groups, and the government provided subsidies to Islamic 
periodicals. For instance, Necip Fazıl acknowledged that Menderes sponsored his 
periodical, Büyük Doğu, with funds from the budget of the Prime Ministry (1993:230-2). 
In addition, the DP government supported some Islamic publications through direct 
advertisements of the SEEs (State Economic Enterprises).  
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Said Nursi, an eminent figure of the Nurcu movement, was respected by the DP deputies 
and governors (Mardin, 1989: 98; Yavuz, 2003:62; Ahmad, 1991:23; Aydemir, 
1976:327; Azak, 2010:115-6). Said Nursi’s close ties with the DP deputies became a 
source of conflict between the DP and the CHP.  İnönü interpreted Nursi’s moving to 
Ankara in the beginning of 1960 as a clear support for the DP against  the opposition, 
CHP (Burçak, 640-2). Ahmad also notes that Nursi had direct a relationship with 
Menderes and wrote him letters to make some suggestions concerning the affairs of 
government (Ahmad, 1991:24). In this context, one can assert that a tradition of 
collaboration between the center-right parties and religious figures and orders started 
during the tenure of the DP thereby enhancing its base of social support.
224
 To a large 
extent, the center-right parties tended to perceive these religious orders in pragmatic 
terms as a bunch of collected votes, and the orders appreciated these parties as the lesser 
evil (ehven-i şer) among the existing parties with a claim to rule the country. This 
pragmatic alliance between the center-right parties and religious orders continued, yet it 
never culminated in an identical entity that merged the two until the rise of Islamic 
politics.
225
 
Especially after 1956, the DP participated more frequently in polemics on religion. The 
opposition party, CHP usually criticized the DP for taking advantage of religion for 
political purposes, and the 1957 Elections became an arena where the dichotomy of 
                                                             
224
 It is necessary to recall that some members of the DP were close to Islamic far-right movements and 
later joined the Nation Party (Millet Partisi). Besides, the DP was far from drawing a unilateral line on its 
relations with Islamic groups.  For instance, on December 23, 1952 Said Nursi was prosecuted by the 
High Criminal Court (Eroğul, 2003:132-2) although the DP governments had a positive opinon towards 
Nurcu and Nakshibendi movements to a large extent (Yavuz, 2003:62).   
 
225
 There was a wide range of religious orders and some of them refused to support center-right parties 
from the outset. At this point, I stress only the general leaning prevalent among brotherhoods in their 
support for the center-right parties. 
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secular versus religious was more pronounced. In the subsequent period, the CHP, on 
the one hand, accused the DP of threatening the regime, and on the other hand, it tried to 
create an image of itself as being closer to religion (Karpat, 1961:443-2; Burçak, 
1998:484-2), which is still a fresh source of conflict for the contemporary CHP as well. 
In face of accusations of engaging in reactionary activities, Menderes declared that 
“[a]ctually, the political reactionism is worse than the religious one” (Kısakürek, 
1993:254; Toker, 1991a:198). By the same token, he also addressed party officials as 
follows: “the ones, who make a fuss over reactionism, are, in fact the ones that oppress 
the freedom of conscience” (Milliyet, 24.03.1951). Thus, unlike the CHP, the party 
refrained from taking every argument about reactionism seriously. The DP put some 
distance between itself and the CHP by way of its focus on relatively negative or passive 
secularism that for the most part emphasized the freedom of conscience.  
 
5.2.1.2. Pro-Secular Policies of the DP 
 
As mentioned above, one of the distinguishing features of the Turkish center-right was 
its successful merging of its claims of peripheral representation with state principles. In 
this respect, religion and secularism play crucial roles in what distinguishes the center-
right parties from that of the left as well as the Islamist far-right. The center-right parties 
usually remain within the boundaries of the regime and never plan to transform the 
regime dramatically. Thus, the Turkish center-right carefully differentiates itself from 
the far-right parties that highlight Islamic demands. Nevertheless, as a result of their 
intensive pragmatism, center-right parties might sometimes flirt with religiously 
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oriented proclivities in opposition to ‘dangerous’ ones such as communism and 
socialism. The DP that acted as a role model for the subsequent center-right parties 
followed along the same path as well.   
The DP did not perceive religion and secularism in an antagonistic way when pursuing 
pro-religious policies in various realms. Turan observes that “[i]t was not the religious 
basis of its political ideology, but its tolerant attitude towards religion, which made the 
Democrat Party popular among voters” (in Tapper, 1991:45). In that regard, not only its 
discourses but also policies of the DP were indeoendent of religious tenets. The party 
considered secularism as one of the essential characteristics of the Republic to be 
preserved. Defining the main problematiqué of the CHP as its exclusionary and 
oppressive understanding of secularism, the DP introduced its minimal, softer and 
inclusive version that Kuru defines as “passive secularism” or in McClay’s terms, 
“negative” secularism (Kuru, 2009; 2011; McClay 2002). In this respect, underlining the 
necessity of separating the affairs of state from that of religion, the DP stated in its party 
program that “[t]he use of religion as a political tool, the involvement of religion in state 
affairs, spoiling the compassion and solidarity among citizens by making religion a 
means of propaganda and stirring up fanatical feelings against other religions and free 
thinking is never to be tolerated” (DP Programı 1946, Article 14).226 Hence, without a 
doubt, the party sided with secularism. The pro-secular and system-oriented approach of 
the party might be tested with respect to certain cases such as the funeral of Fevzi 
Çakmak, the Ticani Movement, the claim to the memory of Atatürk, the Malatya 
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 After coming to power, the DP softened this Article a little bit as follows: “The use of religion as 
political means, corrupting the love and solidarity among citizens by making religion a means of 
propaganda, and stirring up fanatical feelings against free thinking should not to be tolerated” (DP Tüzüğü 
ve Parti Programı, 1951). 
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Incident and the limitations put forth against the religiously oriented institutions and 
publications. 
 
5.2.1.2.1. The Funeral of Fevzi Çakmak 
Just before the DP came to power and in the course of the 1950 Elections, Fevzi 
Çakmak, a devout soldier and a friend of Atatürk had passed away. Fevzi Çakmak, well-
known for his opposition to İsmet İnönü and for his Islamic credentials amongst the 
Kemalist elite,
227
 after serving as the Chief of the General Staff for many years, retired 
and joined the DP in 1946 (Baban, 2009:87; Jenkins, 2008:116). In 1948, with the 
support of several other hardliners from the DP, he founded the religiously oriented 
Nation Party (Millet Partisi – the MP) and defined the mission of the party as to prevent 
a transition to atheism (Ahmad, 1991:21). In this period, his religious orientation was 
more pronounced. It was even claimed that he was a mystical person with superpowers 
that provide cures for illnesses (Baban, 2009:122). On the other hand, the DP leaders 
usually tended to refrain from challenging secularism. Özbudun asserts that “[t]he 
moderation of the DP leaders was one of the most important factors in the successful 
completion of the transition process” (2000:19), which led to accusations revolving 
around the DP of conspiring with Fevzi Çakmak and his companions. 
After his death on April 10, 1950 the state radio that had been carrying on with 
broadcasting cheerful songs led to discontent on the part of the conservative wing. The 
symbolic indifference of the radio was interpreted as that of the state in face of his 
                                                             
227
 It was also argued that one of the main motives behind Atatürk’s insistance on the separation of 
military affairs and politics was to keep Çakmak away from the latter. Since he was a passionate soldier, 
Çakmak chose to stay in the army because, that way, his conservative and religious thoughts could not 
influence politics quite so much. 
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death, which stirred up a considerable reaction among conservative groups. Around 
100,000 people went out to the streets in order to protest such callousness in relation to 
Çakmak’s death (Koçak, Star, 12.01.2013). During the demonstrations--which were 
indeed prohibited at the time--a crowd of university students, sheikhs and preachers, 
shouting Allah-u Akbar out loud, recited azan and prayed in Arabic. Top officials in the 
CHP considered this incident as the rebirth of the “reaction[ism]” in Turkish politics 
(Baban, 2009:125-2).  
The DP’s response to such an event was crucial and the party preferred to take sides 
with the CHP. The DP’s newspaper, Zafer criticized the issue almost as harshly as the 
CHP’s newspaper, Ulus. The party leaders clearly defined their position against Islamic 
upheavals.
228
 Celal Bayar also wrote on this incident that they, as the defender of 
Atatürk’s heritage, would never let reactionary incentives prevail (Zafer, 20 April 1950). 
The reason behind such a backlash might have derived from Çakmak’s leave from the 
DP to found his own party, the MP. Even though there might have been political 
competition between the MP and the DP that led to the strategic positioning of the latter, 
it is worth remembering that right before the DP gained power, it made clear that it 
differentiated itself from religiously oriented movements.  
 
5.2.1.2.2. The Ticani Movement and the Claim to the Memory of Atatürk 
The Ticaniye community, oerational in North Africa was founded by Ahmad al-Tijani at 
the end of the 18
th
 century and gained a foothold in Turkey after 1930s. The Ticanis, 
                                                             
228
 For details, see: Zafer and Ulus Newspapers, 11-17.04.1950. 
 
 294 
first of all, came to the forefront within the context of the protests in the Assembly 
against the regulation on the recitation of azan in Turkish (Azak, 2010:87). To a certain 
degree, they were publicized especially after their assaults on the statues of Atatürk in 
1951. In turn, the leader of the community, Kemal Pilavoğlu,229 along with several 
others was imprisoned for a long period of time (Jenkins, 2008:120; Zürcher, 2004:232; 
Ahmad, 1991:23).   
As a response to the Ticani movement, the DP government prepared a bill and after 
several amendments, the Law numbered 5816 on Crimes against Atatürk was enacted. 
The law envisaged certain punishments including imprisonment of up to five years. 
Although some of the DP deputies spoke against such a proposal due to its 
methodological deficiency as well as its restrictive nature against freedom of speech, the 
DP members, to a large extent, defended the law since they thought that assaulting 
Atatürk was equal to sassaulting the Republic, the regime and the reforms of Atatürk 
(TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 04.05.1951 p.45-2; 23.07.1951 p.258, 261, 266). The deputies 
of the DP harshly criticized the Ticani movement not only for being ignorant traitors (as 
they put it) but also for rebelling against the secular principles of the Republic (TBMM 
Tutanak Dergisi, 23.07.1951 p.264, 273). The party endorsed a perception that 
emphasized that the defense of Atatürk meant the defense of the nation against the 
invocation of reactionism.
230
 In this context, the DP’s main incentive was summarized 
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 The CHP softened its secularist policies and aimed at gathering the votes of this community in the 
1950 Elections as well. Kemal Pilavoğlu, the leader of the Ticani movement was also a CHP candidate 
that was not eligible to run in the 1950 Elections.  For details, see:  Kurtuluş Kayalı. 2005. Ordu ve 
Siyaset: 27 Mayıs - 12 Mart. İstanbul: İletişim, 60.  
 
230
 Not only the DP’s adherence to Atatürk and his reforms but also the organic relations between the CHP 
and the Ticanis, especially the leader of this movement, Kemal Pilavoğlu, might have led the DP to take 
serious action for the protection of Atatürk’s memory.  
 295 
as follows: “this law served as a precious proof that we are ready to rear up against all 
threats that aim for our Republic and reforms” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 23.07.1951: 
262)  
In a similar vein, the DP completed Atatürk’s mausoleum complex (Anıtkabir) as an 
indicator of its loyalty to Atatürk’s memory as well (Jenkins, 2008:120; Bayar, 
1969:123). The DP leaders frequently declared  their respect and faithfulness to Atatürk 
in various contexts. Indeed, Bayar suggested that one of the fundamental principles of 
the DP founders was the advocacy for Atatürk’s reforms (1969:40). Thus, the DP 
reassured their definite standpoint with respect to Atatürk and secularism.   
 
5.2.1.2.3. Malatya Incident 
In the beginning of the 1950s, Ahmet Emin Yalman, the editor of Vatan Newspaper 
published several articles accusing the DP of encouraging anti-secular movements. The 
Islamic press of those days, such as Büyük Doğu 231  and Serdengeçti 232 , regularly 
charged Yalman with being anti-religious. Hüseyin Üzmez, a young high-school 
student, attempted to assassinate Yalman on November 22, 1952 and injured him. In his 
investigation, Üzmez declared that Yalman intended to destroy his faith with the use of 
the Islamic periodicals including Büyük Doğu and Serdengeçti (Azak, 2010:85-3). The 
press, Kemalist circles and even the DP interpreted this incident as the invocation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
231
 A periodical published by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek. 
 
232
 A periodical published by Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, from the MP. 
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reactionary Islam.
233
 The DP acted cautiously in this process and defended secularism 
aggressivelyagainst the violence that originates from far-religious orientations. 
In the aftermath of this incident, the government was considerably concerned about 
Yalman and mobilized state resources immediately for his recovery (Milliyet, 
23.11.1952). Menderes, then the Prime Minister along with some of the members of 
cabinet visited Yalman several times at the hospital while Celal Bayar, the then 
President, paid a visit to Vatan to give his warm wishes (Milliyet, 24.11.1952). On this 
assassination attempt, Menderes declared that “[m]en of thought and men of politics 
could not be intimidated by guns. We are capable of dashing the heads of those into 
pieces who ventured this.” In the immediate aftermath of this failed assassination, Fehmi 
Ustaoğlu was expelled from the DP due to his anti-secular thoughts published in Büyük 
Cihad (Eroğul, 2003:132; Zürcher, 2004:246). Thus, the DP reaffirmed its distance not 
only from violent Islamic movements but also from endeavors intending to renounce the 
path to secularism. 
On the one hand, the Islamic far-rightist intellectuals criticized the government’s 
concern about this issue; on the other hand, the CHP accused the DP of being a secret 
supporter of religious obscurantism. In the face of such criticism, the DP decisively 
pursued its moderate secular standpoint and strived to prevent any abuse of the principle 
of the freedom of conscience.  
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 This incident raised concerns more than the Ticani movement as Azak quotes from Belli that “[w]hile 
Ticanis formed a crowd comprised of ignorant and illiterate peasants (cahil tabakadan ve okur-yazar 
olmayan bir köylü kütlesi), the leading actors of the last event were famous intellectuals” (Azak, 2010: 
99). Therefore, one can argue that, even as early as that point, the content of anti-secular thought had 
started to take shape. 
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5.2.1.2.4. Setting the Limits against Religiously Oriented Institutions and 
Publications 
The DP governments had incurred no harm in limiting religiously oriented opposition 
activities on two grounds. First of all, the DP not only remained within its legal 
boundaries but also considered itself as the protector of secularism. Secondly, the DP 
pragmatically eliminated the political opposition that might gain the support of the 
conservatives of which the DP itself was in pursuit. In this respect, instead of rigid 
precautions, the DP preferred to restrict the activities of the opposition parties. For 
instance, the government did not allow the Congress of Islam to be held in Istanbul, 
which was proposed by Nuri Demirağ, the then leader of the National Development 
Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi- the MKP) (Milliyet, 28.04.1953).  Similarly, Demirağ’s 
suggestion to bring together all the imams of the villages in Istanbul to celebrate the 
anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul was rejected by the DP government (Milliyet, 
28.04.1953). The adamant supporter of the pro-religious MP, Kırşehir, was degraded to 
a town, which might also be considered an anti-democratic move by the DP. Burçak 
notes that behind this action laid the perception, shared by Bayar and the forerunners of 
the DP, that the demotion of Kırşehir was due to the fact that it was considered a focal 
point for reactionary thoughts (1998:224). Actually, the reactionism was only a pretext 
for the DP, which was indeed in pursuit ofrevenge on this city because it did not support 
the DP in the elections. Furthermore, the DP mobilized police forces during the burial of 
a religious sheik, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan in Fatih Mosque (Yavuz, 2003:62; Çakır, 
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1989:130).  Similarly, the interment ceremony of Said Nursi had not been brought to 
Ankara due to the restrictive rules of the DP governments (Yavuz, 2003:62).
234
 
Moreover, several Islamist institutions and publications were closed down in the name 
of the protection of secularism. One of the most significant examples was obviously the 
closure of the MP that had deployed Islamist rhetoric from time to time. Founded in 
1948, the MP gathered 3.1 percent votes in the 1950 Elections, which amounted to only 
one seat in the parliament. The MP provided a more conservative option in the political 
realm, yet it was an efficient opposition in the parliament far beyond the parliamentary 
arithmetic. The party often made its presence felt in the Assembly meetings by harshly 
challenging the DP. After the 5
th
 National Congress of the party in 1953, some of the 
party members under the leadership of Hikmet Bayur left the party to distance 
themselves from the ones that were considered against the reforms and principles of 
Atatürk. Given the claim that the dominant pro-Islamist group in the party toyed with 
reactionary thoughts in order to enhance the political support of the party, this reformist 
group declared that: 
We proposed to underline the equality of woman, not to turn to the Arabic 
letters, not to open the dervish lodges and not to play with religion for 
political purposes in the party program, which was refused in the congress.  
This was an open indicator of the direction that the party moves to. 
(Milliyet, 30.06.1953) 
 
An investigation had been carried out in light of these accusations, and after a short 
period of time, on July 8, 1953 the political activities of the MP became prohibited 
while more than 2,000 local organizations of the party were closed down (Jenkins, 
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 Nonetheless, Yavuz also notes that contary to the official approach of the government, some of the DP 
deputies participated in the funeral of Nursi (2003:62). 
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2008:120). Within a month, the party formally ceased to exist leaving behind suspicions 
about the reliability of evidence (Eroğul, 2003:128-2; Burçak, 1998:136-2). The CHP 
criticized the government for teating the issue in an oversimplified manner. The DP 
defended the punishment of the MP by pointing to its dangerous character with respect 
to the security of the country and by equating its reactionary activities with communism 
equating them with threats to the peace of the country (Milliyet, 08.07.1953; 
15.07.1953). In the same group meeting, Menderes underlined that they were not against 
religion, but they could not have allowed political activities that created anarchy and 
chaos in the country (Milliyet, 08.07.1953).  Actually, the closure of the MP was a result 
of the strong opposition put forth by the MP against the DP in the Assembly especially 
in regards to the salient talent of its leader, Osman Bölükbaşı, in the art of oratory skills 
rather than the reactionary potential of the party.  
A similar attitude was observed with respect to the closure of Islamist associations and 
periodicals. Especially after the Malatya Incident, the DP acted increasingly oppressive 
towards Islamists. In that regard, the Association of Nationalists (Milliyetçiler Derneği) 
was closed down for its ultra-nationalist orientations along with some pro-Islamist 
tendencies such as advocating compulsory veiling of Turkish women (Azak, 2010:90).   
As a summary of the closure of the Islamist periodicals, on March 3, 1953 in his address 
to journalists, Menderes stated that: 
Periodicals, such as Sebilürreşat, Ehli Sünnet, Islam Yolu, Allah Yolu had 
also published rightist articles. We have closed these newspapers down as 
well and sued those who were liable for them. Since, in our country, no 
religious faith and belief has been subject to degeneration, all parties should 
join together and not use religion for the sake of politics (…) Hunting for 
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votes by taking this sacred matter in one’s hands would lead the country into 
a disaster. (Aydemir, 1976:388) 
 
To provide a clear legal ground against pro-Islamist enterprises, the DP enacted the 
“Law on the Protection of the Freedom of Conscience and Assembly” on July 27, 1953 
as a complementary item to the Article 163 of the Penal Code that called for one to five 
years of hard labor to whoever uses religion for political, personal and commercial 
interests (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 23.07.1953; Jenkins, 2008:120).   
In short, the DP drew a line in the sand between the pro-Islamist groups and itself. 
Despite this fact, this action was taken not only because the party thought that the pro-
Islamist groups were largely acting against secularism and the regime but also because 
the DP was concerned that these groups’ opposition might hurt the party. In this respect, 
the DP did not abstain from expelling the Islamist members from the party. Against the 
opposition’s accusations directed at the DP of supporting reactionary activities, the party 
strove to maintain its moderate standpoint. For instance, Ali Rıza Fırat, the son of the 
Sheikh Sait, wanted to become a candidate for the deputyship from the DP, and the 
party forerunners endeavored to convince him not to do so (Burçak, 1998:195-3).   
In fact, the party sought to remain within the limits of secularism even at the expense of 
breaking the hearts of its hardliners. For instance, in face of the demand raised by Fahri 
Ağaoğlu, the then deputy from Konya, to add the following clause to the Constitution: 
“the religion of the Turkish Republic is Islam,” Menderes responded that “[a]s a farmer 
coming from Aydın, I would approve this [clause], but I could not endorse this as the 
Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey. I could not run counter to millions of people” 
(Bozdağ, 2004:113-4). As was seen in this example, the DP not only preferred to hold 
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the line on its pragmatic approach when it came to secularism and remained within the 
boundaries of the regime but also endeavored to appear as a religion-friendly party to a 
large extent. The shift experienced by the party from pro-religious policies to a defense 
of secularism, from sponsorship of the pro-Islamist press to the closure of them, might 
be explained with respect to its pragmatism. Öymen also underlines that Menderes never 
moved far away from the Secularism principle throughout his political career (Öymen, 
2013:225).  Last but not least, as Hale and Özbudun succinctly note “[a]mong the many 
charges that were leveled against the DP leaders when they were put on trial by the 
subsequent military regime in 1960-61, resulting in the execution of Menderes and two 
of his cabinet colleagues, trying to destroy secularism was not included” (2010: xix), 
which clearly confirms the system-friendly approach of the DP. 
 
 
5.2.2. Secularism from the Perspective of the AP  
 
The DP preferred a passive version of secularism when faced with the assertive one 
promoted by the CHP. In fact, the military intervention of 1960 did not bring about a 
frankly controversial agenda against religion, which was evident in the fact that the DP 
was not accused of  eroding the secular functions of the state. Despite certain rumors 
about the intentions of the military elites to take measures against religious practices--
such as re-adjusting the language of the call for prayer (azan) to Turkish--these rumors 
turned out to be groundless. According to Ahmad (1977: 376), this military intervention 
did not amount to an overtly inimical position against religion, yet it signaled movement 
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towards a new viewpoint that emphasized the “anti-liberal, anti-radical and anti-socialist 
dimensions” of religion to bring forth the national and progressive image of Islam in 
order to integrate religion into the prevailing order. Therefore, unlike Kemalist efforts to 
remove religion from the public sphere completely, this time, various efforts at 
rendering religion compatible with the system were attempted. Thus, the AP not only 
followed a similar path to that of the DP when it came to secularism but also it had to 
take steps in a very differing contextual framework as well. In this respect, it will be 
useful to analyze how the AP preferred to approach secularism with an eye to its pro-
religious and pro-secularist policies along with its related discourses. 
Similar to other center-right parties in Turkey, the AP embodied various standpoints 
stretching from conservatives to liberals and Islamists to secularists. Nonetheless, the 
party mainly preferred to remain within the limits of the system during the term of 
Gümüşpala as well as after the defeat of the more conservative Bilgiç group by Demirel. 
Thus, the AP under the leadership of Demirel perceived religion as a kind of cultural 
glue tolerating and utilizing it in the public realm to assuage peripheral sensitivities. 
Broadly speaking, the AP elites were neither as Islamist as the National Outlook 
Movement nor as secularist as the Kemalist elites. They mainly tried to find a middle 
ground between secularism and religion.  In this sense, Demirel stated that the balance 
between religion and secularism can only be found via the AP owing to its tolerance and 
unique way of thinking in relation to both concepts (Demirel, 1973:57).  All at once, the 
AP not only situated itself in the relatively passive wing regarding secularism but also 
managed not to disregard religion by way of such a self-poising. Hence, it will be 
beneficial to analyze the perspective of the AP on secularism under two headings: 
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firstly, the pro-religious policies and the related discourses of the party and, secondly, its 
pro-secular policies and related discourses. 
 
5.2.2.1. The Pro-Religious Policies and Discourses of the AP 
 
While the DP paved the way for the active participation of the periphery, the AP was 
adept at maintaining the standpoint of the DP. AP’s understanding of secularism was 
shaped around such a perspective as well. In that regard, the AP opposed to the CHP’s 
assertive secularism promoted in the name of the regime. In the account of Demirel “the 
regime is not solely the concern of a few privileged person; it is a national concern about 
which the nation should decide” (Demirel, 1973:231). The top-to-down compulsory 
secularization project enforced by the CHP was also criticized by the AP as follows: 
“people are not against change. If the nation rejects something, it is mainly because it is 
not well-explained or such a change is not beneficial for the nation” (Demirel, 1973:36). 
Thus, the AP was against the attempts of cultural engineering “for the nation, despite the 
nation”. Like the DP, the AP underlined that secularism was not to be interpreted as a 
controversial stance against religion or impiety in its party program. Therefore, in the 
account of the AP, the state should respect religious beliefs and practices of its citizens. 
The AP set an example for the succeeding right wing parties by asserting that secularism 
pursued by the state was not the same with that of the people by drawing a line in 
between institutionalism and individualist versions of secularism (AP Parti Programı, 
1969: Article 10
235
).  
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 This point was stressed in the first party program (Article 8) as well. 
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Especially after CHP’s inclination towards left in mid-1960s, the AP began to use 
religion as a trump card more efficiently. Until January 26, 1970 when the National 
Order Party (hereinafter, the MSP) was founded under the leadership of Necmettin 
Erbakan, the AP was the most available party to voice pro-religious demands. In this 
regard, the pro-religious policies of the AP might be summarized under three sections: 
its embracement of religion as a part of local culture, its contribution both to the 
nationwide proliferation of religious institutions, and to the perception of communism as 
a threat to religion. 
 
5.2.2.1.1. Religion as a Vital Component of Local Culture 
The AP elites with relatively rural backgrounds displayed religious features such as 
dependency to religio-cultural codes, religious conservatism and the gemeinschaft of 
cultural stratification (Demirel, 2004:97; Jenkins, 2008:131). In the eyes of the educated 
urban groups, the AP elites were the representatives of “the masses who were under the 
influence of religio-traditional values, and for this reason, who were distant to science, 
incompetent to govern, unfamiliar or even evil to the Republican living style” (Demirel, 
2004:91). The AP, being aware of such degrading evaluations by the upper-classes, 
benefited from the gap formed between the differing value systems of the center and the 
periphery. The AP tended to put forth a self-confident image especially in 1960s, 
presenting itself to be proud of not only the backgrounds, but also the religio-cultural 
codes of its elites. 
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Coming from a relatively more traditional family in which religious rituals were 
exercised, Süleyman Demirel as the leader of the AP played an important role in the 
perception of religion as a cultural component within his personal experiences. Demirel 
has learned how to recite Qur’an from his grandmother when he was a child (Arat in 
Heper and Sayari, 2002:8). His father and some of his relatives visited Said Nursi, the 
leader of the Nurcu Movement periodically (Demirel, 2004:100). When he became the 
Prime Minister of Turkey, he continued to attend Friday prayers in Hacı Bayram 
Mosque (Demirel, 2004:187) reminding similar practices of the DP elites. The Ramadan 
dinners (iftar) were organized at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (hereinafter, 
TBMM) during AP’s term. The AP politicians attended parochial religio-social events 
as well. In this respect, the party did not approve the assertive secularism promoted by 
the CHP that endeavored to demarcate religious practices. For instance, in the first great 
AP convention, some of its members disapproved the criticism of the CHP directed at 
the AP for being reactionary. They stated that “how come the ones that visit the house of 
God, the mosque are reactionary while the ones that restrain them from doing so are 
progressive?” (Milliyet, 02.12.1962)  Thus, the AP rejected the claim of a dichotomy 
between religion and progress. One of the main differences between the AP and the 
CHP stemmed from the fact that the former did not recognize a dilemma between 
religion - perceived as a cultural code- and modernization - conceived from an 
engineer’s point of view as prospects for mechanical and material advancements. In the 
account of the AP, one could be religious and modern at the same time. These were not 
dichotomous standings. One could follow the lead of Western science and technique 
while keeping up with the religio-traditional culture at the same time. Indeed, Demirel 
represented himself as a concurrent example of the co-existence of modernity and 
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national authenticity (Karpat, 1972:364; Demirel, 2004:41). In order to defense 
authenticity, Demirel argued that “one cannot be civilized by rejecting the basic 
authentic values (…) [by doing so] one can only become an imitator, cheater” 
(1973:37). By the same token, justifying religion as cultural cement, he underlined that 
“the societies without genuine values could not be considered as nations” (Demirel, 
1973:35; 37) with the premise of capable of being nation is very significant.  Demirel 
also noted that “the most advanced nations of the world today are not atheists. They 
keep the [doors of] their churches and temples wide open and attending them is not 
considered as a fault or a defect” (Demirel, 1973:57). Hence, the party clearly set its 
position against an enlightened understanding of modernization that envisaged religion 
and modernity apart. 
Such efforts at normalizing religion and considering it as a vital component of national 
culture and vernacular life went hand in glove with certain symbolic religious references 
as well. For instance, Said Nursi –the leader of the Nurcu movement- pointed out to 
‘Islamköy’ as a unique place to raise a prominent figure for the sake of religion (Gezici, 
2006:138-3). Said Nursi probably indicated to another man of religion brought up in that 
village, ‘İslamköy’ that memorized Qur’an. However, it was also Demirel’s place of 
birth and he skillfully made use of such an indication for attracting votes of the Nurcu 
Movement (Gezici, 2006:138-3). Similarly, Demirel harshly criticized restraints on 
religio-cultural practices. For instance, the prohibition of rain prayer commonly 
performed by peasants to get rich harvest became a source of conflict between the AP 
and the CHP (Demirel, 2004:185). The former stressed that rather than being a religious 
practice, the rain prayer had socio-cultural implications in Turkey. Evident in such 
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examples, the AP commonly emphasized the cultural side of religion while making use 
of its symbolic aspects as well. 
 
5.2.2.1.2. The Proliferation of Religious Institutions 
As stated above, the regime promoted by the military intervention of May 27 preserved 
the basic secularist principles set forth in the constitution and intended to tame religion 
in line with the standpoint of the state. In this context, on the one hand, the AP was 
faced with a state that aimed to control religion instead of completely removing it from 
the public sphere. On the other hand, the AP, in relatively good terms with state 
authorities pushed through its pro-religious policies and led to the nationwide 
proliferation of religious institutions with a special emphasis on education.   
Religious education became one of the main themes that frequently appeared in the 
programs of the AP governments. One of the first signals of this concern with religious 
education was evident in a booklet published in 1963, where the necessity to support 
institutions that educate the men of religion in technical and financial terms was 
underlined (AP Hükümet Buhranı Karşısında, 1963:23).  The importance of educating 
the men of religion and the significance of increasing their living standards were 
stressed not only in the first government program of the AP, but also in the subsequent 
electoral campaigns.  
Right before the AP came to power, a new law (numbered 633) was enacted to rearrange 
the scope and the function of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, endowing it with a 
duty ‘to enlighten’ the society in order to strengthen the control of state institutions on 
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religion. With reference to this law that aimed at establishing state monopoly on Sunni 
Islam, only the students graduated from the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools 
(Religious Vocational High Schools- İmam Hatip Okulları) were given the opportunity 
to be considered official men of religion while those raised within Sufi orders were 
ineligible for such posts (Jenkins, 2008:127). The AP embraced and eagerly enforced 
this law starting from the very first government program (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 
03.11.1965:77-2).  
In this context, at the time, the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools were envisaged as 
stretching boards in creating a new generation that would be both religious and 
intellectual. Such an emphasis was also put forth throughout the term of DP, yet the AP 
stressed the significance of these schools as a counter-act against the leftist youth on the 
rise. Accordingly, the AP founded 46 new Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools during 
its single party government terms between 1965 and 1971 (Çakır et al., 2004; Cizre 
Sakallıoğlu, 1996b:239). At the time of 1971 Memorandum, these schools were 
transformed into vocational schools, unique only with respect to their religious functions 
and the secondary schools contained within them were closed down. Thus, the status of 
Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools was downgraded to a more or less second-class 
high school unlike their previously prominent position. When the students of the 
religious vocational high schools were granted the right to enter the university exam and 
the secondary schools within them were reopened, the coalition formed by the CHP and 
the MSP endeavored to prevent these developments.
236
 During the coalitions of the 
                                                             
236
 It is worth noting that, the assertive secularist position of the CHP diminished under the leadership of 
Ecevit to a significant extent. Indeed, Ecevit saw no harm in forming a coalition with the pro-Islamist 
party, the MNP and in opening up further religious vocational high schools in 1970s. According to 
Ahmad, behind this shift in CHP’s standpoint regarding assertive secularism was an attempt to “neutralize 
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National Front, the AP further established 230 religious vocational high schools (Çakır 
at al. 2004:15). In 1976, girls have been admitted in these schools as well. Right before 
the Coup of 1980, the number of students that had been educated in these schools has 
reached to 178 000, which was approximately 48 000 back in 1970 (Çakır at al. 
2004:64). The governments under the leadership of Demirel were determined to support 
these schools and they played crucial roles in such a striking increase. 
The number of Qur’an courses during the term of AP boosted as well. The number of 
these courses teaching how to recite Qur’an along with elicit religious curriculum was 
increased to 786 from 434 in 1971. In the wake of the Coup of 1980, this number rose 
up to 2385 owing to the incentives of the National Front (Akyürek, 2004:191). 
Furthermore, the Qur’an courses considered complementary alternatives to secular 
education were offered in the form of summer courses throughout the term of AP as 
well. 
By the same token, the number of Theology Faculties and Islamic institutes that enabled 
many students to take religious education was on the rise as well. The anti-communist 
generals that came to power following the Coup of May 27 did not prefer to hold back 
this proliferation of religious institutions since they also thought that the rise of 
socialism in Turkey was much more dangerous than that of political Islam. Hence, the 
AP had a more convenient setting for implementing its pro-religious policies compared 
to that of the DP. Moreover, the prevailing left-right tension at secular schools rendered 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
religion as a factor in politics” (Ahmad, 1977: 378). However, the leftist tendencies of Ecevit enabled the 
AP - which presented socialism as a synonym to infidelity - to position the CHP witihin the Socialist 
wing. 
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the religiously-oriented schools more preferable in the eyes of parents owing to their 
relatively non-polarized and secure atmosphere.   
In line with its program (Article 65), the AP constructed further mosques and repaired 
old ones within the framework of pork-barrel grants to please its electorates. During the 
electoral campaigns, the party particularly stressed its services to religion in order to 
convert these services to votes. For instance, during the electoral campaign of 1969, a 
booklet entitled as “the Religious and Spiritual Services of the AP” (Adalet Partisi’nin 
Dini ve Manevi Hizmetleri) was published, where the party highlighted its contributions 
to religion.   
Furthermore, the visibility of religious symbols and Islamic communities has risen to a 
certain extent during the terms of the AP (Demirel, 2004:191). By way of explicit 
collaboration in particular with the Nurcus
237
 (Yavuz, 2003: 65; Jenkins, 2008:128; 
Zürcher, 2004:251; Cizre and Sakallıoğlu, 1996b:240) and Süleymancıs (Demirel, 2004: 
52), the AP cultivated the electoral support of these groups with the exception of 1973 
Elections. As a matter of fact, the AP allocated certain bureaucratic posts to particular 
religious groups. For instance, the leader of Süleymancıs, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan’s 
son-in-law Kemal Kaçar was elected as a member of the parliament from the AP 
(Demirel, 2004: 53). The leftist high-ranked bureaucrats were also replaced by more 
conservative ones. One of the most apparent changes in this regard was the replacement 
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 Following the 1966 Elections, Nurcus faded into the political arena and became more visible. Infact, 
İnönü related the defeat of CHP in the partial Senate Elections in 1966 with this development as 
follows:“the frequency of Nurcus’ [visibility was] more than expected and their support for the 
government led to this result” (Milliyet, 06.06.1966). 
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of İsmail Cem,238 then the director of the Turkish Radio and Television with Nevzat 
Yalçıntaş.239  
Thus, by establishing further religious institutions and forming cooperative relations 
with particular religious communities, the AP not only rallied the support of 
conservative masses, but also expanded its electoral basis. All in all, during the term of 
AP, the number of religious institutions boosted to a significant extent while especially 
during the terms of the National Front governments, certain bureaucratic posts were 
reserved for religiously-oriented figures. 
 
5.2.2.1.3. The AP Discourse on Communism: as a ‘Threat’ to Religion  
One of the most pronounced policy and discourse of the AP in 1970s was the explicit 
enmity towards socialist thoughts. The AP deliberately contributed to the antagonist 
perception of masses regarding leftist inclinations as a threat to religion. Indeed, AP’s 
pro-religious policies depended on an anti-socialist rhetoric accompanied by a symbolic 
association of religion with the right. By making use of the motto of “we are at the right 
of center and on the path of God” (Ortanın sağındayız, Allahın yolundayız), the AP 
explicitly associated the leftist worldview with a symbolically non-religious orientation 
(Ahmad, 1977:377).  
Feyzullah Değerli, an AP deputy, not only asserted that “communism considers the 
proliferation of atheism as a public service and hence rejects the freedom of conscience 
                                                             
238
 Later on, Ismail Cem was not only elected as a deputy from leftist parties and served as a minister, but 
also formed his own party. 
 
239
 Nevzat Yalçıntaş was subsequently elected as a deputy from far-Islamist parties. 
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and freedom of religion” (Demirel, 1973:164), but also remarked during the 1977 
electoral campaign that “in 16th and 17th verses of Qur’an, the left and the right are 
clearly defined. In the account of Qur’an, the ones that believe in God and have faith are 
on the right; while the ones that deny God and his verses are on the left. Accordingly, 
none of the Muslims can say that he is leftist. A person cannot be a Muslim and a leftist 
at the same time” (Demirel, 2004:194). In a similar vein, Demirel stated during the 1965 
electoral campaign that “communism will not prevail in Turkey because 98 per cent of 
our population is Muslim” (Ahmad, 1977:191). Moreover, employing a similar anti-
socialist and religio-nationalist discourse, the AP made common cause with the 
Association for the Struggle against Communism (Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği, 
hereinafter KMD), whose number of branches along with its influence have increased to 
a significant extent during the term of AP (Jenkins, 2008: 129). 
Without doubt, one of the main reasons behind AP’s emphasis on religion was its 
struggle against communism. Identifying religion as a significant component of right-
wing ideology, the AP aimed at driving a wedge between conservative masses and leftist 
parties. Especially with the emergence of the National Front as a right-wing coalition, 
the AP pronounced its rightist proclivities more frequently. It is worth noting that the 
workers began to draw closer to the CHP, especially in 1970s as a result of Turkey’s 
urbanization and industrialization. Indeed, researches indicated to the fact that the 
workers that dwelled in the slums of the metropolis and supported the AP in the 
Elections of 1965 and 1969, began to favor the CHP in the Elections of 1973. Özbudun 
discerns a shift here, from a focus on the center-periphery cleavage based on value-
based issues to a functional one (Özbudun, 1976). In face of such a shift, the AP - the 
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party of big businessmen, tradesmen, peasants, industrialists and artisans - tried to 
impede such functionalization of voter alignments and emphasized the dichotomy of 
religion versus socialism in order to convince workers via religio-cultural values in 
favor of the AP.  
 
5.2.2.2. The Pro-Secular Policies and Discourses of the AP 
 
Sharing the well-known feature of the Turkish center-right, the AP preferred to remain 
within the boundaries of the system as well. In that regard, the preservation of the 
secularist principle usually remained as a blueprint in the Turkish state structure. 
Despite flirting with religious emblems, groups and institutions, the AP, aware of state’s 
sensitivities, never intended to challenge the secularist principle of the regime. It tried to 
act within the limits presumed by the elites of May 27 that not only distinguished 
between the two forms of Islam, namely a regime-oriented Islam and a reactionary one, 
but also promoted the former against the latter. Yet it is worth stressing that prior to the 
establishment of the National Order Party in 1970, the pro-Islamist groups considered 
the AP as their safe haven as well.  Demirel, as a moderate leader, usually resisted 
conservative members of the party
240
 in order to put the religious tone to the back burner 
in late 1960s, while at the same time he did not give up on making public use of 
religious discourse. In 1970s, despite taking part in a coalition with the MSP, the AP 
distanced itself from pro-Islamist inclinations. The pro-religious policies of the AP were 
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 Some of the conservative members of the party, such as Osman Turan and Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti 
did not think highly of Demirel, considering him a freemason (Ahmad, 1977:232). These figures did not 
stay within the AP for long and transferred to far-nationalist and far-Islamists parties. 
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far from challenging secularism defined by the mainstream orientation and they also 
take a dual form, namely a discourse in front of the public and a discourse in front of the 
state elites. Cizre argues that “[i]n fact, this double discourse probably constituted a 
firmer guarantee for long-term stability, because it satisfied the aspirations of both the 
hardline Kemalist secularist camp and the provincial-rural periphery that formed the 
safe support base of the JP [AP]” (Cizre Sakallıoğlu, 1996b:240). Thus, the AP did not 
run counter to the mainstream understanding of secularism. 
In the party program (Article 9), along with the superstition (hurafe), the religious 
separatism constituted the main impediments that block the nation in its quest for 
catching up with the modern world. The AP set its limits against superstitions by 
endeavoring to melt religion and rationalism in the same pot as well. In the first 
government program, rather than an impediment in front of religious practices, 
secularism was presented as their insurance. It was underlined that “(…) the 
Constitution envisaged a state that is national, democratic, secular, social and respectful 
to the rule of law. The main duty of the executive is to govern harmoniously...it was to 
neither prioritize, nor violate any of these principles” (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak 
Dergisi, 03.11.1965 p.20). In the subsequent government programs, the frequency of 
references to secularism was decreased. For instance, in the first government program of 
the National Front, the principle to pay regards to secularism was mentioned only in 
relation to national education.  In the second National Front government programme, 
any reference was given to the secularism principle.  Here, the difference lied behind the 
other coalition partners’ position rather than the AP’s stance towards secularism. 
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Atatürk remained as a respected figure in the policies and discourses of the AP and the 
AP looked out for official rules and procedures. Unlike the DP that usually referred to 
Atatürk and his ideals, the AP managed to abstain from the glorification of Atatürk 
without challenging his personality or ideals. In this context, Demirel states that “[i]n 
Turkey, there are people who aim to wear down Atatürk. We never accept [such 
tendency]. It is possible to wear Atatürk down not only by criticizing, but also by 
glorifying him” (Demirel, 1973: 66). Contrary to the CHP that attributed almost a sacred 
status to Atatürk, Demirel not only criticized the excessive articulation of the principles 
of Atatürk, but also the interventions of May 27 and March 12 in the name of these 
principles as if they were of first priority even with respect to the Constitution (Demirel, 
1975:15). In this respect, the AP projected a right-wing Kemalism by emphasizing 
mainly the nationalist aspects of Atatürk’s thought. Demirel remarked that “the ones that 
despise national values cannot comprehend Atatürk” (Demirel, 1973:299). Put 
differently, the AP portrayed Atatürk as a national hero, who overtly emphasized 
national values. Cizre (1993: 41) therefore notes that the party did not get along well 
with Kemalists, yet it did so without being anti-Kemalist owing to the new version of 
Atatürkism it offered that rested on authenticity. Demirel indeed asserted that “the 
Turkish nation has never objected to the principle of secularism. What put the nation to 
inconvenience was its firm Kemalist application” (Milliyet, 28.11.1966) through 
accusing Kemalists –as the assertive secularists- rather than the secularism maintained 
by Atatürk himself. 
Besides the above-mentioned appropriation of Atatürk, the AP also did not maintain 
coherent relations with figures from the Islamic far-right. To remind, the ones who were 
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opposed to the cultural revolution enforced by the secularist regime in the name of 
Islamic references found their safe haven in the AP prior to the rise of political Islam 
(Demirel, 2004:51). Nonetheless, Necmettin Erbakan - well-known with his Islamic 
credentials as well as illiberal economic perspective - highlighted the differences 
between the center-right and the Islamic far-right in Turkey. Erbakan, being the 
president of the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (hereinafter the 
TOBB), was not welcomed by the AP and considerable pressure exerted by the party 
resulted in his resignation (Demirel, 2004:54-2).  Demirel did not allow Erbakan to be 
nominated as AP’s candidate for Konya as well. As a consequence, the National Order 
Party (Milli Nizam Partisi – the MNP) was founded on January 26, 1970 by Erbakan.  
The MNP, as a pro-Islamist party, pledged to end some environmental activities (Ahmad 
1977: 383) as well as to abolish all forms of birth control (Jenkins, 2008: 131).   
The institutionalization of political Islam with the emergence of the MNP made the 
differences between the center-right and the Islamic far-right even more apparent. The 
AP and other center-right parties opposed to pro-Islamists pledges, especially with 
respect to those related with everyday practices, such as the closure of secular 
institutions and the prohibition of non-Islamic practices. Demirel posited that despite the 
fact that the principle of freedom of conscience was enforced by the AP in Turkey, some 
radical elements, dissatisfied with the present state of this principle put forth demands 
for a more religious order, ironically within an atmosphere already provided by the AP 
in the first place (Demirel, 1973:57). Put differently, in the account of Demirel, the 
radical elements should have been thankful to the AP as they have found the opportunity 
to voice their demands as a result of the religious freedoms introduced by the AP. 
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It was not only the Islamic far-right that came into conflict with the AP about religious 
matters. The religio-nationalist wing criticized the AP for emphasizing the materialist 
aspects of development while ignoring the spiritual ones as well. For example, Osman 
Yüksel Serdengeçti criticized the AP for not transforming the Hagia Sophia into a 
mosque and for not providing extensive cadres to the Prayer Leader and Preacher 
Schools etc. (Demirel, 2004: 56). 
What the center-right parties demanded was to a large extent the liberalization of the 
religious realm by lifting the ban on the visibility of Islamic practices while preserving 
the basic tenets of the regime, including that of secularism.
241
 Probably, for this very 
reason, the 1971 Military Intervention led to the closure of the MNP, while the AP 
remained open.
242
 Nevertheless, the strengthening of the political Islam pushed the AP 
to a more central position as it has gradually lost its influence on certain religious 
communities.  In conclusion, the AP preferred a less passive version of secularism 
compared to that of the CHP which was obviously still far from religion’s complete 
independence from the state and vice versa. As Demirel clearly indicated to the fact that 
an unchecked religious life-style could possibly threaten the secularist order (Demirel, 
2004:188, Cizre and Sakallıoğlu, 1996b:240), he has implicitly acknowledged the 
mission of the state to bring religion under control as well.
243
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 Needless to say, the religious freedoms referred here were to a significant degree limited to the 
practices of Sunni Islam, rather than comprehensive religious liberties. 
 
242
 Özbudun states that “[t]he 1961 Constitution, the most liberal constitution that Turkey had ever had, 
was no exception in this regard, for it banned communist and religious propaganda and parties as well as 
activities deemed dangerous to the unity of the nation and the territorial integrity of the state” (in Özbudun 
and Weiner, 1987:354) which rendered the discourses of the MNP unconstitutional. 
 
243
 For detailed information on Demirel’s pro-secular account about what differentiates the AP from the 
MHP and the MNP, see: Tanel Demirel, 2004, p. 60. 
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5.2.3. Secularism from the Perspective of ANAP 
 
The standpoint of the regime on religion and secularism evolved to a certain extent with 
respect to the changes in the Constitution and in the social dynamics. The regime, not 
only regarded secularism as one of the most important tenets of the Turkish Republic, 
but also given shape by the new Constitution it perceived religion as one of the 
integrative categories of the nation to be led by the state. In this context, the Directorate 
of Religious Affairs was rendered accountable to the office of Prime Minister in order to 
provide religious services (Article 136) under state control and to decrease social 
polarizations prevalent in the society. Interestingly, in the publications led by the 
military in early 1980s, the main elements of the national culture appeared as family, 
mosque and military and this time Atatürk was portrayed as a pious Muslim that 
struggled to rule out obscurantism, rather than religion, itself (Jenkins, 2008:142). Thus, 
according to the new state ideology, religion controlled and approved by the state gained 
significance. Better-said, on the one hand, the new regime aimed at instrumentalizing 
religion to establish social peace; on the other hand, it intended to set certain limits to 
define religion in line with the secularist principle. Furthermore, making use of religion 
for political purposes as well as its exploitation and abuse was banned in Article 24. 
This led to a variety of interpretations about which actions to be considered as an abuse 
or exploitation. In this respect, the regime, not only had the means to easily suppress and 
limit various religious practices and expressions, but also to put aside the civilian and 
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pluralistic interpretation of religions other than that of the official version introduced by 
the state. 
In an atmosphere, where the state-led Sunni Islam was considered as one of the most 
usable keys to open all the doors in order to overcome political violence and social 
unrest, the ANAP was careful in positioning itself vis-a-vis the secularist principle 
asserted by the state. Like other center-right parties, the ANAP preferred a secularist 
path passive than the dominant state ideology that included both pro-religious and pro-
secular tendencies at the same time. The pro-religious predilections of the ANAP 
contained not only the liberation of Islam by rendering it visible in the public sphere, but 
also the promotion of the emergence of ‘Islamic Calvinism,’ a religio-economic position 
referring to the co-existence of wealth and piety all at once. The pro-secular standpoint 
of the ANAP was apparent in the promotion of secular and modern images as well as 
clearly differentiating ANAP from the Islamic far-right. 
 
5.2.3.1. The Pro-Religious Policies of ANAP 
 
5.2.3.1.1. The Liberation of Islam: Visibility in the Public Sphere 
Perhaps the most telling example of the pro-religious disposition of the ANAP was 
Turgut Özal’s religious credentials reaching beyond his predecessors, Demirel and 
Menderes. Özal’s father was trained in a Muslim theological school (Medrese) and he 
was well-versed in Islam (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:13). On the one hand, Özal grew up 
in conservative Central and Eastern Anatolian cities, such as Kayseri and Malatya and 
learned basic religious rituals from his parents; on the other hand, as the son of two 
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government employees, he comprehended the assertive secularist inclinations of the 
state and the Kemalist mission of modernization very well ever since his childhood 
(Barlas, 1994:84). Put differently, Özal, not only maintained a religious life on a 
personal level, but also developed awareness on the importance of being accredited by 
the official ideology. 
He began to pray five times a day and attended rituals of certain religious communities 
when he was an undergraduate.
244
 Özal was among the founders of a conservative 
student association along with his brother, Korkut Özal, entitled as the Istanbul 
Technical University Student Union (Birand and Yalçın, 2009: 19). Özal and his 
brothers protested the funeral of Fevzi Çakmak - a conservative soldier, who was 
considered to be not respected adequately by the state (Birand and Yalçın, 2009: 21, 
543) as well. This was indeed an event with respect to which even the DP sided with the 
CHP. When Özal brothers were working at the State Planning Organization, they were 
called upon as the “clogged brothers” (Takunyalı Kardeşler) since they wore clogs when 
they performed ablution before praying. Özal was also nominated for the religiously-
oriented MSP deputyship from İzmir in 1977, but he could not be elected. Nevertheless, 
the main reason behind such nomination was not the ideological affinity between Özal 
and the Islamic far-right. Rather, it was Özal’s pragmatism that saw no harm in being a 
candidate from a religiously-oriented party. 
He was the first Prime Minister that went on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Furthermore, his 
brothers Yusuf Özal and Korkut Özal, his cousin Hüsnü Doğan and the ANAP minister 
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Ekrem Pakdemirli had connections with the Nahshibendis (Cemal, 1989:17). Özal’s 
mother was also inspired by Nakshibendi order and she was buried next to Sheikh 
Mehmet Zahit Kotku’s grave by way of a special decree (Cemal, 1989:158). Apart from 
personal relations, the governments of the ANAP provided convenient ground for 
religious communities to express themselves. Due to the abolition of Article 163, the 
representation of Islamic inclinations in the political and social realms gained impetus as 
well. The ANAP also abolished the ban on Fethullah Gülen’s preaching (Heper, 
2013:143). At the time, not only the number, but also the scope of Islamic publications 
was on the rise. This was not a unilateral affiliation. Beginning from 1983 Elections, the 
Nakshibendis and many other religious communities supported the ANAP vis-a-vis 
Islamic far-right. 
All in all, the doze of the religious motives of Özal and similar protagonists in the party 
was a little bit more than that of the previous center-right figures. With its pro-religious 
policies what the ANAP introduced was undoubtedly the relative increase in the 
visibility of religious symbols and identities – to a large extent, those of Sunni Islam - in 
state institutions as well as in the streets. For instance, as the Prime Minister and later 
the President, Özal went to Friday prayers like Demirel has done, began to give 
Ramadan dinners (iftar) to the cabinet, the press and various interest groups, shared his 
photographs during his pilgrimage with the public and so on.  By the same token, when 
his son Efe married a non-Muslim girl, Sibel Boronkay, he demanded her conversion to 
Islam and publicized this ceremony (Birand and Yalçın, 2009: 244-2). 
Considering many figures in the ANAP that had no hesitation in expressing their 
religious identities and given the relatively liberal atmosphere in the public sphere, one 
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can discern that the religious identities gained ground and started to be represented more 
frequently at the time. In this context, a chronic source of conflict prevalent in Turkish 
politics, namely the ‘headscarf dispute’ began to be more pronounced in 1980s. On this 
topic, the ANAP usually endeavored to soften the assertive approach of the state by 
considering the issue as a restriction of freedom, rather than a threat to the secular order. 
Özal criticized the ban on headscarf as he considered state’s dictation of a certain 
dressing style as an undemocratic reaction (Cemal, 1989:161). On the other hand, the 
center tended to perceive the issue not only as an abuse of liberties, but also as a threat 
to the prevailing secular state structure. The Council of Higher Education (Yüksek 
Öğretim Kurulu, hereinafter, the YÖK) decreed to ban headscarves in universities in 
1982, which was then rearranged and the ban was removed in 1984. Nevertheless, 
Kenan Evren, the President was not content with this rearrangement and it was banned 
again in 1987. Subsequently, the government under the leadership of Özal enacted a law 
for lifting the ban on the headscarf, yet it was vetoed by Evren once again. The same 
law re-enforced in 1988 was sent to the Constitutional Court by Evren and was annulled 
in 1989 (Aksoy, 2005:167-6).   
The main reason behind such an oscillation regarding the laws on the use of headscarves 
in universities was to a large extent rested on the differing approaches of the ANAP 
(passive) and the center (assertive) on secularism, which led to a considerable 
polarization in institutional and social realms. For instance, the Rectors’ Council 
decided to gradually lift the ban on headscarves in 1987 (Özdalga, 1998:54). The 
Council of State made decisions on behalf of liberties instead of secularist principles 
contrary to those of the Constitutional Court that favored assertive secularism’s ban on 
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headscarves (Özdalga 1998:58). Nonetheless, framing the ANAP as an ardent advocate 
of headscarves would be an incomplete analysis since this advocacy raised certain 
reservations about the popular support behind the party. For instance, Semra Özal and 
considered the disappointing outcome of 1989 Local Elections, in which the popular 
support behind the ANAP dramatically decreased to less than 22 per cent, as a result of 
the ambiguous stance of the ANAP on the ‘headscarf dispute.’ Yet others, such as 
Korkut Özal and Yusuf Özal, did not agree with them since in their account, the Turkish 
nation was conservative and the sympathetic stance of the ANAP did not lead to any 
negative response at all (Cemal, 1989:13). In a nutshell, on the one hand, the ANAP had 
run counter to the official state ideology by considering the ‘headscarf issue’ an 
individual liberty; on the other hand, there were many in the party that did not feel 
comfortable with such a standpoint and considered it among the reasons of the failure in 
the local elections. 
In a similar vein to the AP, an embracement of the Ottoman past by the ANAP was 
discerned at the time as well. The day of Istanbul’s conquest was started to be celebrated 
in 1985. Along with a foreign policy discourse that emphasized certain traits of history 
common with the countries from Middle East, Caucasus and the Balkans, Turgut Özal 
frequently referred to the Ottoman heritage, which paved the way for the forthcoming 
neo-Ottomanism of 1990s that later was merged with Islamic incentives. The Kemalist 
emphasis on the cleavages between the Ancient Regime and the Republican Turkey thus 
was put on the back burner during the term of ANAP, which instead recognized a line of 
continuity between the Ottoman era and the Republican Turkey. Unlike its predecessors, 
the ANAP under the leadership of Özal gave up on recurrently referring to Atatürk and 
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did not make very much use of, in Çakır’s words (1990), the “Kemalist mask” to be 
accredited by the state. 
Despite introducing a notably liberal agenda, in some cases, the ANAP was not in 
pursuit of diminishing the role of the state as many were not convinced about the 
impartiality of its policies as it seemed to intend establishing a form of morality based 
on religious education. For instance, its broadening of the scope of “the bill on the 
protection of children from obscene publications” (küçükleri muzır neşriyattan koruma 
yasası) to seek scientific (ilmi) value in publications (Milliyet, 31.05.1986) was 
interpreted as an example, where the ANAP had taken side with the protection of 
religio-cultural values vis-a-vis the so-called ‘harmful’ publications.  
Like the previous center-right parties, the ANAP maintained its emphasis on the 
necessity of religious education as well. In its first government program, in order to 
educate a ‘level-headed’ generation, Özal underlined “…the indispensability of carrying 
out both the material and spiritual development (…). For doing so, the state should take 
measures to give religious education in primary and secondary schools.  We do not 
consider secularism as a restricting force hindering spirituality. Instead, it is the 
application of the freedom of conscience, the practice of religion and the improvement 
of the religious culture” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 19.12.1983: 67).  On a parallel front, 
in comparison with other vocational schools, the number of Prayer Leader and Preacher 
Schools were on the rise during the rule of the ANAP, whose students concentrated on 
entering the administrative branches of universities. Cemal notes that 40 per cent of the 
students in the Public Administration departments of the universities were coming from 
these schools in 1988 (Cemal, 1989:168). On the other hand, Vehbi Dinçerler, ANAP’s 
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first Minister of Education, was ousted from office due to his conservative remarks on 
the clothing of high-school girls during the celebrations of May 19 (Birand and Yalçın, 
2009: 260). Similarly, in the eyes of secular circles, the public debates of Metin 
Emiroğlu - another Minister of Education - on the evolution theory or on the status of 
the courses on Philosophy for the students of Science and Mathematics (e.g. Cemal, 
1989:165) were considered as examples of pro-religious predilections of the ANAP.   
All in all, one can discern a considerable rise in the availability of religious education, 
the visibility of religious symbols and the religious debates including official figures 
during the terms of the ANAP.  In the meantime, the assertive secularists tended to 
interpret any event directly or indirectly related with religion as a proof of ANAP’s pro-
religious tendencies in order to wear down its legitimacy which still did not make 
ANAP a religiously oriented party.  Instead, although Özal’s ANAP did not decrease the 
state’s role on religious education, ANAP could also be considered as a quite passive 
secularist party who never projected the repression of religion.   
 
5.2.3.1.2. The Promotion of Islamic Calvinism 
The sanctimony of the ANAP that grew out of the dichotomy of religion versus science 
reminds us the previous center-right parties in Turkey, which did not envisage a world 
based on religious rules. They rather tended to consider religion as a personal and 
cultural matter that neither slow down, nor hinder development and progress. Compared 
to the rest of the center-right parties, the ANAP under the leadership of Özal had taken it 
a step further by endeavoring to put forth a theoretical explanation for the amalgamation 
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of Islam and the economic development through a viable free market economy. In other 
words, the ANAP helped spreading the idea of what might be called as “Islamic 
Calvinism” in Turkey. 
Özal frankly described the effects of religion on himself as follows: “Having faith in 
God with great passion is a significant element of healthy societies. I find it beneficial to 
teach religious principles. However, this should neither lead to an opposition to 
innovation, nor isolation from the world…research, reasoning and discussion should 
prevail” (Barlas, 1994:85). In reading out the first government program of the ANAP, 
Özal stated that “the conservatism of the ANAP is an expression of its bond not only 
with our national, spiritual and moral values, but also with our culture and traditions. It 
is the preservation of good, beautiful and precious values” while underlining that the 
government formed by the ANAP would not be against progress and innovation (TBMM 
Tutanak Dergisi, 19.12.1983: 65). Thus, the ANAP under the leadership of Özal did not 
perceive religion as a complete and ultimate guide for designing everyday life. Rather, it 
displayed a general motivation for the reconciliation of religion and progress. 
Özal mainly tried to seek a collaborative middle ground for Turkey in between the 
Western and the Islamic worlds, by clearly rejecting the dichotomy between the two. As 
a pragmatic actor, he efficiently made use of religion as a trump card in order to form 
economic cooperation with other Muslim countries, rather than to pursue a path for the 
unification of the Islamic world. Indeed, what differentiated the ANAP from the rest of 
the Islamic far-right parties was the priority given to the economic concerns rather than 
the religio-ideological projections. On the other hand, as an ardent supporter of Turkey’s 
entrance to the European Community, he stated that “[w]hen I was asked by a foreign 
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journalist whether I had any difficulty in envisaging Turkish membership in a Christian 
Community, I answered that all religions teach mankind to be good and to do good. In 
this respect all three of the great monotheistic religions are sisters… The correct reading 
of history could point to the fact that Islam is not totally alien to the West” (Özal, 
1991:283-2).  Having indicated to the non-dichotomous relation between the West and 
Islam, he also underlined that the duality created between reason and religion does not 
exist in reality. In line with his understanding of Islam, he raised the following question: 
“How was it possible for Arabs to reconcile faith and reason, whereas the rational 
upsurge has been achieved in the West at the expense of faith and in conflict with the 
Church?” (Özal, 1991:286) 
Hence, like its predecessors, the ANAP promoted a rational and modern version of 
religion, which did not inherently challenge notions such as Westernization, progress, 
science and reason on material and technical grounds. The ANAP was eager to make 
use of religion both as cultural cement and a form of morality to motivate people to 
work, earn and invest. For doing so, Özal stressed the necessity of modernizing and 
reinterpreting religion within various public debates (Yazıcıoğlu in Sezal and Dağı, 
2001:209; Aral in Sezal and Dağı, 2001:223). 
In the account of Özal, the free market economy was compatible with Islam. Hasan 
Cemal points out to the significance of Naksibendis on Özal’s religious vision that 
tolerated wealth and private accumulation (1989:154-2). In this respect, Özal often 
quoted the following hadith, “poverty is almost a curse” (fakirlik neredeyse bir 
küfürdür) (Cemal, 1989:158). Thus, Özal strived to harmonize Islam with private 
accumulation. On the other hand, the governments formed by the ANAP began to 
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introduce an appropriate institutional structure to facilitate the inclusion of pious 
entrepreneurs into the economy. For instance, the required institutional amendments 
enforced to establish interest-free financial institutions paved the way for Al Baraka and 
Faisal Finans to take their places in the financial markets of Turkey. As Yayla observes, 
this seemingly simple incentive had impacts reaching far beyond the economic sphere. 
The ANAP intended not only to integrate the economic system of Turkey into the world 
economy, but also to include passive investments of those people who did not want to 
work with casual banks into the economy successfully (Yayla in Sezal and Dağı, 
2001:433). Furthermore, Özal often invited a group of Anatolian businessmen to 
accompany him in his visits to foreign countries. Businessmen with religio-traditional 
behavioral patterns also wanted to earn more and under the leadership of Özal, they 
indeed began to do so by producing goods for well-known brands, such as Levi’s. Small 
Anatolian cities, such as Denizli, Kayseri and Konya began to get involved in the 
operations of world economy by adapting their production processes and by reaching 
out for the global quality standards in particular sectors, such as textile. The concept of 
“Anatolian Tigers” 245  referred mainly to the businessmen with religio-traditional 
affiliations whose share in the economy dramatically increased, rather than those 
modern big capital owners of Istanbul and Ankara. 
In a nutshell, the ANAP exerted efforts to reconcile the West and Islamic World. Having 
rejected the dichotomy of reason versus religion, Özal not only grasped the significance 
of religion in the everyday lives of people, but also endeavored to relate that with 
                                                             
245
 Undoubtly, this concept has been inspired by “Asian Tigers” that was coined with reference to the 
emerging markets of East Asian countries. 
  
 329 
people’s work ethics. As a pragmatic actor, he extended chances to conservative 
investors and paved the way for the rise of Islamic capital, which later gained impetus in 
line with the rise of political Islam.
246
 It is worth noting however that the ANAP 
formulated Calvinist Islam not for the political rise of Islam, but for the sake of 
economic development, progress and social cohesion.  
 
5.2.3.2. Pro-Secularist Approach of the ANAP 
 
Despite its positive approach to religion, the ANAP never intended to run counter to the 
secular structure of the state following the footsteps of the preceding center-right parties. 
Özal’s emphasis on the peaceful co-existence of modern and religious was clearly 
echoed in the policies of the ANAP. Özal often stressed that he was proud of the secular 
system Turkey (Özal, 1991:281). Heper indeed confirms that “[d]espite the fact that he 
increasingly sought Allah’s help and direction, his primary means to realize his goals 
remained secular” (Heper, 2013:142).  
Additionally, Özal was a defender of secularism as evident in his following remarks: 
“Turkey has never abandoned secularism” and “[o]ne of the fundamental indicators of 
Turkey’s European character is that we have a secular society” (Özal, 1991:296, 281). 
Nevertheless, in light of the lessons drawn by the experiences of previous center-right 
parties, he envisaged a more passive secularism. He aimed to give more visibility to 
religious elements not only in the society, but also in the state by arguing that integrating 
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religion with the everyday practices should not be considered as a source of threat. In 
this regard, Özal made references to the American way of passive secularism. “During 
Bush’s oath-taking ceremony, first of all, the priest prayed and the American nation as a 
whole listened to that prayer on their televisions. When the priest was praying, Bush 
bent his head over…put his hand on the Bible…There were two Bibles in the ceremony; 
the one that he brought…and the one that the judge brought. During the oath his wife 
kept the one that he brought by” (Özal, 1989:159-2). Özal’s detailed description of the 
ceremony revealed the fact that he was clearly charmed by the passive version of 
secularism, drawing parallels from the American case. Indeed, by pointing out to the 
status of the priest in Western countries, Özal even asked Evren to improve the status of 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs’ Chief in state protocol, though his suggestion was 
rejected by Evren (Birand and Yalçın, 2009:226). In Özal’s view, such arrangements - 
only contradicted with the militant version of secularism - did not do away with 
secularism; to the contrary, they justified the separation of religion from state affairs. 
For Özal, only the states could be secular, not the people (Yazıcıoğlu in Sezal and Dağı, 
2001:205). Therefore, according to him, the religious affiliations would not cause any 
trouble if the people would behave impartial when it comes to state affairs. Yayla notes 
that Özal had not refrained from expressing his religious affiliations, yet he has never 
obsessively emphasized them as well. Thus, he underlined that in a democratic system, 
religious identities should not be considered as an advantage or a disadvantage (Yayla in 
Sezal and Dağı, 2001:440).  
In that regard, there were a significant number of secularist figures in and around the 
party assuring that the ANAP remained as a system-oriented party, counterposing Özal’s 
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very religious brothers, cousins and several other leading figures, such as Mehmet 
Keçeciler. Beyond any doubt, the most effective among these balancing figures was 
Semra Özal - Özal’s wife - who was surely more than a passive first-lady. Despite 
Turgut Özal’s religious credentials, the Özals as a couple - going out to night clubs, 
dancing and listening to Western music and publicly consuming alcohol - were not 
hesitant to demonstrate that they embraced Western life-styles as well. Not to mention 
her modern outlook with blonde hair, polished nails, low necked blouses, Semra Özal 
was fairly aware of her crucial place as evident in her following statement: “If a 
conservative was in my shoes, the atmosphere in Turkey would be absolutely different. 
For instance, women would be more hesitant in wearing mini skirts” (Cemal, 1989:142; 
Nokta, 30.10.1989: 44). Furthermore, she was mostly skeptical about the conservative 
ministers of the ANAP, such as Mehmet Keçeciler and strived to minimize their 
influence in the party. Thus, to a large extent, neither most of the assertive secularists, 
nor those adopted a secular life-style were uncomfortable with the standpoint of the 
ANAP.
247
 
Moreover, judging from the images of Özal family’s everyday lives along with those of 
other protagonists of the party, it is possible to consider many practices of the ANAP as 
secular, which clearly distinguished the party from the Islamic far-right options. For 
example, liberating the interest rates by taking them out of state control led to their 
legitimation in the existing economic structure. Moreover, the government formed by 
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the ANAP introduced abortion operations in all public hospitals in January, 1984 
(Milliyet, 07.01.1984). This move could be considered as a clear indication of the 
differences between the ANAP and the Islamic far-right in Turkey as well as the 
mainstream center-right approaches in the world that ANAP portrayed a more liberal 
stance.   
The Özal family played a crucial role in hindering the proclivities towards conservatism 
in the ANAP by supporting the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz that succeeded Akbulut, 
after Özal was elected the President. Yılmaz indeed shortly moved from passive 
secularism to a more assertive one in face of the rise of political Islam in Turkey. 
Coming from an upper-class family with center-right inclinations, a graduate of 
prestigious and secular schools, such as Istanbul High School and the Faculty of 
Political Science, Yılmaz who worked his way up in the ANAP by becoming its leader 
and then the Prime Minister of Turkey, advocated the standards of the European Union 
(Çınar and Özbudun in Heper and Sayari, 2002: 182-3). Despite the influence of Özal 
over the Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut well-known for his conservative affiliations, 
Mesut Yılmaz gained the support of the General Congress in 1991 with the help of 
Semra Özal and assumed the leadership of the party. Throughout his presidency and 
following the split between the conservatives and the liberals, Özal kept his distance 
from the nationalist and Islamist wing in the party, called upon as the “Holy Alliance” 
and promoted the liberal wing led by Yılmaz (Zürcher, 2004:287). The leadership of 
Yılmaz was crucial for designating the main axis and the version of secularism. Though 
he could not maintain the electoral success of Özal and the ANAP had taken part in 
coalition governments with other center-right and center-left parties during 1990s, the 
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party sustained its distance from the Islamic far-right. During the February 28 Process 
(the military memorandum), such a distance was notably crystallized and the ANAP, 
unlike the other center-right party - the True Path Party (hereinafter, the DYP) – put 
forth a more assertive secularism as it supported not only the closure of the RP, but also 
the punishment of its members. Indeed, right before this event, Yılmaz not only 
complained about the shift in the direction of Turkey from West to East under the rule of 
the coalition formed by the RP and the DYP, but also stated that they could not support 
those that challenged the fundamental principles of the Republic (Milliyet, 09.02.1997). 
In this respect, Yılmaz differentiated the standpoint of the ANAP from the other center-
right party, the DYP and encouraged the involvement of military undoubtedly by calling 
upon those that were in charge of providing the state security (Sabah, 21.09.1996). 
Moreover, following the February 28 Process, Yılmaz, then the Prime Minister, 
embarked on an eight years long compulsory education, which led to the closure of the 
secondary schools of the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools. At the time, the students 
of those schools were also not allowed to equally apply for universities except from the 
departments of Theology
248
. At this point, one can discern a loud and clear shift in the 
policies of the ANAP, which grew away from not only the passive secularism but also 
the populist center-right tradition that had always endeavored to establish and popularize 
these schools all around the country in order to please the masses. In a similar vein, the 
ANAP (Yılmaz-Ecevit Cindoruk) coalition government enforced bans on headscarves 
all around the country and the university students, who resisted the ban were suspended. 
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The coalition government guided by the military pinned down not only the NGOs hand 
in glove with the RP, but also the Islamic capital and media (e.g.: Milliyet, 25.05.1998). 
This was followed by the displacement of Islamist individuals from the army, 
bureaucracy and universities. Such moves on part of the ANAP signaled to a version of 
secularism rather different than that envisaged by Özal, who had not only strived to 
attract Muslim entrepreneurs and increase the amount of private accumulation regardless 
of Islamic origin, but also to tolerate religious practices including the use of headscarves 
and to promote the plurality of NGO activities etc. With respect to the changing 
circumstances owing to the rise of the Islamic far-right, the ANAP under the leadership 
of Yılmaz situated itself at the “center” with a more assertive secularist vision.   
 
5.3. Conclusion 
 
All in all, secularism was one of the most distinguishing features of the Turkish center-
right, which was well situated in between the assertive secularism promoted by the 
center and the religion-based demands of the Islamic far-right. In the account of the 
Turkish center-right, on the one hand, the state system is undoubtedly secular and this 
should not be challenged. On the other hand, religion as a personal matter as well as 
cultural cement should be visible in the society. In that regard, center-right parties not 
only put forth religious discourses as ordinary means, but also their prominent figures 
attended religious rituals without labeling religion as a threat to the unity of the state.  
Furthermore, the center-right parties did not tolerate political action that envisaged a 
world order based on religious principles. Thus, sometimes the center-right parties saw 
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no harm in punishing those political Islamists that remained marginal to a large extent. 
Nonetheless, the striking rise of political Islam in 1990s has quite challenged the 
prevalent conditions of the system and the ANAP preferred to take its side next to the 
“center,” dominated by the military, the Constitutional Court and the rest of the 
bureaucracy, while the other center-right party, the DYP gave preference to the 
superiority of the National Assembly and collaborated with the RP. The traditional 
center-right actors disappeared in the extremely “fragmented, polarized and volatile” 
climate of the country (Özbudun, 2000), not to mention the economic crisis and the 
claims on corruption. The ANAP was put away owing to its partial responsibility in the 
policies which have suppressed religion in the aftermath of February 28 Process. 
Interestingly, the DYP was also punished by the electorates partially as it has engaged in 
a pro-Islamic government before the February 28 Process but mainly due to its bad 
performance in economics. On the other hand, the National Outlook, as the transformer 
of the political Islam in Turkey, has also been divided into two wings: traditionalists and 
innovationists where the former set forth a relatively rigid agenda, the latter favored a 
more compromising, soft and balanced strategy. The innovators founded the Justice and 
Development Party (the AK Party), which neither rejected the visibility of religion and 
religious practices, nor projected a religion-based political system. In other words, when 
it comes to the tension between religion and secularism, the AK Party put forth a typical 
center-right standpoint, evident in its preference of passive secularism, yet it did so with 
a relatively more religious image and rhetoric.  
On the whole, the tension between the center and the periphery addressed in the 
previous chapters on democracy and state was also carried on with respect to secularism. 
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On secularism, the center-right parties have run counter to assertive secularism 
promoted by the state and the CHP. When the center-right parties drew near to the 
militant secularist wing or to the Islamic far-right – at least by forming strong 
collaborations with them – their public support has been on the wane. With regard to the 
elections of 1961 and 1973, Özbudun argues that “the party system was most 
fractionalized when the conservative votes were fragmented, and consequently no party 
was able to obtain an absolute majority” (Özbudun in Weiner and Özbudun, 1987:345). 
This mainly put a light on the prevalent fragmentation in Turkish politics throughout 
1990s. In this context, the AK Party, capable of rallying conservative votes in 2000s, 
sustained the notions of center-right such as procedural democracy, love and hate 
relationship with the state and passive secularism.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 
The left-right spectrum--is it still relevant in accounting for the contemporary political 
experiences? There are a variety of responses to this particular question. Despite 
substantial transformations, various political parties and politicians are still observed to 
position themselves and their rivals within the confines of this spectrum and it seems to 
be valid in the case of Turkey as well.   
In light of the prevailing connotations, one can discern three main accounts of the left 
and right positions. The first tradition stemmed from the political experiences of the 
French Revolution. In this regard, while the left emphasized values such as equality, 
freedom and secularism; the right stressed tradition, religion, the preservation of religio-
traditional institutions and hierarchy. The second account was derived from a socio-
economic perspective on society and politics that explained related issues in terms of 
social classes and economic dynamics. In view of this perspective, the left advocated 
certain rights for workers and campaigned for social policies of the state endowed with a 
central role in economic regulations. The right, on the other hand, was depicted as 
embracing the principles of the market economy, such as competition, and envisaging 
minimum state intervention in economics. With the emergence of various social 
problems and the waning of socialism around the world, new criteria for distinguishing 
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left and right positions appeared to revolve around materialist versus post-materialist 
standpoints. With regards to this third account, while the new left started to emphasize 
post-materialist issues including sexual orientation, xenophobia, abortion, ecological 
concerns and everything in between; the new right stressed materialist concerns such as 
inflation, unemployment, economic growth, crime rates, the GDP etc. In this context, 
the conceptualizations of the left and right positions are far from being monolithic, static 
and universally agreed upon. At the same time, despite the complexity of their 
connotations, the above-mentioned accounts still come in handy in mapping out the 
contemporary political terrain even though their explanatory potential with regards to 
the patterns of ‘naked reality’ is open to question.  
The case of Turkey demands a closer scrutiny concerning these conceptualizations of 
the left and right positions. This research points out the fact that the Turkish case 
regarding the left and the right cleavage is far from being easily framed within such a 
global conceptualization despite containing some particular overlapping points with the 
three main explanations of the left and the right.  One should also take into account the 
variations within the left and right standpoints in order to have a full grasp of the issue at 
hand. The distinctive lines between the center-left, the center-right and the far-right 
(either nationalist or Islamic) require our attention as well. The differentials between 
these variations seem to speak to the self-positioning of various actors. For instance, on 
several issues, the far-right proved to have more common ground with the center-left, 
rather than the center-right. Indeed, the literature focusing on the left and right division, 
to a large extent, disregards this fact and does not separately focus on these differentials 
adequately or concentrate on the Islamic or nationalist right when they refer to the right. 
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Despite the fact that the center-right has dominated the multi-party era for decades—
thanks to its successive electoral triumphs, it has not been subjected to a comprehensive 
academic study. It is more than likely that such neglect not only stemmed from a lack of 
intellectual interest on this particular subject, but also it was supported by a general 
predilection to underestimate the pragmatic and non-ideological stance of the center-
right. In this respect, without dispensing with its sincere and objective approach, this 
dissertation strives to fill this gap in the related literature by analyzing the discourses 
and policies of the Turkish center-right in light of three guiding parameters: democracy, 
state and secularism. Better-said, this dissertation endeavors to examine the 
characteristics of and the transformations within the center-right tradition in Turkey with 
respect to three major facets of the issue that are significant for understanding  Turkish 
politics.   
This study argues that employing a procedural democracy, developing a love and hate 
relationship with the state and endorsing a passive secularist vision in opposition to the 
militant secularism are three main parameters that define and delimit the center-right 
mentality in Turkey with regards to domestic politics and on the level of political 
parties.  When the center-right parties move beyond any of these three main parameters 
or notions, they begin to lose their center-right characteristic, which leads to a 
considerable loss of political support from the people as well.  This study inherently 
suggests that there exists equilibrium in the center-right mentality in the area of 
substantive democracy and authoritarianism; rejecting the state on all fronts and 
becoming the state; and militant secularism and a religion-based state structure.  The 
center-right parties usually and authentically do not locate in the margins and introduce 
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a mid-path among the radical and strict dispositions.  If they oscillate from the 
equilibrium point to any of those margins, the center-right parties, in all actuality, do not 
represent “center-right” position thereafter.   
Being aware of the necessity to clarify the center-right mentality in Turkey, this study 
focuses by closely examining these three concepts: democracy, state and secularism.  
Theories on democracy either emphasize procedural perceptions or stress substantive 
understandings of democracy. As these categories suggest, the former pays attention to 
democratic rules and the institutionalization of democratic processes with a particular 
focus on the ballot box, freedom of choice, equal franchising and so on. The latter, on 
the other hand, emphasizes the interests of the governed, their equality and active 
participation in the decision making processes, and advocating a more viable 
relationship between the state and the civil society. In that regard, the center-right 
parties in Turkey have generally highlighted the procedural understanding of 
democracy, struggled for the institutionalization of elections, advocated respect for the 
national will and opposed the privileges of state elites that might be taken advantage of. 
In doing so, different than the elitist image of the center-left in general, center-right 
parties in Turkey have been able to successfully communicate with the people and listen 
to their problems and demands by portraying a reachable image to the society.  In 
contrast to these successes, these parties mainly neglected pluralistic and substantive 
aspects of democracy. Keeping a predilection to perceive democracy as a means rather 
than an end, the center-right does not much deal with promoting the democratic 
participation of disadvantaged groups, creating equal access to policy-making 
procedures, including all elements in the society or pursuing economic equality as an 
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outcome of a well-functioning democracy. They have not only failed to introduce a fully 
liberal and inclusive democratization program but also might display authoritarian 
affinitiies when they stay in power for extended periods of time.  If their 
authoritarianism becomes more dominant than their emphasis on democracy, they begin 
to weaken in terms of public support. 
At this point, it is necessary to recall the main features of the varying conjunctures 
within which these parties ruled. For instance, the DP mainly emphasized the 
institutionalization of the electoral system as the victim of single-party domination and 
unfair elections in 1946. The AP endeavored to institutionalize the basic democratic 
procedures leaving aside substantive aspects of democracy in the aftermath of the 
military intervention of 1960 and as the main addressee of the memorandum of 1971. It 
is possible to argue that the ANAP has taken more notice of substantive democratic 
concerns and tended less towards the genre of authoritarianism in comparison with 
previous center-right parties. The ANAP also exerted courageous efforts not only 
concerning religious freedoms but also in regards to the Kurdish question. Such attempts 
may well be considered reformist in light of the conditions of the period.  Despite this 
fair-handedness of ANAP, she also set some limits in the face competition during the 
elections, which was far from being inclusive and participatory.   
The center-periphery cleavage emerged as one of the most frequent themes in the 
discourses and policies of the center-right. From the outset, the center-right parties have 
claimed to represent the periphery. In this context, their relationship with the strong and 
autonomous state gained further importance. Criticism of the center-right parties mainly 
revolves around the domination of state elite in politics as well as economics, the 
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cumbersome functioning of the state apparatus and the irresponsive approach of the 
center when it comes to peripheral interests. In this regard, on the one hand, center-right 
parties exerted efforts to ease the existing tension between the state and the people by 
calling for a state that cares for its citizens, not vice versa. On the other hand, they 
endeavored to promote technocratic and loyal state employees to counter the well-
established, critical bureaucracy. Despite such endeavors, only minor steps were taken 
in liberalizing and minimizing the state apparatus up until the tenure of the ANAP. The 
ANAP, in contrast, not only tried to transform the state apparatus radically, but also 
managed to minimize the involvement state in economics.  
All in all, the relations between the center-right parties and the state may well be 
described as a love and hate relationship. In spite of the above-mentioned criticisms, the 
center-right parties in Turkey pragmatically laid a claim for state power and privileges. 
What is more, in extraordinary circumstances--such as the memorandum in 1971 or the 
process carried out on February 28--these parties could not sustain their authentic 
positions even on discursive grounds and contended with limited maneuvering spaces. 
In this respect, the role of various interventions extrinsic to the civilian realm in 
designating the course of Turkish politics should be taken into account when analyzing 
the center-right’s drift towards the state, such as that of the AP in the 1970s and the 
ANAP in the late 1990s. Rather than considering such fluctuations as erroneous 
calculations of the center-right, it is better to interlink them with the extraordinary 
conditions of the period during which these parties moved beyond the center-right’s love 
and hate equilibrium by falling in line with the status quo of the ruling center.  As 
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suggested in this dissertation, such a move towards the embrace of state to that extent 
begins to locate these parties outside the traditionally defined center-right stance. 
While the state and the center-left enforced an assertive and repressive version of 
secularism in general, the center-right pursued a passive version of secularism that 
proved to be more tolerant when it came to the visibility of religious practices. Even so, 
the center-right parties in Turkey were prudent in keeping the Islamic far-right at arm’s 
length and have never intended to challenge the secularist principles of the state.  Since 
the elites of the DP and the CHP came from similar backgrounds and had comparable 
standpoints on religion as well as the fact that the DP had taken to the political stage 
quite early (in the very aftermath of the militant secularist actions of the state) the DP 
did not differ much from the center-left in comparison to the subsequent center-right 
parties except from some considerable gestures that it performed to please the people.  
The AP on the other hand perceived religion as a kind of cultural cement that galvanized 
support for the AP; therefore, the AP utilized a local religious discourse to communicate 
with the people.  The AP was also eager to encourage collaborations with religious 
groups: they supported religious education and promoted the individuals who took 
advantage of such an education, which was seen as a counterforce against Communism.  
Nevertheless, the position of the AP regarding respect for the secular character of the 
state was still valid akin to other center-right parties.  In fact, it was during the tenure of 
the ANAP, led by Özal, when Islamic demands alongside various other particularistic 
demands began to become more pronounced and acquired visibility in the public sphere. 
In this context, the process of February 28 designed to retard the activity of Islamic 
politics led to the re-structuring of Turkish politics. In the course of this polarization, the 
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assertive nature of demands raised not only by pro-Islamists, but also by militant 
secularists alienated the electorates of the center-right parties. The ANAP in the 28 
February process preferred not to take a stand against the suppression of religion.  
Similarly, the 27 April 2007 e-memorandum process was not protested by the small 
center-right parties, which bahished these center-right parties from their passive 
secularist stance. 
Theory up to this point does not account for the stark reality in its entirety: the center-
right in Turkey does not fit completely into only one of the above-mentioned accounts 
of the left and right positions, yet, it incorporates overtones from all three accounts. The 
discourses and policies of center-right parties in Turkey have displayed strong linkages, 
continuity and similarity when it comes to democracy, state and secularism. Such 
uniformity may help us arrive at a typology of the center-right in Turkey. To account for 
the variations among their performances, pragmatic approaches unique to each party 
along with their dissimilar yet delimiting conjunctures should be taken into 
consideration. In this work’s analysis, the three parties examined in this dissertation (the 
DP, the AP and the ANAP) strived for the institutionalization and internalization of 
procedural democracy, for the moderation of state authority and for the liberation of 
religion by normalizing its visibility in the public sphere while remaining within the 
confines of the regime.  
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